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Abstract 
 
Indian independence in August 1947 came through partition and the transfer of power 
to Congress. India inherited a region destabilised by this partition and an economy in 
desperate need of reconstruction and development. India also entered into a world 
fundamentally destabilised by the end of the Second World War, the onset of the Cold War 
and the re-imposition of European colonial authority in Southeast Asia. Within this context 
and in an attempt to disassociate India’s international approach from that of the Raj, Nehru 
espoused the two main pillars of India’s foreign policy as neutralism and anti-colonialism. 
However, through the selected case studies and employing archival materials from India, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, this research challenges the existing monolithic 
notions of both neutralism and anti-colonialism that dominate studies of India’s external 
affairs. The case studies are as follows: the external implications of the transfer of power, 
Indonesia’s freedom struggle, Indian entry into the Commonwealth and Sterling Area, the 
Malayan Emergency, the Colombo Plan and Gurkha recruitment. Together they expose and 
explore several key themes: India’s imperial transition and legacy, the Cold War and 
colonialism/decolonisation in Southeast Asia, external affairs and national identity, and 
India’s nascent relationship with a Communist China. Also, and fundamentally important, 
was India’s need for economic development and how this affected its policies in South and 
Southeast Asia, for example development as the answer to Communism, and its relationship 
with the UK, its empire and the Commonwealth. This thesis provides a nuanced analysis of 
the first years of Indian independence that fills silences in the existing narrative and 
historiography that emphasise an idealistic and morally governed foreign policy. Through the 
following examination it is possible to recast India as a key Cold War player in South and 
Southeast Asia that balanced its national interest with the need to publically adhere to its 
espoused foreign policy principles. 
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India from Colony to Nation-State: A Re-Reading of India’s Foreign 
Policy in Southeast Asia, c.1945-1955 
 
1) Introduction 
India achieved independence in August 1947 after 200 years of British 
domination ended with partition and the transfer of power to the Congress Party. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister, inherited the colonial administrative 
structure, the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and a two-thirds proportion of the Indian 
Army. However, India also inherited a region destabilised by partition and conflict 
over a disputed Kashmir and an economy in desperate need of repair and 
development. Moreover, India entered a world fundamentally destabilised by the end 
of the Second World War, the onset of the Cold War conflict and the re-imposition of 
European colonial authority in Southeast Asia.1 Within this international system 
India positioned itself on the world stage as a new and potentially influential country. 
India, as a new state, with no established foreign policy (as this had been handled by 
the British) had to formulate and define its basic foreign policy principles ex nihilo. 
The new state, however, could not completely escape the confines of its geography 
and the legacy of British regional policy.2 India had myriad hurdles to overcome in 
the first years of independence and its domestic needs largely defined its responses 
to international events.  
This thesis, therefore, explores how Indian policy evolved and how it was 
                                               
1
 Christopher Bayly and Timothy Harper, Forgotten Armies: Britain’s Asian Empire and the War with 
Japan (London, 2005), this is one of the most incisive and comprehensive introductory accounts of 
the political and social aspects of the war in South and Southeast Asia. Bayly and Harper manage to 
weave multiple individual stories into a meta-narrative that provides an overview of the region in the 
1940s and 1950s. For an account with an emphasis on the United States (hereafter US) and the end of 
the Pacific war see Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle 
for Postwar Asia (New York, 2008) and for an account that says nothing new but provides a concise 
overview see, Jost Dülffer, ‘The Impact of World War II on Decolonization’, in M. Frey, R.W. 
Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives of 
Decolonisation (New York, 2003), pp. 23-34.   
2
 For example India stepped in to the role that the British had played in Nepal as Lord Curzon’s buffer 
policy also served the needs to protecting the territory of the independent state. 
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applied in practice in light of both global and domestic developments. The chosen 
case studies analyse India’s external affairs in relation to parts of Southeast Asia in 
the context of the early Cold War and decolonisation. In this way, it is possible to 
chart India’s integral role in the Asian Cold War that has until now largely only been 
addressed in order to chart the roots of the Bandung Conference and the formal 
declaration of the Non-Alignment movement. Furthermore, the thesis addresses how 
Nehru and his government presented foreign policy to the Indian public and to what 
extent Indian foreign policy was constrained by public expectations, and, 
importantly, to what extent domestic political imperatives influenced foreign policy. 
The case studies enable an examination of episodes in India’s foreign policy that 
have either been neglected in the existing literature, or are in need of re-evaluation 
and as such can contribute to our overall understanding of India’s foreign policy. 
Southeast Asia is the geographical focus of this thesis, but this is not an area or 
regional history and does not purport to cover the whole of Southeast Asia.  
In September 1946, Nehru, as head of the Interim Government, announced 
the embryonic underpinning features of India’s foreign policy when he broadcast to 
the population that ‘we propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power 
politics of groups, aligned against one another, which had led in the past to two 
world wars and which may lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.’3 Moreover, 
Nehru announced that an opposition to colonialism and the protection of Indians 
abroad would be two of India’s aims and guiding principles. Nehru hoped to achieve 
these goals not through military strength, but through the use of diplomacy based on 
India’s moral, non-violent characteristics, which he claimed derived from the 
teachings of Buddha and were most recently personified in M.K. Gandhi.4 This 
announcement has consequently informed all accounts of Indian foreign policy, and 
it is in the effort to execute these foreign policy aims that this thesis is concerned. 
The importance of these first years of independence need to be stressed to expose the 
nuances of India’s foreign policy. However, the aim of the work is not to attempt to 
re-define neutralism/non-alignment, as much ink has already been spilled in the 
                                               
3 G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London, 1966), p. 116. 
4
 See the article, published under the auspices of the Government of India (hereafter G.O.I.) by 
Vijayalakshmi Pandit for a succinct examination of these historical influences, ‘India’s Foreign 
Policy’, Foreign Affairs 34 (1955/56), pp. 432-40. 
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pursuit of this, but rather to examine how a professed neutralism actually operated in 
the cases examined. Bandung is often cited as the apogee, the defining moment of 
India’s international achievements for its part in the emergence of the Third World 
and the birth of the non-aligned movement, and although its myths are now being 
challenged, this thesis looks at the nuances in India’s foreign policy.5 Rather than 
seeking to chart the path to Bandung, or having Bandung’s shadow projected back, 
this research focuses on the context of India’s relations in the first years after 
independence.   
 With the two key basic features of India’s foreign policy of non-alignment or 
neutralism and anti-colonialism noted, it is necessary to take account of the 
determinants that informed and exerted an influence over Nehru’s foreign policy. At 
independence India was a country that had been ravaged by the economic impact of 
the Second World War, and was struggling to recover from crippling inflation and 
acute shortages.6 Furthermore, India was predominantly agrarian, with only some 
2% of the total workforce employed in factories in 1947.7 Moreover, to compound 
the difficulty of a small industrial base, in 1947 just two products, jute and cotton, 
represented over 30% of the total industrial output.8  
The Indian population, 381 million in 1947, despite periodic shocks from 
famine and disease, continued to grow at a pace described by Dietmar Rothermund 
as a parabolic ascent, which strained already limited agricultural production.9 At 
independence the G.O.I. faced the immediate task of controlling price inflation and 
providing sufficient food for its ever-growing population. India had recent and bitter 
experiences with food shortages: as chaos swept through Asia in 1942-1943, the 
                                               
5
 For a prime example of the orthodox handling of Bandung see, Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: 
A People's History of the Third World A New Press People's History (New York and London, 2007). 
For a most perspicacious examination of Bandung see the 1966 work by the journalist G.H. Jansen, 
Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London, 1966).  
6
 See the War Cabinet’s Report of the Committee on Indian Financial Questions, WP (44) 398, 
19/7/1944, CAB 66/52/48. 
7
 B.R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970, Volume 3 The New Cambridge History 
of India (Cambridge, 1996), p. 95. For studies of India’s Economy in the twentieth century see, P.J.  
Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (Second edn, London, 2002), Dietmar 
Rothermund, An Economic History of India: From Pre-Colonial times to 1997 (Second edn, London, 
1993). 
8
 Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970, p. 95. 
9
 Production was largely limited by a combination of lack of irrigation, lack of machinery and the 
relatively small size of most holdings. Rothermund, An Economic History of India, p. 173. 
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supplies of rice to India dried up and as India was dependent on imports of rice there 
were acute shortages resulting in the Bengal famine.10 This experience reinforced the 
need to increase domestic production of rice, but in the short term it was crucial that 
rice supplies from elsewhere in Asia continued, which dictated that international, and 
at the least, regional stability was essential. With the threat of inadequate food 
supplies from Southeast Asia, the G.O.I. was faced with heavy expenditures for food 
from other areas, which often involved large amounts of scarce hard currency.11 
The industrial development of India was a key aim of Indian nationalists, 
who blamed the British for deliberately retarding industrial growth and draining 
India’s wealth during the years of the Raj.12 According to Nehru, the key proponent 
of planning, India’s crushing poverty would be best solved by a commitment to 
democratic social transformation as the integral part of India’s economic strategy.13 
Development, for Nehru, was the key to freeing the people from the grip of poverty 
and communalism and was an integral part of the creation of a modern nation-state 
in the place of colonial India.14 As parts of Southeast Asia were in the throes of 
unrest, moreover, India was subject to uprisings under Communist Party of India 
                                               
10
 It is not necessary to enter into the Failure Exchange Entitlement (FEE) -Food Availability Decline 
(FAD) debate here, but it is clear that decline in rice imports from Japanese occupied Asia contributed 
to FEE, see Sen for his groundbreaking argument that the famine was not the result of an over-all 
shortage of food grains, Amartya K. Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and 
Deprivation (Oxford, 1981), p. 63. For debate on the issues see Omkar Goswami, ʻThe Bengal 
Famine of 1943: Re-Examining the Dataʼ, The Indian Economic and Social History Review 27 
(1990), p. 445-63, Paul R. Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 
1943–44 (New York, 1982), M. Mufakharul Islam, ʻThe Great Bengal Famine and the Question of 
FAD Yet againʼ, Modern Asian Studies 41 (2007) and Sugata Bose, ʻStarvation Amidst Plenty: The 
Making of Famine in Bengal, Honan and Tonkin, 1942-1945ʼ, Modern Asian Studies 24 (1990), p. 
699-727.  
11
 See Nehru’s letter of 7/1/1949 on the dollar situation and food imports in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, Volume 1, 1947-1949 (New Delhi, 1985), 
pp. 258-259. In response to this dual problem the G.O.I. reinvigorated a ‘Grow More Food Campaign’ 
in 1949. Nehru reported to his Chief Minister in March 1949 that the Government had resolved to 
eliminate the food deficit within two years, letter 9/3/1949 in ibid., p. 300. 
12
 See Rothermund, An Economic History of India, pp. 132-133. Accusations of conscience economic 
retardation and wealth draining perpetrated by the British formed some of the first and most sustained 
attacks against colonialism in India, see Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule (London, 
1901) and R.C. Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age (London, 1906). 
13
 Nehru in Interview with R.K. Karanjia, The Mind of Mr. Nehru: An Interview, cited in Francine R. 
Frankel, Indiaʼs Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution (Guilford, 1978), p. 3. 
14
 For accounts of the origins and debates on development in India see, Benjamin Zachariah, 
Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, c.1930-50 (New Delhi, 2005); Frankel, Indiaʼs 
Political Economy, 1947-1977 (Guilford, 1978); Medha Kudaisya, ʻ“A Mighty Adventure” 
Institutionalising the Idea of Planning in Post-Colonial India, 1947-60ʼ, Modern Asian Studies 43 
(2009), pp. 939-78 and Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970. 
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(CPI) leadership which were believed to be on orders from Moscow.15 What needs to 
be ascertained is to what extent, if any, these events had an effect on Nehru’s 
opinions of the Malayan Emergency and developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia 
and in China. In essence, we need to chart the impact that domestic developments 
had on external affairs and vice versa. 
The fruits of industrial development would also free India from dependence 
on capital goods and manufactured goods imports, but to achieve this measure of 
self-sufficiency it was necessary, in the short term, to import large quantities of 
capital goods and technical assistance. This largely dictated that India remain within 
the Sterling Area (a trading bloc based on completing transactions in sterling)  in 
order to secure the import of sufficient capital goods and releases of dollars from the 
Area dollar pool. The existing literature has begun to address the question of the 
importance of economic development to Indian foreign policy; however, few authors 
go any further than stating that India required development aid, as a basic 
determinant, and linking this fact to their arguments on non-alignment, the so-called 
suckling two cows argument.16  This research tackles this suckling argument by 
asserting that in the years under discussion, especially the 1940s, India only had one 
cow to suckle from, the West, and it was through employing the fear of India and 
Southeast Asia falling prey to and not joining the Soviet camp that India attempted to 
extract economic assistance from the United Kingdom (hereafter UK) in particular, 
but also the US. Underpinning all of India’s foreign policy ventures was the need for 
both domestic and international peace and stability for economic recovery and 
growth as envisaged in Nehruvian developmental planning. India’s struggle to 
control inflation, moreover, sharpened Nehru’s aversion to the economic impacts of 
war. Nehru later elucidated his fear in reference to American production for the 
                                               
15
 For Nehruʼs thoughts that Moscow used Calcutta to direct the Communist Party of India see, letter 
dated 7/11/1948 in S. Gopal (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 8 
(New Delhi, 1989), p. 301. 
16
 The suckling argument was first made by Michal Kalecki, see, ʻObservations on Social and 
Economic aspects of “Intermediate Regimes”ʼ, in Jerzy Osiatynski (ed.), Collected Works of Michal 
Kalecki: Volume V: Developing Economies (Oxford, 1993), pp. 6-12. A. Appadorai, The Domestic 
Roots of Indiaʼs Foreign Policy (New York, 1981); Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography 
(London, 1959); Judith M. Brown, Nerhu: A Political Life (Yale, 2003); Werner Levi, ‘India Debates 
Foreign Policy’, Far Eastern Survey 20 (1951), pp. 49-52; K.R. Narayanan, ‘Foreign Policy’, in Jag 
Mohan (ed.), Twenty-Five Years of Indian Independence (New Delhi, 1973), pp. 74-86 and Lawrence 
K. Rosinger, ‘India in World Politics’, Far Eastern Survey 18 (1949), pp. 229-33. 
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Korean War that ‘Inflationary tendencies will be more and more marked all over the 
world. The US will buy up raw materials in all parts of the world and pay heavily for 
it. Thus prices will go up and will affect India too.’17 Nehru continued this theme in 
explicitly linking the issues of rearmament, inflation and development goods, and 
argued that ‘In the economic sphere this [rearmament] means very heavy armament 
expenditure and all raw materials necessary for it will be sucked into the war 
machine. This will result in much higher prices and inflation. It will also result in 
capital goods not being available to us or to countries similarly situated.’18 
An Indian commitment to anti-colonialism was one of the clearest examples 
of impact of the historical legacy of colonialism on its foreign policy, and is first 
seen in the actions taken against Dutch colonialism in Indonesia.19 Anti-colonialism 
co-existed with Nehru’s belief that Asian nationalisms could be the answer to 
Communist subversion, and emphasised the importance of nationalism as a key 
defence against subversion.20 But Nehru himself recognised the interwoven nature of 
Communism and colonialism when, in guidelines for a meeting of the United 
Nations (hereafter UN) General Assembly, he asserted that ‘The Communist 
movements and revolts in South East Asia are so tied up with the movements for 
independence that it is difficult to separate them.’21 
Anti-colonialism and an aversion racism, two of the idealsitic pillars of 
Indian foreign policy, were, as Maxwell argues, born from India’s recent history, but 
the continuation of these messages also served to continue the Congress message in 
the post-independence period.22 The recent history and cultural heritage provided a 
base to external affairs in so much as the foreign policy of any country has to be 
acceptable to the general populace and the political elite. Therefore, it has to be 
                                               
17
 G. Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, Volume 2, 1950-
1952 (New Delhi, 1985), dated 31/12/1950, pp. 302-3. 
18
 Letter dated 1/2/1951 in ibid., p.321, and Nehru reiterates his point again on the 21/4/1951, pp. 376-
77 and again on the 18/2/1952, p. 568.  
19
 The definition of colonial power becomes more ambiguous with the Soviet domination over Eastern 
Europe that Nehru refused to define as imperial since the countries had their own seats at the UN. 
20
 Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American 
Relationship, 1947-56 (London, 1993), p. 65. 
21
 Nehru, 12/9/1948, cited in Gopal (ed.), S. Gopal (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second 
Series, Volume 7 (New Delhi, 1988), p. 611.  
22
 Neville Maxwell, ‘Reconsiderations, Jawaharlal Nehru: Of Pride and Principle’, Foreign Affairs 52 
(1974), p. 633. 
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based at least in some part on the alleged norms and accepted values of the country.23 
Domestic imperatives and experiences link to the issue of what impact the project of 
nation-building had on India’s foreign affairs, and to what degree there was an 
attempt to unite the country and to help create a sense of nationhood behind external 
affairs when the rallying call of the freedom movement was no longer applicable, 
and thus to a certain extent the espousal of these aims of neutralism and anti-
colonialism served a rhetorical purpose. The Congress Party was the dominant 
political force within India, but it faced opposition from the CPI and from the 
socialists that had broken away from Congress. Both of these bodies mounted severe 
criticism of Nehru, both in the press and in the Constituent Assembly; moreover, 
Nehru also faced questions from within his own Congress Party.24 
The G.O.I. was anxious to disassociate independent India’s foreign policy 
from that of the Raj at the same time as maintaining the central tenets of the 
Congress platform.25 Authority in a newly independent state derives partly from the 
leaders’ role in the independence struggle, and in Nehru’s case this was only 
amplified with the death of Gandhi in January 1948 and then Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel in 1950.26 Any infringement or suspicion of infringement of Indian sovereignty 
was unacceptable to the populace or the elite as a whole, and thus Nehru had to be 
overly cautious in his relations with outside powers lest there be an opportunity for 
accusations of impinged independence in foreign affairs.27 This is a contributory 
reason why in the press and in subsequent academic literature moral methods, 
neutralism and anti-colonialism are emphasised at the expense of calculations of 
power politics. 
The reality and responsibility of power and India’s dire economic situation 
                                               
23
 Nehru acknowledged as much in his guidelines to the Indian Delegation at the UN, see ‘Basic 
Principles: Guidelines for Upcoming UN General Assembly, 12/9/1948, in Gopal (ed.), SWJN, 
Volume 7, pp. 609-610.  
24
 For the period 1946-1950, the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly provide a narrative for this 
debate and criticism. 
25
 Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London, 2004), p. 157. 
26
 See Paul R. Brass, ‘Patel, Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai (1875/6–1950)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35403, accessed 2 
March 2010]. 
27
 In this thesis public opinion is gauged through newspaper reports, through questions at public 
meetings, through how the G.O.I. attempted to inform opinion with details of speeches and is 
crucially taken from the G.O.I.’s own appreciations of public opinion. 
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did much to moderate Nehru’s and the G.O.I.’s approach to international affairs, as 
did Southeast Asia’s chaotic post-war political situation leading to apprehension over 
Communist victory in China. Nehru balanced the demands placed on him by an 
expectant party and population to continue the Congress platform and policies 
abroad with the realities of power. Nehru was a firm believer in the virtues of anti-
colonialism, but he was also a realistic operator on the international stage, and he had 
to play by the exisitng rules to try to get things done. Exporting the message of anti-
colonialism abroad was also a way to reinforce Congressʼ domestic position, as 
exporting its normative values to the outside world demonstrated a certain sense of 
continuity from the pre- to the post-colonial periods, and as the UK’s High 
Commissioner, Archibald Nye described Nehru as the ‘external architect of New 
India.’28 
The Case Studies 
First, a few words are necessary on the scope of the project to delineate what 
the project is and what it is not pretending to be. India rarely makes an appearance in 
general historical studies of the Cold War in Southeast Asia for example in the 
recently-released Oxford History of Southeast Asia in World History, or the 
Cambridge History of the Cold War.29 Moreover, the most notable recent addition to 
global Cold War studies, Odd Arne Westad’s, The Global Cold War pays scant 
attention to India.30 This research addresses this absence by presenting India as a key 
participant in the Cold War in Asia. This is not a narrative history of decolonisation 
in Southeast Asia, but contributes to its understanding by examining India’s role in 
various episodes. Nor is this work intended to be a bilateral history of the Indo-
British relationship, although it does contribute to the existing historiography which 
is dominated by attempts to chart the decline of the relationship.31 The emphasis on 
                                               
28
 Archibald Nye to CRO, Despatch No. 41, Ref. P/243, 9/9/1949, DO 142/479. 
29
 Craig A. Lockard, Southeast Asia in World History (Oxford, 2009); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne 
Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1, Origins (Cambridge, 2010). 
30
 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World and the Makings of our Times (Cambridge, 
2005). 
31
 The Indo-British connection was above all else a symbiotic one, in which each side attempted to 
secure the most from the other, and the most definite expression of this was the Commonwealth. The 
majority of the existing literature exists in an attempt to chart the decline of the Indo-British 
connection in economic terms with little reference to the wider relationship. Michael Lipton and John 
Firn produced an extensive piece of research, but the work  is focussed on the period from 1960 
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Britain arises from the dual fact that Britain was the pre-eminent power in the region 
in the period under discussion and was also India’s closest international relationship. 
Through an examination of these case studies, much is revealed about the exercise of 
Indian foreign policy in its first years of freedom in a region that has previously been 
neglected by the existing historiography.  
The first case study analyses foreign affairs in the context of the transfer of 
power, and the extent to which the ability to practise its own foreign policy was seen 
by the political elite and public as an integral part of independence and not simply as 
a symbol of it. Nehru and Congress fought to keep the international identity of 
British India as opposed to both India and Pakistan seceding from the Raj and so 
neither one having an existing international identity, even as the new state tried to 
distance itself from the imperialism of its predecessor whose international identity it 
claimed. The chapter also examines how India’s lack of a foreign service, a colonial 
legacy, strengthened Nehru’s personal control of foreign policy and how it increased 
the importance of personal contacts in the conduct of international relations.  
Rather than being a simple case of India supporting Asian nationalism, the 
next case study, the Indonesian nationalist movement for independence from the 
                                                                                                                                     
onwards, as the authors explained, ‘we are trying to explain the delayed but rapid erosion of what less 
than twenty years ago seemed a strong, stable and peacefully decolonised relationship’, see The 
Erosion of a Relationship: India and Britain since 1960 (London, 1975), p. 1, and for a very similar 
argument also see Michael Lipton, ‘Neither Partnership nor Dependence: Pre-Decolonisation, Inertia, 
Diversification and Para-Protectionism in Indo-British Relations since 1947’, in W.H Morris-Jones 
and G Fischer (eds), Decolonisation and After: The British and French Experience (London, 1980), 
pp. 158-192. In a similar vein, focussing on the economic components of the relationship, B.R. 
Tomlinson produced a short chapter on post-1947 Indo-British trade relations and the weakening of 
economic complementarities, see ʻImperial Power and Foreign Trade: Britain and India, 1900-1970ʼ, 
in Peter Mathias and John Davis (eds), The Nature of Industrialisation, Volume V, International Trade 
and British Economic Growth from the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day (Oxford, 1996), pp. 
146-162. This argument is extremely similar to that made by B.R. Tomlinson in, The Political 
Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947: The Economics Of Decolonisation in India (London, 1979). Debo 
Prasad Barooah, again focussed more on the detailing of facts and figures than on the implications for 
the relationship in practice, is the most comprehensive work from the subcontinent,  Indo-British 
Relations, 1950-1960 (New Delhi, 1977).  The work of Baudsev Chatterji is in part the 
counterbalance in asserting that, ‘On the eve of the Second World War…India remained an important 
asset on the economic balance sheets of British Imperialism’, see Trade, Tariffs and Empire: 
Lancashire and British Policy in India 1919-1939 (Oxford, 1992), p. 474. For further accounts of the 
Indo-British relationship see, A.K. Banerji, India and Britain, 1947-68: The Evolution of Post-
Colonial Relations (Calcutta, 1977); M. Lipton, ‘Growing Mountain, Shrinking Mouse? Indian 
Poverty and British Bilateral Aid’, Modern Asian Studies 30 (1996), pp. 481-522; Shri Ram Sharma, 
Indiaʼs Foreign Policy: The British Interpretations, 1947-57 (Gwalior, 1961) and Maurice Zinkin and 
Taya Zinkin, Britain and India: Requiem for Empire (London, 1964). 
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Netherlands, makes it possible to examine Nehru and India on the domestic and 
international stages bridging both pre- and post-independence. This chapter firmly 
places Indonesia within India’s own transfer of power, linking to the previous 
chapter, and explores the attitudes and actions of India regarding an independence 
movement. Moreover, the research examines the methods by which Nehru conducted 
relations with Britain and the US, and the pressure Nehru exerted upon them to bring 
the conflicts to an end through demonstrating how Nehru sought to set himself up as 
the voice of Asia when in dialogue with the UK and the US.   
The Malayan Emergency, the subject of the third chapter, and the first time 
that primary archival material from the Indian government has been employed, is an 
investigation of Indian attitudes towards a British colony, and towards a specifically 
Communist-directed anti-colonial rebellion in a country that was home to 
approximately 600,000 Indians.32 More importantly, Malaya supported the dollar 
earnings of the Sterling Area through its rubber and tin exports to the US, which, as 
India was a member of the Sterling Area, affected its very economic survival and 
development, a fact that was only reinforced by India’s wartime accumulated sterling 
balances.33 The balances not only provided a means to cover India’s balance of 
payments deficits, but also served as a pool of development capital; however, from 
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14 August 1947 the releases were determined by several sets of negotiations with 
Britain.34  
The existing literature addresses Malaya insofar as it states that Nehru was 
less severe towards the British than towards Dutch and French actions in the region. 
There are two aspects emphasised within this, one which asserts that Nehru did not 
view the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as a legitimate nationalist party.35 The 
other strand argues that criticism was restrained as Britain was the colonial power 
and because India was a member of the Commonwealth from 1949. Michael Brecher 
argues that Indian membership of the Commonwealth resulted in more restrained 
criticism of British colonial policies; S.N. Misra asserts that the Commonwealth link 
negatively affected India’s positive goals; whilst A.K. Banerji argues that it was 
because Britain treated her colonies humanely and that India was a member of the 
Commonwealth that saved her from a scolding; moreover, Sushil Chandra Singh 
argues that Nehru was far more interested in criticising the actions of other European 
powers because of the Commonwealth link.36 This existing body of work fails to 
develop the hypothesis that it proposes, but this thesis investigates why Nehru 
referred to the Malayan Communists as bandits and terrorists, India’s perception of 
what was happening in Malaya, and how it affected India’s material interests through 
regional security and the Sterling Area.37 This research argues that both Malaya and 
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Indian entry of the Commonwealth should however be seen as part of the same 
process as opposed to Indian moderation being a causal result of Commonwealth 
membership. However, the execution of Indians in Malaya was considered neither 
acceptable nor humane either by the G.O.I. or by the Indian press and public 
opinion.38  
The next two case studies are closely connected and demonstrate that in 
certain cases Indian foreign policy was above all else driven in the background by 
material considerations and to a certain extent the sterling balances: Indian entry into 
the Commonwealth and involvement in the Colombo Plan of 1950 for economic 
development in South and Southeast Asia. Several works address why Britain 
wished to retain India in the Commonwealth,39 but few ask why India, after two 
years of Dominion Status from 1947, remained within the Commonwealth40 and the 
majority of accounts from the Indian subcontinent fail to employ British sources and 
rely on statements from Nehru, both public and in the Lok Sabha as their main 
source base.41 Membership, negotiated in April-May 1949, was a key tenet of Indian 
foreign policy, partly dictated by the economic, military and diplomatic exigencies of 
being a newly independent state. This research demonstrates that to understand 
India’s actions, Commonwealth membership has to be placed within its international 
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context. The thesis also examines how membership was presented to a sceptical 
political elite and population.  
The scholarship on the Colombo Plan is largely the product of historians of 
foreign policy, overwhelmingly British foreign policy.42 As such there is a lack of 
scholarship examining both India’s role in the formulation of the plan and India’s 
rationale for participating in the plan; moreover, the existing scholarship fails to 
adequately examine the impact of the sterling balances on the development of Indian 
and British policy in South and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, there is little in the 
literature that suggests that British plans were actually driven by its involvement 
with India; whereas this research demonstrates Indian agency in the formulation of 
the Colombo Plan. 
The final case study again bridges the gap from pre- to post-independence in 
its analysis of Gurkha recruitment, its importance for India, Nepal and Britain in the 
context of accusations of betraying India’s anti-colonial roots and the spectre of 
China across the border. There is very little existing historiography on the Gurkhas 
outside the confines of military history, but this research demonstrates their domestic 
importance for Nepal, and how through debate about their continued recruitment 
Nehru was able to simultaneously satisfy the competing claims of Nepal, Britain and 
Indian public opinion. 
Historiographical Overview 
The detailed historiography of each case study is discussed in turn within the 
relevant chapters, but what is necessary here is an examination of the broad lines, the 
defining contours, of the general literature on India’s foreign policy. The existing 
accounts of Indian policy are largely determined by the source materials available 
which are examined below. Moreover, there is a lack of critical debates in the 
historiography, but one of the few examples is the highly-politicised case of the 
China War. 
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The literature is largely centred on the discussion of the concept of non-
alignment, resulting in a poverty of analysis of other aspects of India’s foreign 
policy, especially the nuances of anti-colonialism. Broadly speaking the general 
literature on Indian foreign policy can be divided into three groups: those that argue 
that India’s foreign policy was based on a realistic calculation of India’s position and 
the international environment; those that argue that India’s foreign policy was 
realistic but also based to a certain degree on idealistic assumptions and principles 
based mainly on India’s past experience as a colony; and lastly those that argue that 
India’s foreign affairs were directed by principles and ideals alone.  
E. Malcolm Hause, in 1960, entered the debate over the key determinants in 
Indian foreign policy by arguing that Indian foreign policy was based on the 
principles of Panchsila. The five principles are listed as mutual respect for each 
other’s territory and sovereignty, mutual non-intervention in internal affairs, equality 
of mutual benefit, mutual non-aggression and peaceful co-existence.43 These in turn 
were based on the ‘deep-rooted historical traditions and memories which are 
embodied in a philosophical and spiritual nonmaterialism.’44 Significantly, Hause 
fails to acknowledge that material factors played any significant role in the 
formulation of India’s policy, and instead relies on a reading of India’s past to 
explain the present. Hause, bordering on the hagiographical, as much writing on 
Indian foreign policy does, continues that, ‘these concepts not only gave Nehru the 
courage to stand alone, and the feeling of security when he does stand alone, but they 
virtually give him no other choice that to chart an independent course in world 
affairs.’45 The only concession that Hause makes to material determinants is that he 
argues that ‘to avoid the charge of showing favouritism to either the East or the West, 
Nehru has extended his political policy of nonalignment to the economic sphere, thus 
allowing himself freedom to accept assistance of all kinds, anywhere, if the terms are 
acceptable.’46 Hause, therefore, suggests that the material calculation was simply an 
afterthought in the formulation of Nehru’s foreign policy. Not only does Hause fail to 
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test his hypothesis, but, following the bulk of literature, he employs a limited source 
base and fails to utilise government archives. 
Similarly, A.P. Rana, in 1969, attempted to explain India’s adherence to non-
alignment as a security policy by tracing its intellectual and idealistic roots. The 
paper focuses on the influence of Gandhi on policy formation and argues that 
‘Gandhi’s influence on India’s international relations was pervasive and can best be 
ascribed to a kind of diffusion of the elements of his personality through Nehru’s 
psyche.’47  The Gandhian approach, argues Rana, with the ideal of non-violence and 
non-coercion, made Nehru recoil from power politics that defined the existing 
system and its resulting conflicts. For Rana internationalism, in the form of non-
alignment, was the result of this influence on Nehru; moreover, he argues that the 
national interests were identified with an international society of states.48 In addition, 
Rana removes non-alignment from its Cold War context and argues that the policy 
had an identifiable identity before the emergence of the conflict. 
B.R. Nanda has released several works on Indian foreign policy and in 1990 
argued that the two planks of Indian foreign policy, the liberation of colonies and the 
promotion of peace, resulted from a hatred of colonialism and war, and thus 
historical circumstances in a similar fashion to Narayanan in 1973.49 Furthermore, 
Nanda argued that the ability of India to pursue an independent course in its external 
relations and to spurn the advantages of association with the West was due to 
Nehru’s ‘clear eyed appreciation of the post-war situation in its historical context.’50 
Nanda explicitly argues that Nehru did not take India into non-alignment based on 
calculations of national interest in securing materials and aid, and he argues that ‘In 
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1947-49 when India unfurled the banner of non-alignment it seemed neither the best 
way of ensuring her national security nor of obtaining economic aid.’51  
Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, elaborated the idealistic aspects, both 
roots and aims, of Indian foreign policy by arguing that neutrality was an approach 
to peace that was not new, but that was based on ‘her traditional outlook, both 
philosophical and historical.’52 Tracing these roots back some 2600 years to 
Gautama Buddha and the emperor Asoka some 2300 years ago, Pandit sets up a 
tradition of peaceful conduct and positions Gandhi as the modern interpreter of these 
traditional approaches.53 In this way Pandit overtly links foreign policy with the 
teachings of Gandhi, linking to the work of Rana, and exposing the wishes of the 
Indian Government to link their foreign policy to the legacy of Gandhi.  
Making the case for a largely pragmatic and realistic foreign policy, Werner 
Levi described Nehru as a realist who knew that the primary aim of foreign policy 
was the survival of the state.54 Lawrence K. Rosinger, in a similar approach to both 
A. Appadorai and Michael Brecher,55 also highlighted this theme of independence in 
foreign affairs, but Rosinger takes account of the fact that Nehru argued that foreign 
policy was ultimately the outcome of economic policy and that until the economy 
had developed properly then the general course abroad would tend to be vague and 
groping.56 This line of thought has been somewhat neglected in more recent 
accounts, but it raises the crucial point that India’s policy was developing in these 
early years. Rosinger further argues that the factors determining India’s foreign 
policy were in large part decided by the conditions under which India became 
independent; these include strong remaining ties with Britain, a geographical 
separation from the USSR and a level of dependence on the US.57 This combination 
allowed Indian leaders time to make up their minds on foreign policy; time that was 
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anxiously sought to allow India to repair its economy. Furthermore, Rosinger asserts 
that taking an independent stance may well have increased India’s bargaining power 
abroad for foreign assistance.  
Prior to Levi, Appadorai surveyed Indian foreign policy as it stood in 1948 
based on public statements and newspaper reports. Appadorai identified the key 
tenets of Indian foreign policy as follows: keeping away from power blocs; working 
with others for international co-operation and goodwill; upholding the principles of 
self-determination for subjugated peoples, especially Asians; fostering good relations 
with its neighbours and maintaining that the presence of Europeans in Asia was an 
insult.58 The vast majority of accounts of Indian foreign policy are based on this 
combination of aims.59 Appadorai continued to ask if maintaining this kind of 
independent foreign policy was possible, which he argued is only answerable by 
seeking a three-fold analysis of the Indian National Congress, the complexity of 
present day problems and looking at the economic and military position of India.60 
What follows is a comprehensive, if somewhat short, analysis that allowed 
Appadorai to interpret the three main considerations of India’s foreign policy: whole 
hearted co-operation with the UN, non-alignment and upholding the weak and 
oppressed nations.61 Appadorai maintains that India was so keen on international co-
operation and collective security because of its belief that settling disputes by war 
was unjust, and because peace was essential for internal reconstruction, which he 
argues ‘illustrates…the blend of two factors which govern India’s foreign policy- 
enlightened self-interest guided by justice.’62 With regards to subject peoples, 
Appadorai is less forthcoming with his analysis and argues that India’s own recent 
history determined this stance. Although Appadorai’s analysis is brief, it identifies 
the themes in Indian foreign policy that frame the subsequent literature. 
One of the most cogent accounts emphasising both the material determinants 
of Indian foreign policy and the idealistic and moral aspects is Brecher’s 1959 
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biography of Nehru in which he argues that ‘Indian views on international affairs 
may be traced to many sources, some traditional, others contemporary.’63 The 
experiences of colonialism and racialism played an important part in moulding 
attitudes, as did the proximity of two powerful Communist neighbours in the form of 
Russia and China.64 But for Brecher, the key to India’s foreign policy was the need 
for economic development, which determined that aid was required from all 
available sources and suggested that global peace was essential. In conclusion, he 
wrote that ‘Indeed, all other factors which shape India’s world-view are subordinate 
to this consideration.’65  
India’s world-view in turn shaped her foreign policy, which Brecher argued 
consisted of the following pillars: anti-colonialism, anti-racism, non-alignment, a 
recognition of Asia’s importance, mediation in international tensions and a third 
force of non-aligned nations.66 Brecher and Appadorai represent the middle ground 
between interpretations that favour an idealistic or a realistic foreign policy, a 
position to which many adhere with varying degrees of emphasis on the balance of 
idealistic and material or realistic factors.67 Both of these accounts also demonstrate 
the use of the main source materials for accounts on Indian foreign policy: 
newspaper articles, public statements and broadcasts and parliamentary debates. This 
work adds to this existing historiography by examining the interplay between the 
espoused guiding principles of Indian foreign policy and the somewhat differing 
reality of Indian actions in certain cases. 
The main themes of Indian policy, argues Judith M. Brown, were beginning 
to crystallise by the end of 1948; she highlights that the policy would be an 
independent one, it would pursue world peace, it would also combat racism and 
imperialism, but it would also work for a revival of Asia.68 Brown concurs with 
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Brecher in that geography heavily influenced India’s policy outlook: she needed to 
build bridges with both Pakistan and China; it was at the centre of Asia and thus 
involved the US and Britain. Brown argues that non-alignment was not neutrality at 
all, but it was a stance that left India free to judge issues on their merits and in 
relation to India’s interests.69 These interests, somewhat inadequately analysed in the 
biography, reinforced a policy of pragmatic responses to foreign issues and a stance 
of non-alignment, and in Brown’s view Indian foreign policy was an intertwining of 
idealism, pragmatism and self-interest: this thesis charts this intertwining.70 
K.R. Narayanan maintains that the foreign policy devised by Nehru was the 
result of historical circumstances.71 Echoing Appadorai in 1948, Narayanan asserts 
that foreign policy was not defined by idealism or internationalism, nor was it 
defined by the pursuit of national interests, but it was defined by the continuous 
endeavour to reconcile and bring into line with each other these two sets of 
considerations.72 Following Narayan, but moving closer to an analysis based solely 
on the idealistic aspects, on this key issue of idealism versus realism P.N. Masaldan 
argues that:  
He [Nehru] was conscious of the duty of every national leader and 
government to protect the country’s national interest. But Nehru’s broad 
outlook, his wide perspective, and his sense not only of history but also of 
future developments in the world, made him usually interpret the national 
interest in a manner that did not conflict with his high principles of 
internationalism and humanism.73 
Though Masaldan fails to present a detailed picture of what he takes to be the 
national interest, his argument suggests little tension existed between achieving the 
national interest and maintaining certain principles, whereas this thesis explores 
tensions between the two. Masaldan’s analysis has to be questioned, however, when 
he slips into the realms of hagiography writing that criticisms of Nehru ‘do not 
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detract much from the greatness of Nehru’s ideas and the magnificence of his 
principles.’74  
The main lines of argument have changed little from the first accounts of 
India’s foreign policy emerged in the form of contemporary commentary in the late 
1940s. As late as 2009, Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi argued that ‘India’s 
policymakers chose, quite deliberately, to ignore systemic constraints and decided to 
pursue an explicitly ideational foreign policy with mostly disastrous 
consequences.’75 The recent Routledge Handbook on South Asian Politics follows 
similar lines of argument: ‘more geographically cohesive, less traumatised by 
partition, and less hamstrung by its own internal security concerns, India’s political 
leaders were able to initially articulate a foreign policy premised less on survival 
than on an ideological commitment to internationalism, nonalignment, and an active 
solidarity with colonial peoples.’76 What these accounts assume is a mythical 
freedom that the G.O.I. was able to formulate its policies within a vacuum, as 
opposed to in reaction to both its domestic needs and the state of international 
affairs, as this research demonstrates.    
Indian foreign policy found its roots in the legacy of colonialism and the 
idealistic concepts formed by the leaders of India, and, although these factors 
influenced Nehru and the G.O.I., the defence of India and the furtherance of the 
national interest were the paramount determinants in India’s foreign affairs. Nehru’s 
own thoughts on the construction of foreign policy can be summarised as such: ‘A 
policy must be in keeping with the traditional background and temper of the country. 
It should be idealistic…and…realistic.  If it is not idealistic, it becomes one of sheer 
opportunism; if it is not realistic, then it is likely to be adventurist and wholly 
ineffective.’77 Nehru was an idealist, yes, but also a realist who with the moderation 
of responsibility on assuming independence placed India’s material interests at the 
core of his diplomacy, though he never let the core guiding principles of Indian 
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foreign policy be forgotten. Through the examination of the selected case studies this 
thesis provides in-depth studies to fill in some of the silences in India’s foreign 
policy and as such contributes to the existing general history of Indian foreign policy.  
 
Sources 
The absence of government archival materials in much of the existing 
historiography encourages a following of the line propagated by the G.O.I. in its first 
years of power. This work is not an attempt to deify the governmental archive above 
any other source material, but rather to integrate the valuable information in foreign 
repositories with that available in Indian archives.  The source base for the vast 
majority of accounts on Indian foreign policy from the subcontinent consists of a 
narrow range of materials from public statements by Nehru and other senior 
politicians, parliamentary debates, newspaper reports and more recently edited 
volumes of collected documents and has fundamentally affected the existing 
historiography.78 Few examples better serve to illustrate the propensity for relying on 
public statements, particularly Nehru’s, as a record of Indian foreign policy than the 
following preface to a collection of Nehru’s speeches published by the Indian 
Ministry of Information:  
This volume was designed to meet the need for finding in one place the 
main lines of India’s foreign policy. No better method could be adopted 
than to present it in the words of the one who was the country’s principal 
spokesman.79 
Public statements and speeches, most often transmitted via the radio and 
through newspapers, formed and still form the basic evidence for the study of India’s 
foreign policy, and continue to inform the very basic understanding of India’s foreign 
policy and its study. This reliance, however, obfuscates many of the nuances of 
India’s foreign affairs, and there is little acknowledgement of the domestic audience, 
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or in fact the foreign audiences, for which public statements were produced. Thus, 
what is needed is an account of Indian foreign policy that integrates this acceptance 
of public statements more as rhetoric with an analysis of why these public statements 
were produced and their domestic significance in the legitimisation of Congress and 
the Indian state.  
Debates from the Constituent Assembly, 1946-1950, and thereafter from the 
Lok Sabha, provide a way of assessing the political dialogue of the disagreements 
and criticisms of Nehru’s foreign policy.80 These aforementioned materials are 
valuable in the sense that they reveal what was not being said in parliament and 
public as much as they communicate what was said, but less so for constructing a 
comprehensive narrative. This can be remedied, however, by the Far Eastern Survey 
and Pacific Affairs which both provide an excellent and invaluable collection of 
contemporary analyses of the events in South and Southeast Asia. The Statesman 
(Calcutta) also offers an excellent contemporary analysis of events. 
The Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN) provide us with a limited 
record of Nehru’s correspondence; there are two problems, however, with this 
resource apart from the fact that it is very heavily edited having been published 
under auspices of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), the guardians 
of Nehru’s papers. First, there is a heavy emphasis on domestic affairs, and secondly 
the volumes consist only of outgoing correspondence, and are thus devoid of the 
context of the discourse in which the communications were produced. Despite 
footnotes that seek to provide parts of the missing side of the conversation, the 
reader has no reference to the tone, purpose, details of previous letters and has to rely 
on a reading of Nehru’s response.81 This problem can be overcome, to a certain 
degree, by employing foreign archives to fill in the silences.  
A problem with the existing historiography is the fact that the majority of 
researchers rely on what these statements say at face value, and fail to interrogate 
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their sources. Public statements, and Nehru’s in particular, are often taken as true 
reflections of policy and intentions, so are parliamentary debates and statements. 
Moreover, there is little account taken of the audience, but as Ton That Thien 
suggests, we should be concerned with ‘India’s deeds rather than with her words.’82 
Further light is shed by the British High Commissioner warning London that many 
of Nehru’s speeches were delivered extempore, more akin to thinking aloud than a 
detailed exposition of India’s direction in world affairs, and that Whitehall should not 
place too much emphasis on such statements.83  
The reason for this reliance on certain materials is the relative inaccessibility 
of Indian government archives. The Ministry of External Affairs (MoEA) retains 
possession of the bulk of its records from 1947, there is no effective 30 year rule and 
the 2005 Right to Information Act further tightened the restrictions over the release 
of materials.84 Without any systematic transfer of materials, there is, as Zins and 
Boquerat argue, ‘a veil of secrecy in India that other major democratic countries 
lifted long ago.’85 This secrecy, which only applies to the post-1947 period, is further 
compounded by the fact that Nehru’s own papers, both as Prime Minister and as 
Minister of external affairs, remain the possession of the Gandhi family under lock 
and key at NMML in New Delhi.86 Nehru’s descendants rarely grant access to the 
post-1947 papers and in most cases access is granted for official publications only, 
further reinforcing the reliance on the SWJN.  
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Few historians acknowledge or address this absence, make comment or 
explore the implications of relying on public statements for the study of Indian 
foreign policy. One of the few historians to acknowledge actively the difficulty of 
accessing Indian government sources is Robert J. McMahon in his examination of 
the US wheat loan to India in 1951.87 In response to this limited access to materials, 
the foreign archive becomes a most useful repository of documents with which to 
examine Indian foreign policy, a process that Zins and Boquerat describe as using the 
foreign diplomatic archive as a mirror.88 This approach is in itself replete with 
questions of reliability, but it does allow the researcher an additional source of 
documentary evidence. However, as Zins and Boquerat argue, foreign archives 
cannot be taken as a direct reflection of India’s external policy since this would lead 
to a one dimensioned image of reality.89 It is with this problem in mind that one must 
approach the use of foreign diplomatic sources. However many continue to rely on 
public statements without fully interrogating such sources; for example, Dennis 
Merrill wrote that ‘Indian Government restrictions limited access to official files and 
manuscript collections for the years after 1946, but published government reports 
were made readily available.’90 Merrill fails to ask why the Government reports were 
published in the first instance, and fundamentally takes them at face value rather than 
interrogating their production and purpose. 
This thesis employs various materials from India, Britain and the US. Despite 
the restrictions noted above, the MoEA have released some records to the National 
Archives of India (NAI) and they represent an invaluable source of primary 
documents. Little has been released on the issue of the Commonwealth decision, the 
Colombo Plan, or Indonesia, but there is some information on the Malayan 
Emergency.91 These are utilised in conjunction with material from newspapers, 
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public statements and edited series of documents including the Letters to Chief 
Ministers series and the SWJN. Nehru’s letters to the Chief Ministers provides a 
narrative of events constructed by Nehru at fortnightly intervals.92 These letters not 
only provide another source with which to build an understanding of Nehru’s view, 
but they also reveals how important he considered international affairs to be in the 
new Indian state by his assiduous reporting of international events and India’s 
responses to Provincial Governments that had no role in foreign affairs.93 
From the UK, the materials available at the National Archives in Kew are 
used extensively, and in particular files from the Commonwealth Relations Office 
(CRO). The files of the High Commission in New Delhi are used to provide a record 
of official communications between Britain and India, but also informal 
communications in the form of personal conversations and meetings. In addition, I 
have made several successful requests under the Freedom of Information Act, 
although certain files remain closed as they contain information pertaining to the 
ongoing situation over Kashmir, and have utilised newly-released files on the 
Gurkhas.94 This research, moreover, augments the departmental records with the 
private papers of, amongst others Chakravarti Rajagopalachari and Stafford Cripps.  
By integrating public statement sources and edited collections, reading them with a 
                                                                                                                                     
the files that I attempted to view: Indonesian Affairs, 114-F.E.A, Vol.II, 1946; Asian Conference on 
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critical eye, alongside materials from the NAI and foreign archives, this thesis 
demonstrates aspects of India’s foreign policies that have until now been overlooked.  
As can be seen from the above introduction, previous studies of India’s early 
foreign policy, whilst providing erudite studies of certain topics, have failed to fully 
explore Indian external affairs in the early years of the Cold War in relation to 
Southeast Asia and nationalist movements, the Indo-British relationship, or the 
impact of material and domestic factors, including popular opinion, on the 
formulation and execution of Indian policy. Through re-examining the early years of 
India’s independence, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of India’s 
foreign policy. Southeast Asia in the context of this study is taken to include 
everything east of Burma and south of Thailand.95 Each case study is now taken in 
turn, each with its own introduction and conclusion and followed by an overall 
conclusion. 
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2) The Transfer of Power in India: Inheriting the Raj, c.1945-
1948 
There are various heated debates on what the Empire bequeathed to its 
colonies, but one that was of indisputable value to India was the international 
identity of the Raj. This chapter, therefore, examines the realm of foreign affairs in 
the process of India’s transfer of power, which also provides the contextual 
framework for a nuanced exposition of India’s first foray onto the world stage as an 
independent nation, and the subject of the next chapter, Indonesia’s freedom 
struggle. This is not an attempt to comprehensively survey India’s transfer of power, 
but rather to elucidate those aspects which had a bearing on the formulation and 
exercise of India’s foreign policy, which have been neglected in the existing 
historiography.1 On the contrary, one of the central points of this chapter is to 
introduce foreign relations during the Interim Government, and to demonstrate how 
closely linked to sovereignty and independence the exercise of an independent 
foreign policy was in Congress and Nehru’s mind, and the legacy that this provided 
for future developments. 
India’s transfer of power produced myriad problems and hurdles to overcome 
in the administration of both domestic and foreign affairs, and in the establishment or 
inheritance of the international identity of the two new states created from the Raj. 
Nehru and the Interim Government pursued building a foreign service and inheriting 
the international identity of the Raj so that at British departure, India would be able 
to continue building links with other nations and retain membership of the UN that 
in turn served to legitimise Congressʼ position as inheritor state to the British.2 The 
literature on the transfer of power can also benefit from this examination of both the 
inheritance of the Raj’s international personality and Indonesia as it exposes 
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 The academic concentration on the domestic effects of the transfer of power, dominated by the chaos 
following partition, has obfuscated the international dimensions of the transfer of power, and there is 
therefore real scope for further research on the external transfer of power. For the two most 
informative, if somewhat aged, reviews of the literature on the transfer of power see,  R. J. Moore, 
ʻThe Transfer of Power: An Historiographical Surveyʼ, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 9 
(1986), pp. 83-95 and H.V. Brasted and C. Bridge, ʻThe Transfer of Power in South Asia: An 
Historiographical Reviewʼ, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 17 (1994), pp. 93-114. 
2
 This examination is not one of the strict history of succession or secession in international law, but 
rather of the political motives behind Nehruʼs and Jinnah’s approaches. 
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something of the dynamic in operation between the Government of India (hereafter 
G.O.I.) and Congress before the Interim Government and then between the Interim 
Government and the British Government thereafter. 
Succession or secession: ‘Hindustan’ as the international heir of British 
India 
From 1918 to the close of the Second World War, India possessed a fledgling 
international persona, firmly controlled by the Viceroy and Secretary of State for 
India to serve the complementary needs of British foreign policy.3 Wartime 
exigencies, however, necessitated an Indian Agent-General in Washington and 
Chungking to liaise on wartime issues, and two Indians, both former members of the 
Viceroy’s Executive Council rather than the Indian Political Service (IPS), held these 
posts.4 Moreover, a US Commissioner was appointed in Delhi as well as limited 
Dominion representation.5 This fledgling international personality belonged to 
British India and was controlled by Britain, but it did ensure that there was a very 
small number of Indians with experience in the field of external affairs. The war also 
expanded the scope of Indian interests from being ‘circumscribed’ to the Indian 
Ocean, Middle East and Central Asia to include Southeast Asia, the Far East and also 
the US and Africa, a process that was strengthened at independence as India took 
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Anomalous International Person (1919-1947), British Yearbook of International Law 44 (1970), pp. 
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Wavell to Amery, 23/3/1944, Doc. 438 in Nicolas Mansergh (ed.) with E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer 
of Power, Volume IV: The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty, 15 June 1943-31 August 1944 
(London, 1973), p. 83. 
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charge of her foreign affairs.6 
As independence approached in the summer of 1947, partition agreed upon 
and planning in train, the international repercussions of the decision to divide British 
India came to the fore.7 Nehru forcefully argued to the departing British that 
‘Hindustan’ was the successor state to the international personality of the Raj and 
should take on all extant international obligations: foreign treaties, recognitions and 
diplomatic missions.8 Nehru employed the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 as his main 
defence, citing that throughout the negotiations for the transfer of power the only 
way he was prepared to accept the creation of Pakistan was on the basis of groups of 
Provinces seceding from India.9 Conversely, Jinnah put forward the case that both 
Hindustan and Pakistan would be completely new states, thus both succeeding rather 
than just Hindustan’s succession. Jinnah emphasised that both states should be seen 
as independent and equal in every way. This forms an integral part of Jinnah’s efforts 
of ‘keeping Indian geography and politics on separate but parallel tracks’, in doing 
so his aim was to contest the Congress’ claim to represent all-India and thus inherit 
the unitary state structure bequeathed by the British colonial state.10 Whereas for 
Nehru ‘India was continuing in every way the same, and the fact that dissident 
Provinces were to be allowed to secede must not interrupt the work of the 
Government of India or its foreign policy.’11  
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 Quoted in Viceroy’s Personal Report, No. 81, Report of 3rd Meeting of leaders to discuss 
administrative consequences of partition, 5/6/1947, L/PO/6/123: ff 114-21, IOR. 
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Nehru’s Hindustan approach found support from the British in India and 
London: as Mountbatten noted to Lord Listowel, Secretary of State for India from 
April 1947, Jinnah was merely damaging the prospects of Hindustan by objecting to 
Nehru’s view of succession.12 In asking London for advice on the disadvantages of 
Jinnah’s secessionist idea, Mountbatten opined that it would be easier for Hindustan 
to inherit all of the international obligations of the Raj.13 Furthermore, and telling of 
the scope of freedom that Nehru had during the Interim Government period, 
Mountbatten argued that ‘all of the diplomatic Representatives of India are nominees 
of Nehru.’14 London’s favour for Nehru’s Hindustan thesis was laced with a 
modicum of self-interest. The India and Burma Committee received a memorandum 
by Lisotwel, which argued that India’s overseas representatives were nominees of 
Nehru, and that ‘Hindustan will…take over the machinery of Central Government 
that is concerned with external relations and will be able to function de facto as the 
successor Government.’15 Whereas, if there were two new states then international 
obligations would lapse and would need to be renegotiated, and as such Britain 
would not immediately be relieved of its responsibility until treaty positions had 
been made both politically and practically satisfactory.16 The British were above all 
interested in leaving the machinery of government in Indian (Congress) hands to 
ensure that it had the tools to play its part in the region and the Commonwealth as a 
democratic, stable nation.17  
Following further entreaties from Mountbatten in support of Nehru’s 
formula, the India Committee deferred to the Viceroy’s advice.18 Such insistence on 
this matter must be seen within the larger framework of Mountbatten’s attempts to 
leave India as amiable to Britain as possible. Nehru and Mountbatten now pushed 
London to clarify the position in the drafting of the Independence Bill, arguing that 
the legislation had to make it as clear as possible which state was the inheritor of 
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British India’s international personality.19 However, as the Foreign Office iterated, it 
was as much for Britain to formulate the legislation suitably so as to encourage 
inference of Hindustan as successor as it was for other nations to recognise 
Hindustan as such, for example in the UN.20 This reasoning did not carry much 
weight with Congress, which remained insistent that it be made as clear as possible 
that Hindustan was to all intents and purposes the same internationally legal entity as 
British India.21 The gravity of the disagreement between Jinnah and Nehru was 
enough to threaten the continuation of the Constituent Assembly, reported 
Mountbatten, but he was able to mollify Jinnah after assuring the more reasonable 
Liaquat Ali Khan that the succession of Hindustan would have no impact on the fair 
division of the financial and capital assets of the Raj.22 Nehru, however, continued 
insisting to Mountbatten and thus London that ‘it should have been made perfectly 
clear that the international personality of the existing India continues and that India 
continues to be the parent state exercising all its rights and performing all its 
obligations under international treaties.’23 For its part, London had to balance 
inferring that Hindustan would succeed the Raj with opposition from the Muslim 
League to any explicit clause in the Independence Bill.24 Listowel reiterated the 
British position to Mountbatten explaining why London had refused to alter the 
wording of the Bill despite Congress entreaties. Listowel wrote that it was not for a 
clause in the Bill to determine the outcome, as much rests on the treatment of the 
Dominions by international bodies and nations and that the existing provision does 
give a ‘hint’ of the ‘position as it will in practice be immediately after 15th August.’25 
The Independence Bill was left as it stood, the British satisfied that it gave an 
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 Mountbatten to Listowel, No. 1719-S, 3/7/1947, R/3/1/154: ff 22-30, IOR. 
20
 Listowel to Mountbatten, No. 7893, 19/6/1947, L/P&J/10/81: ff 232-3. 
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inference to other sovereign powers of their opinion as Hindustan as the successor 
state whilst mollifying Muslim League opposition.26  
This succession-secession debate feeds into several larger ones concerning 
the transfer of power, but it was above all else a symbolic battle for international 
legitimacy which in turn reinforced Congress as the legitimate heir of domestic 
authority. Maintaining the international identity, in legal terms, of the British Raj 
served to validate the new state, anchor it to the past unitary, central authority in the 
context of partition and also continued the more practical aspects of its pre-existing 
presence in international affairs and international bodies. Congress had been 
prepared to sanction partition if it resulted in the maintenance of a strong central 
apparatus of control, which was essential to quell any provincial regionalism leading 
to further secession and was also crucial if a programme of economic development 
was to be effective.27 The failure to prevent the partition of India hardened Nehru’s 
determination to build a strong, unified nation-state without further secessions.28 
Inheriting British India’s international personality served to reinforce the Congress 
claim as the successor authority over the central, unitary government of the Raj in 
the domestic sphere. The inheritance of India’s international identity helped to 
maintain a sense of permanence and continuity in the power, relevance and authority 
of the centre during the turbulence of partition, which was essential if the newly-
created Dominion was to survive in place of the Raj. The possession of the 
international identity of the undivided India gave the newly-independent nation-state 
legitimacy for its new politically and territorially contiguous state. In one of the few 
discussions of the topic, Ayesha Jalal notes ‘this minimised the psychological impact 
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of partition, allowing the Congress leadership to keep alive the fiction of India’s 
political unity surviving the sub-continental division even after the loss of its 
geographical integrity had been recognised internationally.’29 To reinforce this, 
Nehru regularly reported Indian success in the international field to his Chief 
Ministers in the Provinces, giving them prominence over domestic affairs in many 
cases despite foreign affairs being a reserved subject for the central government. 
Nehru maintained this correspondence so that it could serve as a means for the 
numerous Provinces to associate with the central government in an attempt to bring 
political legitimacy to the newly-created political unit of India and forestall 
potentially destructive regionalism.30 Many of these themes are evident in the 
integration of the Princely States into the Indian Union, and manifest themselves 
most clearly in the absorption of Hyderabad in 1948. However, there is little 
discussion of the impact of foreign policy and India’s international personality in 
these processes.31 
Nehru’s idea of succession was not limited to those areas formally part of 
British India, but also extended to the nominally independent Princely States over 
which British paramountcy (akin to suzerainty) would lapse with the transfer of 
power, but would not be transferred to either of the new Dominions.32 Nehru was 
adamant that no Princely States should be awarded diplomatic status by foreign 
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approximately 600, also see Copland for the most up-to-date and exhaustive account of the Princes in 
the transfer of power in The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947 (Cambridge, 
1997), p. 8. 
 Personality of the Raj 
 
34 
 
states, which would undermine his claim for a territorially contiguous India as the 
successor state.33 With the lapsing of paramountcy, the Princely States, in essence, 
were expected to choose to accede to either of the two Dominions, and if diplomatic 
status was awarded to them this would serve to highlight the fissiparous tendencies 
of the subcontinent rather than the Indian Union that Nehru envisaged.34 Nehru’s 
feelings on this subject ran high in the last months of the Raj, as he histrionically 
accused the Political Department of ‘operation scuttle’; Nehru wrote to Mountbatten 
that paramountcy did not lapse, but was inherited by the successor government.35 
This was one legacy that the British refused to allow to succeed to Nehru’s India, and 
each Princely State had the right to accede to one of the Dominions with the centre 
taking responsibility for defence, communications and foreign affairs only.36 In this 
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context the integration of the States can be seen as an act of foreign policy as they 
were sovereign bodies.   
The Princely States were integrated into an Indian Union that needed to claim 
legitimacy - to create some form of territorially contiguous and recognisable ʻIndiaʼ- 
part of the identity of this  new state is found in the foreign policy ideals espoused, 
but not always followed by Nehru. The attempt to create and develop a broad foreign 
policy was very much a part of the larger process of shaping a new India from the 
legacy of the Raj and needs to be seen within this context. Indonesia, for example, 
was a rallying point reflecting India’s new sovereignty, emphasising the point both to 
Indians and to the international community at large. Nehru revealed how closely 
related he considered Indian foreign policy and India’s image abroad when during a 
Constituent Assembly debate he commented that ‘external publicity is so intimately 
aligned with external policy that normally every country has its external publicity 
organised by its Foreign Office.’37 
Nehru sought to control the international identity, and to preserve as much as 
possible the territorial scope, of the Raj by integrating the Princely states into India. 
This exercise provides further evidence of the intention to employ India’s external 
identity as a means to integrate diverse states and areas into the Indian Union.38 
Foreign policy, or the presentation of India’s external persona based on certain 
principles, was one integral part of the ‘Nehruvian’ state and served as a means to 
help unify the amorphous and multifarious state created by the British departure. 
Congress’ commitment to creating a geographically contiguous state led Nehru and 
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to ‘absorb’ Hyderabad, the largest intransigent state not to 
have acceded to the Union, in 1948. Nehru and Patel also secured the return of some 
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French loges and began to negotiate the return of French and Portuguese settlements 
in India.39     
One further demonstration of the importance of international affairs in the 
pre-independence period is that of the Asian Relations Conference (ARC), which is 
in turn used in the construction of the narrative leading to Bandung.40 Following his 
South-East Asian tour, on which Gopal argues the initial suggestion came from Aung 
San of Burma, Nehru used the Council in March 1946 to promote the idea of an 
Asian gathering on Indian soil, although he stood down as the chair of conference 
organising committee.41 With the formation of the Interim Government and Nehru’s 
installation as member for External Affairs, the Indian Council of World Affairs 
announced its intention to hold an Inter-Asian Relations conference in Delhi in either 
February or March of 1947.42 Reflecting Jinnah’s frustration with succession-
secession, Dawn, the organ of the Muslim League, denounced the ARC as an ill-
conceived attempt on the part of Congress to impose Hindu imperialism over the 
continent, especially those Muslim nations fighting for freedom from the British.43 
For Nehru, the ARC was designed as a demonstration of India’s place within the 
world, and within the region, with the coming of independence, but it was neither an 
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attempt to establish some form of Hindu empire, nor was it to form an anti-colonial 
platform or bloc. What the conference revealed was Nehru’s trepidation and 
unwillingness, to support without reservation all nationalist movements that 
requested assistance. The principle of anti-colonialism was not to be applied to 
situations in reality in all cases. What needs to be recognised about Indian foreign 
policy in these early years after independence is that it was to a certain extent a 
process of translating core principles imagined whilst an anti-colonial platform to the 
realities of international affairs. 
Mrs Sarojini Naidu, Chairman of the Organising Committee, sent the official 
invitations to the various governments. These invitations were then passed to 
unofficial delegates from relevant organisations with similar remits to the Indian 
Council of World Affairs. Naidu reported to the governments that ‘At the suggestions 
of many eminent persons in India and outside, the Indian Council of World Affairs, 
which is a non-political body devoted to the promoting of international 
understanding and co-operation, has decided to organise an Inter-Asian Relations 
Conference consisting of representatives from all Asian Countries.’44 The aim of the 
conference was to review the position of Asia in the post-war world, exchange ideas 
on all-Asia problems and study ways of promoting closer contacts between invited 
countries.45 The ARC was a clarion call for Asian nations and colonies to self-
identify themselves as such and to enter into dialogue. The ARC was not a demand 
for the immediate end of colonialism, it did not adopt damning resolutions, but it 
was a call for the increasing dialogue, communication and co-operation between 
Asians.46 As Gopal put it ‘the broad purpose of the Bandung Conference, in line with 
the Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi in 1947, should be to reassert the 
importance of Asia and Africa in the world.’47 The ARC certainly achieved its aim, 
as it influenced US responses to Indonesia by securing more support for Indonesia 
than would otherwise have been awarded. A memorandum by the Deputy Director of 
the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard) read in part that the ARC 
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‘clearly indicated desire for greater integration of Asian countries to protect Asian 
interests against domination by western powers. American indifference or opposition 
to Indonesian cause will strengthen the move toward Asiatic federation which might 
be detached or even antagonistic toward the western democracies.’48 
 The ownership of the foreign affairs portfolio served several domestic purposes 
for Nehru: it enabled him to claim an area of expertise in which he was the 
unrivalled voice of Congress and by extension India. This also reinforced his 
position within Congress by providing him with an area over which he had 
uncontested power in contrast to the power wielded by Patel and his right-wing 
followers in Congress.49 For Nehru, these two episodes of succession and accession 
were also partly about acquiring all the accoutrements of nationhood. Claiming to be 
the true successor state to the Raj served to legitimate India as the true heir of the 
nationalist struggle as opposed to Pakistan, and simultaneously to place Congress at 
the centre of the new state. However, without the skeleton of an Indian foreign 
office, there was little utility in inheriting the international personality of the Raj. 
The Need to Build a Foreign Service 
When Nehru became the member for External Affairs in the Interim 
Government from September 1946, he took over a portfolio that needed to create and 
develop the administrative and physical instruments for exercising its duties, which 
had hitherto been a predominantly British, and largely regional affair.50 The Viceroy 
headed the Department and the IPS (a wing of the Indian Civil Service, ICS), which 
W. Murray Hogben described as an ‘elite British service’ of roughly 30 per cent ICS 
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officers and 70 per cent Indian Army Officers (reflecting the frontier aspect of the 
Department’s role).51 
The Department remained firmly in the hands of British members of the IPS, 
despite the larger process of Indianisation prescribed by the Lee Commission’s 
recommendations of 50 per cent of annual recruitment for Indians and as Kember 
notes that ‘a greater number of officers of the Department were British than in a 
department not reserved for the Viceroy.’52 Lord Bentinck’s aphorism of the early 
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nineteenth century, therefore, still held true 100 years later when he wrote of the ICS 
that the Government had ‘the iron hand of power on the one side, monopoly and 
exclusion on the other.’53 Indianisation was slow, inconsistent, rarely met quotas, and 
the majority of those recruited went to the NWFP, rather than the Indian (Princely) 
States or farther afield.54 As with the defence and finance ministries, the 1935 
Government of India Act continued the practice of diarchy in ensuring that foreign 
affairs remained firmly wedded to British control of central government.55 The 
British Government handled India’s wider foreign affairs within the context of 
empire defence and to ensure a fundamental complementarity between the two.56 
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K.P.S. Menon was one of the few Indians to enter the realm of India’s external 
relations before 1939, and was the first Indian assigned to one of the two main 
sections of the then-called Foreign and Political Department as Deputy Secretary in 
1925.57 The ‘Political’ of the Foreign and Political referred to relations with the 
approximately 560 Princely states in India, and the ‘Foreign’, to which Menon was 
allocated, handled external affairs.58 It was during his time in X section that Menon 
‘realised how little the Government of India under British rule was concerned with 
the world.’59 
Within the context of war, there had been suggestions from the G.O.I. in 
1941-42 and again in 1945 that Indians become more fully involved in foreign 
affairs. Wavell, his predecessor Lord Linlithgow having been unwilling to 
countenance such a development, wrote to L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, 
in the autumn of 1944 reporting that he and Olaf Caroe (Secretary of External Affairs 
Department) had been discussing the wisdom of employing more Indians in 
diplomatic posts abroad, particularly in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan.60 Wavell 
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argued that ‘sooner or later India will have to run her own Foreign Service, and it is 
most desirable that we should gradually build up a cadre of Indian officials with 
diplomatic training.’61    
The twin issues of Indian personnel and India’s overseas representations 
converged around the figure of G.S. Bajpai, the Indian Agent-General in 
Washington, who serves as an example of the increasing British awareness of the 
need for trained Indians in foreign stations.62 Lords Halifax (British Ambassador in 
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Washington), Wavell and Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary) argued in concert for 
the raising of Bajpai’s profile in Washington and reasoned that by giving him his 
own mission independent of the British and Ministerial rank they could take ‘steps 
now to place India on the world stage, at least, as a Dominion with an independent 
diplomatic voice.’63 In fact, Bajpai had been treated very much like Dominion 
representatives in Washington.64 Advocating their course of action, they reasoned 
that it was ‘better to take the present opportunity to train Indian diplomatists under 
British guidance…than to be rushed at a later stage.’65 Wavell’s commitment to 
improving India’s representation abroad, and its twin result of increasing the number 
of suitably trained diplomats, also found expression in his Simla proposals of June 
1945, which were ultimately rejected by Indian nationalists.66 The newly-elected 
Labour Government eventually decided to allow the change after prompting by 
Ernest Bevin (Foreign Secretary) and Pethick-Lawrence (Secretary of State for 
India); the US, however, failed to award any changes in status whilst the 
constitutional position in India was unclear and so the plans failed due to American 
refusal rather than British intransigence.67 Postponement did not dampen Wavell’s 
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enthusiasm for developing talent as he appointed a delegation for the San Francisco 
conference on the UN, and concluded with alacrity that ‘I think the experience has 
been good for them.’68 
With the inexorable approach of independence, within a context of relative 
administrative and practical ignorance, and with the process of establishing 
international representation underway, the task fell on the existing Indians that had 
gathered experience in the field, and the departing British, to begin to design and 
construct a foreign service, both in Delhi and in missions throughout the world.69 It 
is difficult, however, to ascertain who most influenced its early development through 
lack of documentary evidence, but Menon, Krishna Menon and Lord Trevelyan all 
claim some part.70 However, as in the case of a foreign service, this deficiency 
obscures the fact that much of Nehru’s predominance in directing India’s foreign 
police resulted from the absence of a fully developed professional foreign service. 
In terms of personnel, the vast majority of British officials left India as power 
passed to Congress, as did many of the Muslim members of the ICS, and thus to a 
large degree  personnel continuity was broken.71 British practice and institutional 
continuity was, however, to remain as Nehru decided on the British system of career 
diplomats, and an initial three dozen ICS officers were picked to form the core of the 
new Ministry.72 But of these, only Bajpai, Menon and two others had any prior in-
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depth experience of diplomatic relations, and so it was with the task of organising 
this new Ministry that much of Menon’s time as foreign secretary was spent. The 
quantity, not the quality of those men available to manage India’s foreign affairs, was 
the issue and not as Bandyopadhyaya’s argues that the ‘ICS, princely, and Sandhurst 
generation of men…were not properly qualified…for the appreciation and 
implementation of the bold and imaginative foreign and defence policies pursued by 
Nehru.’73 
Bajpai’s experience was considered invaluable to an independent India, and 
despite having earned criticism in India for his perceived role in anti-India 
propaganda in the US during the war and having been a key collaborator with the 
British by serving on the Viceroy’s Executive Council, Nehru invited Bajpai to 
become the most senior civil servant in the MoEA.74  Nehru passed up Menon for 
the pro-Western Bajpai, as Secretary-General of the MoEA shortly after the transfer 
of power as his experience, skills as a diplomat and a chronic shortage of trained 
men trumped past transgressions.75 Bajpai was also well-respected in Britain and the 
US and had a history of personal relationships forged during his years of service; for 
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example Alan Campbell-Johnson described him as ‘Nehru’s accomplished Secretary 
for External Affairs.’76 
Sourcing experienced personnel was just one issue that faced India and as can 
be seen from the debate over succession or secession, it is clear that the British 
realised that India needed to develop its independent capabilities. As such, Nehru 
was afforded the latitude to appoint representatives abroad at the time of the Interim 
Government, a necessity that he was anxious to start.77 Menon was the first Indian 
Ambassador to China in October 1946 and Asaf Ali was appointed as the first 
Ambassador to the US in February 1947.78 Krishna Menon went so far as to make 
contacts with the USSR and Nehru sought representation by November 1946, despite 
British consternation.79 France established a presence in February 1947, as did the 
Netherlands.80 
The physical task of establishing missions abroad was one that required both 
time and capital outlay, but it was also one that offered the chance to very publicly 
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announce India’s independent status. The most symbolic example of this was the 
transformation of India House to the new High Commission in London. Krishna 
Menon, in an effort to demonstrate India’s newly-won independence asked for a 
reorganisation of India’s presence in London. Staffing jumped from 600 to 1,800, a 
fleet of limousines was acquired and a palatial mansion in Kensington Park Gardens 
purchased in an effort to symbolise Indian freedom and sovereignty.81 India, 
however, had to choose where to spend its limited resources, but by November 1947 
India has established or taken over a core of some 19 missions abroad, and by 1952 
the number had reached over 40.82 Whatever the precise figure, India made a 
concerted effort to extend its presence overseas in the first years of independence.83 
The internal organisation of the MoEA, coupled with the dearth of trained 
individuals, further reinforced Nehru’s dominance over Indian foreign policy.84 
There was, for example, no dedicated research or planning department. By the 
beginning of 1951, however, the MoEA had at least identified the need for monthly 
foreign affairs departmental meetings to: 
review the work done in the field of foreign affairs within their Branches 
and by our Missions, principally on the basis of the periodical reports, 
special reports and other communications received from our Missions 
during the month; to discuss the world situation in light of India’s foreign 
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policy; and general to co-ordinate, as far as possible, all information 
received in this Ministry on the international situation.85 
Palpably absent from this exercise in departmental rationalisation, however, 
was any reference to either utilising information in the formulation and execution of 
foreign policy, or any reference to the minister, Nehru. Despite these omissions, the 
first meeting took place the following month and the first item on the agenda was 
Southeast Asia, thus demonstrating the region’s importance for India.86 The fact that 
there was only an embryonic foreign service impacted upon Nehru’s position and 
reinforced his importance within the sphere of external affairs. Without a developed 
and efficient foreign office the G.O.I. and Congress relied even more on Nehru, as 
Brecher argued ‘in no state does one man dominate foreign policy as does Nehru of 
India. Indeed, so overwhelming is his influence that India’s policy has come to mean 
in the minds of people everywhere the personal policy of Pandit Nehru.’87 Brecher’s 
statement is near to the mark, but there are instances where Nehru was heavily 
influenced by others, for example the decision to maintain India’s position within the 
Commonwealth.88 However, Congress was not, as Michael Edwardes argues, happy 
to leave Nehru to it. Rather the Constituent Assembly became a space for the 
discussion of the direction of Indian foreign policy.89 Masaldan, whilst discussing the 
formation of determinants in foreign policy formulation, asserts that ‘India’s foreign 
policy, therefore, was in a special sense, Nehru’s foreign policy.’90 Furthermore, in 
his panegyric article arguing for fresh thinking on foreign affairs after the death of 
Nehru, Sankar N. Maitra argued that ‘The post-Swaraj era was dominated by 
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Jawaharlal Nehru, and in no sphere more so than in foreign policy of which he was 
the planner, architect and engineer.’91 Deepak Lal, in the following month, 
commented that ‘India’s foreign policy between 1947 and 1964 was conceived 
almost entirely by one man – Jawaharlal Nehru.’92 Neville Maxwell provides a 
concise appreciation of Nehru’s centrality, arguing that ‘Nehru’s policies were 
India’s and vice versa’, during his time as Prime Minister ‘foreign policy, in its 
conceptualisation, articulation and execution, was his private monopoly’, which 
Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya terms ‘monopolistic jurisdiction’.93 This is not to 
suggest that Nehru operated completely outside the orbit of the rest of the Indian 
state, especially during the years of Patel’s incumbency at the Home Ministry, and 
public opinion played a crucial role in the presentation of Indian foreign policy.94   
Keenleyside offers a moderately dissenting voice in his formulation that 
‘Nehru was more the dominant articulator than the chief architect of India’s 
emerging international identity prior to 1947.’95 Whilst this may hold more relevance 
in the pre-1947 period, post-1947 foreign affairs were primarily Nehru’s domain, one 
that was insulated more than any other from interference from the rest of the 
Government. Nehru, however, did not operate in a vacuum: he had to take account of 
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the rest of the G.O.I., and crucially operated in reaction to the rest of the world. One 
further result of this underdeveloped apparatus of state was Nehru’s propensity to 
depend on personal contacts, especially in Britain, as is demonstrated in the case of 
Indonesia’s transfer of power. 
Once independence and thus legal equality with other states is achieved, 
Warren Ilchman argues, newly-independent states seek political equality, that is, full 
and equal participation in the ‘political organs of the international system.’96 In 
India’s case, inheriting the international persona of the Raj assisted in the 
legitimisation of the new Indian state and its central government and membership of 
the UN, for example, further reinforced this trend. The UN, in the same vein as the 
Commonwealth, provided a country like India with the means to attempt to 
circumvent the paucity of personnel and Indian presence in foreign nations. Through 
engagement in the UN and the Commonwealth, India was able to communicate with 
far more states than their scarce network of Missions and personnel would otherwise 
allow. Despite his irritation at the inability of the UN to settle the Indonesia dispute, 
Nehru had to continue to engage with it as India was at the time applying for 
membership of the Security Council. 
The cost of establishing India’s national presence abroad did not pass without 
comment and Nehru was forced on several occasions to defend the sums spent by the 
MoEA. This defence reveals dimensions of his thinking on the importance of foreign 
affairs as he argued that ‘we cannot be an independent nation and not have those 
foreign relations.’97 ‘It is not out of vanity’, Nehru argued, that India spreads across 
the globe, ‘but in the protection of Indian requirements.’98 He continued to contrast 
India’s situation with that of Pakistan asking the Assembly ‘Are we going to ask 
England to look after our foreign interests…Is that the type of independence that we 
contemplate?’99 What is independence? Nehru continued, ‘It consists fundamentally 
and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local 
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autonomy. Once foreign relations go out of your hands into the charge of somebody 
else, to that extent and in that measure you are not independent.’100 He finished with 
the absolute declaration that ‘If we are an independent nation we must have foreign 
relations. In fact we cannot carry on without them.’101 This minor debate over the 
cost of foreign establishment takes us to the heart of Nehru’s emphasis on India’s 
interaction with the wider world. The exercise of foreign relations was not simply an 
expression of independence, but an integral and substantive aspect of that freedom. 
Nehru attempted to persuade a doubting Constituent Assembly of this by asking 
‘What does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of 
foreign relations. That is the test of independence.’102 
By the time of the transfer of power, India was in the process of adapting the 
framework institutions left by the departing British to the needs of a country that 
aimed to have contacts with as large a number of nations as possible. This 
administrative and institutional challenge occurred contemporaneously with India’s 
first major foreign policy venture the ongoing issue of Indonesia’s freedom struggle. 
In pushing to inherit the international personality of the Raj the importance and 
significance that Nehru and the G.O.I. placed on international affairs is clear. The 
exercise of foreign relations was for Nehru not only a demonstration of political 
freedom, but was an integral part of that freedom and served to legitimise Congress 
as the inheritor state to the Raj. The first demonstration of this was Indian 
involvement in Indonesia’s struggle for independence. 
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3) “Every Possible Help”: Indonesia1 
Whilst Indiaʼs transfer of power continued towards its end point, Indonesia 
provided Nehru with an opportunity to demonstrate to the wider world and to India 
itself that India was in control of its own foreign policy, to emphasise Indian 
sovereignty, and allow India to present its first foray into foreign affairs as remaining 
faithful to Congress’s anti-colonial roots. The actions also fitted into India’s goal of 
extending its influence in Southeast Asia and presenting itself as a moral leader of 
Asia. Indonesia was also juxtaposed against India’s success in negotiations for a 
transfer of power when, for example, Vijayalakshmi Pandit compared Indian success 
of a Constituent Assembly with the continuing struggle in Indonesia, Burma and 
Indo-China.2 
Nehru skilfully made the transition from nationalist leader to Prime Minister 
with the responsibility for the nation’s foreign affairs, and was able to make at once 
entreaties to the UK and US, asking for assistance whilst publicly denouncing 
imperialism in Asia and giving little publicity to the extent to which his influence 
and action rested on the UK and US. Nehru exploited India’s existing bilateral 
relationships with Britain, and to a certain degree the US, and presented himself as 
the voice of Asia, based on his position as the Prime Minister of an independent 
Asian state. In this position he provided the Western powers with portends of the 
disasters that would come from Dutch actions in Asia and exploited their developing 
fear of losing Asia to Communism.  Nehru’s stance and approach was inherently 
moderate, there is no doubting his anti-colonialism, but how he pushed his case was 
moderate, nuanced and tailored to each situation, which was amply demonstrated by 
proceedings of the Asian Relations Conference (ARC), and the toning down of 
Indonesian nationalist demands at the Indonesia Conference in New Delhi in January 
1949. This chapter is structured to present Indiaʼs foreign policy in the context of the 
Second World Warʼs legacy in Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular. It is not a 
narrative of the Indonesian freedom struggle but rather an exposition of its 
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interactions with India’s own transfer of power and early foreign affairs.3   
As the British prepared to leave India, the foundations of India’s international 
personality and foreign service had been laid. Simultaneously, Nehru took an intense 
interest in Indonesia as India’s first foray into international affairs straddled its 
identity as colony and nation, and this interest was not confined to the post-
independence period. Therefore, it becomes possible to chart India’s international 
transformation from a colony to a nation-state exercising its own foreign policy, and 
to see the continuities that run over the supposed-caesura of August 1947. This also 
enables an examination of Nehru’s transition from nationalist leader employing 
rhetoric without too much regard for responsibility, to leader of an independent state 
where rhetoric was tempered by the responsibilities of power.4 
The existing literature on India’s role in Indonesia is largely limited to 
general studies of foreign policy based on public speeches and newspaper reporting. 
Partly as a result of this less than rigorous historical investigation, Indonesia has 
entered the national memory as India’s first stand in the post-war world, an 
impression that Nehru certainly helped to cultivate. Indonesia is assumed to be a 
simple case of unreserved support for Asian nationalism versus European 
colonialism, and as such is often treated in a cursory and meretricious manner, but 
through this process it is robbed on any other depth and its ability to help analyse 
India’s entry onto the world stage.5 Ton That Thien, for example, argues that 
Indonesia was India’s first action on the world stage and simultaneously was its first 
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example of unreserved support for an Asian freedom movement, but, crucially, he 
fails to connect the international support for Indonesia with India’s domestic 
transformation from colony to state examined in the previous chapter or to examine 
Nehru’s methods.6 
A further aspect is added by Tilman Remme, who proposes that Nehru’s 
reaction was one of genuine outrage, but it was also seen as an opportunity to engage 
in anti-colonial rhetoric and unite the smaller Asian countries behind him.7 There are 
two points of contention with this: first, this denies any connection to the domestic 
scene and the kudos that Indonesia could bring. Secondly, the anti-colonial rhetoric 
was rather moderate and nebulous in the way in which it was only ever directed at 
the Dutch or French, and by and large left the British unscathed. Andrew Roadnight, 
moreover, argues that India had less complex motives than other countries for 
supporting the Republic and did so ‘based on its own colonial past and the wish of 
Pandit Nehru…to carve out a world role for independent Asian states.’8 It is in an 
effort to challenge these reductionist assumptions about Indian foreign policy that 
this chapter takes Indonesia as its subject. 
The Aftermath of war and Indian Independence 
In August 1945, as the war in the Pacific drew to a close, European colonial 
powers made preparations to return to those parts of Southeast Asia conquered by the 
Japanese in late 1941 and 1942, which debunked the myth of Western superiority, 
and irrevocably shattered the pre-war political and economic dynamic of the region.9 
The task of re-taking vast swathes of Asia stretching from Burma to Indonesia with a 
force numbering some 1.3 million men from the British and Indian armies fell to the 
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British-led South East Asian Command (SEAC) under the command of Admiral 
Louis Mountbatten.10  Indian troops made up the vanguard of the forces pushing the 
Japanese from the borders of India in 1944 at Imphal, but as the advance into 
Japanese-occupied territory continued they served as the re-conquering armies for 
the vanquished European powers.11 This was not what Subhas Chandra Bose had 
intended for Indian troops with his designs for the Indian National Army (INA) 
formed from Indian troops captured at Singapore in February 1942.12 The French 
and Dutch, themselves emerging from military occupation, had inadequate military 
strength to take immediate responsibility for their former colonies, and subsequently 
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depended on the British to re-impose order. Faced with the alternative of chaos and a 
power vacuum, SEAC used Indian troops to exercise temporary authority in 
Indonesia, Indo-China and Malaya. This was not, however, a simple case of British 
authorities acting as proxy for its European allies. Instead, the British attempted to 
remove themselves from any political wrangling and maintain order. But this ideal 
was soon realised as ill-founded as nationalist groups resisted the re-imposition of 
control. 
With the pace of demobilisation in Britain quickening due to the manpower 
shortage, SEAC was increasingly composed of its Indian contingents, and the British 
found themselves dependent upon Indian troops and as Chris Bayly and Tim Harper 
argue ‘the availability or otherwise of the Indian Army to suppress dissidence 
determined events not just in Burma and Malaya, but even in Indo-China and 
Indonesia.’13 For Anthony Stockwell, ‘when the British eventually reconquered 
Burma, they did so by virtue of Indian resources as much as their own’, because 
SEAC, as M.E. Dening, Mountbatten’s chief political advisor, noted at the time was 
becoming ‘more and more a purely British Indian affair.’14 
The analytical focus of this chapter is firmly on Indonesia, which Sukarno, 
who took the role of President, proclaimed as the Republic of Indonesia on 17 
August 1945 after Japan’s hold on power had slipped away. General MacArthur’s 
insistence that no landings take place until the official instrument of surrender had 
been signed resulted in the fledgling Republic taking control of a large part of 
civilian administration and beginning to establish the trappings of sovereign control 
in Java. It was into this ambiguous situation over who exercised sovereignty and 
authority that SEAC began to land troops in late September 1945 to carry out their 
mission of disarming and repatriating the Japanese; releasing prisoners of war 
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(POWs) and internees and all whilst maintaining order.15 The British and Dutch 
Governments exchanged notes on 25 August 1945 stipulating that the Netherlands 
Indies Government would resume as rapidly as practicable full responsibility for the 
civil administration of the Netherlands East Indies.16 The situation in Indonesia, 
however, was far more complex than either party initially realised. As the troops of 
SEAC re-entered colonial territories they were invariably welcomed not as 
liberators, but rather as proxies for their absent and vanquished former colonial 
masters in France and The Netherlands. For his part Sukarno urged cooperation with 
the forces of SEAC as they landed.17 However, the task of SEAC was made no easier 
by rising tensions between released Dutch civil servants, the few Dutch troops in the 
area and nationalists. In response to the clear situation that the Republic was well-
established and in effect governing on the ground, the British attempted to bring the 
nationalists and the Dutch together for preliminary talks.18 
Mountbatten concentrated his few troops on the key sea ports of Jakarta, 
Semarang and Surabaya, and it was in Surabaya that the fiercest fighting since the 
war broke out. As SEAC attempted to enter the city and rescue POWs, the confused 
situation over authority quickly led to a breakdown of communications and fighting 
broke out between Brigadier Mallaby’s troops and the local pemuda. The 6,000, 
mostly Indian troops were set upon by some 20,000 local pemuda armed with 
Japanese weapons and the result was a loss of some 233 officers and men. Mallaby 
himself was killed attempting to organise a ceasefire, at which point the commander 
of SEAC forces, General Christison, demanded that all arms be surrendered on pain 
of bringing his entire forces to bear on the city. By the next morning the British had 
deployed one and a half divisions to avenge Mallaby. Within the context of 
continuing to rescue POWs, whilst being attacked by pemuda forces, the leaders of 
SEAC and London continued to push the Dutch towards reconciliation and were 
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alarmed at their inability to see the reality of the altered dynamic in the colony. The 
coming withdrawal of SEAC troops added some urgency to the lack of settlement 
between the Dutch and the Republic as Archibald Clarke Kerr was sent in as a 
trouble-shooter.19 
Within this context, Sukarno actively sought Indian participation in 
Indonesia’s struggle.  For example on 4 October 1945 it was reported that Bandong 
(Bandung) Radio in Java had broadcast two messages of thanks, one to Australia and 
the other to Nehru expressing gratitude for his support.20 Nehru actively used 
Indonesia to bolster both his position as Congress spokesman on foreign affairs, and 
to raise his and India’s international profile by, for example, accepting Sukarno’s 
invitation to visit Java in October 1945. Nehru responded, via Reuters, that ‘If I can 
be of any service to the cause of Indonesian freedom I shall gladly visit Java in spite 
of urgent and important work in India.’21 The trip, though never realised due to lack 
of transport and safety fears, was nevertheless demonstrative of Nehru’s attempts to 
build an international profile and the concomitant profile of the most internationally-
minded man in the Congress. 
The use of Indian troops in Indonesia and vociferous Congress opposition to 
the practice has to be examined through the context of the INA trials and general 
disquiet in India following the end of the war, the release of Congress leaders from 
imprisonment, and the approach of post-war elections. Whilst there is not sufficient 
space to provide a full and nuanced exposition of the impact of the INA trails on the 
transfer of power, it is necessary to note that in conjunction with the use of Indian 
troops in Indonesia it represented a perceived threat to the loyalty of the Indian Army 
and was a rallying point for nationalist criticism against the British.  Equally as 
pertinent is the fact that the INA prolonged the Indian interest in Southeast Asia 
sparked by the Second World War.22 
In the week following the surrender of the Japanese army, the issue of the 
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INA was raised at a reception in Nehru’s honour in Murree where he opined that 
although those misguided men had unfortunately associated themselves with the 
Japanese, it would be a terrible waste if ‘these officers and men and their precious 
lives were liquidated by way of punishment by the British.’23 These fears were 
somewhat allayed when a week later it was announced by the G.O.I. that the rank 
and file of those that joined the INA would be released, but the leaders and those that 
perpetrated particularly heinous crimes would still be tried.24  The G.O.I. made pains 
not to excuse those that joined the INA, but insisted that their circumstances 
mitigated their crimes. Congress erupted into action organising the legal defence of 
those still facing prosecution from the ranks of Congress high command, including 
Nehru. 
In conjunction with the INA trials and their appropriation by Congress for 
political capital, the use of Indian troops in Malaya, Indo-China and Indonesia 
evoked wide criticism in India amongst Congress leaders and the population at 
large.25 In the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender, as SEAC attempted to 
carry out its work, Congress expressed its anxiety at the ‘attempts being made to 
maintain the political and economic subjection of Burma, Malaya, Indo-China and 
Indonesia.’ The Congress Working Committee added that ‘to continue imperialist 
domination in these countries under whatever guise would be a repudiation of the 
professions made by the United Nations in war-time and would sow the seeds of 
future wars.’26 The presence of SEAC thus caused disquiet at the re-imposition of 
European empires, and augured further protests from India concerning the role of 
Indian troops. The British with their Indian troops found themselves trapped in 
Indonesia, however, until their task of rehabilitation was completed. 
Congress politicians, Nehru in particular, warned Claude Auchinleck, the 
Commander-In-Chief of the Indian Army, that it would be politically impossible to 
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use Indian troops to put down nationalist rebellions in fraternal countries.27 Two days 
after British and Indian troops landed in Java, Nehru expressed his disquiet at the use 
of Indian troops in a press conference in Allahabad, commenting that ‘It is monstrous 
that our own people and our armed forces should be employed to suppress those for 
whom we have the fullest sympathy’, and he warned the British that ‘it is likely to 
lead to grave and far-reaching consequences.’28 Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon both 
petitioned London and Mountbatten to cease the practice of employing Indian troops 
to restore order; Menon wrote to Clement Attlee that: 
The role assigned to the Indian army in the present context does not appear 
to be that of a force fighting either for the defence of their homeland or 
against Japanese fascism and militarism, but that if an interventionist force 
to regain dominion for the French, Dutch or other imperialist and 
occupying powers.29 
Indian complaints did not go unnoticed, and the British and Americans were 
well aware of the implications of using SEAC in anything other than its strict role of 
rehabilitation, but it was a role that was increasingly difficult to define as SEAC 
came under attack by various nationalists in Indonesia. Britain was eager not to get 
embroiled in a Dutch reconquest of Indonesia, and the US demanded that all US 
Lend-Lease insignia be removed from any equipment in Indonesia.30 
Nehru and Congress presented the actions of SEAC as anti-colonial rather 
than as a necessary legacy of the Japanese surrender, and in this way integrated the 
current use of Indian troops into the nationalist case against the British. In early 
October, the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) denounced the use of Indian 
troops to put down nationalist movements.31 Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru echoed 
Nehru’s vocal indignation but focussed on Indo-China, stating that ‘the Government 
of India owes it to this country to explain fully why Indian troops were used to 
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suppress the freedom movement in Indo-China and what part they actually paid in 
this connexion.’32 Furthermore, Nehru delivered a speech at the annual AICC 
meeting auguring the development of a third world war arguing that ‘There is a 
perilous resemblance between the war of British intervention in Indonesia and the 
other war of intervention which Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany waged in Spain and 
which was the prelude to world war two.’33  He continued ‘we have watched British 
intervention with growing anger, shame and helplessness that Indian troops should 
thus be used to do Britain’s dirty work against our friends who are fighting the same 
fight as we.’34 Reference to the Dutch, or the French in Indo-China, is palpably 
absent in this example as the Congress deliberately associated SEAC’s actions 
directly with the British in their attempts to utilise the events as a stick to beat the 
British with as a part of their own nationalist struggle. In directly relating the two 
examples of India and Indonesia, Nehru sought to present India’s own struggle as 
part of an international movement and as a threat to peace and stability whilst 
minimising Indian culpability in the use of its soldiers. 
Lord Wavell, Viceroy from 1943, expressed apprehension concerning the 
domestic difficulties that the use of the Indian Army in Southeast Asia could cause, 
telling London that ‘the situation in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East 
Indies will give us some trouble. Indian troops are involved in both places, and we 
shall be attacked for allowing His Majesty’s Government to use them to suppress 
national movements.’35 Although he appreciated the necessity of disarming the 
Japanese and rehabilitating POWs, Wavell pressed London to ‘disengage the troops, 
both British and Indian, and leave the business to the French and Dutch.’36 He 
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repeated his entreaties, having cabled Mountbatten, arguing that ‘Indian troops 
should be disengaged from what is represented here as the suppression of patriotic 
risings.’37 Wavell also had to consider the morale of the Indian Army; he wrote to 
Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, that ‘I have just had a letter from the 
Commander-in-Chief expressing grave concern at the possible effect on the army 
both of the INA trials and the propaganda about their [Indian Army, not INA] use in 
Indonesia.’38 
These words of warning did not fall on deaf ears in London, but the 
circumstances in Indonesia, what Pethick-Lawrence referred to as the ‘intransigent 
Indonese’, required not only that the existing Indian troops remained, but that 
additional troops be sent to Java, and so Wavell was informed that ‘there is no 
alternative to continued use of Indian troops in Java.’39 Despite the pressing needs of 
SEAC, Wavell saw the situation through the prism of the domestic situation in India, 
and his response to Pethick-Lawrence read in part:   
I think it right to let you know privately that in my opinion loyalty and 
discipline of the Indian Army may be subjected to severe strain (A) owing 
to the agitation about the INA, as to whose conduct feelings will be sharply 
divided, and (B) by demobilisation. I think it most important that we should 
not add further strain of commitments in Netherlands East Indies or French 
Indo-China.40 
Auchinleck echoed Wavell when in a report on the state of the Indian Army 
in case of nationalist or communal disturbances he warned the Chiefs that ‘the 
situation in India is, therefore, extremely delicate…Our action in Java…is already 
being represented as European repression of national uprisings of Eastern peoples ... 
it may have a serious effect upon the loyalty of the Indian Armed Forces.’41 Wavell 
added that ‘we have from the first been represented by the politicians and the Press 
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here as supporters of Dutch imperialism’, a theme that Nehru continued post-1947.42 
Pethick-Lawrence repeated these themes when warning the Cabinet of the 
possibility of full-scale revolt in India in the closing months of 1945, warning that 
‘Indian leaders were advocating their views with growing vigour and determination. 
Indian opinion was disturbed on certain issues, e.g. the situation in Indonesia and the 
trial of members of the INA.’43 The use of Indian troops, dictated by circumstance 
rather than choice, limited British responses to the crisis in Indonesia and saw calls 
for withdrawal fall on stony ground. The gravity of the situation, however, was not 
lost, as evidenced by the fact that Lord Halifax discussed it with Dean Acheson. He 
wrote that the continuing Dutch-nationalist stalemate ‘has undesirable consequences 
both on the manpower situation in this country and insofar as Indian troops form a 
large proportion of the British forces in the Netherlands East Indies on the Indian 
political situation.’44 Therefore, there were two interconnected concerns about the 
use of Indian troops in Southeast Asia: nationalist, mainly Congress, opposition 
within the context of a fractious domestic environment at the time of the first post-
war election; and the loyalty of a war-strained Indian Army. Wavell concluded that 
‘from an Indian point of view it continues to be a most embarrassing business and 
the sooner we are out of it, the better.’45 
As Central Assembly and Provincial elections in India drew closer and the 
prospect of an Indian Interim Executive Council loomed the situation threatened to 
become more than embarrassing. The G.O.I. reminded London of the analogous 
situation that could occur if a Government at the centre made the withdrawal of 
troops from Java a test case. ‘They would argue that if India was really to become a 
Dominion in the near future’, wrote Wavell, ‘it was unthinkable to use Dominion 
troops against the wishes of the Indian Government.’46 The result, Wavell predicted, 
was either face withdrawal or resignation of an Interim Government, and he even 
went so far as to argue that withdrawal may be a proviso for forming an Interim 
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Government.47 Although this situation did not materialise in the short-term, the issue 
of Indian troops abroad continued to aggravate nationalist sentiment and the INC in 
particular exploited the issue for its own gains. Motions of protest against the use of 
troops were raised in the newly-elected Central Assembly in January 1946 as 
Congress sought to demonstrate its understanding and establish its credentials in the 
realm of international affairs.48   
With Nehru’s acceptance of the External Affairs portfolio in September 1946, 
the more vitriolic attacks on British use of Indian troops ceased, reflecting a reduced 
number of Indian troops abroad and that Nehru was now himself the figure head of 
Indiaʼs foreign affairs.49 At his first press conference on assuming office, Nehru 
expanded on the general guiding principles of India’s foreign policy, part of which 
was establishing contact with the world and drawing closer to her Asian 
neighbours.50 As such, Nehru continued to push for the withdrawal of Indian troops 
from countries such as Indonesia. With independence on the horizon, it was impolitic 
for Nehru, in his capacity in the Interim government and as Congress leader, to allow 
to go unopposed the use of Indian troops against nations that he hoped to form 
relationships with after independence.51 This pronouncement was largely an empty 
gesture as SEAC was already in the process of being wound down, and the British 
had pre-emptively planned for the recall of Indian troops from foreign operations as 
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Dutch and French troops became available in larger numbers.52 The announcement 
that Indian troops would begin to be withdrawn from Indonesia had been made by 
Auchinleck on 1 March 1946.53 There remained, however, the paradox of sending 
messages of sympathy to the Indonesians whilst Indian troops were still stationed 
there.54   
In fact, the last British and Indian troops left Indonesia not long after Nehru’s 
press conference as part of the winding down of SEAC and were praised by Dr 
Sjahrir for their discipline and efficiency. Six months later Defence Minister, Sardar 
Baldev Singh, requested the return of the few remaining troops in Asia by the end of 
1947.55 Thus the issue of Indian troops had largely, although not entirely, been 
neutralised by the time the Interim Government was sworn in, but the larger problem 
of Indonesia was still an ongoing issue that Nehru took a lively interest in, as did 
India as a whole.56 Rather, Nehru concentrated his attention on the Republic’s battle 
for independence from the Dutch, both for the year that the Interim Government was 
active and as Foreign and Prime Minister of India after August 1947. Congress and 
the Interim Government had to face the problems of the transfer of power as the 
approach of independence inexorably continued. From the above analysis of Indian 
troops abroad, it is evident that Nehru and Congress’ main weapon was to presage 
the consequences of the continued use of Indian troops abroad, warnings which the 
British G.O.I. took seriously enough to ensure that measures were in place to return 
all Indian troops as soon as possible. This auguring of dire consequences did not die 
with the promised withdrawal of Indian troops, but rather served as one of Nehru’s 
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key diplomatic devices with the UK and the US over the Indonesian dispute. 
However, as British and Indian troops left Indonesia, fighting escalated 
between the Dutch and Indonesians and continued intermittently until 1949. These 
intervening years of Dutch-Indonesian internecine warfare  continued to provide 
Nehru with one of his first tests on the international scene. Indonesia provided Nehru 
with the opportunity to call on the UN to demonstrate its efficacy as the international 
community’s arbitration council.57 Indonesia represented for Nehru the first example 
of putting an international issue before both the Constituent Assembly, and more 
widely before the nation, which he took a symbol of India’s entering the international 
field.58 At a press conference, for example, Nehru made the following statement 
when asked about Indonesia ‘The Government of India are intensely interested in the 
preservation of peace in the world and in the realisation of freedom by all people 
who at present lack it’ he continued ‘in pursuance of this policy they adhered to the 
UNO and associated themselves with the UNO Charter.’59 
As independence continued to approach, Nehru considered steps for 
Indonesian nationalists to take in the face of Dutch obduracy and failed negotiations 
for a resolution of their disputes. Before the opening of the First Police Action, 
Nehru had warned Amir Sjarifuddin about the consequences of trusting the Dutch 
implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement and cautioned that they would try to 
get hold of the Republic’s army and territory. Nehru suggested either international 
arbitration, appealing to the ‘Big Three’ to apply pressure on the Dutch as the best 
course of action, if not the next step was the UN.60 Nehru held the Dutch in perpetual 
suspicion and was still considering the idea of arbitration as the Police Action 
approached, but was advised by Bajpai that both British and American support 
needed to be secured before suggesting arbitration.61 One of Nehru’s key approaches 
throughout this episode was to exploit its connection with the UK and its fledgling 
bilateral relations with the US, by consistently providing the UK and the US with 
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portends of the destructive effect that Dutch intransigence would have on Asia and 
Asian nationalism. Nehru’s main diplomatic tool, therefore, of warning of the 
consequences of inaction by the UK and the US was designed to both exploit and 
reinforce his position as leader of the largest independent Asian nation. One of the 
first examples of this approach was in anticipation of Dutch action amidst talks of a 
build-up of Dutch armed forces. Krishna Menon, by this time Indian High 
Commissioner in London, presented Lord Listowel with an exposition of the 
regional consequences of continued Dutch prevarication that was to set the tone for 
future Indian communications with both the British and American governments. This 
message read in part that the ‘disturbed state of [an] important segment of South East 
Asia will be a constant threat to the peace of the whole of that region and economic 
recovery of the world will be hampered by paralysis of economic recovery in 
Indonesia.’62   
Due to the persistent failure of negotiations between the two parties, the 
G.O.I. felt that under the terms of the Liggadjati agreement all matters of dispute 
should be taken to arbitration. ‘The G.O.I. are going to suggest this course of action 
to both the Dutch and the Indonesians’, Nehru wrote, but ‘they would be glad 
if…United Kingdom and Government of United States both of whom are conscious 
of urgent need of restoring stability and peace to Indonesia will lend strong 
diplomatic support to this proposal.’63 Listowel was again cabled by the Interim 
Government asking for British intervention in the context of the breakdown of 
negotiations between the two sides as the Dutch cabinet decided whether or not to 
take military action and as the Indonesian Premier declared on Radio Jogjakarta that 
the Dutch were determined to avert the road of peace. The message emphasised to 
Listowel the wider, regional implications of conflict in Indonesia, by stressing that 
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‘hostilities in Indonesia will be a threat to peace of whole of South East Asia and a 
hindrance to economic recovery of the world.’64  In addition to what India termed 
their ‘strong moral sympathy’, emphasis was placed on the more physical dangers to 
India, arguing that ‘Indonesia is a source of food supply whose security and 
prosperity are of vital importance to India.’65 The threat to peace that the ongoing 
Indonesian situation represented was not the only reason that the G.O.I., both pre- 
and post-independence, sought a solution to the problem. Indonesia was a key source 
of foodstuffs for India and in the face of perennial food shortages, and the 
concomitant expenditure in hard currency in securing alternative sources of food, a 
swift resolution to the problem was imperative.66   
First Police Action, July 1947 
The Dutch launched their Police Action (Operatie Product) on 20 July 1947 
less than one month before India itself reached independence and India greeted the 
news with immediate public and private condemnation of the Dutch. The violent 
action ended on 4 August 1947 after a UN resolution called for an end to the fighting 
and it is India’s part in securing an end to these hostilities that this section examines. 
This was handled not through the Viceroy, but demonstrably by the Interim 
Government and Nehru on the advice of Bajpai and through Krishna Menon in 
London. The Interim Government was therefore, in effect, awarded full freedom of 
movement in this field. 
As the Dutch forces attacked, Sutan Sjahrir was travelling to India to seek 
assistance as the authorised agent of the Republic, and he arrived in Delhi carrying 
communications from President Sukarno, which for Nehru confirmed that the ‘so-
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called police action by Dutch is an extirpation and long prepared military campaign 
whose real purpose is to inflict complete military defeat on Republic.’67 The aim of 
this, Nehru opined, was to prepare the ground for a political settlement that was 
entirely favourable to the Dutch.68 The bold Dutch actions brought into stark relief 
the precarious position of the Republic, its ability to defend itself, and the larger 
issue of the continued spectre of European colonialism, which added urgency to 
India’s response to the crisis. 
The Republic actively sought to capitalise on its fledgling relationship with 
India and personal contacts with Nehru and at a press conference in Delhi, Sjahrir 
reported that he hoped that India, and Australia, might explore the possibility of 
giving assistance through negotiation and arbitration.69 Sjahrir sought to build on 
India’s previous statements of support and the symbolism and practicality of India’s 
approaching independence and entry onto the world stage as a sovereign nation. The 
attacks provided Nehru with an opportunity with which to launch India onto the 
world stage, especially as Sjahrir was present in Delhi and as Indian troops, albeit 
under British control, were initially linked with events. Nehru replied to Sjahrir’s 
entreaties by offering ‘every possible help’ and rhetorically asking what would 
become of the UN Charter if this kind of attack was possible.70 
Dutch action was a shock, but one that Nehru was partly prepared for as 
evidenced by his repeated entreaties to the British and Americans. Nehru reported to 
Krishna Menon that he was continuing to communicate with the UK and the US 
about the possibility of arbitration and stressing the grave consequences of the 
conflict.71 ‘We must invoke the UNO’, hopefully in conjunction with the UK and the 
USA’, Nehru wrote, but ‘if necessary then on our own.’72 However, appealing to the 
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UK, US and eventually the UN was not the only action that Nehru was prepared to 
take and it was at this point Nehru sought Krishna Menon’s counsel regarding the 
feasibility of stopping Dutch flights over Indian sovereign territory and stopping in 
Indian territory.73 This would be a very public and symbolic action and would not be 
taken lightly, but in conjunction with press conferences by Sjahrir it provided 
publicity for both the Republic and India’s role. Furthermore, it served to 
demonstrate that the Interim Government was in control of Indian territory. 
In another highly symbolic moment, Sjahrir made further public statements 
in attempts to garner support for the Republic in the Constituent Assembly. He 
warned that the Dutch would never succeed in establishing a new empire in the East. 
In support of that end, Mr Kripalani, Congress President, assured Sjahrir that the 
G.O.I. would exert all its influence in the international sphere to assist Indonesia.74 
The Constituent Assembly thus played host to a very public display of Indian support 
for Indonesia, and as such the success of India was juxtaposed against the dire 
situation with which the Republic was faced.    
Meanwhile, Sukarno made appeals to the US to stop the fighting and support 
the British in their offer to mediate.75 With little immediate success, however, the 
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G.O.I. decided that the most suitable option was to orally present the case to 
representatives of the British Government. Nehru instructed Menon to call on Bevin 
and to convey to him that the Dutch attack had come as a ‘climactic shock.’76 
Moreover, Nehru wanted Menon to further emphasise the regional ramifications of 
the conflict, writing that ‘prolongation of the conflict is likely to threaten the peace 
of the whole of South East Asia and to hamper the economic recovery of world by 
paralysing economic recovery of Indonesia.’77 This repeated line of argument was 
not simply employed in dealings with the British by playing on their fears of chaos, 
but rather reflected the material concerns of those in command of Indian foreign 
policy. Nehru thus asked Menon to communicate India’s desire for the UK to suggest 
a ceasefire and arbitration, failing this then the whole dispute should be submitted to 
the Security Council for consideration.78 
Nehru did not immediately take the issue to the UN, but rather sought 
conciliation through other means, which is revealing in so much as it exposes a level 
of trepidation on Nehru’s part. This delay is explained by understanding that this was 
Nehru’s first foray into international affairs and failure for India in attempting to take 
the lead without support could have proven disastrous. Indian opprobrium at Dutch 
obduracy was tempered somewhat by India’s limited scope for action and efforts to 
persuade the UK and US to exert pressure on the Dutch was based on advice from 
Bajpai and a realisation that India had few cards to play. If India had referred the 
case to the UN without some indication that it would be supported by the UK at least 
and her efforts were stymied or ignored then it would have been a far from 
auspicious start to India’s own foreign policy. Any failure in this field would not only 
have been an embarrassment for India, but also would have undermined Nehru’s 
claim to be the most internationally-minded man in Congress. Nehru thus 
encouraged and cajoled the UK to take the lead whilst advising in private and 
warning about the destructive impact of Dutch imperialism in public. 
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Time was of the essence, however, as the Dutch swiftly made significant 
gains into Republican territory. Menon was thus authorised to inform HMG that if 
they did take the issue to the Security Council then India ‘would be happy to support 
any demarches that they may make.’79 Only if the British failed to take the issue to 
the UN did Nehru see India taking the issue to the General Assembly itself. This 
dependence on the British is indicative of two things: that Nehru sought to exploit 
Britain’s position as a great power with vast experience in international relations, but 
it also demonstrated a certain trepidation on Nehru’s part on committing a soon-to-
be-free India to such a bold move.80 
With the wheels set in motion, Nehru subsequently issued a further press 
statement denouncing Dutch aggression as ‘an astounding thing which the new spirit 
of Asia will not tolerate.’81 Nehru continued in vitriolic fashion attacking European 
colonialism that was in stark contrast to the diplomacy behind the scenes and 
asserting ‘no European country…has any business to use its army in Asia. Foreign 
armies functioning on Asian soil are themselves an outrage to Asian sentiment.’82 
Nehru concluded by publicly attempting to broaden the Indonesian crisis into a test 
case for proving the mettle of the UN, ‘If other members of the United Nations 
tolerate this or remain inactive, then the United Nations Organisation ceases to be.’83 
Nehru’s strong condemnation demonstrated to the public that India was defending 
another colonial territory and was in control of its own policies. The statement, and 
others like it, was also designed to work alongside the quieter, private diplomacy 
being employed with the UK and US by demonstrating the position of authority and 
influence that India enjoyed and emphasising the height of Asian indignation aroused 
by Dutch actions.84 Nehru was, in this instance, able to wear two hats, one of an anti-
colonial leader and one of the leading diplomat of a potentially powerful and 
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influential nation. 
Krishna Menon and Nehru remained in regular contact over the course of the 
next few weeks and  in response to Nehru’s instructions of 22 July, Menon saw both 
Bevin and Listowel and concluded that HMG was suitably impressed with the 
urgency and the gravity of the situation and were taking steps to help end the 
hostilities.85 The UK and US subsequently jointly offered their ‘good offices’ to the 
Dutch, who it would appear only for public face said they would give the offer due 
consideration. In the absence of immediate results, Nehru demonstrated his 
frustrations with the UK and the US with an argument to Menon that ‘no one in India 
or anywhere in Asia will believe that if Governments of United Kingdom and of 
USA really desired to bring this conflict to an end, they could not do it immediately 
without military intervention.’86 Nehru’s censorious tone and his frustration at 
inaction was reinforced when placed in comparison to his and India’s own limited 
scope for action. The time for formal offers of mediation, Nehru opined, was over, 
and the US and UK needed to bring their influence to bear on the Dutch who were 
economically dependent upon their goodwill.87 
Nehru began planning for the UN and if the US and UK failed to settle the 
issue and it went before the Security Council, Krishna Menon was to take the stand 
for India. Time, however, was of the essence as the Council was due to enter recess 
on 12 August.88 The instructions from Nehru once again reveal a certain 
predisposition not to immediately take the case to the UN and rather to attempt to 
induce the UK and the US to take action, largely in the hope of effecting an 
immediate resolution rather than a more protracted procedure at the UN. Nehru 
admitted as much to Menon with the speed of Dutch actions destroying Indonesian 
resistance and the inaction of the UK and US when he wrote that ‘personally I must 
express profound disappointment at slowness with which these two Great Powers 
have handled a situation of great urgency and grave international importance. Even 
though appeal to the United Nations may bring no immediate relief to hard-pressed 
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Indonesians, it will rouse moral conscience of the world.’89 Frustration with the pace 
of events and lack of immediate progress dogged Nehru throughout the settlement of 
the Indonesia question, and as Nehru’s frustration grew so did his anger at the UK 
and US for their trepidation. 
Within the context of Dutch military success, Nehru instructed Menon to 
inform the British that unless success has been made by them on 29 July then India 
would submit the issue to the UN under Article 35 of the Charter.90  Nehru’s patience 
with the UK and US had clearly come to an end, but this was also a last minute 
gambit to push the UK and US to further increase pressure on the Dutch. Nehru gave 
the UK one last try at the Dutch when they asked to postpone reference to the 
Security Council for 24 hours.91 Nehru also began to feel pressure from his domestic 
audience as he wrote to Menon ‘I have to consider the mounting pressure of public 
opinion in India and in Asia and can no longer delay approach to the United 
Nations.’92 One such incident of the public sympathy with Indonesia manifested 
itself on the streets of Calcutta where student demonstrators came to blows with the 
police as they contravened a public order banning public demonstrations.93   
Simultaneously and predominantly as a symbolic gesture emphasising its 
control of Indian sovereignty and foreign policy and to demonstrate action 
independent of a multi-lateral approach to the UN, the Interim Government took 
unilateral action and barred Dutch planes in the form of KLM charter flights and 
Dutch military flights from using Indian airspace. At a press conference Nehru 
explained that ‘The mere presence of a colonial regime or foreign troops is an insult 
and a challenge to Asia endangering peace and preventing economic recovery.’94 
Although India was not a member of the Security Council, taking the issue there was 
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preferable to waiting for the General Assembly to meet in six weeks’ time.95 With 
India’s own independence only a fortnight away, Nehru exercised a sovereign right 
and on 30 July 1947 India duly submitted its complaint to the UN as did Australia, 
and with some urgency the Security Council adopted a resolution on 1 August 1947 
calling for both sides to halt hostilities, and both sides subsequently accepted US 
offers of Good Offices.96 As planned, Menon was instructed to present India’s case to 
the UN, Sjahrir was also to assist in presenting the case, and in this way India was 
providing the Republic with an asset that was otherwise denied it because of the 
absence of sovereignty – the right to take and debate a grievance in the UN. Nehru 
warned Menon, when approaching the case at the UN, not to appear to favour either 
the West or Eastern bloc, writing that ‘In conformity with our declared policy of 
nonalignment with either Western or Eastern Bloc I consider it especially important 
that as our spokesman in the Indonesian case you should avoid all appearance of 
leaning more for support to one side that to the other.’97 The Security Council 
ultimately called on the Dutch and Indonesians to cease hostilities and settle their 
differences through arbitration.98 Despite the relative success of achieving a UN 
Resolution, Nehru remained dissatisfied with the Indonesia situation and wrote to 
Menon that ‘I feel that the UK and USA have given indirect encouragement to the 
Dutch.’99 In the weeks immediately preceding independence, therefore, India had 
already embarked on its first major foray into international affairs. Despite achieving 
success in securing a ceasefire UN Resolution, by the last quarter of 1948 any hopes 
of further progress were lost in stalemate. 
The Second Police Action, December 1948 
In the aftermath of the first police action and with a ceasefire in place, Hatta 
wrote to Nehru to seek advice as the Dutch operated an informal economic blockade 
of the Republic. Nehru’s advice to Hatta, whilst admonishing the Dutch, warned him 
to be careful to take on actions that could ‘prejudice your position in international 
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eyes.’100 Calling on the international community through the UN and through 
bilateral contacts had proved successful in achieving a first UN resolution and this 
further reinforced Nehru’s strategy of utilising international opinion to the best 
possible effect. 
Indonesia was discussed in its regional context at Nehru’s first 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in October 1948 alongside Malaya and 
Indo-China.101 With an effective stalemate between the Dutch and the Republic 
continuing, Nehru emphasised the grave consequences that such actions could entail, 
and reported the following to his Chief Ministers: 
I pointed out that the USA and the UK Governments would, to some extent, 
share in the unpopularity of the Dutch in Asia as it was generally believed 
that the Dutch would not take any military measures if the USA and the UK 
wanted to stop them. My arguments had some effect, and I know that both 
the USA and UK Governments brought considerable pressure to bear on 
the Dutch to refrain from any such action.102 
Nehru reflected on India’s actions, ‘I think it may be said that owing to 
India’s insistence on this issue, Dutch military action did not take place then or up 
until now’.103 Progress, however, was not forthcoming in negotiations between the 
two parties. Nehru again reflected on actions to date over Indonesia, communicating 
to his Chief Ministers that India had taken up strong support for the nationalists, and 
had been in contact with several governments, the UK and US in particular, with the 
result that ‘I think I can say that our action in this matter had produced some results. 
It may even prevent further Dutch aggression, though we cannot be sure of that.’104 
Nehru’s prediction did not hold and as the end of 1948 approached, the Republic, 
under intense pressure from the Dutch and with little progress on the diplomatic 
front, sought Nehru’s advice on actions to take if the Dutch launched another police 
action. Nehru neatly summarised his policy of the last two years to Hatta when he 
wrote that ‘I have discussed Indonesian situation repeatedly in London and Paris 
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with representatives of various Governments, and pointed out the imminence of 
Dutch military action and very grave consequences that would follow.’105 On the 
success of his efforts Nehru could not claim a resounding success, but he did impress 
on Hatta that much sympathy was expressed and ‘some action was also taken to 
impress Dutch’ as to the consequences of their actions.106 Nehru reiterated this 
message in communication with Sukarno, where he emphasises that ‘I laid stress on 
the dangers of the situation there and took a strong line against the Dutch policy’ but 
in contrast to the admission of doubt of his own efficacy to Hatta he wrote to 
Sukarno that ‘I know that I produced a great deal of effect on both the UK and the 
USA.’107 
As the situation in Indonesia deteriorated and as Nehru reported to Bajpai 
that there were ‘feverish preparations’ for military action by the Dutch, both men 
continued their efforts with the UK and US.108 Nehru’s resolve strengthened with 
each action taken by the obdurate Dutch, to the extent that in November 1948 he was 
willing to consider giving the Republican Government exile and what other facilities 
could be granted to the fleeing Government.109 Throughout the Indonesian crisis 
Nehru remained moderate in his approach and although he criticised the UN, the UK 
and the US, he never publicly lost faith in the ultimate objectives of the UN. The 
moderation in this case was a microcosm of the larger transition that Nehru 
underwent from nationalist leader to national leader compared to others in Congress 
that were less well acquainted with international affairs. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, for 
example, attacked the moribund UN’s delays, accusing it of having done nothing to 
solve the Indonesian crisis, which the American Embassy report of the speech 
concluded was fairly representative of wider Congress and national opinion.110 The 
next day Nehru, somewhat defensive of his own policy, his portfolio as well as his 
claim to represent India’s foreign identity, rebuffed Patel’s comments claiming full 
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faith in the UN despite certain decisions (Kashmir) having gone against India.111 
This action publicly highlighted Nehru’s moderation of a more forthright Congress 
member, one which was the only credible threat to Nehru’s position, but it is also 
demonstrative of Nehru’s dilemma of balancing the realities of foreign affairs with 
public and political opinion. 
Nehru continued his earlier line of attack in consummately understanding and 
exploiting the measure of UK and US fears when he instructed Bajpai to emphasise 
that the Dutch would never regain full control of Indonesia, that they would be 
engaged in intense guerrilla warfare and thus their be unable to contribute to any 
European war. The consequences for Asia would also be grave, Nehru warned that 
‘large parts of Asia will be violently against Dutch and to some extent against UK 
and USA for passively supporting Dutch.’112 Nehru personally emphasised this to 
Attlee, writing that Dutch action would let loose ‘such a volume of bitterness and 
hatred in South East Asia against not only the Netherlands, but also other Western 
Powers that I shudder to contemplate.’113 As the Communists in China steadily made 
progress towards Nanking, and in light of the spread of Communist uprisings, Nehru 
warned Attlee that ‘the situation would give a chance to the Communists…to play a 
more important role as defenders of Indonesian freedom.’114 Nehru played on British 
fears as the situation in Southeast Asia deteriorated, demonstrating Indian policy in 
microcosm on the relationship between stability and national freedom. The need for 
stability was not limited to Indonesia, but rather to the whole region, as Nehru later 
wrote in a memorandum that ‘The only way to have stability in Indonesia and 
thereby help stability in South East Asia, is for the Indonesian Republic to be firmly 
established and to function in a completely independent manner.’115   
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Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and 
Nehru were in regular correspondence throughout 1948 and the former warned 
Nehru at the end of November that the Dutch would not accept a Republican army 
and would not yield over the supreme command of the Federal Army. Nehru took 
this as further evidence of Dutch obduracy and as part of a larger scheme to re-
impose strict colonial rule over the whole of Indonesia.116 India, Nehru argued, could 
not advise the Republic to accept Dutch demands and fully realised that this could 
lead to military action, but even if the Republic ceased to exist then the ‘ideal of 
Republic will remain and will be fought for to bitter end.’117 It was the Dutch, Nehru 
told Noel-Baker, and not the Indonesians who should be modifying their stance.118 
Despite his earlier admissions of frustration with the lack of action by the UK 
and the US, Nehru placed emphasis on the ability of the two powers to control the 
Dutch when he wrote to Sukarno and Hatta not to be misled by Dutch threats as ‘it is 
not easy for the Dutch to start military action in view of grave warnings by United 
Kingdom and American Governments who are now most interested in preventing 
this in view of deteriorating situation in China.’119 This confidence was soon to be 
destroyed as the Dutch launched a second Police Action, which galvanised the world 
against the Netherlands and allowed Nehru an opportunity to demonstrate to the 
international community, and to Indians, India’s emerging foreign policy role. 
The Netherlands once again resorted to ‘police action’ at the end of 1948, in 
an attempt to resolve the problem of the Indonesian Republic and make it bend to 
Dutch will and ultimately join a Federation of its design on its terms. Nehru was 
willing to do all he could to assist the Indonesians, but was ever respectful of the UN 
and international law. In response to requests to allow a government-in-exile to 
operate from India, Nehru claimed that this would depend on the UN.120 Nehru, 
                                                                                                                                     
Volume 12 (New Delhi, 1991), p. 370. 
116
 Cable to Noel-Baker, 30/11/1948, in Gopal (ed.), SWJN, Volume 8, p. 380. 
117
 Ibid. 
118Ibid. 
119
 Cable to A. Sukarno, 29/11/1948, in ibid., p. 379. 
120
 Cable to Government of Indonesia, 8/11/1948, in ibid., p. 375. This moderate attitude, arguably 
softened by the realities of power and responsibility was a far cry from a British worry in the week 
before independence. Nehru had enquired about the capabilities of the plans to be left to the Indian air 
force, which Air Marshall Sir Thomas Elmhirst inferred was an attempt by Nehru to calculate the 
feasibility of sending forces to assist the Republic, see Viceroy’s Personal Report, No. 15, 1/8/1947, 
 Indonesia 
 
81 
 
however, authorised the sending of a plane to collect key members of the Indonesian 
cabinet, who were due to arrive by 20 December, and also authorised the lending of 
small sums of money to the Indonesians, mainly for the maintenance of their 
representatives in foreign nations largely in an effort to keep up their international 
profile.121 
In his initial thoughts to Menon, Nehru treated the Dutch with opprobrium; 
maintained that the aggression would have long-term effects; and was scornful 
towards the UK and  US who he argued had let the situation go this far by not 
pushing hard enough with the Dutch.122 However, in communication with the two 
powers Nehru laid the blame squarely on Dutch obduracy. Nehru’s note to Menon 
contained a précis to be sent to the UK and the US communicating India’s views on 
the world situation in which he admitted that ‘the USA and the UK Governments 
have strongly advised the Dutch not to take military action, but the Dutch have not 
been very cooperative in this respect.’123 Once again, the telegram demonstrates 
Nehruʼs attempt to emphasise that Indonesia was an open sore, an issue that 
threatened East-West relations and was an ever-present symbol for the wider 
anachronistic practice of colonialism.124 Nehru continued this line of reasoning in 
correspondence with long-term friend Stafford Cripps, the same man who had been 
authorising India’s generous sterling balance settlements. In response to Cripps’ 
anxiety over the advance of Communism in Asia, Nehru again lambasted the 
‘excessively stupid’ Dutch within the context of chaotic Southeast Asia.125 The 
Dutch mission in Indonesia, and the French in Indo-China, Nehru argued, is 
supported by Marshall Aid and with the passive assistance of the UK and the US, but 
if this policy continues then Southeast Asia will be lost to Communism.126 This line 
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of argument, that colonialism fostered resentment upon which Communism thrived, 
was taken up by Nehru time and again in his efforts to end colonialism, and in the 
short-term achieve a more accommodating imperialism that worked with 
nationalists. 
Indonesia itself was not isolated from the threat of Communism in Southeast 
Asia, but the forces of the Republic swiftly dispatched a PKI uprising in mid-1948. 
As Nehru reported to his Chief Ministers, ‘the gallant young Republic, fighting for 
its freedom against the Dutch, was faced by a Communist uprising.’127  Their swift 
action removed the immediate threat of Communism from the Indonesian 
independence struggle and in doing so gained them a more sympathetic ear from 
both the UK and the US. B.K. Nehru, in the wake of the Madiun Affair, again 
emphasised India’s fear of Communism and attempted to exploit US fear of its 
spread as he told Butterworth (State Department) that the uprising had galvanised 
Indian determination to see swift end to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.128 
In the face of Dutch obduracy and the bald aggression of the Second Police 
Action started the previous day, Nehru addressed the annual AICC in Jaipur on 19 
December 1948, where he again argued to his fellow Congress members that this 
action was only part of the problem of foreign rule in Asia and that ‘their action is 
contrary to all principles of the United Nations Charter.’129 The AICC remained, as it 
had done in the years before Indian independence, a key platform and public event at 
which to discuss and pronounce on international affairs. As international frustration 
at the Dutch increased Nehru was better able to situate himself as the voice piece and 
de facto champion of Indonesian freedom. 
In the wake of Dutch military action, Nehru hurriedly wrote to Attlee and 
once again presented an exposition of how Asia, not just India, viewed the action. 
Nehru continued with the themes of how damaging the Dutch flouting of its 
authority had been to the UN; how Dutch actions were equated with imperialism as a 
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whole and threatened relations between the East and West; and with new emphasis 
how ‘since Holland is a member of the Western Union and clearly dependent for its 
economic and military rehabilitation upon US and, to less extent, UK, it seems 
inevitable that at least the people of Asia should think that Anglo-American aid is 
being used by the Dutch to crush the Indonesian Republic.’130  The theme of the 
flouting of UN authority had not been employed at the time of the First Police 
Action, but now the Dutch acted in direct contravention of the UN Resolution of 
August 1947, and India had made much noise about its part in the UN Resolution. 
Throughout the Indonesian crisis, Nehru employed the ‘Asian opinion’ card time and 
again both to play on British and American fears of losing Asia to Communism and 
to strengthen his own position as their main source of information and voice of Asia. 
‘There will be prolonged and fierce guerrilla warfare in Indonesia’, Nehru told Attlee 
‘Nationalism throughout South East Asia will actively ally itself with Communist 
and any other element that may be prepared to join the struggle for freedom against 
colonial imperialism.’131 
As India had to create its own diplomatic service, it had not yet sent its 
representative to Holland and would not in the foreseeable future, but this did not 
prevent India floating the idea of expelling the Dutch Ambassador. 132 This was a 
symbolic warning to the two Western powers and the significance of an Asian power 
sending home the representative of a European nation was not lost on either the UK 
or the US.133 India’s communications during the crisis were not confined to the UK 
and US, but it was also in contact with Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan. In a cable to 
Burmese Prime Minister Thakin Nu, Nehru reported that the US and Australia had 
tabled a resolution in the Security Council, which India would support, demanding 
that troops return to their pre-hostility positions and a Good Offices Committee to 
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report on conditions.134 
Attlee responded to Nehru, emphasising British consternation at Dutch 
intransigence and that the British continued to strive for a settlement. Nehru, 
however, was dissatisfied with both the UN Resolution and the part taken by the UK 
in the Security Council, and he passed a note to Krishna Menon to convey to Attlee, 
in which he argued that the Resolution accepted Dutch aggression by asking for a 
ceasefire allowing the Dutch to keep hold of their territorial gains.135 Nehru’s ire was 
directed at Britain for its failure to support the US-Australian resolution and the 
memo stated that ‘It will be most unfortunate if the impression spreads in Asia that 
the UK Government is passively supporting the Dutch in Indonesia.’136 This was one 
step too far for the British who took umbrage at Nehru’s insinuation of passive 
support and swiftly informed him of their displeasure, which Nehru immediately 
explained as a misunderstanding, stating that ‘for my part, I am both aware and 
appreciative of your own and Mr Bevin’s personal effort to restrain the Dutch and 
sincerely hope that these efforts will be continued and will succeed.’137 The US, in 
the meantime, had acted and stopped all Marshall Aid to the Netherlands East Indies 
on 22 December 1948. As was his modus operandi throughout the Indonesia crisis, 
Nehru sought to connect the disparate episodes of chaos in Southeast Asia and 
employ them in his relations with the UK and the US. As such, Nehru wrote to 
Cripps that ‘I should like you to appreciate what all this is leading to in South East 
Asia…unless the USA and UK come to the decision that colonialism in South East 
Asia must end, their prestige will go down, and in a moment of real crisis in South 
East Asia they will have few friends.’138 Nehru related Indonesia’s treatment with the 
wider advance of Communism and with Malaya by continuing his letter to Cripps 
stating that ‘I have mentioned all this because it is very relevant in considering the 
question of the spread of Communism in South East Asia.’139 Nehru attempted to 
exploit his personal relationship with Cripps over the issue of Marshall Aid as he 
wrote to the Chancellor covering a range of topics, but centred on the lethargy of 
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British actions easing the way for Communist advances, which Nehru admitted was 
making him anxious too.140  As the US highlighted, however, stopping aid would be 
taking unilateral action outside the authority of the UN.141 
With the Second Police Action underway, Nehru provided a neat précis to his 
Chief Ministers to keep them informed: India had been energetically lobbying the 
UK and US since October and warning them in person of the ‘grave danger of the 
Dutch indulging in military action.’142 Nehru had not only castigated the Dutch, but 
had warned the US and the UK that if a Dutch attack went ahead then part of the 
blame would fall at their feet.143 Nehru warned that as the Marshall Plan was 
supporting the Dutch, it was also supporting the actions in Indonesia, and as such the 
Western Union would suffer a loss of prestige and ‘Asia would turn away from the 
Western Union and the policies that the USA and the UK stood for.’144 
Nehru continued to employ all means available to him: pressure on the UK 
and US, belief in the validity of the UN, moral support for the Republic, and the 
‘immediate step that we are taking is to stop KLM flights across India.’145 Nehru 
took this action in concert with other nations and asked that Burma deny KLM 
landing facilities, as India, Ceylon and Pakistan had announced a ban on 24 
December 1948.146 Nehru communicated to the Chief Ministers something he had 
also made strikingly apparent to the US and UK that ‘It has brought to the fore the 
whole question of European Imperialism in parts of Asia ... the habit of ignoring Asia 
still continues. But now with the developments in Indonesia, there has been a rude 
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shock.’147 
Nehru’s frustration at the Dutch and lack of firm action by the UN was clear 
when he explained that the UN had failed to the grasp the nettle of Dutch aggression 
in Indonesia.’148 The Security Council subsequently adjourned until 6 January 1949, 
with the Dutch effectively having ignored the two resolutions already passed149 and 
it was in this atmosphere of frustration that Nehru felt it necessary to begin to 
organise a conference for interested parties in New Delhi following prompting from 
Thakin Nu.150 This conference has become part of the established narrative of Indian 
foreign policy and is presented as an example of India’s strident and independent 
anti-colonialism. However, the conference has a far more nuanced significance than 
as evidence of India’s strident anti-colonialism, beginning with the fact that Nu 
prompted Nehru to call the conference. 
Once again, as with the virulent comments regarding the use of Indian troops 
in Indonesia, this strong statement came at the time of the All India National 
Congress annual meeting. Indonesia thus again provided Nehru with a platform with 
which to exercise his authority in India’s foreign affairs and also be seen to be 
defending Asia against imperialism in the eyes of his domestic and political 
audience. Nehru expressed his frustration with the Security Council’s lack of 
decisive and firm action when he wrote to the Chief Ministers that ‘owing to the 
delay of the Security Council in dealing with this matter, we decided to convene a 
conference in New Delhi at ministerial level, of representatives of the Asian 
countries, plus Egypt and Turkey.’151 This conference was not born out of a desire to 
create a third bloc, nor to circumvent the UN but rather to demonstrate to the UK and 
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US both India’s unique position in the Asian world and the disquiet of Asian nations 
as Nehru wrote to his Chief Ministers that ‘In thinking of Asia they now think of 
India and the line India may or may not take. Thus a great burden of responsibility is 
cast upon India.’152 In Nehru’s mind, however, this responsibility was not so much 
by design as by default ‘but facts and circumstances are compelling India to play an 
important role in these developing world events.’153 
The delegates mainly represented regional and Asian territories, including 
Australia and New Zealand. The UK, US and other European powers did not receive 
invitations because, as Nehru explained to Krishna Menon: 
had we invited UK as an Asian power, how could we have left out USSR, 
or France or USA…exclusion of the USSR, USA and France would have 
brought protests from all three. Even though we might have ignored 
France, we could not have ignored USSR and USA. Inclusion of last two, 
along with UK, would have introduced into conference all the distrusts, 
rivalries and rancours which have paralysed the Security Council.154 
The prospect of a conference raised concern from both the US and UK that 
Nehru was attempting to circumvent the authority of the UN, and that he was 
attempting to form some kind of Asian bloc.155 However, as Gopal notes ‘the 
presence of Australia and New Zealand was sufficient testimony that this was a 
regional conference and not the first step in the formation of an Asian bloc animated 
by hostility to the West.’156 The conference was, rather, an attempt to demonstrate 
India’s regional importance and awareness, and that, as already noted, Nehru 
presented himself as the voice of Asia whilst domestically demonstrating Indian 
efforts. 
Nehru again employed the fear of Communism in his efforts to achieve his 
ultimate aims in Southeast Asia, and in this context Indonesia. In an effort to placate 
US concerns about Nehru’s anti-American tone in regard to Indonesia and the calling 
of the conference, Nehru informed Henderson that if India failed to take the lead in 
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removing the last vestiges of the European colonial system in Asia then the USSR 
would do so in a manner that would strengthen Communist influence in the various 
national movements.157  In light of presaging a collapse in East-West relations, 
Nehru was asked by the US to make a public statement emphasising that the 
conference on Indonesia was not intended to supplant, but complement, the UN in 
exchange for a US declaration of support for the conference.158 Not only was Nehru 
willing to placate the US. But it is also of importance that Nehru, despite his lack of 
confidence in the UN on this matter, had not yet made it patently clear that the 
conference was to strengthen, not weaken, the UN. Nehru called the conference at 
the request of others in the heat of the moment and began to see the potential folly of 
the decision in that the responsibility for whatever happened at the conference was 
with India. An MoEA official, therefore, emphasised in press questioning that the 
point of the conference was to support, not circumvent the Security Council.159 
Bajpai consequently organised a press conference where he and Nehru made efforts 
to emphasise the conference’s complementary not confrontational aim, and asked for 
the US to hold up their end of the bargain and issue a statement of support for the 
conference in the spirit of East-West co-operation.160 Nehru confirmed that he had 
stressed the co-operative aims of the conference at dinner with Henderson, citing that 
he hoped it would both relieve concern in the West and frustrate those in India and 
Asia who wanted to cause an East-West rift.161 
In his attempt to maintain the focus of the conference, Nehru intended to 
‘confine the conference to the Indonesian questions alone.’162 The conference 
decided on three aims: to recommend to the Security Council immediate steps the 
Dutch should be called to take; to recommend further action to be taken in the case 
that the Dutch failed to comply and finally the setting up of administrative 
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machinery to ensure the co-ordination of action by Asian countries for implementing 
the decisions of the conference.163 The conference got underway by emphatically 
clarifying that any measures to deal with Dutch aggression should be in accordance 
with the principles of the UN Charter.164 Nehru argued that the conference ‘is not 
intended to bypass the Security Council, but to impress upon it the strength of our 
feeling on this matter.’165 
The conference concluded with recommendations for the Security Council: 
all leaders to be freed immediately. All pre-December 1948 territory should be 
returned to the Republic; Interim government should be formed; all Dutch troops 
should leave Indonesia by a certain date to be decided by the Good Offices 
Committee; elections to a constituent assembly should be no later than 1 October and 
that power should be handed over to a United States of Indonesia by 1 January 
1950.166 The first resolution made several suggestions, described by Nehru as 
feasible, which sought to achieve an immediate ceasefire and lay the foundations for 
a final settlement of differences. The resolution called for the immediate release of 
all political prisoners; full freedom to allow the Republic to function and the 
restoration, before 15 March 1949, of the territory held by the Republic before 18 
December 1948. It also called for the establishment of an interim government with 
full control over defence and external affairs; elections for a constituent assembly; 
and a transfer of power no later than 1 January 1950.The second resolution sought to 
establish some form of suitable machinery for consultation with concerned parties to 
ensure the implementation of measures. The third resolution, as Nehru commented in 
his closing address, ‘indicated that wider sphere of cooperation which is becoming 
more and more necessary…We have to explore and that and devise such methods for 
consultation and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations as are to 
our common advantage and the advantage of the world.’167 This was not an attempt 
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to create a third bloc, but rather to continue to present an Asian perspective to the 
Western powers and the UN as Nehru had been attempting throughout the 
Indonesian crisis. For India, Indonesia represented an international coming of age; it 
was a chance to externally demonstrate the sovereignty and legitimacy of the new 
state of India. Nehru wrote that the conference had been ‘a great success 
which…enhanced the prestige of India all over the world.’168 The political capital of 
holding the conference, albeit not a wholly successful conference, was used to 
deflect domestic criticism of negotiating entry into the Commonwealth in January 
1949 as Nehru employed it as evidence for the independence of India’s foreign 
policy whilst nominally a Dominion.169   
In retrospect, Nehru complained that the Security Council’s January 
Resolution on Indonesia was inadequate although it followed the Delhi Conference 
lead on many matters. However, Nehru wrote to Patel on the subject and informed 
him that ‘one result of our convening it has been to push the Security Council some 
considerable distance and they are going to propose a resolution which, though not 
entirely satisfactory from our point of view, still is on the whole favourable to the 
Indonesians.’170 How much the Security Council followed Delhi is debatable when 
the resolutions passed in Delhi were sensible, reasonable and constructive and made 
it easy for the Security Council to adopt similar approaches.171 The 8-Point 
memorandum that the Conference produced and submitted to the Security Council 
was reflected in the eventual UN Resolution: immediate ceasefire; release of 
political prisoners; holding elections and a transfer of power by 1 January 1950. Two 
points failed to square with the Security Council’s proposals: that of an immediate 
total withdrawal and complete freedom on the interim government. Most pertinent 
for this investigation is that the proposals put forward by the Conference were by and 
large already extant in both Resolutions 63 and 64 and in US proposals for a third 
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resolution.172 What it is difficult to ascertain is the knowledge that the Conference 
parties had of the drafting of the third resolution and the extent to which this 
influenced their own drafting of proposals. When examining US documents it is 
difficult to detect any consideration of the proposals handed to the President of the 
Security Council by Nehru on 23 January 1949, when in fact the Resolution had 
already been drafted. In short, there is scant evidence that the Security Council, and 
the US in particular, was considering altering draft proposals in light of any 
decisions made in Delhi. But both the Delhi proposals and the US draft resolution 
drew heavily on the existing agreements and progress already made in negotiations, 
and the result was proposals that were similar in aim and tone.173 
Both the Security Council Resolution and the proposals arrived at by the 
Delhi Conference were heavily based on the understanding that both disputing 
parties still held to the Renville Agreement, namely establishment of a United States 
of Indonesia and a transfer of power. Aside from the matter of ceasefire and 
delineating lines of control, the bulk of the resolutions were primarily concerned 
with ensuring the continuation of negotiations and both provided strikingly similar 
timetables for action. The important point to take from the Security Council 
resolution was that Nehru was dissatisfied that it failed to go as far as the Delhi 
Resolution.174 The Conference resolution itself fell short of the original proposals put 
forward by the Indonesians, namely the immediate imposition of air and sea 
restrictions on Dutch traffic to Indonesia; imposition of sanctions by conference 
countries if the Security Council failed to act; and providing money and supplies to 
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the Republic.175 We need to ask the question of how seriously the concept of 
sanctions outside of the UN was considered, as Nehru had consistently argued that 
only the UK and the US had the power to effect a change on the Dutch and that 
Nehru shied away from taking any actions that could contravene international law. 
The Delhi Conference was for all intents and purposes, a symbolic talking shop 
where the delegations could simply demonstrate their ability to discuss. As Anita 
Inder Singh notes, the resolutions from the Conference bore out Nehru’s attitude as 
‘they were moderate.’176 The conference was more a forum for venting off steam and 
working with the Security Council, and its moderation stems largely from Nehru’s 
stewardship. Commenting on reportage on the wider significance of the conference, 
Nehru stated that there had been a turning point in history ‘This fact is well 
recognised’, he wrote, ‘by competent observers all over the world. It means new 
alignments and a new balance of power, if not now, then in the near future.’ Despite 
the fact that Nehru repeatedly denied attempting to create a third bloc ‘it is inevitable 
that as a result of this conference and other causes, the countries of Asia will come 
closer together and that India will play a leading part in this. This brings India new 
responsibilities.’177 
In the wake of the conference Krishna Menon and Bevin met in early 
February 1949 to discuss the implementation of the resolutions, or lack thereof. In 
response to a demand from Menon for further details on British policy in response to 
less than speedy actions by the Dutch, and as an attempt to get the Commonwealth 
as a whole involved, Attlee cabled all Commonwealth Prime Ministers.178 Attlee saw 
two objectives, both of which chimed with Nehru’s own thoughts: first to achieve a 
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lasting settlement for Indonesia and secondly to uphold and strengthen UN authority 
in regard to this and other disputes.179 Attlee was also candid in his exposition of the 
nationalists, who needed to concentrate on the prospect of rule after the Dutch and 
ensure that they are in a strong enough position to do so. Attlee employed equal 
candour in explaining the dangers if the Dutch failed to act appropriately: if the 
Dutch ignored the UN, the UN would have to then impose sanctions and the Dutch 
could leave the UN. Attlee also highlighted the danger of the nationalists not fully 
cooperating and hiding behind the UN commission and also that any prolongation of 
the conflict that weakened the authority of the UN played into Russian hands.180 
Attlee explained to his fellow Commonwealth Prime Ministers that Britain 
had instructed its Ambassador in the Hague 'to impress on the Dutch the need for 
speed in announcing their plans and for fulfilment of their programme and of 
Security Council Resolutions.’181 Attlee also implored that ‘In these 
circumstances…[we] use every channel to impress on the Indonesians the difficulties 
that lie ahead and that, in the long run, their salvation is in their own hands, however 
much sympathy and help they may get from friends outside.’182 This last plea was 
directed at India in particular. This was a direct reflection of Nehru’s policy of 
encouraging the British to exercise their influence with the Dutch to effect a 
settlement. Nehru replied to the telegram post haste agreeing with his assessments of 
the potential dangers, but jumping on Attlee’s assessment of the nationalists as an 
obstacle to the lasting peace so desired.183 Nehru was patently not totally satisfied 
with the substance of the UN Resolution as ‘It fell short in several respects of the 
very moderate resolution adopted by the Delhi Conference’, but it had to be 
respected and worked with.184   
Nehru was increasingly frustrated at the sometimes weak reprimands that the 
Dutch received from the US and the UK, noting that they ‘address occasional 
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homilies to the Netherlands, and for the rest remain acquiescent, or seek to make the 
Indonesians agree to Dutch terms.’185 By March 1949, negotiations had slowed 
considerably and the American diplomat Cochran attempted to keep the talks alive. It 
was at this time that Nehru received a request from the Dutch Government, asking 
for Indian assistance in persuading the Republicans to attend the proposed Round 
Table Talks resulting from Louis Beel’s (Governor-General of Dutch East Indies) 
February 1949 plans in response to the Security Council.186 Nehru responded 
negatively to the request, in light of the fact that he was not satisfied with the 
substance of the 28 January 1949 resolution and furthermore that he did not view the 
most recent Dutch entreaties as satisfying the demands of the Security Council. 
Instead, Nehru cabled to Indian representatives in the Delhi Conference nations and 
his representative at the UN to further emphasise the need for full implementation of 
the Security Council’s Resolution.187 
The Security Council, Nehru proposed in concert with Australia, needed to 
again discuss the stalemate in Indonesia during their May session.188 Nehru’s 
ultimate fear was for continued stalemate followed by further Dutch military actions, 
and he wrote to Bajpai that ‘We cannot possibly remain silent and just wait for the 
Security Council to be a little more generous.’189 It was at this point that Nehru 
raised the possibility of acting upon the second resolution of the Delhi conference 
and organising an informal meeting of the interested parties that attended the 
conference in January.190 With the failure of the two sides to establish an interim 
Government by 15 March 1949, the UN Commission for Indonesia was instructed to 
bring the two sides together for a preliminary conference to settle the issues of the 
return to Jogjakarta, the ceasefire and the release of prisoners. The preliminary 
Round Table conference opened 15 April 1949 and ultimately led to a successful 
conclusion resulting in Indonesian independence under the Dutch crown. 
As soon as the Dutch showed significant signs of compromise and an end to 
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the conflict was in sight, India reacted by softening its tone and stance vis-à-vis The 
Netherlands. Once the Republic took possession of Jogjakarta, and Round Table 
talks planned at The Hague, Nehru both removed the ban on KLM flights in place 
since  December 1948 and also sent the Indian Ambassador, Mohan Sinha Mehta to 
Holland.191 On the conclusion of Round Table talks in The Hague, Mehta, reported 
that ‘This will be a very important event in the political development of South-East 
Asia.’192 Nehru concluded on India’s role in the Indonesian freedom struggle with 
the rather terse report to his Chief Ministers that the United States of Indonesia was 
to come into existence in the next fortnight or so.193 
Conclusions 
In conjunction with the previous chapter this chapter has contextualised 
India’s earliest forays into international relations with its own transfer of power and 
with Indian domestic history. Moreover, it has provided a more nuanced account of 
the role India played in the decolonisation of Indonesia focussing on the Police 
Actions. Once Indian troops had been removed from Indonesia, the key Indian aim 
was to see a peaceful and acceptable resolution to the dispute between the Dutch and 
the Republic. Indonesia can also reveal aspects of India’s last months of colonial rule 
and from the available evidence, it appears prima facie that Nehru was given a free 
hand in the prosecution of India’s nascent foreign policy contrary to Zachariah’s 
argument that the Interim Government did not have a great deal of power.194 
Nehru supported the Republic for a variety of reasons connected to and 
directly reflecting the changes in India’s status from colony to nation-state. 
Furthermore, Indonesia was compared to India’s own success in achieving 
independence. The cause of Indonesia was widely supported by the majority of the 
public opinion and Congress, partly because of its link with the use of Indian troops 
abroad. Indonesia was, above all, a relatively clear cut issue, and one that was widely 
discussed in the Indian press thanks to the legacy of Indian troops in Southeast Asia 
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and the INA. Nehru exploited the situation to make a stand and set an example in 
international affairs (in contrast to the quagmire of Kashmir and Nehru’s own Police 
Action in Hyderabad). Impassioned attacks on the Dutch, bordering on histrionics, 
demonstrated Nehru’s strength of feeling on the issue, feeling that he was able to 
translate into action thanks to the relatively straightforward nature of the Indonesian 
freedom struggle. Moreover, it was a chance for India to demonstrate its broad 
foreign policy principles in action and to distance itself from the legacy of the Raj. 
The issue was clear cut in the eyes of India: a case of blatant and aggressive 
European imperialism.   
The timing was ideal and allowed Nehru to reinforce his position as the most 
internationally-minded man in Congress and to assert and demonstrate Indian entry 
onto the world stage as power was being transferred to the two newly-created 
Dominions. Supporting Indonesia outwardly demonstrated the continuity of 
Congress as anti-colonial in the transition from nationalist movement to government.  
The fact that Indonesia was the largest Muslim country on earth did not pass Nehru 
by in the context of Pakistan, as he felt a ‘special satisfaction at championing the 
rights of a Muslim people.’195  
Supporting Indonesia’s case in the face of violence provided India with a 
means to attempt to present itself as the moral leader of Asia through its 
championing of Indonesian freedom. However, as the ARC demonstrates, Nehru did 
not intend India to be the sole champion of all freedom movements; India could 
provide moral support for freedom movements, but such staunch opposition to the 
Dutch would not be the default response to imperialism.196 The rhetoric of anti-
colonialism, it would seem, became moderated in the real world of international 
affairs. Nehru and India’s newly-won international status were exploited by a 
Republic that struggled to win official international recognition; for example, when 
India and Australia took the case to the UN. As such, India at times acted as a 
conduit for the Republic and as a champion of Indonesian nationalism, albeit in a 
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moderate fashion exploiting the tools at India’s disposal. The use of the tools 
available to an independent state also came with the responsibility of adhering to 
international law, which Nehru was adamant should be upheld. The threat to peace 
that the ongoing Indonesian situation represented was not the only reason that the 
G.O.I., both pre- and post-independence, sought a solution to the problem; Indonesia 
was a key source of foodstuffs for India. In this respect Indonesia acted as a 
microcosm of India’s Southeast Asia policy of securing stability, in this case through 
the ending of Dutch rule over Indonesia. In the years that followed Indonesian 
independence, the relationship with India was one its key bilateral contacts.  
Nehru fully utilised the existing contacts that India possessed, in part because 
of the absence of a more fully developed foreign service. India was also able to 
exploit its administrative weakness when it refused to send its Ambassador to The 
Hague until a resolution to the problems had been found. The UN also emerged as a 
key tool for India, not purely because of Nehru’s thoughts on the utility of the UN 
from a principled angled, but more so because it enabled India to interact with a far 
larger number of nations than would otherwise be possible. This episode also shows 
Nehru as somewhat mercurial at times, for one moment he praised the UK and US 
for their assistance and efforts with the Dutch and the next he lambasted them for 
passively allowing events to continue. Nehru’s policy was manifold and at times 
stressed both the statesman and nationalist leader identities. Through his 
communications with the UK and also the US, Nehru attempted to establish himself 
as the voice of Asia. Nehru used this position as he exploited Western fears of 
Communism for his own ends. Nehru partly explained his method of emphasising to 
the US and Britain that Dutch actions, viewed as being taken with their concurrence, 
were damaging to Western interests in Asia because it was true, but also because he 
calculated that it would have more effect than a ‘pious appeal about help to 
Indonesia.’197 Nehru’s experiences over Indonesia contributed to India’s decision to 
remain in the Commonwealth and to co-operate with the UK in Southeast Asia. 
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4) India’s Membership of the Commonwealth, 1945-1949 
British India gained independence through partition into two Dominions 
within the Commonwealth as a temporary, politically expedient arrangement, a 
‘pathway out of deadlock.’1 Accepted as part of Mountbatten’s June 1947 plan, 
India’s Commonwealth status had to be addressed as the Constituent Assembly 
constructed a constitution for an independent, sovereign republic in light of 
Congress’s expressed desire for Purna Swaraj and the Objectives Resolution passed 
in January 1947.2 India was thus unable to acquiesce to a Crown link, and with the 
failure of this approach the structure of the traditional Commonwealth had to be 
changed to accommodate a willing India. 
The reasons that India both wanted and needed Commonwealth and Sterling 
Area membership, and it is often a difficult task to determine the fine distinction 
between the two, is the key question that the chapter addresses. The negotiations of 
entry are examined to expose the intricacies of the process, but this is not 
constitutional history. There is little reward in simply listing the base factors that 
contributed to India’s decision, as this reveals little except the diverse structural 
components of any decision; what is required is an analysis of how the major factors 
interacted with each other. The changing domestic and international situation that 
India faced from independence and the evidence of experience of rule, combined to 
demonstrate to Nehru and the G.O.I. that its interest would best be served by 
continuing association with the Commonwealth. These categories of interest can 
broadly be divided, not in any impermeable way, into: economics that acknowledge 
the unbreakable link between the domestic and the international, international Asia, 
international global, defence, Pakistan, Indians abroad and international legitimation. 
India joined for a combination of these reasons, but this is not what was presented to 
the wider world, it was presented with India actively pursuing its goals rather than 
being guided by the force of circumstances. However, this research demonstrate that 
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it was a combination of these two pressures: circumstance and national interest, 
which at times were hard to distinguish between. Key turning points often obscure as 
much as they seek to reveal, but the Prime Ministers’ Meeting in October 1948 
signalled Indian intentions to remain within the Commonwealth. 
The experience gained in government, both in the national and international 
fields weighed heavily on Indian appreciations of the value of the Commonwealth 
link. Initially reluctant to have a link, Nehru’s experience in international affairs in 
particular convinced him of the value of close relationships with members of the 
Commonwealth, and potential future members in the form of colonies.3 This was 
only further compounded by the continuing polarisation of the world and Communist 
intrigues in South and Southeast Asia from early 1948. The experience of Dominion 
status and pressing structural exigencies helped the growing realisation that India’s 
needs could be best served within the Sterling Area and the Commonwealth. Indiaʼs 
sterling balances were instrumental in its decision making. Development has long 
been viewed as a determinant in Indian foreign affairs, but the effect on policy is 
another question entirely; it is one thing to say and another to explain and 
demonstrate the nature of development on India’s external affairs. The economic 
situation in which India found itself was a key desiderata in its foreign policy. As 
Nehru opined in December 1947, a country’s foreign policy is ‘ultimately…the 
outcome of economic policy.’4 Development in the years immediately after 1947 
until the formulation of the first five-year plan was more about post-war efforts 
towards reconstruction. The worst deficiencies of wartime deprivation needed 
rectifying, and at times overshadowed the G.O.I.’s aim of using their resources and 
sterling balances exclusively to fund capital goods imports.5 The sterling balances 
also meant that Indian development cannot be separated from the wider problem of 
the British post-war financial settlement. The economies of the two nations, and the 
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Sterling Area more widely, remained crucially interwoven. One of the key 
contributions that this chapter makes both to the thesis and to the understanding of 
India’s decision is to actually examine the importance and relevance of the sterling 
balances and why their existence necessitated Commonwealth membership in a more 
detailed and nuanced way than hitherto done.6 Technically, joining the 
Commonwealth was not a requisite for remaining within the Sterling Area, and so 
why India decided to join the club is the question that this chapter answers. 
The spread of Communism in Southeast Asia has largely been overlooked by 
historians looking for India’s motivations. It is argued that the insurgencies in 
Southeast Asia and India’s own Communist menace softened some of those Indians 
opposing a Commonwealth link, and hardened those in favour. India had two 
intimately linked aims in Southeast Asia, the end of European colonialism and 
preventing the spread of Communism. The end of European colonialism, through the 
granting of independence to national states, held the answer to preventing the spread 
of Communism as far as J.A. Thivy (India’s Representative in Malaya) was 
concerned, and Nehru shared this broad appreciation, arguing that genuine 
nationalism was the answer to the Communist menace.7 
 The principle of remaining within the Commonwealth and Sterling Area 
largely decided by the benefits expected. Nehru thus had to square the circle and 
achieve membership on a basis that would be acceptable to as large a proportion of 
Indians as possible and consequently this chapter also explores how Commonwealth 
membership was presented to the Indian public. The decision was presented to the 
Constituent Assembly and the population as an active choice, one that emphasised 
the more attractive aspects of membership (protection of Indians abroad, promoting 
peace), and the loosely defined term ‘material benefits’. What the G.O.I. was careful 
to do was to deny any sense of necessity or economic determinism in membership: 
India was in because India had made the conscious decision to be in as equal and 
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free members. Nehru and the G.O.I. publicly presented the case as one of voluntary 
membership determined by the benefits that India could gain, and not as a vital 
necessity in the traumatic international situation and challenging domestic economic 
scene. This was a politically managed exercise that outwardly emphasised India’s 
sovereignty whilst neglecting to acknowledge the necessity of the decision. 
Once it was realised that Indiaʼs interests lay with the Commonwealth and 
that India was willing to continue its membership, two linked processes continued: 
how to find a formula that would secure both Indiaʼs sovereign republic status, a 
non-aligned stance and be acceptable to a broad spectrum of public opinion. V.K. 
Krishna Menon assured Mountbatten in April 1947 that although India would 
become an independent, sovereign Republic ‘some formula’ was being sought that 
would allow a close association between the two nations. But, he continued, 
‘initiative on Congress’s part is impossible; even the semblance of it would lose 
them their position; it must come in some way from us [UK].’
8
 
This chapter contributes to the existing historiography by integrating the 
decision to join the Commonwealth with Nehru’s other moves in Southeast Asia, its 
economic imperatives and its relationship with Britain, and it also exposes the 
intimate link between the Commonwealth, the Sterling Area, the Colombo Plan and 
India’s imperative need for development aid. Once again, the structural and 
international forces crucially limited India’s room for manoeuvre, and serve to 
emphasise the all-too-often forgotten fact that India did not operate in an 
international vacuum. This research builds on the work of R.J Moore who has 
produced the most comprehensive analytical narrative of events, but re-examining 
the narrative account of the constitutional deliberations helps to expose the 
underlying importance of the link for India and for the other Commonwealth 
members.9 Several works address British motivations for retaining India in the 
Commonwealth, but few ask why India, after the Purna Swaraj Resolution of 1929 
and two years of Dominion Status, decided to remain within the Commonwealth and 
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the Sterling Area in April 1949.10 There is a discernible trend in this historiography 
that attempts to demonstrate that India joined only to gain benefits. For example, 
Bimal Prasad notes the benefits, but not the necessity of the decision.11  
A further strand of the historiography, echoing the G.O.I. pronouncements at 
the time, argues that, as B.R. Nanda demonstrates, India’s decision took nothing 
away from independence. Nanda, however, fails to connect the material benefits with 
the decision.12 Sarvepalli Gopal too argues that the decision did not limit freedom, 
and argued that it would promote stability and peace, but does acknowledge that the 
spectre of Soviet expansion fed into the decision.13 Echoing Gopal and Nanda, P.N. 
Masaldan asserts that membership did not harm independence, but would promote 
goodwill; however, Masaldan too fails to accept that material determinants 
contributed.14  
Michael Brecher was the first to document systematically the factors 
involved in India’s decision to remain within the Commonwealth in 1949, and his 
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perspicacious work remains the key text on the issue.15 However, Brecher’s article 
lacked a depth of analysis and crucially failed to demonstrate the links between the 
factors that Brecher identified. Seven components, Brecher argues, were involved in 
the decision-making process- the emerging pattern of bi-polarity and the onset of the 
Cold War; two sets of bilateral relationships, one with Britain, the other involving 
Pakistan; turmoil in south east Asia and the Far East; India’s military weaknesses; 
economic dependence; and the advocacy of opposition political parties. However, 
what is lacking from Brecherʼs analysis is a nuanced evaluation of the sterling 
balances. 
Charrier’s unpublished PhD thesis goes some way to connect the economic 
situation of independent India with that of the Commonwealth decision, and the 
formulation of the Colombo Plan.16 He argues that material needs favoured Indian 
acceptance of Commonwealth membership. Similarly, Anita Inder Singh combines 
strategic and material factors in her reading of Indian motivations for accepting the 
Commonwealth connection, and highlights that the Commonwealth provided a 
means of maintaining a non-aligned stance but avoiding isolation, and also that 
India’s economic dependence on the Sterling Area to cover her balance of payments 
dictated adherence to the Commonwealth.17 Inder Singh also notes that India 
calculated that she had a better chance of more generous releases if she remained in 
the Commonwealth and Sterling Area.18 However, as is demonstrated through this 
research, generous releases were not always desired as India feared wasting the 
balances. 
Judith M. Brown echoes Inder Singh, arguing that, amongst other issues, easy 
access to the sterling balances was a key determinant of India’s decision.19 B.S. 
Pavadya argues that membership was ‘accepted not so much for sentimental reasons, 
but rather for the tangible advantages believed to accrue from Commonwealth 
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membership, both in the national and international fields.’20 Whilst this may be true 
there is little analytical value unless a more nuanced approach is taken to expose the 
developing realisation of these benefits. There is an elephant in the corner when 
discussing the Commonwealth, and its economic counterpart the Sterling Area, 
which is the question of whether India had any other choice. This chapter builds on 
the existing historiography by looking at the decision through Indian domestic and 
international lenses, with a focus on the interaction of the multiple variables that 
entered the decision-making process. 
The majority of accounts from the Indian subcontinent fail to employ British 
sources and, as access to official Indian sources is variable, rely on statements from 
Nehru, both public and in the Constituent Assembly, as their main source base.21 
Nehru’s Selected Works provides only a very basic narrative and fundamentally fails 
to reveal any underlying components of the decision. The Commonwealth in 
particular raises the issue of the absence of Indian policy documents: the question of 
whether we can assume that India conducted a cost benefit analysis. However, there 
are very few explicit expositions of India’s formulation of the pros and cons.22 What 
we are able to do, however, is to read much into the way that India conducted itself 
vis-a-vis the sterling balance negotiations. 
Early ideas about Commonwealth Membership 
India became increasingly aware of the value of the Commonwealth link and 
intended to remain in as long as a suitable formula could be found. One crucial point 
that is under-epmhasised is the fact that, as Gordon-Walker argued, ‘the link had not 
                                               
20
 Pavadya, ‘Nehru, The Indian National Congress and India’s Membership in the Commonwealth’, in 
Patil (ed.), Studies on Nehru, pp. 377-78. The benefits Pavadya identifies are defence weakness, trade 
links, exchange reserves, Commonwealth as a force for peace, settlers abroad, and ‘may’ also have 
been the Kashmir issue and also the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, pp. 376-377. 
21
 For example Zubeda K. Khan, International Politics and Indiaʼs Foreign Policy Under Nehru 
(2000) and Mehrotra, ʻIndia and the Commonwealthʼ, in Nanda (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy: The 
Nehru Years, pp. 24-41. 
22
 In a rare elucidation of India’s motives, V.P. Menon, one of the most powerful civil servants in 
India, and a key Patel advisor, informed the British High Commissioner that India must stay in the 
Commonwealth for four keys reasons: keeps trade agreements; continued use of British foreign 
services in countries India as yet had no presence; growth of Communism disturbing and India wants 
to be associated with anti-Communist counter-action taken by the Commonwealth including receiving 
intelligence reports. Record of Conversation between UKHC official and V.P. Menon, undated, DO 
133/91. 
 Commonwealth 
 
106 
 
yet been snapped. There was something that could grow.’23 Krishna Menon 
retrospectively echoed Gordon-Walkerʼs analysis stating membership ‘was mainly 
because of ... an existing connection.ʼ24 Furthermore, a letter from Pethick-Lawrence 
to Wavell at the end of the latter’s tour of duty in India reported a conversation 
between Nehru and Cariappa.25 Cariappa informed Pethick-Lawrence that ‘Nehru … 
saw no reason why India should leave the Commonwealth provided His Majesty’s 
Government did nothing to antagonise India in the meantime.’26 Pavadya argues that 
Congress was willing to remain within the Commonwealth, and so the problem 
became not one of Britain persuading India, but of finding an acceptable formula that 
would allow a republic to enter.27 Whilst there is merit in this argument, it fails to 
acknowledge that there was opposition to the link from within the Congress Party, 
from other political parties and from public opinion more widely, and that at times 
Nehru’s frustration with Britain’s legalistic approach brought to the fore real 
concerns that a formula could not be found. 
Expressing opposition to the link, Sitaramayya Pattabhi (Congress President), 
argued with A.C.B. Symon (UKHC) in early 1948 that ‘he and his friends were 
doing everything possible to ensure that India severed her connection with the 
United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth at the earliest possible date.’28 This 
admission is in direct contrast to Pavadya who argues that because the Constituent 
Assembly was Congress-dominated, and as Congress was dominated by the right 
there would little trouble getting the Resolution passed.29 How much the rank and 
file of Congress were kept informed is difficult to ascertain.30 Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel’s correspondence is conspicuously quiet on his take on the Commonwealth 
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until Nehru’s London visit in April 1949.31 
Immediately following Nehru’s October 1948 trip to London the British High 
Commissioner noted that Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (Governor-General) was 
‘definitely in favour of India remaining within the Commonwealth’, but ‘the looser 
and less formal the ties the better.’32 Despite bad press over Hyderabad and the 
British attitude towards Kashmir that had done nothing to help the Commonwealth’s 
case, Rajagopalachari thought ‘that Nehru might have some difficulty in persuading 
the Party to remain in the Commonwealth’, but ‘he did not seem to think that Nehru 
would be unsuccessful.’33 
The Communist Party of India (CPI) opposed a link, following Moscowʼs 
line, as did the Socialists. Jayaprakash Narayan, reaffirmed Socialist opposition as 
Nehru left for London in October 1948, arguing that it would be a betrayal of Purna 
Swaraj.34 At the 1949 National Executive, moreover, the Socialist Party reiterated 
that whilst they would support a real federation of nations ‘free from racial 
discriminations and economic exploitation, [they] cannot be a party to India 
remaining a part of the British Commonwealth.’35 The attitude of the Socialists was 
considered by Nehru before his October 1948 trip. V.P. Menon informed Shattock 
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(UKHC) that ‘Nehru was…apprehensive of the political capital which the Indian 
socialists might make out of India retaining her connection.’36 The All-India Forward 
Bloc, reorganised after Subhas Chandra Bose, passed a resolution that India should 
opt-out of the Commonwealth. The General Secretary maintained that India should 
remain neutral and should do nothing to antagonise Russia in acquiescing to the 
policy of the British Commonwealth.37 Domestic opposition to the Commonwealth 
came from competing political parties as well as some consternation within 
Congress, and in his presentation of the benefits of the link Nehru explicitly sought 
to assuage opposition fears. 
The concept employed to explain the G.O.I.’s decision to remain is that of 
India’s experience, both nationally and internationally. K.M. Panikkar, himself 
largely pro-Commonwealth, confirmed this development towards a more favourable 
view of membership when he told Mountbatten that ‘Nehru was now more firmly 
persuaded of the need for Indo-British understanding.’38 Mountbatten, as Governor-
General, provided London with suggestions on the importance of altered 
‘nomenclature’ that would allow Asian countries to remain within the 
Commonwealth.39 Whilst ‘individual Indian leaders are alive to the advantages of the 
continued Commonwealth connection,’ Mountbatten argued, ‘their political position 
has been weakened and the attitude of the Government adversely affected by the 
policy adopted towards Kashmir.’40 However, Mountbatten had ‘purposefully 
avoided discussing the subject, so far, with Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel’, although 
he was under the impression that they were among those most alive to the 
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advantages of Commonwealth membership.41 However much certain leaders were 
aware of the advantages of membership, they had to square the circle by entering in a 
way that did not alter their constitutional aims or open them to accusations of 
betraying Purna Swaraj. Information from Delhi demonstrated that at this early stage 
Krishna Menon was in favour of a link with the UK, and would continue to lobby for 
an accommodation between the two sides.42 The key question to ask is why these 
first years of Dominion status helped to persuade the G.O.I. that its interests would 
best be served by remaining within the Commonwealth. Britain attempted to ensure 
that it did nothing to antagonise India, and to demonstrate the benefits of association 
to India. 
The International Context 
Whether or not the Calcutta Youth Conference organised and initiated 
Communist revolts to start throughout Southeast Asia is a subject of intense 
historical debate, but to many contemporaries the moment was viewed as the 
beginning of an orchestrated Communist drive in Southeast Asia.43 With the victories 
of the Communist Party in China, the elucidation of the Zhdanov thesis and 
insurrection in Southeast Asia, India grew increasingly eager for stabilisation and 
increasingly fearful of international isolation. The overall stability of the region was 
threatened by the spread of Communism; Southeast Asia represented a key area of 
the world for India, and the spectre of expansionary Communism threatened nascent 
links- economic, cultural and political- between India and the region. As outlined by 
Nehru for the Indian Delegation to the UN in September 1948, ‘We are most 
intimately connected with South East Asia and we should therefore develop these 
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contacts as much as possible.’44 An expansionary Communist threat was, therefore, 
not welcomed and made it onto a list by V.P. Menon of four key contributory factors 
to India’s decision.45 This list is one of the very few discussions of the range of 
factors that entered into India’s decision-making process, and as such deserves note. 
Communist uprisings from Burma to Malaya had a sobering effect on 
Nehru’s international view, as did the violence of India’s own Communists, and by 
early 1949, Nehru described East and Southeast Asia as being in a state of ‘flux’.46 
This instability, Gordon-Walker argued, had the impact of making India realise ‘that 
isolation might be dangerous.’47 India clearly recognised the dangers of Communism 
in Southeast Asia. As Nehru told the Indian Cabinet in November 1948, ‘A link with 
the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries is desirable as in these days 
no country can profitably live in isolation.’48 The informal structure of the 
Commonwealth allowed India to avoid isolation whilst simultaneously upholding 
formal neutrality. Moreover, Britain was the only major power that had shown an 
interest in the area and especially in development as an answer to Communism. 
Vijaylakshmi Pandit informed the Congress Working Committee, discussing the 
Commonwealth in the run-up to the October 1948 meeting, that she was convinced 
that friendly relations with the UK had to be maintained: it was impossible for India 
to go to the Russian camp and the Americans would ‘use dollars and demand too 
much of a quid pro quo.’49 Attlee considered Nehru fully aware of the threat that 
Communism posed in Southeast Asia, and his Cabinet in late 1948 that Nehru ‘had 
specifically in mind the Communist threat to South-East Asia.’50 But the key issue 
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here was to ensure that entry into the Commonwealth did not appear to compromise 
either India’s neutrality or her sovereignty. In response to a Constituent Assembly 
speech on 8 March 1948, Symon reported that Nehru ‘is learning from experience in 
two directions: first that it is not possible to steer an altogether clear course between 
Scylla and Charybdis; and second, that idealism must give way to realism when 
India’s own interests are at stake.’51 The G.O.I. faced domestic hostility to close 
association with Britain and its imperial system in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, 
Nehru had to balance the demands of domestic opinion with the realities and 
responsibilities of international affairs. Nehru was no longer able to speak freely as 
he had done as a Congress spokesman, or even as freely as he had done in the 
Interim Government in 1946-47. 
The Commonwealth, Nehru hoped, would help to promote international 
stability and in the future provide other colonies with a path to follow, as Pavadya 
argues: ‘India, by declaring itself a Republic, severing her allegiance to the Crown, 
yet opting to remain in the Commonwealth, set a precedent that was availed of by 
other nations that won independence from British rule.’52 Such a precedent presented 
an alternative trajectory from formal adherence to one or other of the emerging 
power blocs, and in this way supports an argument that India was interested in an 
ʻarea of peaceʼ. Indian succession from the Commonwealth could have serious 
repercussions and damage both Indian and Commonwealth influence, both in the 
short term and in the longer term, as other colonies began to win freedom. India in 
the Commonwealth not only offered legitimacy to the organisation, but also provided 
India with international legitimacy in terms of its entry onto the world stage and with 
additional opportunities for political leadership in an Asian context. Aubrey 
Metcalfe, former Indian Foreign Secretary, assessed the future of Indian foreign 
relations and argued that outside of the Commonwealth, India ‘would suffer from the 
want of adequate expert diplomatic representation in foreign countries.’53 V.P. 
Menon, in one of the few elucidations of Indian calculations, echoed this assessment 
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in conversation with the British and referred specifically to Indian access to 
Commonwealth intelligence reports on Communism.54 The Commonwealth, in the 
same way as UN membership, assisted Indian entry onto the international stage at 
breakneck speed, which otherwise would have taken many years of pursuing the 
traditional practice of establishing missions overseas.55 The Commonwealth was an 
additional form of direct contact with leaders and an opportunity to exercise 
influence beyond the realms of bilateral or UN relations.56 The Commonwealth was 
very much a forum in which India could have a strong voice, and could attempt to 
use this to influence others in support of its position as on Indonesia. This positive 
aspect was demonstrated in October 1948 when the London Commonwealth 
conference was the occassion for wide-ranging and constructive discussion on a 
range of topics. 
Beyond international stability, defence was a key element in Indiaʼs 
Commonwealth calculations, not in terms of obligations but of benefits. Baldev 
Singh, Defence Minister, informed the Congress Working Committee that the only 
possible defence tie for India was with the UK.57 The army was staffed by senior 
British officers, and the equipment continued to be supplied by British arms 
companies and the British Government.58 Military equipment from Britain was 
essential for the continued operation and development of the armed forces and 
especially the growth of the air force and navy. V.P. Menon, moreover, argued that 
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the Chiefs of Staff made a ‘particularly powerful’ argument that Indian equipment 
was all British and that India would continue to rely on British advice for years to 
come.59 Adherence to British defence supplies was determined by both the existing 
structure of the armed forces and Indiaʼs sterling balances, and Britain had made it 
clear that the Commonwealth countries had preference over others in the supply of 
British arms.60 The sale of HMS Achilles is one prominent example, which was sold 
to India and became HMIS Delhi. On its arrival Nehru wrote that ‘This is a rather 
special occasion from the point of view of our Navy and our Armed Forces. It means 
that our little Navy in a sense grows up.’61 The central importance of fully-
functioning armed forces was reinforced by the first years of independence: 
Hyderabad, the Telengana uprisings and the conflict with Pakistan. The air force was 
crucial to the defence of India’s tenuous hold on Kashmir as in times of trouble an air 
lift might be the only way to move troops and defend Srinagar.62  Pakistan and 
Kashmir’s influence on Indiaʼs decision has been addressed by many who have 
examined the Commonwealth decision, over-emphasised by some, and there is little 
evidence that it was the defining impact on Indiaʼs decision regarding the 
Commonwealth. 
A minor issue, but one that was lauded as demonstrative of the benefits of 
Commonwealth membership, was the freedom of movement in the UK that Indians, 
and vice versa, would lose if India were to become a foreign nation.63 
Commonwealth membership was also presented by the G.O.I. as a means to help 
secure the interests of the millions of Indians in the Empire and Commonwealth, for 
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example in South Africa.64 Had India completely divorced from the Commonwealth, 
there would have been a direct impact on those of Indian origin abroad as elucidated 
by the Colonial Office: 
The fact that India had become a foreign State would make for disturbed 
political conditions in the Colonies with Indian communities should any 
substantial majority of the latter decide to become Indian nationals. Their 
disenfranchisement [relating to the colony in which they reside] would 
presumably be complete and [would result in] the creation of large alien 
blocs without political rights.65 
This would then have raised the thorny issue of the rights and status of 
India’s broadly-defined migrant population in the Indian domestic sphere, an issue 
which Nehru sought to avoid. Furthermore, opined the Colonial Office, ‘the fact that 
India had become a foreign state would reduce any restraint which membership of 
the Commonwealth could have upon Mr. Nehru’s anti-colonial policy.’66 Despite the 
protection of Indians abroad being presented as a positive benefit of membership, the 
treatment of Indians in Malaya was used to attack Nehru and the Commonwealth 
link as the Resolution passed through the Constituent Assembly. The foregoing 
factors in India’s decision were not as central as the next two, trade and sterling, 
which in turn relate to the stabilisation of Southeast Asia and in part explain Indian 
hostility to expansionary Communism. 
A large proportion of India’s external trade was with the Commonwealth: 
approximately 45 per cent, and of this, 28 per cent was conducted with the UK, 
which took 20 per cent of India’s total world trade, composed largely of inter alia 
tea, jute and leather.67 More than 60 per cent of India’s export earnings from tea, 
leather and unmanufactured tobacco came from Britain.68 Approximately 70 per cent 
of India’s exports to Britain were covered by preferences, but most of these were 
primary products like tea, which India could if needs be find alternative customers 
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for, suggests Inder Singh.69 This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the fact 
that any trade disruption would be catastrophic for Indiaʼs balance of payments and, 
therefore, the standard of living of the average Indian. British goods received 
reciprocal preferences from India and largely covered items of higher value than 
Indian products exported to Britain. For example, Britain enjoyed preferences on 
motor vehicles, chemical preparations, electrical apparatus, parts and bicycles. In 
light of Indian desire for machinery and finished goods for industrial development, 
there was little immediate risk of preferences being withdrawn when Britain was the 
only market capable of serving these needs in exchange for sterling, and in light of 
India’s fear that Britain divert capital goods to alternative markets.70 Thus, a key 
benefit India could lose if she seceded from the Commonwealth was the extant 
trading benefits in the Indo-British Trade Agreement of 1939 and imperial 
preferences.71 V.P. Menon, in demonstration of its importance, cited maintaining 
existing trade agreements as one of the four key reasons why India wished to stay in 
the Commonwealth.72 
India, furthermore, relied on sea-borne imports for a range of goods carried in 
the merchant fleet of the Commonwealth (largely UK): oil and lubricants, capital 
goods and machinery of all kinds, and certain essential raw materials.73 Jute and 
cotton were mainly produced in Pakistan, and any change in Commonwealth status 
would inevitably have an impact on this trading relationship. The British Treasury’s 
contribution to the Commonwealth debate starkly laid out the limited scope for 
Indian action; the costs of leaving the Sterling Area would have been prohibitive for 
both India and the UK.74 The Board of Trade added that it was ‘in our interest to try 
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to prevent India from going formally foreign, either by keeping her in her present 
status or, if possible, by arranging some new status which would be proof against 
most favoured nation claims from third countries.’75 
Indian business was not altogether opposed to the Commonwealth link. A 
sympathetic article on the subject in the Birla-owned Eastern Economist on 23 July 
1948 demonstrated that business, as Government, was increasingly alive to the fact 
that Britain was the best hope for continued imports in the form of releases from the 
balances.76 Of all foreign investment in India, Britain’s share was estimated at 
between £150 million and £600 million, approximately 80 per cent of the total, 
mostly in private enterprises, which provided some £20 million in invisible 
income.77 On the reverse side, these British investments represented industrial 
expertise situated in India, which was accepted by the G.O.I. in the 1948 Industrial 
Policy statement as necessary for India’s future development. India also relied on 
Western countries for trained technicians, again essential for economic 
development.78 
Since the war, there had been a persistent deficit on external trade resulting 
from the import of grain, machinery and equipment for Indian industry, the most 
developed in the East bar Japan, and consumer goods to counter rampant inflation.79 
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Britain provided vital support in the form of releases from the sterling balances. 
Much of the deficit was in dollar trade and to fund this hard currency deficit, India 
drew heavily on central reserves of the Sterling Area, and purchased almost $100 
million from the IMF in 1948-49.80 India made attempts to solve this problem, 
particularly by switching to soft currency suppliers within the Sterling Area, and 
thereby deepened immediate links and dependency of the area. 
As the President of the World Bank reported in spring 1949 ‘the food 
situation dominates any approach to the Indian problem’ and his words capture the 
core of the matter as India’s precarious balance of payments was so crucial because 
food shortage was an ever-present threat that had recently manifested itself in its 
most destructive guise of famine in Bengal.81  Moreover, at the start of 1948, within 
the context of the post-war disruption of food production, partition and the dollar 
shortage, the Finance Minister Shanmukham Chetty publicly stressed the need for 
self-sufficiency in food and argued that unless India ceased to be dependent on 
imported foodgrains she could not overcome the economic difficulties of the 
future.82 Nehru reported the severity of the situation to his Chief Ministers in 
February 1949: prior to the war the food deficit was, on average, 3 per cent, but with 
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the loss of Sind and Punjab that had risen to between 6 and 7 per cent, which was 
further compounded by a bad harvest resulting in a deficit closer to 10 per cent of 
total requirements.83 This demand translated, from April-December 1948, into a call 
of $75m out of a total deficit of $93m.84 Whilst it did not dominate negotiations for 
sterling releases, the food situation played heavily on the minds of India’s 
delegations.85 Any decline in the living standards of Indians would be disastrous for 
the Congress government, especially in the context of the nascent Cold War in Asia, 
and as Inder Singh notes, the post-war economic and political situation in India was 
fertile soil for Communism.86 
Reducing dollar expenditure on food would also release a commensurate 
amount of dollars to be spent on other imports, namely capital goods, but the 
inflation problem was further exacerbated by the shortage of foodstuffs, as Rao 
noted in 1952 ‘there has been no possibility of dealing with the inflation in the 
absence of a substantial increase in the domestic production and procurement of 
foodgrains.’87 In March 1949, one month before the Commonwealth PM’s meeting, 
Delhi pledged to eliminate the food deficit within two years, but food remained the 
key issue to be remedied when the First Five-Year Plan was formulated from April 
1950.88 What can we conclude about India’s decision making from this basic 
economic and financial information what can we conclude about? This is in part 
                                               
83
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illuminated through looking at the sterling balance negotiations that took place in the 
years before the April 1949 decision was made. 
The British came to the conclusion that ‘India’s trade is conducted in sterling, 
and it does not seem likely that she would wish to leave the Sterling Area unless she 
were impelled to do so by such a degree of political hostility to the Commonwealth 
as would induce her to ignore the possible financial consequences.’89 Reinforcing the 
British impression when speaking to the Associated Chambers of Commerce in 
Calcutta at the close of 1946, Nehru opined that the relationship with Britain could 
not be cut off suddenly and would remain ‘unless the break came in such a way as to 
poison the future.’90 Thus, India’s financial health was clearly dependent at times 
upon the Sterling Area and releases from the balances, which had a deep and 
fundamental impact on its appreciation of the Commonwealth link and therefore 
deserves attention.91 
The Accumulation of the Sterling Balances and Release Negotiations: A 
Shared Interest in Stability   
‘The very size of these sterling debts is itself a protection. The old saying 
holds. Owe your banker £1,000 and you are at his mercy; owe him £1,000,000 and 
the position is reversed.’92 John Maynard Keynes’ insight provides a starting point 
with which to consider the sterling balances in the context of the value of the 
Commonwealth link, Indo-British relations, and the importance of the Sterling Area 
and Malaya to India post-1947.93 From 1947-1949 the balances served to 
                                               
89
 Annex “C”, ʻIndia’s Future Relations with the Commonwealth, Implications for Commonwealth 
Countriesʼ, Memorandum by the Prime Minister, CP (49) 58, 14/3/1949, CAB 129/33. 
90
 Speech delivered on 16/12/1946, reported in The Statesman, 17/12/1946, p. 1. 
91
 B.N. Ganguli provides a neat précis of some of the key patterns of Indian trade in the first years of 
independence and reaffirms the importance of the Sterling Area and the benefits that India accrued 
from membership, ‘India and the Commonwealth: Economic Relations’, in Verinder Grover (ed.), 
International Relations and Foreign Policy in India, Volume 5, Great Britain, Commonwealth and 
India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1992), pp. 378-398. 
92
 Lord Keynes, ‘Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III’, WP (45) 301, 15/5/1945, CAB 66/65/51. 
93
 There is scant literature on the history of the sterling balances that takes the international politics of 
the issue as its primary focus of investigation. The existing economic literature on the balances can be 
broadly divided in to two classes: works which provide a narrative account, for example L.S. 
Pressnell, External Economic Policy Since the War, Volume One, The Post-War Financial Settlement 
(London, 1986); Benjamin Zachariah, ‘Imperial Economic Policy for India, 1942-44: Confusion and 
Readjustment’, in B. Pati (ed.), Turbulent Times, India, 1940-44 (Mumbai, 1998), pp. 185-213; B. 
Dhar, The Sterling Balances of India (Calcutta, 1956); H.A. Shannon, ʻThe Sterling Balances of the 
 Commonwealth 
 
120 
 
demonstrate the value of the Commonwealth link to India, and can also be used to 
examine the interplay of the economic and political balance of power between India 
and Britain.94 Keynes struck at the heart of the matter with his prescient words: at 
independence India had a joint stake in the stability of the Sterling Area, the empire 
and the Commonwealth, and depended on the willingness of London to release 
crucial funds from the balances. India was not, however, as powerless as at first 
seems, and exploited the knowledge that for political reasons Britain wanted India in 
the Commonwealth to extract economic concessions from an erstwhile unwilling 
Treasury. The sterling balances, accumulated during the Second World War and 
amounting to £1160 million by 1945, represented one of the most important aspects 
of the post-independence Indo-British relationship and signalled the reversal of the 
debtor-creditor position, one of the pillars of the Raj.95 Moreover, the balances 
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formed independent India’s foreign exchange reserves, crucially supported the 
balance of payments in the first years of independence and served as a vital source of 
development capital.96 
The Defence Expenditure Plan 1940 set out that His Majesty’s Government 
would pay for ‘measures taken in India for India’s local defence, and a share of 
measures “taken jointly in the interests of Indian Defence and of 
H.M.G.”’97Additionally, India produced vast quantities of essential supplies for both 
the military in India and domestic markets in Britain, which manifested itself in a 
large balance of payments surplus as British wartime exports to India declined.98 
This surplus was initially used to repatriate India’s sterling debts held in London, but 
by the outbreak of war in the Far East, the pre-war debts had been almost entirely 
repatriated just at the point when war expenditure in that field was set to increase 
dramatically.99 From this point on, Treasury gilts were deposited in the Bank of 
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England in the account of the Reserve Bank of India.100 The Chancellor, Kingsley 
Wood, supported by Churchill, consequently argued in Cabinet for a readjustment of 
the payment arrangements in July 1942, stating that ‘from now onwards India is 
likely to increase her sterling balances…we are likely to become heavily indebted to 
India.’101 The erosion of Britain’s foreign capital and the accumulation of debts to 
India caused considerable consternation in London. The Cabinet heeded the advice 
of Leo Amery, and Linlithgow, the Viceroy, who both argued against the Treasury 
and Churchill’s idea of a revision of the settlement at that point, citing the disastrous 
potential political ramifications in India.102 Churchill, however, remained opposed to 
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the April 1940 settlement and the idea that Britain had paid for the defence of India 
only at the war’s end to be told to clear out and still owe India a vast sum of 
money.103 India’s balances remained under discussion for the rest of the war; further 
memoranda were submitted to Cabinet and a Standing Committee on the Indian 
Financial Question was established, which raised the fear in India that the debts 
would be rescaled or cancelled at the war’s end.104 Moreover, with the failed 
attempts of the Indian delegation to get the question of the balances included at 
Bretton Woods, it was clear that the issue would have to be settled bilaterally.105 
A constant theme throughout the debates over the accumulation of sterling 
was an attempt by Amery and the G.O.I. to disarm Treasury criticism by 
emphasising that the balances could be controlled and released at Britain’s 
discretion, and that they could bring benefits to the British economy in terms of 
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secured markets.106 On the political side, Amery argued that the balances may have 
been ‘the best guarantee of continued economic relations with India…and a real help 
in keeping India within the British Commonwealth.’107 At the war’s end, the issue of 
the balances had to be resolved against the backdrop of the transfer of power and in 
the wider context of the post-war financial settlement and the UK’s and India’s 
parlous economic condition.108 As Amery noted, ‘the real problem…will not be how 
to find the money with which to discharge a debt, but how to make sure that the 
spending of that money by its recipients after the war shall not damage our financial 
structure or frustrate our efforts to balance our trade by excessive immediate calls 
upon us for goods and services without an equivalent return in essential imports.’109 
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There was, however, neither a readjustment of the 1940 settlement, nor a counter-
claim made against India as the political ramifications of such a move, especially of 
jeopardising Indian entry into the Commonwealth, militated against attempting to 
reduce the debt. The fear of such a move did not, however, soften in India and 
remained ever-present in dealings over the balances after independence. 
Wartime expenditure had an immediate and pernicious effect on India 
through shortages and rampant inflation causing severe hardships, and as such the 
exploitative nature of the accumulation of the balances (India had no say in its 
declaration of war) added a moral dimension to the settlement of the balances.110 The 
balances entered Indian nationalistsʼ central lexicon of British exploitation alongside 
the drain theory, and thus added to the need for the post-colonial government to 
secure generous releases of the money so painfully earned during the war years.111 
For India, the balances were not a war debt, nor a contribution under the banner of 
lend-lease, but an extracted duty levied on an impoverished country to pay for a war 
declared by Britain without their consent. Moreover, the sum was serviced at a very 
low rate of interest.112 To make the goods and services available to the UK, argued 
the leading industrialist G.D. Birla, India underwent ‘self-denial verging on 
starvation…there were millions who died of famine.’113 
The post-war release of the funds was by a series of negotiated agreements 
with the British, and the release over a long period of time, due to British penury, 
rather than in the form of a lump sum, necessitated a continued Indian interest in the 
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stability of the Sterling Area. Moreover, the prospect of unilateral cancellation was 
both politically fraught with danger and could have fundamentally undermined 
confidence in sterling.114 However, Michael Lipton and John Firn’s assertion that the 
situation was ‘resolved after the election of the labour Government in 1945, and an 
agreement was quickly reached – to release the sterling balances in instalments’, 
fails to consider the interaction of the political and economic factors that resulted in 
hard bargaining between the two sides.115 B.R. Tomlinson also fails to fully address 
the political utility of the sterling balances.116 This research serves to re-orientate the 
analysis of sterling away from Tomlinson’s 1985 article which is taken as the 
seminal text on the balances and addresses the Anglo-centric focus of treatment of 
the sterling balances.117 
One key aspect neglected in the existing historiography is that India was 
deeply concerned about the swift run down of the balances, concluding that if a high 
rate of releases continued there would be little left to fund the first of India’s future 
development plans. As John Matthai, the Finance Minister, explained ‘if we expend 
our capital resources at the pace at which we have been expending them, easily and 
quite probably the sterling balances will get exhausted before we knew where we 
were.’118 In 1950, Matthai ‘made it clear that there can be no question of any scaling 
down of these balances and they must be fully available for restoring the health to 
our economy.’119 The All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution in 
September 1945 opposing the scaling down of the balances and stressing the reserves 
would be used for development.120 Public announcements that India wanted 
reasonable drawings  was at once both economically sound, and served as a 
rhetorical device to defend from public criticism of lower than expected releases. 
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The likelihood of India remaining within the Sterling Area, at the least, is 
illuminated through looking at the sterling balance negotiations that took place in the 
years before the April 1949 decision was made. Membership of the Sterling Area did 
not automatically entail full Commonwealth membership, or vice versa, but entry 
was needed if India was to have a voice in deciding Area policy through the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meetings.121 Moreover, if India was in the 
Commonwealth then this politicised its membership of the Sterling Area, making it 
more difficult to treat economic questions on solely economic grounds. 
India was in a difficult economic position post-war and post-partition and 
needed the benefits of the Sterling Area, the chances of India voluntarily opting to 
leave the area were low and in this way, in reclaiming its debts, India depended upon 
the colonial empire for its sustenance. There are two factors that have to be kept in 
mind in reference to the settlement of the sterling balances, and the first was to 
achieve equilibrium in dollar trade. The key, according to British thinking, was to 
restore the pre-war patterns of trade with the Far East: Malaya’s earnings in 
particular cancelled out deficits within the Sterling Area as a whole.122 India’s 
demands have to be seen in this context of the dollar convertibility crisis, which 
lasted from 15 July to 20 August 1947.123 Despite the need to earn dollars, Britain 
accepted the need for capital exports to India and on this point Tomlinson is 
vague.124 London explicitly informed high commissioners around the world in 
December 1947 that they intended to ‘as far as we can…assist both Dominions in 
their plans for economic development.’125 With the explicit aim of stabilising India 
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through industrial development and building her military capability, the conclusion 
was reached that Britain should ‘do all we can to provide capital goods.’126 The 
second factor to consider is that in Article 10 of the American loan agreement of 
1945, the UK agreed to negotiate to ‘adjust’ the sterling balances with the consent of 
the holders. 
 The First Interim Settlement, 1947 
As the time of the transfer of power approached, access to the sterling 
balances had to be negotiated between Britain and India.127 Mountbatten forwarded 
Nehru’s request that any agreement take into account the projected balance of 
payments deficit (£40 million, largely for food imports) and stressed the function of 
such a move in building a positive relationship and the need to ‘increase the goodwill 
that we are all working so hard to build up.’128 Goodwill, as Nehru had previously 
told the British, was essential if India was to remain in the Commonwealth.129 In the 
context of the economic trauma of war, partition and the domestic political situation 
in India, the Chancellor Hugh Dalton authorised £35 million, and only £15 million 
was expected to be needed for dollar purchases.130 The Indian delegation had asked 
for £48.5  million, but this was deemed to be excessive by London in light of their 
economic situation, and Nehru had only asked for £40 million in his entreaties.131 
Listowel spoke in India’s favour highlighting the need for food, and a reasonable 
release so as not to jeopardise India’s future membership of the Commonwealth.132 
Despite the dire debacle of the convertibility crisis, India successfully secured 
generous releases of dollars and sterling to last until the next set of negotiations in 
January 1948.133 The Statesman’s key argument in their editorial was that ‘this 
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agreement will assure India’s essential food imports.’134 In light of Article 10 of the 
American loan agreement, however, the British Government refused to relinquish 
their right to readjust the balances and no agreement was made between the two 
sides as to the total sum of the balances without cancellations or adjustment.135 
Following the agreement, Shanmukham Chetty took the opportunity to spell 
out India’s plans for the balances and raised the issue in his 1947 interim budget 
speech following partition.136 ‘Rapid depletion’ of sterling, Chetty told the Assembly, 
‘caused some anxiety to the Government.’137 Chetty bemoaned the import of 
‘unessential’ and ‘luxury’ goods as frittering away resources and thereby reducing 
‘pro tanto the capacity of this country to finance capital and developmental 
expenditure abroad.’138 The aim of the Government, Chetty continued, was to 
finance day-to-day expenditure through earnings from exports: ‘we should draw 
upon these accumulated reserves, broadly speaking, only for the purpose of 
purchasing capital goods.’139 This aim, however, was difficult to realise in the 
economic context where the balances were used to support the balance of payments. 
Chetty announced a more restrictive import policy, and it was this policy that the 
British successfully won exemptions from during subsequent balance negotiations. 
January/February 1948: The ‘Difficult Wicket’140 
Following the convertibility crisis, the Sterling Area became a discriminatory 
bloc once more with dollar-pooling and rationing re-introduced.141 Within this 
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context, India and Britain met to discuss the balances for the first time since India’s 
independence; however, despite a relatively healthy sterling surplus by the beginning 
of 1948, India had overspent her $60 million 1947 limit by approximately $90 
million.142 In this context, Jeremy Raisman led the British delegation in Delhi to 
negotiate releases of sterling and, more importantly, dollars.143 The Indian aim at 
these talks was to secure reasonable releases of dollars for the upcoming six month 
period to support their balance of payments.144 The British aim was to secure as 
small a release of dollars as possible commensurate with maintaining friendly 
political relations, and maintaining trade links and safeguarding British economic 
interests in India. The British were caught between several competing priorities: dire 
financial, in particular dollar, position; the need to maintain close political ties with 
India, through the Commonwealth, and the need to preserve trading links with ‘a 
country which is usually our largest single market.’145   
Narahari Rao, Indian delegation leader, sought to assuage British fears of 
Indian profligacy and to maintain releases by informing the British that the Indian 
cabinet ‘are most anxious to maintain the agreement in its existing form, particularly 
as regards the formal convertibility of releases and the steady utilisation of the 
balances.’146 In doing so, Rao exposed the long-term importance of the balances for 
the Indian state. At the same time, Rao attempted to present a responsible Indian 
attitude to the dollar issue as he claimed that India was now as ready to share the 
burden of limiting dollars as the rest of the Sterling Area.147 The admission of 
anxiety by the Indian delegation also exposed their fear of the cancellation or scaling 
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down of the balances as had been floated during the war, which was an ever present 
aspect of the negotiations.148 The convertibility crisis made the British initially 
intransigent on the issue of a generous release of dollars on the basis of the severe 
shortage in the dollar pool: ‘the basic fact is that we are not (repeat not) in a position 
to afford continuance of drawings by India upon reserves of sterling area to finance 
her dollar deficit.’149 
The negotiations reached a point of breakdown with the potential outcome of 
having to put India out of the Sterling Area. Raisman reminded London that if too 
harsh a treatment was insisted upon then ‘India’s succession form the Sterling Area 
would be bound to have its influence on the question of her continued status as a 
member of the Commonwealth.’150 Symon supported Raisman’s assessment, 
reporting that he found ‘it hard to believe that the amount of hard currency which is 
at stake…can weigh seriously in the balance against the harm to our political and 
economic interests which would result from a break with India.’151 As India 
threatened to leave the Sterling Area and despite its earlier assertions, the Treasury 
was persuaded to act generously by the potential political fall-out of punishing India. 
Stringent dollars releases, it was argued by the delegation and the CRO, could 
jeopardise future Indian entry into the Commonwealth.152 The CRO argued that if 
India was to leave, or be pushed out of the Sterling Area, then it ‘would receive a 
strong push towards quitting the Commonwealth.’153 This connection between the 
Sterling Area and the Commonwealth was at the heart of the importance of the 
sterling balances. India, too, was banking on the political value of its continued 
Commonwealth membership outweighing the cost of its hard currency requirements, 
and they were ultimately correct in their assumption as under the pressure of 
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circumstances London eventually agreed to generous dollar releases for India for a 
six month period. London, however, managed to secure concessions from India. 
First, India was to cover half of its own dollar deficit by drawing on the IMF; India 
agreed to join the Sterling Area Statistical Committee to monitor her balance of 
payments, and most importantly the releases of sterling were made in light of the fact 
that India endeavoured to relax import restrictions. This relaxation sought to ensure 
that more British consumer and other goods in ready supply could enter India outside 
of its restrictive import licensing scheme, which also had the effect of absorbing 
purchasing power with consumer goods helping to ease inflation in India.154 This 
potentially politically sensitive undertaking was taken as a gentleman’s agreement, 
with no official mention of it in public, and it was not included in the terms of the 
agreement primarily to protect the G.O.I. and the agreement from becoming a point 
of criticism, and to lessen the impression of Indian weakness.155 Indian dependence 
on British capital good supplies was determined by the large store of sterling and the 
dearth of dollars, and one further aspect exposed by the Indian delegation, and one 
that ran throughout each subsequent negotiation, was the grave concern lest Britain 
divert capital exports to other (dollar earning) markets.156 
Indian public opinion followed the balances negotiations and Rao argued that 
the stringent dollar allowances had to be accompanied by a more generous release of 
sterling for presentation purposes.157 Britainʼs High Commissioner echoed this 
sentiment reporting that Chetty had concerns that they would be unable to defend 
small releases of dollars in the Constituent Assembly.158  India also began to engage 
with its responsibility to ensure the viability of the Sterling Area, as demonstrated 
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through its expressed willingness to conserve dollars and joining the Sterling Area 
Statistical Committee. Furthermore, for all the heated exchanges, India at no time 
left the Sterling Area, reflecting its dependence on access to the benefits of sterling 
and the balances. Although India did threaten to leave, there is no way of 
ascertaining the intent behind these threats, rather it is argued that the threats were a 
key bargaining technique. India’s access to the sterling balances and convertible 
dollars ensured its import programme for the next six months. In sum, India received 
its allowance and remained in the Sterling Area. 
The issue of the balances on Commonwealth membership was a key 
determinant in the financial decision, but Britain also got concessions in terms of 
relaxation of import licences. Both sides moderated their initial positions: India’s 
financial needs were to an extent met by Britain, not on financial grounds, but out of 
the need to avoid a break with India. India bargained its way to a generous 
settlement, and both sides accepted that the alternative of leaving the Sterling Area 
was not an option. 
In the summer of 1948, India and Britain once again met with the specific 
aim of settling a new agreement for the sterling balances. To place the financial 
situation into context, India’s balance of payments in sterling was approaching 
equilibrium,159 and the Treasury calculated that India had approximately £87 million 
credit in her No. 1 sterling balance account and could afford to import all that she 
needed from her current earnings for the rest of the year.160 India went to London 
with the aim of securing a three year agreement to ensure stability in her import 
policy, a healthy dollar ration and continued capital goods exports until 1951. India’s 
opening gambit to the British goes some way to reveal her dependence on the 
balances: India proposed a shopping list of approximately £800 million, mainly 
capital goods, over three years.161 This represented the bulk of its remaining sterling 
balances, but was an opening bargaining offer rather than a final demand and the 
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Indian delegation then suggested £250 million, half to be convertible, over the course 
of three years.162 India remained firmly wedded to the idea of a three year agreement, 
preferring lower releases for the stability of a settlement to support her import 
programme.163 Britain was initially unwilling to acquiesce to Indian demands. 
However, to avert a breakdown Cripps stepped in to discuss the matter with Chetty, 
and after some hard bargaining a compromise agreement was reached.164 India 
settled for lower releases, but achieved a three year settlement with a verbal British 
commitment to keep capital goods exports at approximately £35 million a year. This 
addressed Indian fears expressed in January, and Britain informally agreed to further 
help in the third year if necessary and if the supply of capital goods in the UK had 
increased. The British provided higher releases over more than their guide timeframe 
of one year, but ensured Indian adherence to the Sterling Area and avoided political 
storms. The final agreement was agreed by Cripps and Chetty on 24 June 1948.165 
As for hard currency, £15 million for dollars was released from the central 
reserves and the remainder of the deficit was again to be met by drawings from the 
IMF.166 This quota was annual and so had to be renegotiated in a year’s time: spring 
1949. As in February 1948, India verbally agreed to further relax import restrictions 
to allow entry to British goods in ample supply.167 The connection between releases 
and import restrictions was again kept informal so as to avoid the misconception in 
public that the British had extorted concessions from India in return for balance 
releases. Despite at the time having surplus sterling, India achieved its three year 
settlement with releases in the second and third years and a healthy dollar ration, but 
its demands were moderated by no additional releases in the first year. The British 
achieved no immediate releases, but had to acquiesce to India’s demands for a three 
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year deal.168 These terms were based on the immediate political need for a token 
release and longer term estimates of India’s financial requirements.169 
Indian public opinion had to be considered as the Indian delegation would be 
open to criticism if they returned to Delhi with seemingly meagre releases. The 
eventual 1948 agreement was in any case widely criticised in India.170 The sterling 
balances were an emotive issue in India, and as Zachariah notes there was much 
resentment that Britain was unable to fully satisfy Indian demands for capital goods, 
or dollars.171 There was, however, an appreciation of British difficulties by the G.O.I. 
as opposed to public perceptions of rough treatment from the UK.172 The Indian 
delegation, therefore, faced the task of securing sufficiently generous releases to 
satisfy Indian public opinion, against which had to be balanced the increasing Indian 
concern that the balances were being drawn down at too high a rate.173 
The immediate political nature of the agreement is further revealed in letters 
between Cripps and Nehru who opined that ‘We appreciate the spirit in which these 
negotiations have been carried on and I trust that this will result in promoting further 
good-will between India and England. There is a fund of good-will and the 
Mountbatten’s, as I wrote to you, have added greatly to it.’174 The balances 
represented more than simply a transfer of funds and came to be both a core 
component of the residual post-colonial relationship and a key factor in India’s 
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decision to remain within both the Sterling Area and Commonwealth. As Nehru told 
Mountbatten, an agreement would lead to better understanding between the two 
countries ‘while lack of agreement would have had the opposite result.’175 It was not 
simply the bare economic facts that influenced Indian actions, but the realisation that 
productive negotiation and discussion could take place and result with a favourable 
outcome. From the British point of view ‘looked at in the broadest way the sterling 
balances are clearly one of the major factors likely to influence our relations with 
India.’176 The handling of the sterling balances demonstrated the benefits of 
association with the Sterling Area, and through this the Commonwealth, at a time 
when India’s membership was under examination. 
The Indian Cabinet accepted the proposals, and was eager to confirm that 
further advances may be necessary in the third year as an informal and friendly 
understanding between the two governments, dependent upon the circumstances in 
the third year.177 Nehru thus reminded Cripps that ‘you may in fact be able to do 
more in the way of capital goods. We hope that if these difficulties appear in the third 
year, as they well might, your Government will be able to help us with further 
advances.’178 Cripps assuaged Nehru’s anxiety: ‘I hope that what I arranged with 
Chetty will deal with the point that you raise. That was its intention.’179 Nehru was 
aware that certain parts of the agreement were likely to be criticised and noted that 
‘indeed we were not happy in regard to some parts.’180 Nevertheless, Nehru accepted 
the agreement as reasonable for ‘there has been no scaling down’, the ever-present 
Indian fear, and ‘we shall get adequate releases in the course of the next three years 
for our projects.’181 
What can again be ascertained from the negotiations is India’s dependence on 
the sterling balances, its membership of the Sterling Area, and also India’s 
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determination to utilise the balances for development purposes even before the first 
five-year plan had been formulated. Furthermore, it demonstrated London’s 
willingness to avert political breakdown at the expense of financial prudency, and by 
agreeing to a three year time frame the issue of the balances was, albeit temporarily, 
settled so that it held less potential for criticism as India continued to consider its 
future status within the Commonwealth. Nehru was fully aware that the UK was 
eager to retain India in the Commonwealth and exploited this knowledge in seeking 
favourable sterling balance releases. Cripps provided the Commons with a statement 
on the balances, which serves as a suitable précis: ‘negotiations, though naturally 
difficult owing to the pressing needs of both countries, were conducted in a spirit of 
mutual co-operation and understanding, which…augurs well for the future 
relationship between our countries.’182   
April/May 1949: Indian Overspend and Reward 
Despite the three year agreement, a serious deterioration in India’s financial 
position, in both sterling and dollars, necessitated further assistance from Britain in 
the form of additional releases. Unlike any other set of negotiations, however, India’s 
membership of the Commonwealth had been agreed in April 1949, and was to be 
ratified mid-May by the Constituent Assembly. The upcoming negotiations were 
briefly mentioned during the Constituent Assembly debate on the Resolution when 
Shri H.V. Kamath hoped that ‘the Financial delegation…will be able to prevail-upon 
the UK Government to follow a more honest policy with regard to our sterling 
balances.’183 
India’s continued membership of the Commonwealth resulted in favourable 
financial treatment as they received all of the assistance needed to rectify their 
sterling overspend of some £90 million as opposed to agreed limit of £40 million.184 
By May 1949 even the Treasury conceded that ‘from the political point of view we 
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have to take into consideration the necessity of showing sympathetic consideration to 
Indian needs, in view of her continued membership of the Commonwealth’ and it 
also recognised India’s importance as a stabilising element in Southeast Asia.185 In 
discussing the Indian overspend, the British Overseas Negotiating Committee (ONC) 
agreed that ‘India, unlike such Commonwealth countries as Australia…thought more 
of privileges than of the responsibilities of being in the SA’ but ‘as we wished to 
keep her in the Commonwealth, we could not threaten to exclude her from the 
sterling area’186 In other words they used the sterling balances to demonstrate the key 
benefits of Commonwealth membership. The balances served to encourage Indian 
entry into the Commonwealth and then served as a means to demonstrate the benefits 
of association. 
The British agreed to cover India’s sterling overspend, caused partly by a 
relaxation of import licences pushed for by Britain in 1948, and to keep India’s 
working balance at £30 million whatever the cost during a so-called tapering-off 
period to avoid economic dislocation. They also agreed to release £50 million in 
each of the next two years.187 As a quid pro quo, however, India agreed exemptions 
from a re-tightening of the import licences for certain goods, which enabled Britain 
to continue with their export target to India of £120 million per annum.188 India had 
also overspent its dollar allocation by 50 per cent, which Britain waived rather than 
asking for reimbursement.189 
In addition, part of India’s decision rested on the fact that full membership of 
the Commonwealth, rather than just the Sterling Area, had the benefit of giving India 
a voice in deciding Sterling Area economic policies. The Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers’ Meetings, where policy was formed, was only open to members of the 
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Commonwealth. Cripps, for example, described the 1949 Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers’ Conference as a ‘Commonwealth conference and not a sterling area 
conference.’190 In this way India gained representation at the highest table, and 
satisfied demands of its equality with other members of the Commonwealth. 
India had to further demonstrate that it could act in the best interests of 
sterling rather than India alone in light of the continued drain of dollars. The British 
approach was to use the offers of cuts by other Commonwealth countries at the 
Finance Ministersʼ Meeting in July 1949 to ‘make it morally incumbent on India to 
agree to similar cuts.’191 Following the British example, the Commonwealth pledged 
to cut dollar expenditure by 25 per cent from the 1948 figure.192 India also agreed to 
limit dollar expenditure in line with these efforts, and demonstrated its willingness to 
co-operate as a fully independent sovereign nation in the Commonwealth. India’s co-
operation struck Cripps, and despite their dollar overspend of $84 million, he vetoed 
the idea of any formal dollar quota and instead awarded India full access to the 
Empire Dollar Pool.193 Despite the overspend India not only gained full access to the 
dollar pool but Britain also let the overspend pass without calls for a reimbursement. 
The Reserve Bank of India estimated that India was allowed to draw $140-150 
million as opposed to only $60 million the previous year, which reduced India’s need 
for IMF funding.194 Cripps argued that as India agreed to cut dollars, along with the 
rest of the Commonwealth, to impose a dollar ration would be unacceptable.195 
Cripps’ decision was, however, based on its political rather than economic rationale 
as he noted that it ‘seemed likely that this decision would improve our relations with 
India.’196 India was now a fully integrated member of the Sterling Area, a full 
member of the Commonwealth and contributed to measures to strengthen sterling. 
The future of India’s sterling balances from this point on became closely linked to 
the Colombo Plan of 1950 for the economic development of South and Southeast 
Asia. 
                                               
190
 ‘The Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Conference’, EPC (49) 79, 9/7/1949, CAB 134/222. 
191
 Minutes of UK Officials Meeting, 29/6/1949, L/E/9/332. 
192
 See ‘Meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers’, Memorandum by the President of the 
Board of Trade, CP (49) 160, 21/7/1949, CAB 129/36. 
193
 ONC (49) 60th Meeting, 28/7/1949, L/E/9/332. 
194
 Simha, The Reserve Bank of India, Volume 1, 1935-51, p. 627. 
195
 Cripps, ONC (49) 60th Meeting, 28/7/1949, L/E/9/332. 
196
 Ibid. 
 Commonwealth 
 
140 
 
Through this examination it is possible to see India not simply as a powerless 
dependent of Britain, but as a proactive state that utilised its political significance to 
advance its material requirements whilst simultaneously acknowledging that 
adherence to the Sterling Area and through it the Commonwealth was of vital 
importance to India’s economic stability. The balance negotiations demonstrated to 
India that as a member of both the Sterling Area and the Commonwealth it would 
receive financial and economic support. Persistent overspend and reward showed 
India that even though it was unable to balance its payments there was a clearly 
politically driven aspect to sterling releases. Britain treated India generously, though 
not too generously, and economic decisions at every stage of the negotiation process 
were influenced to a large degree by the need to keep India in the Commonwealth 
and this was not lost on India. 
Balance releases enabled India to begin its plans for economic development 
without seeking considerable assistance from either of the two superpowers. On a 
more basic level, the release of sterling covered crucial imports of food, raw 
materials and capital goods. Charrier notes that ‘the degree of Indian dependence 
upon the sterling balances is evident from the fact that in 1948/1949, 79% of the 
central government’s balance of payments deficit with all countries (£165 million) 
was financed by releases by the sterling balances.’197 This analysis is too 
reductionist, however, as it was not simply about covering balance of payments, but 
also controlling inflation and the proportion of capital goods refers to the 
development imperative. The crucial aspect was dollars and a continual stream of 
capital goods from Britain. Furthermore, at the time of the summer 1948 agreement 
India had a surplus in her external trade. India’s membership of the Commonwealth 
was not simply a case of India attempting to secure more generous releases, as Inder 
Singh and Brown argue, because India was concerned about the balance run down. 
India wanted the capital goods that, thanks to the dollar shortage, only British 
industry could provide, and deduced that she would have more chance of getting a 
sustainable level of capital goods if an active and equal member of the Sterling Area 
and Commonwealth. In view of the improbability of India agreeing to any form of 
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commercial treaty with the UK, the sterling balances also worked as a means of 
assuring British assets in India were treated with due respect, and increased the 
likelihood of Indian membership of the Commonwealth, thus preserving trading 
benefits.  
India had already made it clear in January 1948 that leaving the Sterling Area 
was not a favoured action, although it had made vague threats, and so required some 
form of political assurance against possible reprisals from Britain if overspend 
reoccurred. Membership of the Commonwealth would politicise any actions taken 
regarding the Sterling Area.198  Britain was the ‘lender of last resort’ for India – and 
exercised this role several times and India had to ensure that Britain remained 
willing to support its balance of payments when necessary. To that end, India did 
attempt to moderate her spending and attempt to act as a responsible member of 
Sterling Area. Despite feeling that she had not been treated as generously as she 
would have liked in January 1948, India remained within the Sterling Area, a 
decision moderated by the increasing realisation of India’s economic dependence on 
sterling.199 
India’s membership of the Sterling Area determined her financial relations, 
and strictly speaking Commonwealth membership did not determine financial 
benefits.200 However, the Sterling Area was in essence the financial and economic 
manifestation of the political Commonwealth. The Sterling Area on its own could 
have served the fundamental financial needs of India, but would do so without 
providing any political influence or clout in Area decision-making. India 
acknowledged that as a full member of both the Commonwealth and the Sterling 
Area it would be in a better position to influence issues of national interest. By 
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joining the Commonwealth India gained a seat at the top table, both in terms of 
general political policy and in economic management. Commonwealth membership 
was in essence conflated with that of the Sterling Area; the economics and politics 
could not be simply separated. Moreover, if India joined the Commonwealth it 
would be harder to eject her from the Sterling Area if the need arose for fear of 
precipitating her departure from the Commonwealth. 
India’s interest in the integral stability of sterling, moreover, needs to be 
emphasised more fully than historians have previously acknowledged. Without 
markets and customers, India’s membership of the Sterling Area would bring her no 
benefits, in much the same way, as if India had nowhere to spend her balances then 
they too would bring little bonus. The Sterling Area physically had to be defended, 
and the value of Sterling also had to be defended, both of which India realised after 
the transfer of power. Britain was fundamentally as generous with balances as 
commensurate with financial stability and ensuring a positive trade relationship, 
much of which was based on the political need to keep India within the 
Commonwealth and the Sterling Area and to emphasise that India’s endowment 
fundamentally rested on the success of the rest of the Sterling Area and 
Commonwealth.201 India received preferential treatment because of her political 
value, her potential influence in Southeast Asia and her position as Britain’s largest 
single market. It is the interplay between these two sides that is the core of this 
section and it serves to place the Commonwealth decision within a longer time frame 
than is commonly applied. 
However, Attlee’s message to Parliament in light of the worsening economic 
situation in the UK at the end of October 1949 once again raised the fear of some 
form of readjustment of the balances and also explicitly links the balances with 
stability for the first time: 
Undoubtedly this is a strain on us. It is obviously quite impossible that we 
should pay off these sterling balances. At the same time, to close down 
right away on them would be to ignore all their wants. We have very great 
interests in trying to preserve peace and stability, especially in Southeast 
Asia…We shall have to be far tighter in the future…as was said by my Rt. 
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Hon. and Learned Friend [Cripps] in Washington there must come a 
settlement of all these things.202 
This settlement in many ways came together in the form of the Colombo Plan. 
Whilst India’s releases were not formally tied to the Plan, India saw this as the best 
opportunity to secure continued funding over a long period without risk of British 
cancellation and as a contribution to stemming the tide of Communism in South and 
Southeast Asia. The final balance agreement that regularised payments for six years 
from 1951 was ultimately linked to  the Colombo Plan. 
Having explored the material factors behind India’s willingness to remain in 
the Sterling Area, it is necessary to examine the negotiations for Indian entry into the 
Commonwealth as a Republic. This is not, however, an intricate constitutional 
history of India’s entry into the Commonwealth. The key issue was not the principle 
of membership as this was largley decided by the factors discussed above, but the 
terms on which India joined, and in shifting focus to this aspect of the case study it is 
possible to reinforce the argument that India was far more concerned with 
membership, and this in turn reinforces the arguments based on India’s joining out of 
a combination of necessity and active pursuit of its national interests. 
Attlee initiated contact with Nehru in March 1948 ‘in order to start a 
discussion as to the future relationship of India and the Commonwealth.’203 
Emphasising that the Commonwealth was ‘in effect the Commonwealth of British 
and Asiatic nations’, Attlee conceded that ‘it may well be that the title should be 
changed, but it is my hope that the reality will remain.’204 His purpose was to 
ascertain if ‘there is any real objection to the continuance of India in the British 
Commonwealth owing to the common allegiance to the Crown.’205 Nehru’s response 
was nebulous and claimed that there were strong views and so he was ‘not 
attempting an answer at this stage.’206 The overall tone of Nehru’s letter indicated 
hope for India remaining in based partly on British policy toward India and the 
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Mountbattens’ charm. Nehru ended that ‘I shall not say much more at this stage 
except to repeat the hope that India and England will be closely associated to their 
mutual advantage. In a world full of conflict and difficulty this is even more 
necessary that in might have been at any other time.’207 Attlee reinforced the 
message of his last communication, highlighting the flexibility of the 
Commonwealth and his belief that in these matters ‘informal exchange of view 
between Prime Ministers is useful. Once these matters get into the hands of the 
constitutional lawyers on either side, there is a danger of rigid positions being taken 
up.’208 
As the scheduled October 1948 meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
approached, the Congress Working Committee decided that the Indian Cabinet was 
the only body to come to the final decision.209 At the October 1948 meeting, Nehru 
was expected to sound out opinion in London and then return to report to Congress 
and the Cabinet.210 On his return to India Nehru was keen to stress that no decisions 
or undertakings had been made, and that the Constituent Assembly would have the 
final say in the matter.211 Nehru attempted to calm any rank and file Congress fears 
that India’s independence was at threat by assuring them that the Objectives 
Resolution still held and India would become a sovereign republic.212 After Congress 
had formally given their consent, the negotiations entered Nehru’s remit of control, 
but that does not mean that he was not mindful of his actions. There was some 
hesitation and suspicion among Congress members, Nehru told Krishna Menon, but 
he thought that it would not be too difficult to get membership through.213 The 
Congress Working Committee, Congress Party and Cabinet were kept abreast of the 
general principles, but as Nehru told Krishna Menon, he would not go into details.214   
No commitments had been made at the October Conference, but Ten Points 
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were drafted by senior Labour members and Nehru, and these points represented a 
starting point for setting out terms for India’s continued membership of the 
Commonwealth. They were also written before the Jaipur Session of the All India 
Congree Committee formally agreed to a connection. However, on further inspection 
the draft Ten Points contained insufficient links between the Commonwealth, Crown 
and India to justify in international law the substance of the Commonwealth link.215 
Lord Jowitt, like Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, was anxious to 
avoid any sense that the Commonwealth was throwing India out, but the Ten Points, 
he was advised, were not legally sufficient.216 
Norman Brook,217 British Cabinet Secretary, advised that the only other 
options to provide a stronger India-Commonwealth link would be either to accept 
that the King has some jurisdiction in respect of India’s external affairs, or that the 
King was Head of the Commonwealth.218 Nehru was informed that his Ten Points 
were insufficient on 16 November 1948, that Britain was investigating the position 
and that India should do the same.219 Nehru responded to the UK High 
Commissioner that he had drawn up the Points with Cripps, and that the latter had 
opined that whilst there may be some legal difficulty it was important that 
technicalities not be allowed to override broader political considerations.220 Attlee 
had the same attitude, as expressed when he wrote to Nehru in March 1948,221 but as 
the High Commissioner responded ‘the legal objections put forward were not mere 
technicalities but matters of substance.’222 Pursuing Commonwealth membership on 
the basis of the Ten Points would have left the terms of admission, and thus the 
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substance of links, open to attack from foreign nations challenging the validity of 
Commonwealth economic links. As Attlee again reiterated to Nehru in delivering the 
news of the Ten Points: 
Our objective here remains…exactly as it was. We want India to remain 
within the Commonwealth, and we believe in the light of the talks that you 
and I and other Ministers have had in London, that India herself shares that 
view provided an acceptable basis can be found.223 
Various proposals were made after the rejection of the Ten Points; for 
example, the possibility of diplomats receiving their credentials in the name of the 
King was even raised in earlier conversations with Bajpai, who thought that it was a 
possibility.224 The Crown link was expressed in this way when Commonwealth 
Ministers met in Paris on 17 November 1948.225 Bajpai communicated the substance 
of the conversation to Nehru: 
We have been thinking in terms of Commonwealth citizenship as link of 
association among Commonwealth countries…It is not suggested that India 
should not be sovereign republic or that Head of State should be other that 
President elected according to the provisions of Indian constitution. What is 
suggested is that as symbol of Commonwealth association authority to 
appoint Heads of Missions abroad should derive from the King. This could 
be achieved by permanent delegation by King to President of Indian 
Republic of power to appoint Heads of Missions.226     
Following this telegram and the rejection of his Ten Points, and facing 
continued opposition from the Congress Parliamentary Party not to jeopardise Indian 
sovereignty, Nehru wrote to Krishna Menon: 
The very point the United Kingdom wishes to emphasise for legal or 
sentimental reasons is objected to here. Most people are prepared to accept 
the common citizenship idea plus a declaration that we are in the 
Commonwealth. If you go beyond this, there is difficulty…Our people 
want to make it perfectly clear that they are making a new start and that, as 
the Constitution will itself declare, sovereignty resides in the people and in 
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no one else in any shape or form.227 
The rejection was unexpected as Nehru had written to Krishna Menon, informing 
him that he was discussing membership with the Congress, Cabinet and Congress 
Working Party, and if the response from all three was favourable, Nehru reasoned, 
then he could inform Attlee.228 Despite Cabinet opposition to the substance of the 
Ten Points, Nehru followed with an Eight Point plan, and emphasised that the issue 
was political and not legal.229 However, these points were quickly rejected as again 
providing an inadequate basis to the relationship, and through the points it was clear 
that no substantial link to the Crown would be accepted.230 Despite this legalistic 
wrangling, the All-India Congress Committee Jaipur Session, December 1948, 
endorsed the prospect of India remaining within the Commonwealth, if it could be 
achieved without compromising Indiaʼs sovereign republic aims.231 
Krishna Menon was charged with communicating Nehru’s distress at the 
rejection of his revised Eight Points to the British, writing that ‘on the 
Commonwealth situation his [Nehruʼs] feeling is that he has been under a 
misapprehension as to the basic agreements and desires.’232 Furthermore, he felt ‘left 
“high and dry” after he had dealt with his side with the greatest risk and 
difficulty.’233 Nehru further elucidated the points made by Krishna Menon in the 
following days, writing to Cripps that ‘I have met several kinds of opinion and I 
have gone dead against the current of opinion in India. Yet I have persisted because I 
thought this was the right course.’234 Nehru also wrote to Patel that ‘I do not think 
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there is the least chance of our going further than what we said in London. To that 
we are prepared to stick still, in spite of some opposition in our country.’235 Cripps 
responded to Nehru assuring him that ‘we are studying this closely with Krishna and 
are determined to find a solution that is satisfactory to all of us – if that be humanly 
possible – and we must make it possible.’236 
Crucially, however, Krishna Menon emphasised that there could be no 
prospect of a two-tier Commonwealth; India would either be fully in or completely 
out of the Commonwealth.237 Already facing criticism for its advocacy of 
membership, any hint of subordinate status or that India was entering an agreement 
on anything but an equal footing would have further fuelled criticism. Nehru 
remained under pressure throughout this process to ensure that the conditions of 
India’s membership would be acceptable to Congress; for this more than any other 
case was the meeting of India’s external and domestic spheres.   
Stalemate continued after the rejection of Nehru’s Eight Points until Gordon-
Walker came up with the seeds of a possible settlement, based in part on earlier 
suggestions by Mackenzie King and Amery.238 He suggested that ‘we must start 
again from the fact that India wants to be in the Commonwealth and all its other 
members want to accept her into membership.’239 ‘Could we not base ourselves on a 
Commonwealth relationship resting upon the will and intent of all its members’, he 
argued ‘this would give us a real link to start from.’240 Similar ideas also came into 
Cripps’ orbit through George Blaker, an old ICS hand, who argued that the link, 
which was extant, was the ‘fundamental community of outlook…and a desire on the 
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part of all the Dominions, to remain in the Commonwealth.’241 Could the King not 
be both King of certain Dominions and the President of the Commonwealth 
separately asked Blaker.242 Gordon-Walker set the ball rolling by meeting with a 
receptive Krishna Menon in January 1949.243 
By early 1949 the British had rejected the notion of a two-tier 
Commonwealth, with India unable and unwilling to accept a Crown link and with 
Commonwealth citizenry an insufficient link, common history and common will to 
remain associated became cardinal facts of the relationship.244 As such, the existence 
of the Commonwealth as an entity would depend on de facto international 
recognition, and had to stand up to the scrutiny of those who would wish to legally 
challenge the association and its economic policies. With the publication of India’s 
constitution due in July and time running out, ministers were dispatched early in 
1949 to prepare for a Commonwealth Prime Ministerʼs Meeting in April 1949 to 
attempt to settle the matter through dedicated talks.245 The results of these diplomatic 
missions demonstrated an almost complete preference for India within rather than 
India outside the Commonwealth, which resulted in the final abandonment of a 
Crown link for India.246    
Nehru’s frustration with Britain’s past legalistic approach was betrayed in a 
letter to Patel as he wrote that ‘the result is likely to be an inconclusive 
conference.’247 It was the strength of the links and the benefits that Nehru expected 
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to accrue that pushed him to seek a compromise solution that satisfied India and 
satisfied the Commonwealth. At the Conference, Nehru maintained contact with 
Patel and far from bemoaning the overly legalistic British approach Nehru 
communicated the increasing flexibility of the British as opposed to some of the 
other Dominions on the issue of the Head of the Commonwealth. Through mutual 
discussion the participants agreed on Indiaʼs membership to be legally clarified 
through declarations of intent. Nehru sought to remove the independent phrase ‘Head 
of Commonwealth’ from any declaration and agreement, which he argued the British 
would have agreed.248 India’s final entry to the Commonwealth as a republic was 
made possible by Indian acquiescence to the recognition the King as the symbol of 
the free association of Commonwealth members.249 
Patel fully endorsed Nehru and his team’s efforts in London and confirmed 
that India’s intention to become a fully sovereign republic had not been betrayed, 
writing to Nehru that ‘by recognition of the King as Head of Commonwealth as a 
symbol of free association of its members we do not derogate from that status.’250 
Patel did, however, raise the concern of the other Dominions issuing a joint 
statement, emphasising their common unity through the Crown, on the basis that it 
could give rise to the impression that India was an ‘inferior class’ of member.251 On 
the final draft of the Declaration Patel congratulated Nehru, confirming his view that 
‘our membership will be full and equal…our objective has been achieved and our 
position as Indian Republic fully safeguarded’, and this is how he presented it to the 
Indian public in a press conference prior to Nehru’s return.252 The Commonwealth 
was expanded and the Crown as the only link of association was broken as India 
joined the Commonwealth as a Republic. 
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The April meeting was in itself revealing for what can be gleaned from the 
closing conversations of the assembled leaders, and highlighted that Nehru was 
acutely aware and anxious about the chaotic situation in Southeast Asia. Nehru told 
the other leaders that Commonwealth ‘co-operation would be determined, not by any 
formal commitments accepted in advance, but by their friendly and understanding 
approach to common problems.’253 Using the example of China, Nehru continued to 
argue not for mutual assistance in the face of aggression, but rather ‘policy must be 
so directed as to appeal to the great masses of people throughout Asia who were not 
committed to any particular ideology but were in a state of unrest due to the 
dissatisfaction with their conditions in life.’254 Nehru explained that ‘the problem for 
Commonwealth countries was how to combine a policy for preventing war with 
preparations adequate to ensure that, if war came, they were ready to meet it. It 
would be disastrous if, by concentrating on the second object, they frustrated the 
first.’255 This, Nehru continued, was why he deprecated the notion of power blocs 
that led people to think in terms of war. Rather, the Commonwealth ‘must develop, 
and pursue, a positive policy for preventing war. And in Asia must take the form of 
removing the condition which encouraged the growth of communism.’256 This line of 
thinking not only directly correlates with the advice provided by Nehru on the 
Malayan Emergency, but was the central philosophy behind the Colombo Plan. 
Nehru laid down the gauntlet in the many ways at the Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting, and utilising the ongoing Indonesian crisis, argued that ‘it was vitally 
important that the democratic countries should do nothing at this stage which might 
cause those people to look elsewhere for inspiration and assistance.’257 Nehru 
evidently had an effect on his fellow Prime Ministers, as Chiefly: 
agreed with Pandit Nehru that the primary object of Commonwealth policy 
should be to create, in countries exposed to communist influence, social 
conditions in which it would be impossible for communism to flourish. It 
was by these methods that the advance of communism must be checked. In 
Asia certainly, and possibly in other countries also, military strength was 
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not an effective weapon against communist encroachment.258 
Nehru joined the Commonwealth, as can be seen from the above entreaties to 
fellow Prime Ministers, to advance Indian national interests through the stabilisation 
of the international arena. This was not so much a case of the Commonwealth 
moderating India’s stance on colonialism in Southeast Asia, but rather of India 
forwarding its own policy to the rest of the Commonwealth. Membership of the 
Commonwealth did not equate to a moderation of Indian policy regarding Malaya, as 
is argued elsewhere, as India already possessed a Malayan policy that changed little 
until Malaya became independent. Michael Brecher argues that Indian membership 
of the Commonwealth resulted in more restrained criticism of British colonial 
policies; S.N. Misra asserts that the Commonwealth link negatively affected India’s 
positive goals whilst A.K. Banerji argues that it was because Britain treated her 
colonies humanely and India was a member of the Commonwealth that saved her 
from a scolding.259 What this research proposes is that India was actually far more 
influential in the shaping of Commonwealth and British policy in Southeast Asia 
than hitherto acknowledged. Nehru was in fact in the forefront of fighting the spread 
of Communism; the aim was to increase the standard of living for the average Asian 
as a precursor to improved political freedom, and this dual approach served to 
promote the cause of anti-colonialism, albeit slowly and through its effectiveness as 
an anti-Communist measure. Nehru’s advice on Malaya was a microcosm of the 
larger vision of an Asia free from Communism and advancing towards political 
freedom and Commonwealth membership enabled him to contribute to 
Commonwealth discussions on the topic. On a far more mercantile note, Southeast 
Asia was an area of increasing exports for India, and a population with higher living 
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standards would be able to afford more India wares to support India’s economy.260    
In the public domain the freedom of India’s choice was emphatically 
reiterated throughout the Commonwealth debate; there was some discussion of the 
positive advantages and benefits, but little mention of the economic or financial 
necessities of the link and Nehru was eager to dispel rumours of ‘secret talks’.261 
Nehru went so far as to tell the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Calcutta that 
India was in an economically strong position.’262   On his return from London, Nehru 
was careful to present the benefits of membership rather than the factors which made 
it necessary; for example, he emphasised that ‘economically we are as independent 
as independent nations can be.’263 These comments echoed those made a few days 
earlier when Nehru told a press conference that the Commonwealth will ‘co-operate 
in building up…industry.’264 Nehru focussed on what the Commonwealth added, not 
took away, he focussed on the benefits rather than the necessity of the decision, was 
silent on the issue of the sterling balances, and was conspicuously quiet on the 
spread of Communism in Asia. 
It was clear to me that whatever the advantages might be of any association 
with the Commonwealth or with any other group, no single advantage, 
however great, could be purchased by a single iota of our pledges being 
given up, because no country can make progress by playing fast and loose 
with the principles which it has declared.265 
Nehru made this declaration to the Constituent Assembly on 16 May 1949 as he 
presented the Commonwealth Resolution. The existing structure of the 
Commonwealth, Nehru argued, with allegiance to the King as the central 
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organisational concept, was mutually exclusive with the expressed intentions of 
India to become a sovereign republic. The speech focused on dispelling the fears of 
members of the Assembly, namely that India would be surrendering some of its hard-
won sovereignty or autonomy to the Commonwealth. 
In the days before the Assembly debate, Nehru used the tactic of branding 
critics, largely the Socialists, as reactionaries and of being trapped in a groove.266 In 
doing so Nehru attempted to disarm his opponents through employing the rhetoric of 
the national interest, but this did not silence critics. The breadth of criticism caused 
Nehru to write to Cripps that ‘there has been some fierce criticism from our socialist 
friends and others which has distressed me.’267 With Nehru and Patel behind the 
Resolution there was little chance of rejection, but objections and amendments were 
nonetheless raised by Assembly members. With Patel sitting silently, Nehru 
presented the Resolution and gave members two choices based on the fact that it was 
an international agreement and so not open to revision: accept or reject.268 
Emphasising the choice between either acceptance or rejection was part of an effort 
to base the vote on Nehru’s personal prestige and influence, which echoed his 
opening words: ‘Nevertheless when I went, I carried this great responsibility and I 
felt the burden of it. I had able colleagues to advise me, but I was the sole 
representative of India and in a sense that future of India for the moment was in my 
keeping.’269 There was fierce criticism and amendments were raised, even though, as 
H.V. Kamath (Forward Bloc) told the Assembly, they had been faced with a ‘fait 
accompli’.270 Damodar Swarup Seth, moreover, accused Nehru of having ‘acted 
beyond his authority’ and that he should have ‘made the Declaration he gave at the 
London Conference after the Constituent Assembly had formally accepted 
it…thereby he virtually agreed to keep India a member of the Commonwealth.’271 
Contrary to Pavadya’s assertion, not all members of the Assembly supported the 
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decision and remained uneasy about formalising India’s relationship with its 
incorrigible old colonial master and the imperialistic Commonwealth, particularly in 
light of the situation in Malaya:   
I feel that British imperialism goes its own way and it will not be deflected 
no matter what we do to try to cajole it or to win it over. It has its own 
purpose. I am surprised that our Prime Minister, who is respected all over 
the world for his idealism sometimes forgets these simple things.272 
Shibban Lal Saksena continued that ‘the execution of Ganapathy and the 
refusal to commute the death sentence on Sambasivan in Malaya in spite of the 
representations of the Indian Government clearly show that India cannot derive any 
advantage from the membership of the Commonwealth and that Britain and other 
members of the Commonwealth cannot give up their Imperialist and racial 
policies.’273 Association with British imperialism was also subsumed by larger 
accusations of joining the Anglo-American bloc: ‘By joining the Commonwealthʼ, 
Shibban Lal Saksena responded, ʻwe are joining the third world war on the Anglo-
American side against Russia. That is why I am so strongly opposed to this 
motion.’274 
Further calls were made to reject, or amend, the motion based on several key 
themes: that it called into question India’s sovereignty; that it implied obligations 
that fundamentally altered India’s neutral stance in the world and that could propel 
India into the Western bloc and thus war; and that the Commonwealth was 
unrelentingly racist and imperialistic in outlook. Shibban Lal Saksena’s motion for 
amendment, which sought to defer the decision until after the Constitution had been 
written and new elections based on a universal franchise had taken place, was 
defeated comfortably, but not without exposing Nehru’s decision to a severe 
mauling.275 There was fierce opposition to the Commonwealth move, but its 
necessity was accepted by Congress high command, and the decision was pushed 
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through using the personal prestige and influence of Nehru. Some two week’s later 
the All-India Congress Committee met at Dehra Dun and approved by ‘a very large 
majority’ the Commonwealth decision.276 
 
Conclusions 
Nehru and the G.O.I. remained under pressure until April/May 1949 in their 
efforts to find an acceptable formula by which India could enter the Commonwealth, 
and it is was by no means clear at the end of 1948 that this would be possible. The 
continued efforts of both sides reflected the importance of the link. Once again, the 
G.O.I. engaged in deft political window-dressing in order to join the Commonwealth 
on its own terms, gain benefits from membership and present to the world that its 
foreign policy principles remained unaltered. What the G.O.I. failed to mention was 
the combination of factors that pressed India into pursuing membership. This work 
has avoided assigning reward to any one architect of the new Commonwealth as no 
one individual determined the course of events, or made Commonwealth 
membership possible. Rather it was a process that involved several countries in 
continual debate. 
This chapter contributes to the existing historiography through its analysis of 
the sterling balances and demonstrates how the balances were involved in the 
process of India’s position within both the Sterling Area and the Commonwealth. 
The balances were not mentioned, or lauded, as a benefit in order to avoid criticism. 
Britain used the sterling balance negotiations to demonstrate to India the benefits of 
association despite a parlous economic situation. India recognised and exploited the 
political side of the balances, but also recognised that their economic situation left no 
other choice but adherence and compounded their fear of cancellation. 
The public rhetoric espoused by the G.O.I. was based on the benefits, not 
necessity, of the decision; this was independence added to and not taken away. There 
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was quite strong opposition to India’s continuing association with the UK, and much 
of the public rhetoric employed was designed to disarm criticisms of Indian 
membership. India’s sovereignty was sacrosanct – public opinion would allow 
nothing that even remotely resembled continued domination or monarchical 
connection with the UK. The entire performance of arranging India’s entry had to be 
done with all of the participants as equals. 
India immediately set about actively using the Commonwealth as a forum to 
push for action against the root causes of Communism in Asia. As argued throughout 
the thesis, this was composed of two parts: raising living standards through 
development and national freedom through decolonisation, which for Nehru were 
essential components of the same solution. What is harder to detect is the extent to 
which Nehru exploited the menace of international Communism to secure both 
development funds for itself and Asia and for furthering its aim of the dissolution of 
European empires. Nehru certainly feared the advance of Communism and took 
steps to counter it, but his answer to the threat neatly pushed two of his key 
objectives of economic development and national freedom. 
Indian membership of the Commonwealth softened to a certain extent Indian 
anti-colonial attacks on the UK, but the connection is deeper than it at first seems 
and was not a simple causal relationship. Membership did not mean instant quiet, 
and India failed to criticise British actions in Southeast Asia for pre-exisiting reasons 
of national interest, which in turn help to explain what she hoped to get from the 
Commonwealth. Membership of the Commonwealth did not automatically translate 
into a softening of India’s position. Rather, any softening and membership of the 
Commonwealth should be seen as part of the same process of a moderation in 
Nehru’s appreciation of India’s position in light of the volatility of the world 
situation. 
India did not join for basic economic needs alone, as these could on a basic 
level be served by remaining in the Sterling Area, but rather because the 
Commonwealth served other needs too: namely as a forum for discussion on 
international affairs, and by providing safety from international isolation. India’s 
financial and economic problems dictated that she had a shared interest in the 
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strength of sterling, and more widely the system of Commonwealth co-operation that 
supported and regulated the Sterling Area. Indian moves  towards this stance were 
demonstrated by the Sterling Balance agreement of summer 1948, and their 
increasing willingness to cut their dollar deficit.277 Access to the goods exchanged 
for the commensurate writing down of India’s sterling balances helped to ease the 
shortage of goods caused by war and partition, and in turn helped to dampen rampant 
post-war inflationary tendencies.278 Entry was thus determined by a combination of 
pressing concerns which precipitated an association with the Commonwealth. India 
joined both out of the necessity of its colonial legacy and out of a desire to further its 
own national interests, both economically and through influencing Commonwealth  
economic and international policies.  
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5) Indian Foreign Policy, the Malayan Emergency and 
Regional Stability 
As South East Asia Command attempted to stabilise the region from Burma 
to Singapore at the close of Pacific War, both the Dutch and French took steps to 
recover their colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. For these actions, the Dutch and 
French governments earned themselves a severe censuring from Nehru, both as 
leader of the Interim Government from September 1946 and as Prime Minister. 
India, therefore, emerged on the world stage in the months before independence in a 
mood of defiant anti-colonialism. Throughout 1947 and the first half of 1948, 
colonial tensions in South and Southeast Asia, aggravated by the increasing 
polarisation of the Cold War, exploded into a series of Communist-inspired uprisings 
and rebellions along the great crescent from Burma to Malaya and Singapore.1 These 
uprisings posed myriad questions for India’s nascent foreign policy, especially the 
Malayan Emergency. 
The swift Japanese advance into Burma and the Indian border regions in the 
Second World War sharply reminded India that, as a part of the great arc from 
Calcutta to Indonesia through Singapore, Malaya represented a key strategic point 
for the defence of its North-Eastern borders.2 With the decolonisation of India, 
Malaya became by far the most economically valuable and strategically important 
British colony East of Suez. Through its triangular trade relationship, Malaya sold its 
rubber and tin to the US in exchange for dollars, which contributed to the reserves of 
the Sterling Area dollar pool from which India drew its foreign exchange reserves. 
With dollars so scarce in the immediate post-war period, Britain was committed to 
doing all that it could to return to imperial control of Malaya in order to ensure the 
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viability of the Sterling Area.3 Malaya, however, erupted into an anti-colonial 
uprising organised by the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP), and 
by the summer of 1948 ‘Malaya slipped inexorably into armed conflict between the 
forces of the state and the supporters of the MCP.’4 Britain reacted swiftly to the 
threat and deployed over 40,000 troops to combat the MCP whilst simultaneously 
crafting a security state underpinned by emergency regulations of sweeping power.5  
Britain initially feared that their actions in Malaya would earn them a 
scolding like the French and Dutch, but the G.O.I. was surprisingly taciturn in its 
reactions to the Emergency. Contrary to British fears, Nehru was reticent as it 
became increasingly clear to him that Malaya had to be held as it was part of a wider 
regional phenomenon, and took the opportunity to advise Britain on how to remedy 
the situation through improving the living and working standards of the average 
man. This advice was not confined to Malaya alone, but represented part of Nehru’s 
solution to the advance of Communism in Asia: remove the grievances on which it 
fed.  
The G.O.I. came to view the situation as a manifestation of the larger 
regional phenomenon of the advance of Communism made all the more real by the 
continuing victories of the Chinese Communist Party. India’s reaction was further 
determined by its own legacies of colonialism in the form a large Indian population 
in Malaya and India’s reliance on the Sterling Area. The nature of the threat 
influenced India’s reaction as the spectre of Communism threatened not only Malaya 
but the immediate and future stability of a democratic Southeast Asia. The G.O.I.’s 
reaction to the Emergency was thus influenced by several interconnected factors, the 
combination of which demonstrates the complex interaction of material and 
ideological policy determinants in Indian foreign policy decision-making. 
The economics of the Sterling Area and Indian development dictated that a 
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stable Malaya that continued to provide the lion’s share of dollars to the shared pool 
was not only a priority, but a necessity for Indian economic recovery and 
development. Malaya, moreover, lay at a strategically vital junction of the Straits of 
Malacca, ‘one of the world’s greatest arteries of oceanic trade that separates the 
Indian Ocean form the South China Sea.’6 Malaya also flanked the vitally important 
harbour of Singapore, which was the centre of British power in Southeast Asia. 
The overall stability of the region was threatened by the spread of 
Communism. Southeast Asia represented a key area of the world for India, and the 
spectre of expansionary Communism threatened the nascent links - economic, 
cultural and political - between India and the region. As outlined by Nehru for the 
Indian Delegation to the UN General Assembly in September 1948 ‘we [India] are 
most intimately connected with South East Asia and we should therefore develop 
these contacts as much as possible.’7  
The continued advance of the Chinese Communist Party in China also had an 
impact on the G.O.I. appreciation of both the Malayan Emergency and its place 
within the larger machinations of Communism in Southeast Asia as Nehru’s at times 
vehement anti-colonialism was tempered by his fear of a Southeast Asia dominated 
by Communism. Dissecting the origins of the Malayan Emergency is outside the 
scope of this thesis, but importantly at the time India viewed it as part of the general 
progress of Communism across Asia. Historiographical debate continues on the 
origins of the crisis, but what is clear is that within the context of other uprisings in 
Asia, and with the victories of the Communists Party in China, it was considered by 
India and Britain as all the more important to prevent Communist control of Malaya 
and the surrounding areas.8 As it looked increasingly likely that the Communists 
                                               
6
 Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, p. 8 and also see Michael Leifer, International Straits of the 
World: Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1978). 
7
 ‘Basic Principles: Guidelines for Upcoming United Nations General Assembly’, 12/9/1948 in S. 
Gopal (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 7 (New Delhi, 1988), p. 609. 
8
 There are three articles that concisely discuss the development of the historiography of the Malayan 
Emergency, see Deery, ‘Malaya, 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War?’; Karl Hack, ʻ“Iron Claws on 
Malaya”: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergencyʼ, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30 
(1999), pp. 99-125 and ʻThe Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948ʼ, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 40 (2009), pp. 471-96. The ‘Communist Plot’ or orthodox line follows that at the 
Calcutta Conference in February 1948 in Calcutta, the Communist Party of Soviet Russia transmitted 
orders to the MCP, amongst others, to take up arms. For examples see Ian Morrison, ‘The Communist 
Uprising in Malaya’, Far Eastern Survey 17 (1948), pp. 281-28; Virginia Thompson and Richard 
Aldoff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia (New York, 1950); Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or 
 Malayan Emergency 
 
162 
would win, Nehru wrote that ‘as China is in a state of disintegration, there is little 
threat to its neighbours for some time to come, but what is likely to happen is that 
Communist Parties in other countries will be greatly encouraged.’9 Malaya, with 
over two million Chinese was an obvious example. India’s China policy was not, as 
argued by some, based on a naïve assumption that the Communist giant posed no 
threat, but that the best way to counter that threat was through engagement and 
inclusion in international and regional affairs.10 An expansionist Communist threat 
was not welcomed and the only immediate alternative to British control was Chinese 
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domination of Malaya. 
In addition, Malaya was home to approximately 500,000 Indians, few of 
whom had Malayan citizenship.11 It is partly through examining the experiences of 
two of these men, Ganapathy and Sambasivam, and the furore they casued in India, 
that this chapter sheds light of India’s foreign policy. These two men exposed the 
tensions in India’s policies in Southeast Asia and the extent to which the G.O.I 
listened to public opinion. A direct result of late nineteenth-century imperialism, 
these Indians contributed a large proportion of day/wage labourers on rubber 
plantations.12 Overseas Indians were a constant reminder of India’s colonial past and 
large numbers of Indians overseas was at odds with Nehru’s efforts to create an 
Indian state bounded by the territory India inherited from the Raj. This issue was 
also one that a large number of Indians in India could immediately identify with and 
the treatment of Indians abroad was one of the clearest manifestations of the ills of 
imperialism. The treatment of Indians in Malaya as a part of the Emergency further 
heightened attention to the conditions of Indians abroad. The continuance of 
egregious working conditions and the treatment of Indians in British colonial 
repressions was equated by many in both the press and the opposition as a betrayal 
of the independence struggle.13 The communal dimension of Malaya provides an 
additional reason why Nehru was willing to afford the British time in Malaya. 
Nehru’s own domestic experience, as he attempted to forge an Indian national 
identity, influenced his appreciation of Malaya and the need to forge a Malay 
nationality from the disparate identities of the Malays, Chinese and Indians. As the 
Monthly Foreign Affairs Departmental Meeting minutes noted ‘it does not appear as 
if a solution of the Malayan problem would be obtained by accelerating the pace of 
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self-government as the racial conflicts involved are very far-reaching in their 
character.’14 
The issue of India’s anti-colonial credentials was further complicated by the 
ambiguity of the struggle in Malaya: the MCP was a Communist party fighting for 
national freedom from a colonial occupier. In a wider regional framework, India had 
two intimately linked aims in Southeast Asia, the end of European colonialism and 
preventing the spread of Communism, both of which aimed to provide stability in 
the region. The end of European colonialism, through the granting of independence 
to national states, held the answer to preventing the spread of Communism as far as 
J.A. Thivy, the Indian Representative in Malaya, was concerned.15 Nehru shared this 
broad appreciation and argued that nationalism, genuine nationalism, was the answer 
to the Communist menace.16 
Malaya fell somewhere between the lines of this argument: a colonial 
territory under Communist assault, but the only power capable of maintaining order 
and establishing a national state was a colonial power. For Nehru the choice was 
clear: allow Britain to restore law and order in Malaya whilst simultaneously 
progressing the territory towards self-government, in part through economic 
development. This approach remained the preferred Indian position until at least 
1956 when in his annual report on the UK the Indian High Commissioner reported 
positively that: ‘In Malaya British forces are achieving gratifying success in ridding 
the jungles of the terrorist bands. But simultaneously, significant steps were also 
taken towards responsible self-government.’17 Nehru’s approach of helping the 
British stabilise Malaya and then decolonising chimed well with Britain’s own 
developing policy for the region, based in part on India’s input, which involved a 
gradual transfer of power to responsible, independent successor states who would 
then maintain collaboration with the West.18  
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In order to satisfy a number of competing claims on its foreign policy, the 
G.O.I. followed a policy of ‘keeping quiet’ both to avoid any embarrassment to itself 
from a doubting public and to Britain in its efforts to quell the MCP and secure 
stability in Southeast Asia more widely. With its policy decided, India kept quiet and 
avoided drawing attention to an ambiguous situation. However, with the arrest of 
two men of Indian origin, Ganapathy and Sambasivam, in Malaya in 1948/1949, an 
incredulous Constituent Assembly, press, political opponents and public forced the 
issue of Malaya into the political limelight as the attention of India was also focussed 
on Nehru’s negotiation of Indian membership into the Commonwealth. Through the 
cases of these two men it is possible to further examine the exercise of Indian foreign 
policy. 
There is, however, little in the current historiography of Indian foreign policy 
on the Malayan Emergency; many of the accounts that do examine the Emergency 
do so in passing and as part of a general sweep of the countries where the influence 
of Communism was making itself felt. For example, the Indian Council of World 
Affairs 1950’s series on India’s neighbours fails to devote any time to the 
Emergency.19 The case of Malaya, however, reveals many intricacies in the Indian 
world view that make for a more nuanced and more finely grained picture of Indian 
foreign policy in the early post-independence years. There are two broad strands of 
thought within the existing literature on India’s reaction to Malaya: one asserts that 
Nehru did not view the MCP as a legitimate nationalist party, for example works by 
S.N. Misra and D.R. SarDesai.20 The second strand proposes that criticism was 
restrained due to the fact that Britain was the colonial power and India a 
Commonwealth member. Brecher argues that Indian membership of the 
Commonwealth resulted in more restrained criticism of British colonial policies and 
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Banerji suggests that it was the humane treatment of her colonies and India’s 
membership of the Commonwealth that saved Britain from censure.21 This chapter 
demonstrates that both these strands help explain Indian policy and that, as argued in 
the previous chapter, Commonwealth membership and India’s Malaya policy were 
both part of a realisation of the danger of militant Communism rather than Nehru’s 
restraint resulting from India’s Commonwealth membership.     
Two works of note that deserve attention are those of Ton That Thien and 
Hugh Tinker. Thien’s 1963 chapter on Malaya is a most perceptive account; 
however, there was little use of primary source materials and the work suffers for 
this absence.22 Moreover, the major weakness of Thien’s work is that he argues that 
Nehru paid little heed to public opinion, which fails to acknowledge the impact that a 
broad definition of public opinion did have on the G.O.I..23 Tinker’s work is more 
concerned with the changing fate of those Indians abroad rather than an exposition of 
Indian foreign relations, but nevertheless offers one of the few sustained pieces of 
research into Indians in Malaya.24 Tinker’s research, however, does not take into 
account the context of the Cold War, or India’s foreign policy.  This research 
redresses the problems with the existing literature which fails to pay adequate 
attention to the Emergency in its own right, and in exploring the implications for 
both India’s actions in Southeast Asia more widely and the Indo-British relationship.  
This chapter employs primary source materials from both the G.O.I., the first 
time that such sources have been used, and from various governmental departments 
in the UK to examine the initial Indian reactions to the Malayan Emergency; how the 
G.O.I. perceived the Malayan Emergency in terms of colonialism and Communist 
expansion; how India’s interests came under threat; and how the government dealt 
with Indians involved in the Emergency in response to public outcries. This work 
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will also further understanding of the place of Malaya within the international scene 
of Southeast Asia and the Cold War.  
First of all, the chapter provides some context on the connections between 
India and Malaya, both because they are vitally important and because they have 
been so rarely documented elsewhere. The analysis will then move to examine the 
initial reactions of the G.O.I. and how these fit into the rhetoric of Indiaʼs foreign 
policy. The chapter will continue to examine the cases of two prominent Indians in 
Malaya and their treatment under the Emergency Regulations and assess the 
relationship between G.O.I. actions and Indian public opinion.  
Indiaʼs Economic Interests in Malaya: The Sterling Balances 
Despite the relative modesty of the size of the Indian population and the fact 
that the majority of Indians in Malaya undertook unskilled plantation labour, India’s 
economic interests in Malaya were considerable and were a direct legacy of British 
imperialism. Moreover, with the coming of independence, India sought to strengthen 
both political and economic ties with Southeast Asia.25 The chettiars (chettyars) of 
southern India that had made their living in Malaya had substantial holdings; it was 
estimated that Indians owned some 150,000 acres of rubber plantations valued at 
some 450,000 Straits dollars; paddy fields valued at some 5,000,000 dollars; land 
worth some 30,000,000 dollars in addition to shares and securities worth some 
200lakhs. All in all the sum invested by this one section of the population was 
estimated at 15.5 crores of rupees.26 As Attlee told the Cabinet when discussing 
India’s interests in the Commonwealth, ‘Indians…have substantial interests in 
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British colonial territories…There are large Indian communities in…Malaya’ in 
addition ‘large trading interests are also carried on by Indian citizens who are not 
domiciled there.’27 Remittances from Malaya also benefitted India’s economy to the 
tune of 10 million rupees annually (approximately $2.3 million).28 India’s trade with 
Malaya was on the increase, reaching 15,804,113 Straits dollars in January 1950 
whilst Indian imports stood at only 5,293,795 straits dollars, which made Malaya an 
important market for an expanding Indian export trade. By early 1950, India was the 
largest supplier of textile goods to Malaya and the third largest supplier of goods of 
all types.29   
The Southeast Asian region as a whole was an integral and dynamic part of 
the pre-war global trading network, and it was imperative that this position was 
restored with the cessation of hostilities in 1945. The area produced a vast array of 
commodities for international markets, and Singapore facilitated a huge entrepot 
trade. Food, in the form of rice, was the foremost essential commodity that the area 
produced and exported, excluding Malaya which was a net importer. Without this 
supply, the entire region of South and Southeast Asia faced food shortages and 
eventually famine, which was a real prospect immediately following the cessation of 
the war.30 A bewildering array of essential commodities for export also came from 
the region: copra, coconut oil, sugar, teakwood, coffee, quinine, oil, tin, iron ore and 
bauxite.31 The British Foreign Office added jute, wolfram, chrome and, of vital 
importance, ‘virtually all of the tea in the world comes from Asia.’32 The increasing 
oil production in Borneo and Sarawak, moreover, promised to save precious dollars 
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for the Sterling Area.33 Malaya’s real value, however, was its position within the 
Sterling Area. 
The key to both Indian and British economic interests in Southeast Asia was 
Malaya’s position as a net dollar earner in the Sterling Area from its exports of 
natural rubber and tin. These two products were strategically valuable, but their true 
importance comes from their place within the triangular trade pattern that supported 
the dollar earnings of the Sterling Area. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
India remained a key member of the Sterling Area after independence, partly to 
retain access to the sterling balances, and reaffirmed this position by its membership 
of the Commonwealth.  
As part of the pre-war triangular trade, Malaya took British manufactured 
goods and services, on which it ran a considerable balance of payments deficit. 
Malaya, however, sold its rubber and tin production to the US, and, since its import 
needs had been satisfied by Britain, took her trade surplus payment in dollars.34 
These dollars then serviced the Malayan deficit with Britain and ultimately 
contributed to the balancing of the overall Sterling Area dollar deficit.35 Britain 
estimated that in 1948 the US imported 371.1 million tons of rubber, comprising 
some 52% of their consumption.36 The US bought more from Malaya than from any 
other country apart from Canada, but Malaya figured 39th as a destination for 
American exports.37 In 1928 this arrangement manifested itself in the following 
figures: US imports from Malaya reached $208 million, US exports to Malaya 
represented a paltry $16 million, which resulted in a surplus of some $192 million.38  
With the acute post-war dollar shortage, the importance of a healthy 
triangular trade was second to none in the eyes of the British Government, which 
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lavished millions of pounds on restarting production after war-time neglect by the 
Japanese. As the Colonial Secretary, Creech Jones, argued, Malaya was ‘by far the 
most important source of dollars in the Colonial Empire and it would gravely worsen 
the whole dollar balance of the sterling area if there were serious interference with 
Malayan exports.’39 The Ministry of External Affairs (MoEA) and Nehru were alive 
to the economic importance of Malaya when the monthly Foreign Affairs 
Departmental Meeting minuted that ‘The dollar earning capacity of Malaya has not 
been reduced on account of the disturbances ... Hence Malaya remains an important 
dollar earner for the UK and it is not likely that the British Government will easily 
give up its position both on strategic and prestige grounds as well as for economic 
reasons.’40 
India, in most of the years under discussion, ran a deficit on its balance of 
payments, and as a member of the Sterling Area drew on the shared dollar pool and 
gold reserves to settle her accounts. As Ganguli notes the tin and rubber trade 
contributed to the ‘easing of the dollar crisis and the stability of the sterling area.’ 41 
He fails, however, to make the connection with India’s sterling balances, and in 
doing so fails to fully appreciate that the maintenance of the Sterling Area reserves 
and thus the strength of sterling by Malaya, and other members of the colonial 
empire, was a key Indian interest. India’s balance of payments difficulties were, in 
essence, covered by the earnings of the colonial empire. Furthermore, as India held 
some £1100 millions of sterling balances, blocked in London, the entire foreign 
exchange reserve of the country was at stake. 
The sterling balances and India’s membership of the Sterling Area tied India 
to Britain in a symbiotic relationship, in which the interests of one fundamentally 
affected the interests of the other.42 This symbiosis had a fundamental impact on 
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India’s reaction to the Emergency, to membership of the Commonwealth, and to the 
Colombo Plan of 1950. India, therefore, had a vested interest in the resumption of 
Malayan production and trade. The Emergency from June 1948 threatened the health 
of the sterling area with its first objective of ‘the maximum industrial unrest and 
disruption of economic life.’43 One further imperial legacy affected the G.O.I.’s 
reaction to the Emergency, that of Malaya’s Indian population.  
Migration during the Raj left Malaya home to a large Indian population 
representing approximately 10 per cent of the total population of Malaya. The Indian 
labour influx began in earnest under British rule in the last half of the nineteenth 
century with the development of Malaya’s plantation industries, and as Nedyam 
Raghavan argues ‘English planters opened up the country with Indian labour.’44 
Although wages were on average higher than those in India, working conditions 
caused concern in the G.O.I..45 Indians, however, not only cleared the land, but also 
contributed to the development of the infrastructure that supported Malaya’s 
economic growth. 
 With the growth of the Indian community came the need for an official 
Representative for the Indian community. One of the first tasks facing Nehru’s 
government in its exercise of foreign relations was the problem of presence and 
personnel in foreign territories.46 In certain cases the G.O.I. had been allowed to 
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station representatives in colonies or nations with large Indian populations.47 Malaya 
was one such example, where under Section 7 of the Indian Emigration Act of 1922 
an Indian Agent was appointed whose main duty was to monitor the working 
conditions of Indian labour.  
With the Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1941 the position lapsed until late 
1945 when S.K. Chettur (ICS) was appointed to the post.48 Despite the upgrade to 
Representative, the job description remained ‘to establish close liaison with Malayan 
Government in all matters affecting Indian interests and Indians of all classes, to 
work for promotion of better and more harmonious relations between the two 
countries and to constitute normal channel of communications between the 
Government of India and the Governments in Malaya.’49 Chettur was not long for 
the post, however, and Nehru appointed John Aloysius Thivy as India’s new 
Representative.50 Thivy had made his living as a lawyer in the interwar years, having 
trained in London and had been a member of the Indian Independence League.51 
During the war years, Thivy played a key role in the INA and sat as a member of 
Netaji’s Azad Hind Government. In the immediate post-war he attended the Asian 
Relations Conference in 1947 as a member of the Malaya delegation, having been 
the Founding President of the Malayan Indian Congress from 1946-47.52 Thivy was, 
therefore, viewed as a friend of the Indian population in Malaya and an opponent of 
colonialism, and he was regarded without too much scepticism by the British 
authorities in Malaya.53 As a result of the large Indian population at the coming of 
Indian independence there was already a direct representative of India in place in 
Malaya.  
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Nehru’s independence day message to Indian communities overseas was at 
variance with the later policy on Indians abroad as manifested in Malaya. Nehru told 
them that:  
On this day of liberation the motherland sends her affectionate greetings to 
her children abroad. She calls them to her service and to the service of 
freedom wherever they might be. Every Indian abroad is a representative of 
India and must ever remember that he has the honour of his country in his 
keeping.54  
   Nehru continued that ‘None of India’s children, wherever they be, may submit 
to anything which is against national self-respect or against the cause of freedom. 
They must preserve their own freedom at all costs and respect the freedom of 
others.’55 Nehru later provided a more nuanced response to questions in the 
Constituent Assembly demanding greater action on behalf of Indians overseas. He 
argued that ‘This House gets mixed up. It wants to treat them as Indians and, with 
the same breath, it wants complete franchise for them in the countries where they are 
living. Of course, the two things do not go together.’56 The G.O.I. attempted to use 
Malaya as a means with which to educate Indians, both in India and abroad, about 
the lengths that they could and were willing to go to in defence of overseas Indians.  
  Nehru’s potential influence on Indians abroad was a cause of concern for the 
British. As the British Military Administration (BMA) began the task of rebuilding 
Malaya, Nehru as the leader-in-waiting of the Congress Party, and as its leading 
authority on international relations, travelled to Singapore and Malaya in March 
1946 to provide succour for the demoralised Indian community on one of his first 
forays in a semi-official position 57 What his visit reveals is the BMA’s apprehension 
over the possible political influence of Nehru, the INC and thus the soon to be 
independent G.O.I., on Malayan politics.58 This apprehension continued to haunt the 
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British as Malaya slipped into rebellion.  
The Declaration of the Emergency 
From before the beginning of the Emergency in June 1948, the opinions of 
the G.O.I. and the potential political influence that it could command in Asia was a 
key factor in British attempts to deal with its colonial possession. In the face of 
increasing MCP disturbances throughout the early months of 1948, which the 
Government in Malaya considered as part of a general Communist drive into 
Southeast Asia, the authorities attempted to devise mechanisms to effectively deal 
with those troublemakers outside the existing control orders already in place.59 These 
attempts centred on extending the Banishment Ordinance to use on the entire 
population, which had previously been vetoed for fear of political repercussions in 
India.60 The British Colonial Office argued that on account of their existing 
immunity, British Indians had increasingly become prominent as leaders of 
disturbances and the accompanied threats of violence.61 After initial reluctance, the 
Colonial Secretary authorised the use of banishment powers on British subjects and 
those who did not belong in Malaya.62 With the decision to extend the ordinance 
made, it was argued that it would be wise to inform the G.O.I. of the intention to 
issue banishment powers in Malaya, both out of the need to inform the Indians of 
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any possible returnees to their shores, but also because: 
It is of course recognised that to make a communication to the Government 
of India at this stage might well produce the customary reaction of protests 
against our treatment of Indians, and that this might be an embarrassment 
before use is made of the banishment powers; on the other hand there will 
presumably be protests sooner or later if the powers are used and it might 
well be of use to anticipate them with a reasoned explanation of our 
policy.63 
The Colonial Secretary’s initial hesitation was based on the likelihood of Indian 
contestations, but as J.B Williams of the CO recorded, ‘we feel that in the form in 
which the use of the law has been authorised…no possible grounds have been given 
for objection by the Government of India.’64 The greatest effort was made by the 
British authorities to ensure that everything was done to reduce the G.O.I.’s 
opposition to these repressive measures. The High Commissioner in Delhi was 
informed of the decision and instructed to pass the decision on to the Indian 
authorities:  
It is expected that a number of Indians will be among those to be deported. 
Should the Government of India raise the matter with you you will be able 
to emphasise that the Ordinance is not directed against Indians as such, that 
it does not apply to Indians who are Federal Citizens, and that deported 
Indians will almost certainly be Communists or criminal types who are 
tools of Communism.65 
The British further argued that the ‘case for vigorous action against 
Communist disturbances should be appreciated by the Government of India…in 
view of action taken by them against Communists.’66 The violent and disruptive 
methods of Communists in India had so shocked Nehru that he considered ‘the 
Communists, with all their idealistic element that is no doubt part of Communism, 
have become bitter enemies of society and order in India and have practically 
become terrorists.’67 In response Nehru took firm actions against this threat to Indian 
                                               
63
 Letter from J.P. Gibson to J.B. Williams (Colonial Office), Pol.8654/48, 28/6/1948, DO 142/404. 
64
 Letter from Williams to Gibson, 15/6/1948, DO 142/404. 
65
 Telegram to UKHC Delhi, Pol.8654/48, No.1872, 21/6/1948, DO 142/404. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Nehru to Chief Ministers, 2/2/1950, in Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru Letters to Chief 
Ministers, 1947-1964, Volume 2, 1950-1952, p. 12. Nehru also commented that, ‘We talk of the 
Communists in India and Burma, but it must be remembered that we are hardly dealing with the 
economic doctrine of Communism. We are dealing with active revolts, and what is more, rather brutal 
and bloody revolts, where individual killing is indulged in.’ Nehru to Chief Ministers, dated 9/3/1949, 
in Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, Volume 1 1947-1949, 
 Malayan Emergency 
 
176 
stability and the British, therefore, hoped that this stance on his domestic 
Communists would soften Nehru’s opposition to such repressive measures in a 
British colony with a large Indian population.68 British fear of opposition, however, 
manifested itself in other ways as ‘Counter measures in Malaya, though accepted 
understandingly in official quarters, gave the Press an opportunity for another tilt at 
British Imperialism.’69 In the process of extending the framework of the repressive 
measures to quell the Communist rebellion, the British had already conceded the 
importance of the views and opinions of the G.O.I. in policy production in Southeast 
Asia. So let us turn to examine the initial reactions of Nehru to the declaration of the 
Emergency in June 1948. 
Indian Reactions to the Emergency 
Integral to any examination of India’s reactions to Malaya are Nehru’s 
developing thoughts on the relationship between colonialism and Communism in 
Southeast Asia. As he argued, ‘if colonialism continues anywhere in South-East Asia, 
the natural result will be a growth of Communism.’70 The insidious economic effects 
of colonialism such as those in Malaya, Nehru argued to the British, provided the 
grievances that the appeal of Communism exploited. Nehru, moreover, was well 
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aware of the complexities, interconnectedness and confusion of the developing 
situation when he wrote that ‘the Communist movements and revolts in South East 
Asia are so tied up with the movements for independence that it is difficult to 
separate them.’71 This relationship between colonialism and Communism in Asia 
informed the G.O.I.’s understandings of the roots of the Malayan Emergency. One of 
Nehru’s first communications with Krishna Menon in London after the Emergency 
was declared revealed his desire to use the situation to push for an improvement in 
the conditions of Indians in Malaya.72 Rather than focussing on the international 
ramifications, Nehru concentrated on the reasons why Communism was able to 
command support. He identified the deleterious working conditions of Indians in 
particular as one of the key reasons why the Communist movement was attracting 
support in Malaya, despite also emphasising that Indians were keeping away from 
the troubles.  
In explaining the labour situation in Malaya to his Chief Ministers, Nehru 
wrote that ‘in Malaya, the situation is unsatisfactory from the Indian point of view. 
Indian labour there has not had a square deal at any time and, even in the recent 
disturbances there, they have suffered, although they have taken very little part. We 
have alerted the attention of the United Kingdom Colonial Office to this matter.’73 
The situation in Malaya was, for Nehru, a microcosm of the larger state of Asia and 
explained the appeal of Communism to the mass of Asians. He wrote to Cripps that 
‘it is obvious that a movement of this kind could not have lasted long if it had only 
the Communists behind it. There has been serious labour discontent and a 
longstanding demand for improvement in labour conditions…Hence the 
Communists function with a great deal of sympathy of others.’74 A month later 
Nehru reiterated his comments: ‘the positive side of approaching a problem there, 
that is to say the betterment of political and economic conditions has not been 
emphasised.’75 Nehru continued to push this theme to the British, both in their 
actions in Malaya and in its conceptualisation of the regional answer to Communist 
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advances.76 
As the British declared the Emergency, Nehru told Krishna Menon that he 
was ‘not prepared to condemn any violent revolution in favour of political or 
economic freedom.’77 Nehru was reticent over the validity and aims of the MCP 
struggle, but as 1948 turned to 1949 and Southeast Asia remained in chaos, he 
strongly denounced their violent and terroristic methods in the strongest terms as 
‘something we Indians disliked intensely.’78 The abhorrence of violence, in part 
based on his continuing domestic Communist troubles, militated against any 
sympathies that Nehru may have had for the wider political aims of the MCP. The 
G.O.I. came down in favour of supporting British actions in Malaya as Nehru made 
it clear that his government had ‘no sympathy with terrorists, whether Chinese or 
Indian, and recognise that the first responsibility of HMG is [to] restore law and 
order and ensure their maintenance.’79  
As the man on the scene, Thivy reported in The Statesman in July 1948 that 
he suspected the Chinese-dominated terrorists in Malaya were directly under Chinese 
control and were part of the Communist plot to topple the so-called capitalistic 
regime.80 In doing so, Thivy firmly placed the situation within the regional effort by 
Communists to topple the existing regimes in Southeast Asia, but stopped short of 
condemnation as did the G.O.I.. The MoEA judged ‘it would be true to state that the 
fortunes of the Malayan Communists were inextricably wound up with the progress 
of international Communism.’81 The report continued that ‘morale got a big boost 
when Communist forces triumphed in China in the fall of 1949’. Had the nationalist 
regime continued, ‘it is doubtful whether the Malayan Communists would have been 
able to continue for any length of time. They would have had little support from the 
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Chinese population in Malaya.’82 A MoEA paper prepared in 1957 on the nature of 
Communism in Indonesia provides further evidence of the assessment made by India 
regarding the Emergency K. Gopalachari (Deputy Director) wrote that ‘Unlike in 
Malaya and Thailand where Communism came through local Chinese and is, 
therefore, suspect, in Indonesia it is an off-shoot and parasite of nationalist parties.’83 
Bajpai, betraying the Indian fear of the domination of Southeast Asia by an 
expansive Communist China, commented in 1950 that without proper preparation, 
the Malays could come under the control of the Chinese immigrants.84 In the context 
of the Communist victory in China, stressing communal co-operation was aimed at 
reducing the likelihood of any insidious external Chinese influence being able to 
exploit the internal situation and exert an influence on Malayan politics. At the same 
time this approach offered the best hope of treatment for the Indian population.85 
In one of the first communications between the two governments on the 
Emergency, Bajpai made it clear to Terence Shone86 that the first priority in Malaya 
was the restoration of law and order.87 In a similar vein to Thivy, Bajpai laid the 
blame for the troubles on the Chinese and sought to excuse the involvement of any 
Indians by claiming that they had been led astray by the Communist Chinese.88 In 
response to these initial Indian reactions and discussions with Bajpai, the High 
Commissioner informed London that ‘While there have been warnings against 
infringing the rights of Indians on the pretext of political expediency, the arrests of 
Indians have not been seriously criticised and Mr. Thivy, who has been called to 
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Delhi for consultations, was non-committal on the subject.’89 Reinforcing the 
opinions of Thivy and Nehru, the British High Commissioner noted that ‘it was 
evident that Bajpai thought that there was a plan to create a Communist diversion in 
the Far East.’90 British fears over the Indian reaction to Malaya failed to materialise 
as India privately expressed concern over the expansion of Communism, but held 
back from condemning international Communism in public until 1949. 
In letters to his Chief Ministers, Nehru communicated some of his initial 
thoughts on Malaya: ‘In Malaya there has also been a serious rebellion but in view of 
the superior striking power of the British Government there, this revolt is likely to be 
suppressed.’91 Nehru further expanded on his first opinions when a fortnight later he 
wrote that in Malaya:  
the strength of the rebellion is evidenced by the fact that more and more 
armed forces are being needed to suppress it. It has been said by the British 
authorities that it will take a long time to liquidate this rebellion. Although 
the rebellion may be Communist inspired, it could not have assumed such 
large proportions unless there was a great deal of discontent and economic 
distress. It is strange that while every effort is being made to suppress the 
rebellion by force, little attention is being paid to the economic aspect.92  
Malaya was employed as an opportunity to press upon the British the need for 
improvement in the standards of living of the vast populations of South and 
Southeast Asia, the so-called ‘economic aspect.’ The MoEA responded to Thivy that 
‘you are probably aware that the Prime Minister has already impressed upon the 
United Kingdom authorities the need for an enlightened and liberal policy in the 
treatment of colonial territories and he might at suitable opportunity impress upon 
them again the desirability of a more liberal attitude in the treatment of Malayan 
problems.’93 Nehru offered the British government advice on how best to deal with 
the situation; for example William Strang (incoming Permanent Secretary at the 
Foreign Office) discussed Malaya with Nehru on his fact-finding tour in early 1949, 
when the latter suggested that it was the economic condition of the people that 
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allowed the MCP to take support from the population.94 Nehru also wrote to Stafford 
Cripps in January 1949 that ‘about Malaya I do not for a moment doubt the bona 
fides of the British Government’s policy, these are the difficulties they have to 
face.’95  
Nehru highlighted the Communist, in particular the Chinese, nature of the 
insurgency in their dealings with the British whilst emphasising the reasons for their 
success as a means to apply pressure on the British to pursue a more enlightened 
policy. The G.O.I. was tacitly in support of British actions against an insurgency that 
was considered to be part of a wider Communist plot, although was less willing to 
assert this in public and its condemnation of Malayan Communists would come in 
1949. Nehru rightly stated that the majority of rebellion leaders were Chinese, 
although his assessment that no Indian leader was known to have joined the ‘rebels’ 
was to later prove false.96 Nehru continued to make the case that if conditions 
improved then the great mass of labour could be weaned from the subversive 
elements.  Krishna Menon, however, directly equated Nehru’s eagerness to advise 
the British with assisting them to maintain imperialism in Asia.97 Nehru went so far 
as to suggest sending Thivy to London for talks with the Colonial Office. Krishna 
Menon was, however, concerned about how offering advice and keeping quiet might 
look when he and Menon discussed being ‘cast in the role of an ally of 
imperialism.’98 There was a delicate situation in play, and Nehru was tacitly in 
support of British efforts to quell what was essentially, albeit Communist inspired, a 
colonial rebellion. But this did not mean that Nehru was going to come out in 
support of the British in public as this would have been unacceptable to the Indian 
public and would have destroyed Indian claims, however rhetorical they may have 
been, to a principled and fair foreign policy.  
A range of terminology was employed when discussing Malaya. Care must 
be taken, however, in ascribing too much emphasis to variations in nomenclature, as 
Deery attempts to do with the British authorities, as there is little evidence of any 
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clearly defined design or official terminology for use by the G.O.I..99 In public, the 
G.O.I. initially generally followed the British line of focussing on MCP methods and 
described it as a band of terrorists, bandits and dacoits. However, the term 
Communist was not totally absent from discussions, but was usually found in 
conjunction with terrorist, bandit or dacoit. In doing so the G.O.I. hoped to downplay 
the colonial and the Communist aspect of the MCP, and emphasised their violent 
methods.100 Thus, the G.O.I. adopted the rhetoric of the colonial state not only in 
reference to Malaya, but also for its own Communists and in an attempt to strip all 
political legitimacy from their actions. However, in private, the G.O.I. largely 
employed the term Communists in conversations with Britain, and also in internal 
communication.101    
Not all in India, however, agreed with the Government’s appraisal; Blitz, a 
leftist weekly, denounced the use of Gurkha troops in Malaya to suppress what it 
called an Asian freedom movement.102 India was party to the 1947 Tripartite 
Agreement alongside Britain and Nepal, governing the recruitment of Gurkhas, and 
as such Blitz called on the government to put pressure on Nepal to cease recruitment 
and for the Indian Government to refuse transit rights.103 According to the 
Communist Party of India (CPI), and in line with the Moscow position, Malaya was 
yet another example of Indian complicity with the Western powers and further 
evidence of India’s Anglo-American directed foreign policy. A pamphlet of the CPI’s 
1949 Conference complained that ‘The Government of India has not opposed the 
colonial wars that are being waged by the imperialists in Malaya, Vietnam, 
Philippines and Burma…Nehru denounced the Malayan patriots as bandits and 
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terrorists and thus helped the British enslavers of the Malayan people.’104 
As counter-insurgency operations developed, it became all the clearer that the 
Emergency was going to affect the lives of Indians in Malaya, and within a year of 
the declaration two prominent Indians faced the death penalty for subversive 
activities in Malaya. The MoEA took an interest in the individual cases of Indians 
being arrested under the Emergency Regulations. For example in the fortnightly 
reports from Singapore, the numbers of Indians effected was a key theme.105 
Indian support for the British came in the form of reticence and advice and 
ultimately raised the question of India’s anti-colonial credentials in the face of a 
sustained Communist insurgency against a colonial power. Intimately linked to this 
point was the political hue of the MCP and its connections with a wider Communist 
plot in Asia. The Chinese in Malaya represented the majority of the insurgents 
involved in the Emergency, but the Indian community also participated in the trade 
union movement, and often in senior positions. Two individuals in particular, 
Ganapathy and Sambasivam, found themselves at the sharp end of Malaya’s 
repressive powers when arrested by the authorities under suspicion of terrorist 
activities. As the news of the arrests broke in India, it threw into stark relief the 
Government’s stance on Malaya in both the Constituent Assembly and India more 
widely.  
Ganapathy, a 24 year old Tamil (32 according to the British), was the ex-
President of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and remained a prominent 
figure in the trade union movement. Ganapathy also had a wider political career and 
was, like Thivy, an INA man and had also served as a member of the Malayan 
Delegation to the Asian Relations Conference in 1947.106 Ganapathy was arrested on 
1 March 1949, found guilty of carrying a fire arm, and sentenced to death in 
Selangor on 15 March 1949 in contravention of the Emergency Regulations, not 
technically for being a Communist. Similarly, Sambasivam, a clerk in the Labour 
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Union, was arrested in September 1948, and tried in the Supreme Court on 2-3 
March 1949 for unlawfully carrying a fire arm. The public and parliamentary 
reactions in India to these incidents are in stark contrast to the private diplomacy 
between India and Britain. Through examining the cases of Ganapathy and 
Sambasivam it is demonstrated that in public India was able to play the part that was 
expected of it in defending the two Indians involved, but at the same time the issue 
never threatened Indian acceptance that the measures in Malaya were necessary to 
avoid chaos and secure regional stability. 
However, Ganapathy, was not the first Indian to suffer as a result of the 
Emergency Regulations despite G.O.I. assertions to that Indians kept away from the 
trouble.107 A steady flow of banishees returned to India from Malaya throughout the 
Emergency and several other Indians were either shot or hanged, but none produced 
the same reaction as Ganapathy and Sambasivam.108 To account for the severity of 
the reactions it is necessary to turn to the wider context of India negotiating entry 
into the Commonwealth and the deterioration of the international situation. 
The basic facts of this case were not at issue when Thivy made 
representations to the Malayan Government, but the severity and finality of the 
punishment and the lack of consultation with the G.O.I., which felt slighted and on 
the back foot from the outset, made it harder for the Government to publicly manage 
the situation. Krishna Menon, in his capacity as High Commissioner, made it known 
in London that the G.O.I. was thoroughly displeased with this kind of offhand 
treatment by another sovereign nation.109 Initial representations, however, met with 
little immediate success, partly due to communication issues involved in the network 
of authorities involved110 but more importantly because the British ovgernment had 
no prerogative of mercy which was in hands of the Sultan of Selangor under the 
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Federation Constitution.111 Britain, moreover, did not wish to give the Indians the 
impression that in a case such as Ganapathy’s, policy could be altered to meet the 
demands of Indian ‘public opinion’.112  
When Bajpai reported to Krishna Menon that Ganapathy had been executed 
on 4 May 1949,113 he complained that there should have been a stay of execution 
until they had been informed of the reasons why the British supported the decision of 
the local authorities, or explained why they failed to interfere.114 The British High 
Commissioner in Delhi took the brunt of Indian representations, but in conversation 
with both Bajpai and Keskar (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs) the complaints 
centred not on the methods of colonial control or the fact that Britain was engaged in 
large scale colonial warfare, but again on the fact that the Indians felt that they had 
been treated in an off-hand manner.115 Part of the Indian frustration stemmed from 
the claim that had the government been informed in advance of the execution, there 
would have been less cause for complaint as the G.O.I. would have been able to 
practise some political window-dressing and could have saved face in the press and 
in public.116 Whatever the intricacies of the situation in Malaya, Indian public 
opinion and political opponents, both from the left and right and from within 
Congress, seized the opportunity to accuse Nehru of complicity with British 
imperialism and betraying the anti-colonial roots of Indian nationalism. 
The situation, however, had wider ramifications as at the time Nehru had just 
concluded discussions over India’s future within the Commonwealth at a Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting in London. Bajpai elucidated the ramifications of the incident to 
Krishna Menon writing that an ‘Execution, immediately following success of 
London’s Premier’s Conference, is most (repeat most) embarrassing for us as it 
exposes us to charge of continuing association with Commonwealth which is 
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unrelentingly imperialistic in outlook and action.’117 Before the G.O.I. was mauled 
too heavily in the press and by the Constituent Assembly, attention turned to the case 
of another Indian in Malaya, Sambasivam. 
Sambasivam was arrested in September 1948 and tried in the Supreme Court 
on 2-3 March 1949 for unlawfully carrying a fire arm. Two Assessors found him not 
guilty, but the judge disagreed and ordered a re-trial for 22 March 1949 and this time 
he was found guilty.118 The next stage came with the Court of Appeal on 28 April 
1949, where all three judges decided that there was no reason why the death sentence 
should not be carried out and he was due to be executed on 16 May 1949, the same 
day that Nehru was presenting the Commonwealth Resolution to the Constituent 
Assembly. The primary aim of the G.O.I., therefore, was to secure either a stay of 
execution or to have the charges against Sambasivam withdrawn. 
As Nehru discussed India’s entry into the Commonwealth in London, Thivy 
reported to Delhi on 30 April 1949 that the Federation Court of Appeal had upheld 
the death sentence.119 When the Indian authorities learned of this development, the 
representations made to the British and Malayan authorities were far more vigorous 
than those previously delivered. Krishna Menon met Lord Listowel (Colonial 
Office), on 6 May 1949 to make their feelings perfectly clear. He later reported to 
Bajpai that ‘representations have been as vigorous as they can be consistent with 
good manners.’120 Menon again made representations to Listowel on 7 and 9 May 
1949, and pointed out the unfortunate timing so soon after the Prime Ministers' 
Conference, and highlighted the ammunition that this gave to the opponents of 
Nehru’s policies.121 The G.O.I., swiftly and with alacrity, impressed ‘upon HMG that 
another execution closely following that of...Ganapathy may have the worst possible 
reaction on Indian opinion and may result in disastrous political consequences.’122  
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The gravity of the situation was not lost on the British as Listowel reported 
his conversation with Krishna Menon to Philip Noel-Baker (Commonwealth 
Secretary), writing that the ‘High Commissioner concluded by saying that it was 
most unfortunate that this should have happened just after the Prime Ministers’ 
Conference and that it would be an embarrassment to Nehru on his return.’123 
Listowel went quite some way in understanding the Indian position when he further 
wrote to Noel-Baker that Krishna Menon’s ‘real object was to do something that 
would maintain the prestige of his government and make it easier for criticism in 
India to be answered.’124 The G.O.I. attempted to manage a situation that was 
causing considerable embarrassment at the time of one of the most significant policy 
decisions of post-independence India: membership of the Commonwealth.  
In a further attempt to make their representations heard, Bajpai saw Nye in 
Delhi and warned him that another execution so soon after that of Ganapathy and on 
the eve of Nehru’s broadcast on the Commonwealth would be ‘disastrous’.125 
Following this portend, Bajpai continued to elucidate that his primary concern was 
‘if this second man was executed at such a time when his Prime Minister was 
explaining to the country the advantages which flow from the Commonwealth 
association it would have a singularly unfortunate political effect and would present 
the critics of the Prime Minister with a very effective weapon with which to attack 
him.’126 
Krishna Menon again saw Attlee in London, who had promised to do 
everything within the limits of propriety to help solve India’s dilemma; Creech Jones 
promised much the same, and the increased efforts by the British reflects the wider 
importance of the Commonwealth issue.127 At this point, Britain took a more active 
role than previously and Henry Gurney, High Commissioner in Malaya, was told to 
inform the Sultan of the situation and suggest the exercise of mercy.128 As the date of 
the expected execution and the Constituent Assembly debate approached, Bajpai saw 
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Nye on Nehru’s behalf. Nye then cabled London to reiterate ‘that Sambasivam 
should be executed on the very day on which Prime Minister is going to present to 
Constituent Assembly for its approval the recent London declaration about India’s 
relationship with the Commonwealth makes matters all the more unfortunate.’129 As 
with Ganapathy, the British could not unilaterally interfere as they had their hands 
tied by the Federal Constitution. However, having attempted to sell the 
Commonwealth to a sceptical political elite and wary public partly on the grounds 
that membership would allow for better protection of Indians abroad, Nehru was 
placed in a very difficult situation. He now faced the task of answering his critics 
over the Commonwealth policy in the context of one dead Indian and another 
sentenced to death. Nehru’s considerable disquiet at the timing of the situation in 
Malaya was amply demonstrated when he asked Thivy to reason with Gurney that 
the execution ‘should be deferred in view of the effect it might have on [the] current 
political situation in India.’130  
London’s earlier prompting of the High Commissioner in Malaya bore fruit 
as Thivy met with Gurney, and reported that he received Gurney’s assurance that 
even if the Sultan denied the appeal, ‘he [Gurney] would delay the carrying out of 
the sentence until the critical stage in the current session of the Constituent Assembly 
is passed.’131 When the Sultan ultimately denied the request, the concession of 
staying the execution was granted, as was a petition of leave to appeal to the Privy 
Council in London, the Empire’s ultimate judicial body.132 The British had informed 
Thivy and Krishna Menon that the Privy Council was a possibility, rather than see 
Sambasivam executed at such a sensitive time.133 The G.O.I. seized upon the 
opportunity and absorbed the cost of the legal action in London, but informed Thivy 
in Malaya that ‘too much publicity should NOT be given to our share in appeal 
since, in the event of failure of appeal, it may only exacerbate opinion in India and, 
in Malaya, whatever result of appeal ... We shall, of course, continue to give appeal 
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our backing quietly but effectively.’134 The G.O.I. was also anxious lest its 
interference in this case backfire into hostility towards Indians in Malaya, and 
threaten to destabilise communal relations, but also to forestall requests for 
assistance from Indians across the globe. By the middle of July, Sambasivam was 
granted an appeal by the Privy Council, and eventually acquitted, but was rearrested 
as soon as he was released in 1950.135 These case studies are not about the individual 
men, Ganapathy and Sambasivam, but are concerned with the wider ramifications at 
a sensitive time in India as Nehru negotiated the future composition of India’s 
relations with the Commonwealth in the face of a doubting political elite and public. 
The cases of Ganapathy and Sambasivam, in conjunction with the negotiation of 
Indian entry into the Commonwealth, focussed attention on the G.O.I.’s policy on 
Malaya. As Nehru explained to Cripps, the situation in Malaya only further added to 
criticism of Commonwealth entry and ‘it is put forward as an argument for our not 
continuing in the Commonwealth.’136 
In a rare public discussion of Malaya, Nehru directly tackled the Ganapathy-
Sambasivam issue in his press conference to the nation on the topic of the 
Commonwealth in May 1949. In an attempt to neutralise opposition and disassociate 
Malaya from both the Cold War and the ‘freedom struggle’ and to lay the blame on 
the Malayan Government rather than Britain, he noted that the cases had ‘nothing to 
do with the cause of peace and war… the local government in Malaya…acted with 
extreme folly.’137 Nehru attempted to disassociate the actions of the Malayan 
Government from Britain, and in doing so to neutralise criticism levelled against the 
G.O.I.’s decision to join the Commonwealth.138 Keskar also partook in the attempts 
to lay the blame for the death of Ganapathy at the feet of the Malayan authorities 
rather than targeting London.139 India largely followed Britain’s own line of 
argument that Malaya had control of its own legal system and thus British 
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jurisdiction had no authority, and in doing so attempted to isolate Malaya from 
Britain and the Commonwealth. At the close of 1949, Keskar further argued to an 
audience of students that India could not take up the extreme position of asking the 
colonial rulers to leave, but without passing any moral judgement on the character of 
the colonial administration, he could most emphatically reiterate that the exploited 
people of Malaya had India’s full moral sympathy.140 
The Commonwealth Resolution drafted at the London Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ meeting in April 1949 had to be ratified by the Constituent Assembly, and 
it was during this debate that doubts were aired over India’s position regarding the 
nature of the relationship with an imperial power, which had been specifically 
focussed through the recent events in Malaya. Nehru himself opened the 
proceedings: ‘We join the Commonwealth obviously because we think it is 
beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance.’141 It is in 
opposition to these claims about the benefits – namely protection of Indians abroad 
and being better able to influence the process of decolonisation that the criticisms 
came from the somewhat incredulous members, and not just from the left wing, of 
the Constituent Assembly. 
Replying to Nehru, Maulana Hasrat Mohani (Muslim League) challenged the 
resolution, arguing that ratifying it ‘is not only a betrayal of the independence of 
India, but it is a betrayal of all the efforts of all Asiatic countries who are struggling 
to gain their independence.’142 In this view, Mohani was echoed by Shri H.V. 
Kamath who asked: ‘how far are we (India) committed to the maintenance of the 
status quo of the Commonwealth generally, and particularly in Malaya, in South-East 
Asia...Colonialism is rampant; imperialism is rampant...Are we subscribing to 
this?’143  
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One further example from a vocal foreign affairs critic within Congress 
demonstrates the underlying opposition to Nehru’s moves. Shibbanlal Saksena 
argued that:  
If Britain had washed its hands of Imperialism and Colonialism in Asia, 
then certainly she could tell the Malayan people to set up their own 
Government and withdraw as they did from India but they do not say so. 
They say “We are sticking on in Malaya”...The development in South East 
Asia is a portentous development and so long as the UK Government is a 
party to all these that are going on-and the UK is a brother member of the 
Commonwealth, and whatever UK may say that the Malayan government 
may decide what they like, UK cannot wash its hands clean of blood of 
Ganapathy who was executed a few days ago and of another Indian who is 
perhaps being executed today. The UK, through its Colonial Office, is 
responsible for what is going on in Malaya. Can we say with our hand on 
our heart that so long as UK Government follows such policy in 
Malaya...that we freely and willingly continue to be members of the 
Commonwealth, because this declaration does not lay down any conditions 
whatever for our continuance as members of the Commonwealth?144 
Saksena pleaded for India to stick to its principles, doubting Nehru’s claims about 
the benefits of membership. Saksena concluded that ‘I come to it and that is that we 
have agreed to freely co-operate in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress. Very 
fine words but fine words butter no parsnips.’145 The focus on Malaya reveals deep 
tensions in the Assembly but despite the assaults against the Commonwealth policy, 
the resolution was eventually passed. These criticisms appropriated Malaya as a 
focal point, and raised what was perceived by many as being a betrayal of India’s 
anti-colonial principles. The fact that the MCP was a Communist organisation was 
little mentioned. The issue of Malaya was presented as an example of the 
continuance of an insidious British imperialism that India was doing little to criticise 
and was, in fact, preparing to endorse with its membership of the Commonwealth.  
Despite the fact that the immediate and heated criticism over Malaya cooled 
somewhat with the passing of the Commonwealth Resolution in mid-May 1949, the 
G.O.I. still expected flak from opponents and the wider spectre of public opinion 
over the continuing story of Sambasivam. This was amply demonstrated, for 
example, when Bajpai reported to the British that the G.O.I. would follow up the 
possibility of Sambasivam applying for leave to petition the Privy Council in the 
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main with the Malayan authorities and in London ‘to avoid [a] situation in which 
High Commissioner might be in difficulties with Indian Press.’146 
At Dehra Dun, where Congress was to endorse the Commonwealth decision, 
Nehru again mentioned Malaya: Sambasivam was now the target of G.O.I. efforts. 
Nehru gave a clear appreciation of the situation, in part to demonstrate the limited 
options available to India, but also as a form of education to India that it was not 
possible to defend the rights of all Indian emigrants across the globe and thus 
dampen expectations for action in any future cases. Emphasising the rule of law and 
legal constraints, Nehru told Congress that the ‘Malayan Government has certain 
laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of Malaya…the Government of India 
cannot tell the Malayan Government that Indians arrested under the same regulations 
should not be treated just like the others.’147 The G.O.I. aimed to reduce expectations 
of intervention in cases where Indians abroad turned to India for assistance. Nehru 
continued to advise that Indians abroad look to their adoptive countries as home at 
the opening of parliament in January 1950.148 Keskar echoed Nehru during a speech 
at Patna where he strongly criticised those who advocated Indian intervention 
employing a hypothetical question and asking how Indians would feel if the British 
press insisted that the British Government intervene to save the life of an 
Englishman sentenced to death by an Indian court.149  
With the experience of the Ganapathy and Sambasivam cases,  Nehru 
attempted to reduce the expectations of Indians both abroad and in India in regards to 
the G.O.I.’s ability and willingness to protect overseas Indians by emphasising that 
‘Indians in Malaya must be loyal to the land they live in and it integrate themselves 
with other communities.’150 This entreaty also served to reinforce Nehru’s other 
belief that without communal co-operation and harmony there would be little 
progress in Malaya’s transition to nationhood. Thivy stressed this point to the 
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Ministry of External Affairs, arguing that racial equality and communal harmony 
would help remove fear and would allow the Chinese to settle down to nice, quiet 
lives rather than turning to Communist China.151 
Conclusions 
The most instructive and revealing way to discuss Indian reactions to the 
Malayan Emergency is to pose the question: why did Nehru and the G.O.I. ‘keep 
quiet’ when over Indonesia and Indo-China they railed against imperialism? 
Fundamentally, the case of Malaya demonstrates an Indian negotiation of interests, 
principles and public pressures. First and foremost, Malayan stability was intricately 
linked to the overall health of the Sterling Area and this represented the most obvious 
link to Indian material interests in Malaya. The MCP rebellion, whatever its methods 
and intentions, threatened the dollar earnings from rubber and tin. Far from falling 
foul of Nehru’s tongue, the British came to respect his position on Malaya, and were 
broadly appreciative of Nehru’s flexible attitude on the wider issue of Malaya. As 
General Harding (Far Eastern Command), Malcolm MacDonald (Commissioner 
General Southeast Asia) and Elser Dening (Head of Southeast Asia desk at the 
Foreign Office) all argued, ‘Nehru has on the whole been sympathetic to our position 
in Malaya.’152 MacDonald wrote to Cripps that ‘The more I see of him [Nehru] the 
more I feel his greatness.  I think he has quite a sympathetic understanding of our 
problem in Malaya, and he is certainly always very friendly when we meet and 
discuss it.’153 Malaya both informed and reiterated Nehru’s conviction that the only 
way to forestall Communist advances was through a combination of both political 
progress and economic progress, and it was through the example of Malaya that 
Nehru hoped to educate the British.  
Turmoil in Malaya and in Southeast Asia was something that Nehru 
acknowledged, but that he was reluctant to publicly condemn until the middle of 
1949.154 Furthermore, Nehru reasoned that the MCP uprising was Communist-
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inspired and not nationalism as he recognised and respected. Nehru saw the MCP not 
as liberators or as true nationalists, but that did not mean that he was willing or able 
to outwardly support the case of the British without risk of domestic repercussions. 
Nehru further reasoned that stability could be achieved in Southeast Asia more easily 
by working with the British than against them, a fact that was not lost on the British. 
The stability of Southeast Asia was of paramount importance to Nehru, and with the 
threat of Communist victory in China growing, Chinese dominance of the MCP 
raised the spectre of increasing Chinese influence in the region. China was 
increasingly seen as a long term threat to the stability of Southeast Asia and as 
competition to Indian influence, with the MCP comprised mainly of Chinese, Malaya 
was at the epicentre of Indian worries. Nehru was thus eager to bring the Chinese 
into the international fold and to treat them as friends as an attempt to neutralise 
regional hostility. 
The specific cases of Ganapathy and Sambasivam also allows us to see that 
the G.O.I. was sensitive when it thought that it was being kept in the dark and not 
treated with the level of respect that it deemed necessary as a sovereign power – a 
legacy of its colonial identity. There are two parts to this: one is a heightened sense 
of pride due to the fact that India was only recently decolonised; the second part was 
that being kept in the dark not only made India look impotent in its dealings with the 
UK but also provided opponents with a stick with which to beat Nehru.    
Once again Nehru was forced to try to reconcile several different pressures: 
Indian opinion, world opinion and the balance of attempting to balance a foreign 
policy that satisfied both material and ideological requirements. Nehru preferred 
progressive colonialism to Communism in Southeast Asia in the short term because 
colonialism at least offered a semblance of stability. This is a key factor that has long 
been overlooked in the study of Indian foreign policy, and it was by way of historical 
heritage that immediate stability in Southeast Asia meant support of the British in 
their efforts in Malaya rather than see the region fall under the sway of the Chinese 
and Russians.  
Overseas Indians also factored into Delhi’s thinking. Nehru sought to 
dissuade overseas communities from being too dependent on India for support over 
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their domestic issues in other sovereign territories. However, one must question Lal’s 
assertion that Nehru’s foreign policy excluded the issue of expatriate Indians from its 
foreign policy both on the grounds that expatriate is a fluid concept and that Nehru 
clearly did not exclude this group from his policy formation.155 The issue of Indians 
abroad had a resonance with the situation in South Africa, in particular, Ceylon, 
Burma and East Africa, which were emotive issues that could not be ignored by the 
G.O.I.. Thus the treatment of Indians in another part of the Commonwealth impacted 
upon responses to the troubles in Malaya.156 The Indian population in Malaya was a 
direct result of imperial enterprise and the low wages and deleterious working 
conditions not only served as a reminder of this legacy, but provided a grievance for 
the MCP to exploit. Nehru continually pushed the British for better working 
conditions for Malaya and for them to follow a progressive path.    
Nehru, moreover, was negotiating entry into the Commonwealth. It would 
serve no purpose for the G.O.I. to take a wider view of the cases of Ganapathy and 
Sambasivam and attack the entire enterprise of British imperialism in Southeast 
Asia. Criticism centred on Ganapathy and Sambasivam, as the British High 
Commissioner reported the reaction to the arrest of both Indians, writing that 
‘Malaya for the first time since independence has come in for much criticism this 
summer. This was occasioned largely by the death sentences…on two Indian trade 
unionists of Communist leanings who were involved in terrorist activities in the 
federated states.’157 Nye continued that ‘Congress and Leftist leaders as well as the 
Press indulged in the most immoderate abuse of the Malayan Government 
stigmatising it as a “Planters’ Raj”.’158 
Sambasivam and Ganapathy were not the only two Indians to be caught up in 
the Malayan Emergency, but were two of the most high profile due to the timing of 
their trials and the subsequent attention paid by the press and popular opinion. The 
G.O.I. was, therefore, prompted to attempt to resolve the situation by demonstrating 
support for Sambasivam and Ganapathy. In fact, the Indian Representative in Malaya 
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and Singapore continued to work on the behalf of Indians prosecuted under the 
Emergency Regulations. M. Gopala Menon reported that during 1951, three Indian 
rubber tappers were sentenced to death, and that ‘All efforts were made by this 
Representation to save their lives, but they met with success only in the last case.’159 
More prominent members of Singapore society than rubber tappers also fell foul of 
regulations in 1951 for disseminating MCP materials.160 None of these, however, 
elicited such interest and intense reactions as the case of the two Indians dealt with in 
the spring of 1949.   
Ganapathy and Sambasivam’s trials, moreover, reveal something of the 
ambiguity of the situation in Malaya, and in Indiaʼs rhetoric of foreign policy. They 
reveal how the impact of the press and public opinion influenced Nehru and his 
government. The G.O.I. had to attempt to rationalise and defend its policy to an 
incredulous public opinion that held their own nationalist struggle dear. Crucially, 
Malaya also illuminates the constraints acting upon Nehru, and especially the 
reliance on the old British imperial system in Southeast Asia. Despite the G.O.I.’s 
general discretion over the Malayan Emergency, the hanging of Ganapathy and the 
potential execution of Sambasivam provoked a defence of Indians abroad in reaction 
to public outcry directed and enflamed by the press and opposition in the Constituent 
Assembly. The criticism that emanated from the G.O.I., however, was specifically 
targeted at the Malayan authorities and at the procedural workings of the Emergency 
Regulations and not at the overall project of defending Malaya from Communism 
and in the same action defending colonialism. For example, Nehru was reported to 
have informed a press conference that the Malayan authorities had acted with great 
folly in their hanging of Ganapathy.161 Malaya was part of Nehru’s realisation that 
events on the ground did not necessarily fit neatly into the ideological or principled 
tropes that were so often espoused as guiding the formulation of India’s foreign 
policy. It is the interaction of the cases of these two men with the wider regional 
situation and Indian entry into the Commonwealth that provides an insight into 
Indian foreign policy.  
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6) India and the Colombo Plan: Putting South Asia back in 
Colombo 
In a world racked by schism and confusion it is doubtful whether free men 
can long afford to leave undeveloped and imprisoned in poverty the human 
resources of the countries of South and South-East Asia which could help 
so greatly, not only to restore the world’s prosperity, but also to redress its 
confusion and enrich the lives of all men everywhere.1  
These words formed the closing remarks of the report of the Commonwealth 
Consultative Committee entitled ‘Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic 
Development in South and South-East Asia.’ This Commonwealth initiative, known 
as the Colombo Plan, aimed to raise the economic standard of living of Asians 
through economic development set out in individual country plans and funded 
through Commonwealth contributions. The Colombo Plan also sought to lay the 
foundations of future economic growth, and thereby combat the spread of 
Communism in Asia by providing a physical and psychological assault against the 
appeal of Communism. The Colombo Plan aimed to facilitate the rehabilitation of 
the region so that it could play its part in balancing the world economy through the 
export of dollar commodities for the Sterling Area and the reducing of dollar 
expenditures for food imports. The Report was largely the product of three meetings 
held in 1950: Colombo in January, Sydney in May and London in September. But the 
seeds of what became known as the Colombo Plan are located in the years before 
1950. 
India was actively involved and a key influence in the formation of the 
Colombo Plan, as the plan served to satisfy several key aims of India’s foreign 
policy: to foster regional co-operation, it was part of the settlement of India’s sterling 
balances, and it was an attempt to engage the Commonwealth and potentially the US 
in the development of South and Southeast Asia largely on the basis of halting the 
spread of Communism in the region. Colombo, however, takes a back seat in the 
existing historiography to India’s other regional moves, for example the Asian 
Relations Conference and the infamous Bandung Conference of 1955. The Colombo 
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Plan is one of the Commonwealth’s lasting legacies and still provides technical 
assistance to this day. However, it is absent from the established narrative of India’s 
foreign policy and the relevant volumes of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru 
and the National Archives of India contain little reference to the Colombo meetings 
further compounding its absence. With few Indian governmental archival materials 
to utilise, British records provide a basic narrative of pertinent events and minutes of 
meetings.2 
For Nehru economic development served the purpose of saving Asia for 
democracy as opposed to either Communism or Western imperialism. Economic 
development aimed to ensure that newly-independent nations could offer their 
citizens a tangible improvement in their standards of living, and to demonstrate to 
colonial territories, Malaya for example, that national development, not 
Communism, was the answer to their problems. Development was not simply, as 
Marc Frey argues, to ʻlegitimise continued colonial rule.’3  Development was rather 
part of the psychological counter-attack to Communism that Nehru prescribed to the 
Western powers, and it was for this reason that Nehru emphasised the threat to the 
West. Moreover, he presented the satisfying of Asia’s nationalist aspirations with 
development, and also argued for development as a means of co-operation between 
the East and West. Through the Commonwealth platform, India was able to 
contribute to the moulding of policies for Asia, and maintain not only a claim to be a 
voice for Asians - not the leader of an Eastern Federation as Charrier suggests - but 
also to being a core member of a reformed Commonwealth.4 
Nehru’s alarm at Communist expansion was genuine, as evidenced by his 
own actions against Indian Communists, but was also employed in an attempt to 
exploit the interest of the UK, Commonwealth and US. John Aloysius Thivy, India’s 
Representative in Malaya and Singapore, detailed a very similar argument in 
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conversation with the MoEA in early 1949 when he argued that Britain had to be 
convinced that the only way to build a ‘bulwark against Communism’ was to remove 
racial discrimination and establish common equality, rights and duties in their 
territories, and also in the economic field. If this could be achieved then there would 
be a chance of ‘effecting some measure of democracy and freedom in territories 
under British rule.’5 Thivy continued that ‘If we base our attack on the dual grounds 
of (a) threat of Communism, and (b) India’s security, we may break down Britain’s 
selfish motives. Once Britain is won over, then half the battle for Asia’s freedom is 
over. Britain will then become an active ally in the task of breaking down the 
resistance of the Dutch and the French in their colonial policy.’6 This exposition 
echoes the advice Nehru provided at the Commonwealth meeting in April 1949 
concerning Malaya and Indonesia. 
Additionally, India expected to benefit from the potential economic 
development of Asia. Giles Boquerat, in a similar fashion to the economist Michal 
Kalecki, concludes his study of India’s foreign aid policy with the assertion that ‘the 
Indian Government did not hesitate to take advantage of the East-West confrontation 
to mobilize aid from both superpowers.’7 However, this only holds true for the mid-
1950 period and beyond, whereas in this earlier period India exploited a growing fear 
of the spread of Communism to loosen the purse strings of its Western allies. India’s 
approach, to employ and exploit the fear of Communist expansion, developed 
alongside its own increasing realisation of the danger of the spread of Communism. 
Part of India’s emphasis on development as policy was that it would then 
enable India to be involved as opposed to any form of political or military approach, 
which India would have been unable to reconcile with a commitment to remaining 
free of formal obligations. The British were not blind to this fact and it informed 
their own formulation of their Southeast Asia policies to a large extent as India was 
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considered the ‘the key to the whole South-East Asian regional co-operation. 
Without India we can achieve little.’8 For Nehru the approach also represented an 
example of the efficacy of the Commonwealth connection in international affairs and 
as evidence of the benefits of India’s membership.  
The Colombo Plan provided India with a forum in which to take part, to co-
operate on the regional basis with other Asian nations and in a way that satisfied 
India fears that it was not obligated to follow any specific line or policy. Colombo, 
moreover, eventually provided India with a long-term sterling balance solution at a 
time when the fear of some form of readjustment was palpable. India decided to co-
operate and contribute because assistance was all conducted on a bilateral basis, and 
so was able to maintain its principle of avoiding binding treaties. The anti-
Communist aspect of the plan was seldom mentioned in public discourse and was 
certainly not emphasised by the G.O.I.. The rhetoric of Colombo gradually 
developed to underplay any Communist-directed aspect of its inception, and chose 
rather to concentrate on the raising the standard of living for its own sake. 
Of central importance for India, as for the Commonwealth and Sterling Area 
as a whole, was that any success from the initiative could have the overall effect of 
increasing world trade and, through its concentration on agricultural assistance, 
increase India’s access to food supplies. Development served as a means to increase 
production in Southeast Asia in the hope of rebalancing dollar deficits, which in turn 
benefitted all, and this aspect of the plan cannot be forgotten or lost in the rhetoric.9 
Setting Asia on the path to development would not only raise the standard of living, 
moving the territories closer to self-government, but also provided India with 
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markets for exports crucial to its economic growth and balancing development 
budgets. As B.N. Ganguli argues, an important post-war trend was the continuance 
and expansion of India’s imports, namely rice, timber mineral oils, from Southeast 
Asia, which underlined India’s dependence on imports of food and raw materials. 
However, the link is not made that this expansion of trade figured into India’s 
appreciation of expansionary Communism.10 
The Planning Commission, under Nehru’s leadership, prepared the 
submission for the Consultative Committee.11 In their submission to the 
Commonwealth Consultative Committee, what became the Colombo Plan, 80 per 
cent of projects in the submission were already underway, as was the First Five-Year 
Plan from 1951. To a degree, Colombo was a rhetorical device that gave substance to 
the rationalisation of existing projects in India and made it a national plan.12 The idea 
of national development was crucial to Nehru’s conception of development as a key 
means to unite a fissiparous nation. Colombo was a codification of India’s existing 
projects, or planned projects, not exclusively for economic reasons, but also for 
forging a sense of national identity through a commitment to economic development. 
India was able to secure international assistance whilst maintaining the national 
control of planning. Constructing the plans also served as a means to clearly set out 
India’s needs, its progress since the war, and of emphasising the seriousness of their 
need for assistance.  
Within the context of Britain’s economic problems, most recently manifested 
in devaluation, India viewed the Colombo Plan as a means of securing regular and 
secure releases from her accumulated sterling balances amid continued Anglo-
American financial discussions and rumours of cancellation. Britain had indicated 
that sterling releases would have to be addressed in the wake of devaluation in 
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October 1949, but India’s existing agreement remained in place until June 1951, after 
which time the releases would again have to be decided upon.13 Crucially, the 
Sydney meeting in 1950 provided India with access to technical assistance from the 
rest of the Commonwealth, linked to their Colombo submission which then formed 
the kernel of the first five-year plan.14 Involvement also held the prospect of 
American aid, both to India and more widely to the rest of South and Southeast Asia, 
through the demonstration of real progress towards self-help, which the US insisted 
upon as part of Truman’s Point Four programme.  
Oakman argues that ‘To some extent, the Colombo Plan was a façade, a 
device intended to lure independent Asia into an alliance with the Western bloc’, and  
at the heart of this chapter is the question of how India fits into this interpretation.15 
India’s role in where and when the idea originated can in part be demonstrated 
through examining the historiography. There are multiple existing narratives of the 
formulation of the Colombo Plan, but none as yet that take India as a key 
protagonist. Moreover, the Colombo Plan seldom forms a part of the narrative of 
India’s foreign policy.16 
The majority of the existing accounts end the analysis of Colombo at January 
1950, but what is necessary is an emphasis on examining the subsequent 
development of the plan.17 Much of literature, for example, Ademola Adeleke and 
including Percy Spender himself, focuses too heavily on Australia and the 
contribution of Spender’s idea that ‘formed the kernel of the proposal that the 
Commonwealth foreign ministers transformed into the Colombo Plan.’18 Daniel 
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Oakman, in a similar vein to David Lowe, also places too heavy an emphasis on the 
Colombo plan as Australian policy.19 Much of this literature focuses too tightly on 
the proceedings of the meeting in Ceylon in January 1950, which thus lends weight 
to the argument of Australian centrality.20 There are, however, other narratives to 
consider, and as Lalita Prasad Singh notes it was Ceylon that first vocalised the 
kernel of the idea at the Colombo meeting.21 Whereas Charles S. Blackton argued in 
1951 that the issue was first raised at the Colombo conference in January 1950, he 
provides little detail on the voice that suggested it.22 This research, however, places 
less emphasis on the meetings themselves and instead focuses on the communication 
of ideas before, during and throughout the meetings to discuss the Colombo Plan.  
There is little established historiography on India and the Colombo Plan. 
Whilst the January 1950 meeting in Colombo is of importance, it is necessary to 
establish its place in the wider narrative of economic co-operation as an answer to 
Communism, and doing so helps to reveal the central role that India played that is 
too often neglected. The seeds for ‘fruitful’ discussions were sown in October 1948 
at Commonwealth discussions in London and continued at the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting in April 1949. Lalita Prasad Singh attempted a partial 
rehabilitation of India’s role as he argued that K.M Panikkar should be credited with 
originating the idea for circulating a memorandum in early 1949 containing 
proposals for an economic assault against the appeal of Communism.23 J.C. Kundra 
argues that Colombo ‘definitely resulted in India’s agreement that Communism 
should be checked throughout South-East Asia by economic action.’24 Although his 
judgement on where the idea originated is unclear as he also argues that the idea was 
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predominantly Indian.25 Kundra, however, fails to examine the close relationship 
between Indian and British ideas on blocking Communism and the crucial factor of 
India’s sterling balances. For India, pushing the economic front as the means to stop 
Communism was the only way to secure British and hopefully American 
development assistance to the region. S. Gopal, Nehru’s official biographer, also 
gives little attention to Colombo and does so only in reference to Communist China, 
emphasising the centrality of the January 1950 meeting and Nehru’s role, noting that:  
As for aggressive communism, it could be best resisted in South East Asia 
by removing every vestige of colonial control and strengthening the 
nationalist forces. The Commonwealth Foreign Ministers, meeting at 
Colombo in January 1950, agreed; Nehru secured general acceptance that 
what was needed was not a Pacific pact on the lines of NATO but the 
raising, with the assistance of the Commonwealth countries, of the 
economic standards of the region.26 
An additional strand of the literature attempts to integrate the Colombo Plan 
within the narrative of British and, to a lesser extent, US foreign policy in Southeast 
Asia, and it is thus not difficult to agree with Adeleke’s conclusion that much of the 
literature on the Colombo Plan has focused on the role of the Western powers. This is 
at odds with Oakman’s assessment that little attention has been focussed on the 
economic, political and strategic context.27 Oakman’s observation does, however, 
have some merit: there is a palpable lack of literature that examines the role of, for 
example, the sterling balances within the wider context of the study of foreign 
policy.  
Tilman Remme, for instance, charts the development of British foreign policy 
and the formulation of regional cooperation, in Southeast Asia.28 Britain, argues 
Remme, crucially influenced by the need to secure Indian involvement, not active 
Indian agency, concluded that economic assistance was the best way to combat the 
Communist menace.29 Remme, however, fails to adequately position India’s role 
within these policies, and in doing so misses the central importance that the existence 
of the sterling balances had in the formulation of both Indian and British policies. 
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Nicholas Tarling is among those who focus too heavily on the UK, describing 
Colombo as an ambitious strategy of British foreign policy.30 Tarling acknowledges 
the importance of India in Southeast Asia in general, but only in so far as he notes 
that the British took account of the attitudes of Indian leaders.31 
In 2009, B.R Tomlinson attempted to address the topic of the Colombo Plan 
in tandem with that of the sterling balance problem and concluded that the Colombo 
Plan did little more than to regularise the payment of wartime debts and slow down 
British economic recovery, but crucially fails to examine its significance.32 Whereas 
Schenk, in the context of her study on the impact of the Sterling Area on the British 
economy, argues that ‘Instead, the plans to link these two aspects of the sterling area 
[balances and development] were rather disingenuous attempts to reduce UK 
liabilities while manipulating America into providing dollar aid to the sterling 
area.’33 Schenk’s analysis is far too reductive as she sets the entire scheme of 
regional development as a disingenuous exercise to extract money from the 
Americans in order to solve the balances problem rather than exploring the intricate 
links between Colombo and the sterling balances.34 
Philip Charrier also made a valuable contribution to the historiography by 
taking the policies of Britain, and to a lesser extent India, in Southeast Asia and 
charting the development of the Colombo Plan within the context of their regional 
policies. Britain, Charrier argues, was eager to create a multi-lateral post-colonial 
structure designed to satisfy the demand of the nationalists whilst safeguarding the 
                                               
30
 Nicholas Tarling, ʻThe United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo Planʼ, The Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 24 (1986), p. 3 and Britain, South East Asia and the Impact 
of the Korean War (Singapore, 2003) also see the recent book by Peter Lowe, Contending with 
Nationalism: British Policy towards Southeast Asia, 1945-65: Global Conflict and Security since 
1945 (London, 2009). 
31
 Tarling, ʻThe United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo Planʼ, p. 4. 
32
 B.R. Tomlinson. ʻ“The Weapons of the Weakened”: British Power, Sterling Balances and the 
Origins of the Colombo Planʼ, in The Formation of the New International Order in Asia and the 
International Aid Plan, (Tokyo, 2009), p. 54. 
33
 Catherine R. Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area: From Devaluation to Convertibility in the 
1950s (London, 1994), p. 35. This accusation was also made by Australia, which claimed that the UK 
was more interested in the economics than the foreign policy, see Oakman, Facing Asia A History of 
the Colombo Plan, p. 48. 
34
 The British Cabinet even reported that, ‘one of the more valuable by-products of the Colombo Plan, 
though not the primary objective, particularly vis-a-vis the United States, is thus likely to be that ... 
this problem of war-time accumulations of sterling balances will have been virtually solved.’ EPC 
(50) 101, 27/10/1950, CAB 134/227. 
 Colombo Plan 
 
206 
economic interests of the colonial powers.35 As for India, Charrier argues that it 
wanted a narrowly Asian ‘eastern federation led by India.ʼ36 In contrast, this research 
argues that India’s interest in Colombo was designed to ensure that states in the 
region had the necessary economic stability and strength to warrant decolonisation, 
and to assist those recently decolonised.  
Ritchie Ovendale made a start on examining Anglo-American relations in 
Southeast Asia, as did Merrill and McMahon. These accounts began to link the 
issues of Communism in Southeast Asia, with US and British policies for India, but 
without more than a passing reference to Colombo.37 However, it was in 1993 with 
the publication of Anita Inder Singh’s The Limits of British Influence that the set of 
British, Indian and American relationships were all considered in the same work.38 
Inder Singh’s work, however, is directed in its focus on the British relationship with 
America concerning India rather than the individual set of bilateral relations. 
Moreover, Inder Singh gives little attention to the economic factors that underpinned 
the relationship and in particular fails to provide material on either the sterling 
balances or the Colombo Plan. In ʻPlaying Fairy Godfather to the Commonwealthʼ 
Ademola Adeleke raises the question of why the US ultimately bought into the plan, 
and argues that it was for its own political and strategic goals, informed by the 
Korean War, and not in support of the Commonwealth, that the US bought in.39 
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Whilst Adeleke examines the Anglo-American diplomacy surrounding the issue and 
positions it within the broader context of Louis and Robinson’s Anglo-American 
coalition, there is extremely little on the place of India within the analysis and 
Adeleke fails to engage with the economic aspects of the problem.40 Having 
reviewed the existing literature, there is scope for an interpretation that places India 
in the fore, and crucial to any analysis of India’s actions in Asia is an appreciation of 
the threats posed by the growth of both domestic and international Communism. 
‘The Communist Party has been functioning in practically open revolt in 
certain parts of India’41 
Nehru had long been committed to the economic development of India and 
the strength of post-war Communism served to reinforce his belief in the necessity of 
raising the standard of living of Asians. There were two sides to the evolution of 
India’s stance on Communism: domestic and international, both of which were 
closely linked. India’s international position on Communism was not an ideological 
stance against Communist ideals and principles, but against its expansionary moves 
and methods and the fundamental threat that it posed to Asian freedom. India’s 
policy towards Communism, stability through economic and national development, 
was one of indirect action that reduced the chances of open conflict and aggression.  
India’s own domestic Communist problem was the key to its increasing 
realisation of the threat that external Communism posed to India itself and to 
Southeast Asia. Domestic Communism was the largest threat to the national project, 
and by May 1948 Nehru complained to his Principal Private Secretary that ‘the fact 
of the matter is that the Communist Party has been functioning in practically open 
revolt in certain parts of India, indulging in violence, and sabotage and murder.’42 In 
spring 1948, Nehru was eager to publicly emphasise that the proscription of the 
Communist party in West Bengal and elsewhere were not directed by him, nor did 
they represent any change in India’s international politics and should not be taken to 
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mean the expression of sympathy for one bloc or another.43 Despite Nehru’s 
statement to the contrary, India agreed to assist the US by providing the particulars 
of known Communists in much the same way as they did with Britain.44  
Nehru’s first public attack on domestic Communists came in July 1948 in the 
Hindustan Times in ‘Nehru Denounces Communists’ where he presented them as a 
threat to India’s internal stability in the context of Hyderabad and the proscription of 
the CPI in West Bengal. Nehru provided an elucidation of his approach to 
combatting this insidious threat: economic recovery which in turn was dependent on 
the general recovery of trade.45 Crucially Nehru still remained publicly reticent on 
the subject of international Communism in the face of continued criticism from 
Moscow.46  
By the beginning of 1949, in the domestic context, Bajpai stated in 
conversation with the US Ambassador that the G.O.I., after a long hesitation, had 
come out sternly against the Communists who were trying to create chaos in India as 
in other Asian countries.47 H.V.R. Iengar (Secretary to Ministry of Home Affairs) 
further elucidated India’s domestic take on Communism to the British, which was at 
the time free to operate in India apart from in Bengal. Suppression alone, he argued, 
was no cure for Communism and whilst there were 12,000 troops in Hyderabad, 
remedial economic measures were also being taken.48 
Nehru’s approach to domestic Communists fundamentally influenced his 
opinions on how to deal with international Communism: through the amelioration of 
economic conditions on a national basis. In essence it was not combatting 
Communism, but combatting the conditions in which it thrived, namely economic 
hardship and the absence of national freedom. Repression was utilised in India, but 
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repression without reform was directly linked in Indian public discourse with the 
colonial repression of the British Raj. Repression alone, Nehru and the G.O.I. feared, 
would continue to be used by critics to beat the government, and therefore a positive 
policy was needed.49 The Government cannot ‘look on supinely’ when trouble was 
created argued Nehru, but he also expressed concern over international and domestic 
opinion over repression, doubting whether ‘we are winning in this battle of gaining 
people’s minds and hearts.’50 Positive action, in conjunction with repression when 
necessary, therefore, was the only answer to the domestic Communist threat.51 Their 
actions did not fit with what Nehru saw as the ‘everyday politics’ of independence 
and the best way, Nehru also opined, to discredit the Communists in India was ‘to 
lay stress on the violence, sabotage, terrorism, etc., and to deal with it all vigour and 
not to emphasise the fact of communism.’52 Nehru’s policies represent one of the 
first expositions of hearts and minds tactics that he attempted to push on the British 
in their attempts to deal with Malaya.53 Nehru’s domestic problem informed and 
reinforced his belief that economic development was what Asia needed.  
Despite any Soviet reaction, or internal criticism, the G.O.I. would not allow 
the Communists to undermine law, order and security in India. India’s domestic 
Communist problem fundamentally influenced its attitude towards international 
Communism as Southeast Asia experienced a series of sustained Communist-
inspired uprisings from Malaya to Burma. These were viewed as part of a Moscow-
directed assault launched at the Calcutta Youth Conference and Communist Party of 
India Conference in February 1948. Thivy, the Indian Representative in Malaya, 
offered the view that the activities of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) were not 
simply a result of economic conditions or the undemocratic nature of Malaya, but 
that MCP actions took a firmer and stronger line of action in line with the common 
plan of action decided upon in Calcutta 1948.54 India began to make much of its 
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internal efforts to combat Communism to the UK and the US. In the summer of 
1949, whilst emphasising that India had no sympathy for Communism when it 
manifested violently or in attempts to destroy states, Nehru privately made it clear 
that ‘we have, however, consistently refrained from any activity that may be 
regarded as political hostility to Communist ideology as such or to communist 
states.’55 Nehru’s emphasis on avoiding conflict reinforced the need to combat 
Communism by development and through satisfying demands for national freedom. 
He wrote to Vijaylakshmi Pandit that the ‘way to fight communism is not by armies, 
but by other methods and these are psychological as well as the adoption of 
progressive policies.’56  
India’s interest in Colombo was part of Nehru’s growing realisation of the 
complex nature of post-war international politics. The victory of the Chinese 
Communist Party at the end of 1949, and its recognition soon thereafter, played an 
important role in the continued development of India’s approach in Southeast Asia. 
From condemning internal Communists, Bajpai privately informed Henderson in 
February 1950 that India disapproved of the avowed aims, activities and methods of 
international Communism.57  
Colombo was the first time that the Commonwealth met in Asia, although it 
was not, as Oakman argues, the first time that Asian members were given the 
opportunity to discuss their views of regional issues.58 Nehru, for example, had 
previously stressed the need for a psychological counter-attack and positive 
measures in the economic field.59 International Communism threatened both India’s 
internal security, and a stable region of free nations. In Nehru’s view of the situation, 
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Communism ‘appears to us…to come in the way of freedom’, it was anti-national, 
he argued, and instead of concentrating on the inhabitants of Southeast Asia, the 
Communist movements thought ‘rather of a wider world policy in which the interest 
of the Soviet Union are paramount.’60 Part of Communist success in China was that 
they had been considered as liberators from foreign (American) interference, which 
had implications for Southeast Asia as Nehru argued at Colombo: ‘they might be 
regarded as a liberating and economic rather than a military force, and we must do 
something to counter this.’61  
The Commonwealth, Nehru argued at the London Commonwealth meeting in 
April 1949, ‘must develop, and pursue, a positive policy for preventing war. And in 
Asia must take the form of removing the condition which encouraged the growth of 
communism.’62 Any moves, however, had to be undertaken in a way that did not 
threaten India’s desire to remain outside of any bloc or treaty directed against any 
other. Colombo and a regional effort was also seen by Nehru as a key way to reduce 
the chances of international conflict, and to assert Asian primacy in solving an Asian 
problem as opposed to Europeans attempting to solve Asia’s problems with little 
reference to Asians themselves.  
‘The Communist Victories in China have made a tremendous difference 
to Asia and the World’63 
These words from Nehru go some way towards demonstrating the profound 
international impact of Communist victory in China. India had to have relations with 
its giant neighbour with whom it shared approximately 2,500 miles of border 
stretching from Kashmir to Assam in the east, whatever the composition of its 
government, and it was Nehru’s policy to engage rather than risk a confrontation 
with the Communist leaders of China. As early as June 1949, Nehru argued that 
India’s approach should be one of friendly expectations and waiting to see what 
happens.64 This early approach was in part based on Nehru’s reading of Chinese 
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nationalism, which he argued would eventually prove stronger than Communist 
doctrine, but that it would take time for the Chinese to overcome its influence.65 
Nehru provided a further elucidation of his views on China in conversation with Loy 
Henderson, the American Ambassador, arguing that Chiang Kai-Shek had alienated 
Chinese nationalism, which the Communists cleverly exploited to take over the 
leadership of Chinese nationalism. However, interference by Russia would be deeply 
distrusted and resented due to the anti-foreigner sentiment in Chinese nationalism.66 
Nehru reiterated his China approach in conversation with President Truman on his 
American trip in October 1949: it was an agrarian revolution that had been so 
mishandled by the Kuomintang that power had fallen by default to the 
Communists.67 Bajpai echoed Nehru in asserting that Chinese Communism was 
different from elsewhere and that the Chinese and the Russians would not make 
happy bed-fellows.68 This reading encouraged the notion that a friendly modus 
vivendi had to be reached, and part of this was speedy recognition of the new 
government. India’s China policy was not, as argued by some, appeasement based on 
a naïve assumption that the Communist giant posed no threat, but that the best way 
to counter that threat was through engagement and inclusion in international and 
regional affairs.69  
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One vital point is that the Communist Party’s victory was a fait accompli 
with the Kuomintang isolated on Formosa, and as Nehru told Thakin Nu of Burma: 
‘there is not much choice left in the matter and the facts of the situation lead us only 
to one conclusion.’70 India argued that it was simply acknowledging fact, whereas 
withholding recognition could only be based on the fact that it was the Communist 
Party that had triumphed. In conversation with Donovan, the American Chargé, 
Bajpai said that whether the world liked it or not the Communists would establish 
themselves as the de facto and de jure government. Non-acceptance of this fact 
would push China towards the USSR, whereas accepting the Communists would 
strengthen the patriotic elements leading to an ‘oriental Titoism’.71 Ignoring the fact 
did not mean the fact disappeared and rather than follow this line, India decided to 
award recognition although it delayed to allow Commonwealth consultation.72  
However, there was clearly apprehension in Delhi as India recognised the 
new Communist government in an attempt to neutralise any potential hostility. India 
followed a policy of friendship because their policy had to be clear, definite, 
unambiguous and not half-hearted.73 This was to be a relationship built on 
attempting to develop a friendship for containment and engagement as opposed to 
isolation. Nehru thus emphasised to Thakin Nu that any anti-China or anti-
Communist bloc in Asia had to be avoided lest it provoke the Chinese.74 Nehru 
reasoned that China was not about to begin declaring war on neighbouring nations as 
any interference would come in the form of infiltration, agitation and would be 
propagandist in nature.75 Fears of the impact of Communist victory in China on the 
co-ordination of insurrections in Southeast Asia were reinforced as delegates from 20 
countries met in Peking under the World Federation of Trade Unions in late 1949, 
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which concluded with a manifesto call for the millions of workers in Asia to unite 
and overthrow the imperialist yoke.76 Adding to this impression, an Indian précis of 
the situation in Malaya reported that the MCP ‘morale got a big boost when 
Communist forces triumphed in China in the fall of 1949’, had the nationalist regime 
continued, ‘it is doubtful whether the Malayan Communists would have been able to 
continue for any length of time. They would have had little support from the Chinese 
population in Malaya.’77 As Mark Feer notes, Communism ‘made a fine art of 
infiltration and subversion, and has never shown much respect for international 
boundaries when afforded an opportunity to extend its sway.’78 Nehru emphasised to 
Bajpai that the crucial point was that ‘armies do not stop communist infiltration or 
communist ideas. They have to be dealt with by other methods, namely a strong 
stable and progressive civil government undertaking major reforms.’79 This view of 
China further reinforced the lessons learned from the domestic experience with 
Communism. 
Communist victory in China further added to the existing anxiety in Delhi 
over Communism and Delhi was not reticent in sharing this with both the UK and 
the US, as can be seen from discussions with the British High Commission. Bajpai 
informed Roberts (UKHC) that the Belgian Ambassador passed Nehru information 
which suggested that the intention of a Communist China was to set up a system of 
Soviet republics on the USSR’s model, starting with, amongst others, Tibet.80 Bajpai 
reported that after discussions with Nehru the G.O.I. remained as anxious as the 
British G.O.I. to retain Tibet as a buffer state between them and China.81 In 
conversation with the Americans, Bajpai attempted to assuage their misgivings 
                                               
76
 See the Times of India report, ‘Communist Plan for Revolution in Asia’, 10/11/1949, p. 1, and 
Milton Sacks, ‘The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia’, Pacific Affairs 23 (1950), p. 231, and 
also Shao Chuan Leng, ‘India and China’, Far Eastern Survey 21 (1952), p. 74. On the conclusion of 
the conference see, ‘Peking Conference: Manifesto to Asia’s Workers’, 3/12/1949, The Times of India, 
p. 10. 
77
 Report from the Indian Representative in Malaya, Political Report for 1952, Part One – Federation 
of Malaya, Chapter II – Emergency Situation, 3(44)- R&I/53, R&I Branch, Annual Reports, MoEA, 
NAI. 
78
 Mark C. Feer, ‘India’s Himalayan Frontier’ Far Eastern Survey 22 (1953), p. 137. 
79
 Nehru in response to Bajpai’s note of 5/10/1951 in which Bajpai argued that, ‘though a large 
Chinese army or   a Tibetan army under Chinese inspiration and leadership may not attempt an 
invasion of India, the possibility of small forces dribbling through the numerous passes, and then 
combining to make trouble for us cannot be and had not been ruled out’, S. Gopal (ed.), Selected 
Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume. 16, Part II (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 560-561.  
80
 Report of conversation between Bajpai and Roberts (UKHC), 18/9/1949, No. X.1652, DO 142/177. 
81
 Ibid. 
 Colombo Plan 
 
215 
whilst at the same time revealing an important component of India’s decision to 
recognise China’s new government. With other Asian nations, particularly Burma, 
ready to recognise Communist China, India would be in an embarrassing position if 
it were to be the only major Asian power not to extend recognition.82 As Nehru 
explained to fellow Commonwealth members at Colombo, India intended to show 
firmness with China in anything affecting her security, but otherwise to be cautiously 
friendly.83 
The British initially wanted recognition discussed at Colombo, but India 
sought to recognise before the end of 1949, which helped to sway Britain’s 
timetable.84 The reluctance of other Commonwealth members only reinforced India’s 
decision to recognise China before the end of 1949. As Anita Inder Singh argues, an 
Indian memorandum set out that a delay in recognition could embitter the 
Communists, enable them to raise popular sentiment against foreigners and hold 
manifold commercial and economic problems.85 Moreover, the existence of large 
Chinese communities in many countries in Southeast Asia further counselled 
recognition and engagement. This memorandum was, however, largely concentrated 
on the needs of the nations that it was sent to, as Nehru wrote to B.N. Rau: ‘for us, 
early recognition would be simple, since we need no special safeguards to protect 
political or economic interests.’86 What Inder Singh fails to recognise is that any 
recognition of China had to be seen as India’s own decision and taken on its own 
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terms to a timetable of its devising, and thus whilst extensive consultation took 
place, the final act was individual: the art of window-dressing was again practised by 
India. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel had, in fact, expressed concern over any independent 
action on India’s part, arguing rather to act as members of the Commonwealth, the 
UN or in mutual concert with other powers, as India did not ‘stand to gain anything 
substantial’ from early recognition.87 Patel’s strength of feeling about the process of 
recognising Communist China moved him to take the unusual step of discussing 
foreign affairs with the American diplomat Donovan.88 Patel expressed his concerns 
that a Communist China, with Burma collapsing and Tibet vulnerable, presented 
grave problems for India as Donovan dismissed the notion that swift recognition 
would be rewarded with goodwill. Indian apprehension over the timing of 
recognition was evident as Nehru responded to concern from Patel and argued that it 
would be valuable for India to recognise earlier than the rest of the Commonwealth, 
but in consultation with them, as India could not recognise China after the rest of the 
Commonwealth for if it did so ‘it would mean that we have no policy of our own, 
but follow the dictates of other countries.’89 Following this line of argument, Nehru 
told Patel that recognition had to come before the planned Colombo Conference so 
as to maintain India’s independence in foreign affairs and avoid accusations of India 
following the lead of other Commonwealth members. This was India’s recognition in 
consultation with other powers rather than a joint recognition.90  
Communist victory in China brought Communism ever closer to India’s 
border with Tibet and India’s largely-undefined borders with China, which helped 
define India’s policy of positive engagement. ‘In view of developments in China’, 
Nehru decided to keep in close contact with reactions in Tibet and acknowledged the 
need to formulate a policy.91 Nehru continued to express his desire to see an 
autonomous Tibet under Chinese suzerainty as had been customary during the Raj.92 
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K.P.S. Menon’s also informed the US that small arms exports to Tibet would 
continue but Nehru refused to supply any large quantity of arms to the Tibetans, and 
as Bajpai told the British, there was no chance of India engaging in any military 
adventure in Tibet.93 India also strengthened its existing security arrangements in the 
border regions.94  
India’s border policy emphasised that its territorial integrity was sacrosanct 
and this was a large contributory factor in its decision to pursue a policy of friendly 
engagement with China, which extended to campaigning for Chinese entry into the 
UN Security Council, whilst attempting to strengthen the buffer states on India’s 
northern borders. For example, having lost the traditional outer-buffer of Tibet, India 
had to strengthen the inner-buffers, including, of course, Nepal with which India 
signed a Treaty of Friendship in February 1950.95 In addition, India had suggested to 
the Nepalese Government that it needed to strengthen itself from Communist 
infiltration warning that unless more enlightened reforms were enacted they might 
fall prey to internal Communist-inspired uprisings.96  
After large numbers of Chinese troops entered Tibet in the autumn of 1950, 
Bajpai told Phillip C. Jessup that India was not as enthusiastic about China and was 
concerned by Tibet.97 Nehru remained adamant that India’s territorial borders be 
respected and he wrote to K.M. Panikkar that ‘our position is first of all that our 
frontiers with Tibet, that is the McMahon Line, must stand where they are…There is 
no room for controversy on that matter.’98 This defence of national boundaries was 
publicly repeated in the Lok Sabha: ‘The McMahon Line is our boundary, map or no 
map. We will not allow anybody to come across that boundary.’99 In November 
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1950, India persuaded the UK and the US not to debate Tibet in the UN as, 
Guangqiu Xu argues, Nehru thought debate on the issue would not produce 
results.100 The reasons that it would not produce results are the most revealing: there 
was physically nothing that any power could do to enforce any potential sanctions: 
Communist China was not represented at the UN; and India’s overall policy of 
friendship towards China and any UN action on Tibet could have implications for 
India’s own Kashmir problem. Any action over Tibet could of course had have had 
an impact on the situation in Korea and risk being included in the settlement of 
Korea. El Salvador condemned Chinese aggression in the General Assembly in 
November 1950, and with all eyes on India their delegate simply expressed the hope 
that the two parties would reach a peaceful settlement.101 India’s reaction to the 
occupation of Tibet was not determined by a lack of realisation of the geographical 
and strategic consequences as argued by Parshotam Mehra, but rather by the dual 
realisation that nothing could physically be done to prevent it and that the best way 
to combat any further Communist encroachment in Asia was to trust in fruits of 
economic improvement and political freedom whilst fully engaging with China.102  
India’s Neighbour: Burma 
India’s commitment to ensuring stability in bordering countries was first 
demonstrated by its willingness to provide funds for Burma in concert with the 
UK.103 The funds were designed to help the central government stabilise the country 
largely against the Karen insurrection and Communist activities and to enable the 
purchase of essential supplies of rice. After Burma first requested aid in January 
1949,104 Commonwealth ministers met in February and again in April 1949 to 
discuss Burma and Britain and India decided to assist Thakin Nu’s government with 
arms and financial support as a short-term measure whilst pushing for further 
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dialogue with opposition forces.105 Although this offer was rebuffed, Burma again 
requested assistance, again accepted, although India’s share of any assistance would 
be small.106 With no agreement reached by the time of the Colombo meeting, the 
issue was again tackled, where again India offered £1 million, the largest 
contribution after Britain’s £3.75 million and the loan agreement was signed in June 
1950.107 India’s financial contribution to Burma was from its own reserves in the 
form of the sterling balances.  
India feared that continued chaos in Burma would threaten its commercial 
interests and potentially trigger a flood of Indian residents in Burma back to India’s 
Eastern states, which were already overstretched with refugees from partition. Most 
importantly, however, was Burma’s position as a net exporter of rice, 40 per cent of 
the world’s exportable surplus; India purchased 50 per cent of its imports from 
Burma as did Ceylon and Malaya received 40 per cent of its imports.108 Rice imports 
into India and Pakistan were already half the level of the 1930s and any reduction 
would further stress food supplies and affect prices and may have necessitated 
further dollar expenditure for foodstuffs. Burma’s crop was exported through the 
state monopoly State Agricultural Marketing Board which had to purchase the crop 
from producers, but with the collapse of pre-war credit channels the finance had to 
be found through other channels. The sale of rice also provided the Burmese 
Government with crucial sterling funds as Burma remained a member of the Sterling 
Area on leaving the Commonwealth. Indian assistance to Burma, as part of a 
Commonwealth initiative, demonstrated the lengths to which it was willing to go to 
secure its regional neighbours. India’s interest in Burma, as with the regional as a 
whole, was shaped by events in China.   
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Indian Fear of Readjustment 
With the deteriorating international situation, the Communist threat was 
exploited by India in an attempt to extract funds from both the UK and US.109 One 
such example of this comes from a conversation between Franks Roberts of the 
British High Commission and Bajpai in the context of continued Communist 
victories in China, where Bajapi argued that ‘with Communist danger threatening 
Asia it was essential for India to be economically as strong as soon as possible.’110 
India, moreover, left no time in emphasising its financial needs to the British as 
Nehru’s trip to the US approached, arguably under the impression that the British 
would make a case for India.111  
The problem of development in South and Southeast Asia, which was 
increasingly accepted as the only viable solution to the spread of Communism, was 
closely connected to the existence of the sterling balances. From the very 
accumulation of the sterling balances, India feared that under economic strain Britain 
would unilaterally cancel the debt, and with devaluation at the close of 1949, the 
prospect was once again raised. The Anglo-American loan agreement of 1945, in 
fact, had committed Britain to seek a mutual readjustment with the holders of the 
balances and the economic strain on Britain. India was at the centre of connection 
between development and sterling for two main reasons: it was the largest holder of 
balances, and was regarded as the key to South-East Asian regional co-operation. 
From before the Bombay Plan in 1944, India had remained determined to utilise the 
balances for economic development.112 India, however, was eager to maintain the 
settlement of the sterling balances on a bilateral basis, rather than as part of some 
global financial settlement, for fear of losing out in any blanket readjustment.  
In tandem with the Colombo talks, the sterling balances remained a central 
topic of discussion between the US, Britain and also Canada as all three worked 
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towards a solution to the dollar shortage.113 At Tripartite talks in September 1949 
there was broad acknowledgement that the balances had served the purpose of 
supporting much of Asia in the post-war years. It was also recognised, however, that 
Britain was unable to maintain releases at such a high rate.114 The twin issues of a 
resolution of Britain’s and the Sterling Area’s dollar problem and defending Asia 
from Communism through development formed a centre-piece of British 
conversations with the US during 1949-50. At the conclusion of the meetings a 
public memorandum of understanding stated that the sterling balances required 
further investigation.115 
However, India and the other members of the Commonwealth had no 
representation at these meetings, had no input into the discussions and were only 
partially informed of the conclusions of the meetings. India and Pakistan both 
complained vociferously at Colombo that discussions vitally affecting their interests 
were being conducted, and decisions potentially made without prior or adequate 
consultation.116 This led to calls for all Sterling Area and Commonwealth 
governments to be fully informed of all negotiations and talks as it vitally affected 
their interests.117 These Indian and Pakistani complaints continued when British 
officials visited Delhi after Colombo despite an undertaking to furnish the 
Commonwealth with select information and timely consultation.118 Talks, the 
Commonwealth was informed, would continue in the spring after further detailed 
investigation. 
Anglo-American discussions did indeed continue in the spring of 1950. 
Whereupon details of a potential partial cancellation were leaked, by the Americans 
Schenk argues, which prompted resentment from India at continued lack of adequate 
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consultation.119 In light of these rumours, V. K. Krishna Menon sent Cripps the 
following demands continuing the themes from Colombo: that India be sent all of the 
memoranda that had been sent to the US and Canada; that before anything else was 
discussed, India should be allowed to put its side of the story forward and that in the 
future Britain keep India informed of all matters and approach India for her reactions 
to any proposals and allow her to make her views known to the other participants.120 
Cripps responded to these complaints by asserting that no actions could be imposed 
on any balance holder, and reminded the G.O.I. that: 
Over the last few years we have given many signs of our intention to deal 
honestly and justly with India in this matter…There is our sympathetic 
treatment, year by year, of the question of releases - often in the face of 
much criticism here, in reply to which we have not held back from making 
India’s case clear. We have also firmly resisted any suggestion for drastic 
action - such as unilateral cancellation or the pressing of “counter-claims”- 
which would be as distasteful to us as it would be unacceptable to India.  
We feel that, in return, we are entitled to pursue the subject, for the time 
being, in the way we propose and to ask the Government of India to believe 
that its interests will not be in the least prejudiced thereby.121 
This dialogue demonstrates that India remained nervous about continued 
access to its sterling balances, which fed into Indian willingness to engage in the 
Colombo Plan, and as Matthai reported India had, ‘made it clear that there can be no 
question of any scaling down of these balances and they must be fully available for 
restoring the health to our economy.122 In May 1950, despite British efforts to 
persuade the US to fund the sterling balances as part of a development package in 
Southeast Asia, Acheson informed Britain that there could be no linking of American 
development aid with a settlement of the sterling balances.123 In light of this refusal, 
the British decided to continue as they had done since the war by negotiating releases 
with each holder, which would now be influenced by financial plans associated with 
any submissions to the Commonwealth Consultative Committee.124  Britain thus 
proposed to proceed by discussing with ‘India ... a scheme of releases over, say, the 
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six-year period 1951-57 ... the period envisaged for the development programme to 
be drawn up as a result of the Sydney Conference.’125 With this diverse context 
examined, let us turn to the meetings that eventually resulted in the Colombo Plan. 
Nehru remained selective in his choice of international conferences; for 
example India initially refused to accept an invitation to a conference proposed by 
the Philippine President Quirino to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia in spring 
1949. He refused to send representatives to a proposed meeting because, as he 
explained to Vijaylakshmi Pandit, it could not be divorced from an earlier conference 
with Chaing Kai-Shek and South Korea that resulted in a joint communique 
announcing a united front against Communism with scope for further consultation 
and a broadening of the front.126 As the invitation from Quirino failed to preclude 
this subject from the conference it could be either honestly regarded or 
misrepresented as the promotion of some form of anti-Communist bloc in Asia.127  
Nehru was, in essence, only prepared to take anti-Communist measures on his own 
terms that did not impinge on his desire to keep clear of commitments. India, did 
however, grudgingly acquiesce to attend the Baguio conference from 26-30 May 
1950, which is all but forgotten in the narrative of Asian co-operation but is 
significant as the first gathering of fully independent states of Southeast Asia and the 
Western Pacific on a governmental level.128   
Prime Minister Senanayake of Ceylon, acting on advice from London, sent 
invitations to his fellow Commonwealth members for the already roughly-scheduled 
Foreign Affairs meeting in Colombo in January 1950.129 As set out above, the 
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beginning of the process of Commonwealth consultation can be found in October 
1948, continuing through to William Strang’s tour in early 1949 and the 
Commonwealth meeting in April 1949 where Nehru committed India to continuing 
its membership of the Commonwealth. In July 1949 Nehru had suggested that the 
question of what assistance other Commonwealth countries could give should be 
discussed in Ceylon, 1950.130  Moreover, at the beginning of 1949, the Ambassadors 
of India, Australia, the UK, and the US met informally to discuss the consequences 
of a Communist Chinese victory, and it was here that K.M. Panikkar presented his 
ideas for the establishment of consultative machinery for economic co-operation and 
upon which the delegates reached a tentative consensus.131 K.M. Panikkar wrote that 
‘I thought the time had come to formulate a policy which would strengthen the 
economic, social and political structure of the area … I wrote a memorandum the 
main argument of which was that without immediate and adequate help in the 
economic field, the political structure of South-East Asia would provide no more 
than a frail barrier to the expansion of communism.’132 Despite his admission that 
‘the proposals in that memorandum formed the basis of the discussions of the 
discussions which led to the Colombo Plan, Panikkar was only another, albeit 
important, voice in the chorus calling for constructive action.133  
The Commonwealth link was crucial as India had to be seen to be involved in 
Commonwealth discussions and actions in Asia, to be taking a lead on Asian 
questions or risk being locked out of any regional co-operation, even if in public its 
role was emphasised far less than behind closed doors. Following his stance on the 
interconnectivity of development, national freedom and Communism at the 
Commonwealth meeting in April 1949, Nehru enthusiastically accepted the 
invitation from Ceylon to attend a meeting in Colombo in early 1950 for a discussion 
of Commonwealth foreign affairs. Subsequently, the Government of Ceylon were 
duly informed that Nehru welcomed the idea for the first half of January 1950.134 
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Australia and Ceylon, as some historians argue, claim the provenance of the specific 
proposal for co-operative development, but Nehru opened the discussions on both of 
the key topics at the conference: China and Southeast Asia.135  
As the conference opened in early 1950, India suggested that as host 
Senanayake take the chair and preside over the proceedings, not only to follow 
custom, but to reinforce that the meeting was being held in Asia, discussing Asian 
problems with the consent and participation of Asian nations. After this Nehru 
opened the discussions on Southeast Asia with his oft-repeated advice that there 
must be a complete removal of foreign domination from the region and the solution 
of its pressing economic problems.136 Far from the Colombo meeting overcoming 
Indian opposition as Remme argues, India was a most active participant and 
presented its views which were largely in line with the UK and the rest of the 
Commonwealth.137 Continued foreign domination, Nehru further opined, was 
comparable to American influence in China, and may have the same impact in 
Southeast Asia.138 Nehru, however, added a rider to his analysis of East-West 
relations when prompted by Bevin stating that he did not wish to see the West go 
from Asia, but he welcomed co-operation, what had to go was domination and 
control over Asian affairs.139 
The meeting covered a range of topics from recognition of China to the 
Japanese Peace Treaty. On the issue of Southeast Asia and Communism, Nehru 
argued and was echoed by MacDonald, that success would only come with the dual 
satisfaction of both the urge for political freedom and the urge for economic 
betterment. Which of the two would come first was a point that Nehru did not 
attempt to answer.140 The conference subsequently drew to a close with the intention 
to meet soon after to further discussions on economic development in South and 
Southeast Asia under the aegis of a Commonwealth Consultative Committee. At 
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Colombo, therefore, one of Nehru’s strategies to free Asia of Western domination 
was to emphasise the detrimental impact of the European presence in Asia on halting 
of the spread of Communism. Nehru, moreover, attempted to use the spread of 
Communism to help extract development aid and technical assistance from the more 
developed members of the Commonwealth. For the British, part of the aim in the 
ideological battle was to persuade Asians that their interests would be best served by 
democratic development in association with the West. This also rings true to a certain 
extent for Nehru’s thinking as his aim was to see the development of independent 
nation-states without imperial influence of any kind and that emphasised the primacy 
of national development. Nehru fully endorsed the ideas discussed at Colombo with 
its aim of promoting regional co-operation and Asian co-operation with the West 
through economic development and even its anti-Communist hue as long as this was 
not presented as the sole motor behind the Commonwealth’s actions. India’s 
approach was confirmed by the first meeting in Colombo about which Bevin wrote 
‘There was…a remarkable unanimity of view as to the menace of communism and 
as to the necessity of improving the standard of life and the social welfare of the 
peoples of South and South-East Asia in order to combat this menace.’141 Nehru’s 
approach also provides further evidence that however much India viewed 
Communism as a threat it could be exploited in dealings with the Commonwealth 
and also the US. Despite British intentions for the plan to secure its interests in 
Southeast Asia, India took part in an effort to gain materially from the exercise and 
to promote its ideas of regional policy.142  
As ever, the G.O.I. was conscious of public opinion and in public interviews 
and statements at the close of the conference, Nehru presented Colombo as 
‘satisfactory’, emphasising the mutual free exchange of opinions and that no formal 
agreements had arisen, underplaying the scope of the Conference.143 As with all of 
India’s international affairs, Nehru and the G.O.I. sought to present their actions to 
the public and to the Chief Ministers in the Provinces as upholding the independence 
of India whilst furthering its influence. Candidus in The Times of India noted that 
‘Pandit Nehru’s achievements were substantial both before and after he arrived in 
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Colombo’, referring to Chinese recognition, assistance to Burma and a forestalling of 
recognition to Bao Dai, but there was also a minor reference to ‘something like an 
informal Marshall Aid to Asia programme.’144 In addition, Nehru reported to his 
Chief Ministers:  
The Commonwealth Conference held in Colombo did not arrive at any 
startling conclusions. Nor was it expected to in spite of what the press 
wrote about it. These conferences are for mutual consultation and mutual 
understanding from which, of course, a measure of co-operation results. 
But each country represented there is an independent country and has 
ultimately to decide for itself. The questions discussed were recognition of 
the new China, the situation in Indo-China, the Japanese peace treaty, aid to 
Burma, and economic help to South and South-East Asian countries.145 
Colombo, moreover, was used to publicly justify India’s foreign policy more 
generally as at the opening of the Lok Sabha in January 1950, India’s first as a 
Republic, when Nehru emphasised Colombo and the Commonwealth as examples of 
friendly, constructive discussion without any derogation of national sovereignty.146 
Nehru remained anxious lest Australian motivations at the Sydney meeting of 
the Commonwealth Consultative Committee be misconstrued by others as an attempt 
to build an anti-Communist bloc. Nehru wrote to Bajpai that ‘our delegation must be 
warned against falling into this trap…we are not going to make ourselves parties to 
the creation of what might be called an anti-communist bloc in South East Asia.’147 
The aim was to combat Communism, the roots of Communism, but could not be 
seen to be anti-Communist. 
Nehru pushed and exploited fears of Communism to support the furtherance 
of national development, both economically and politically. In communication with 
Bajpai Nehru added that ‘to talk about raising economic standards in order to counter 
Communism is the wrong approach’ and he explained that ‘The grace of the act goes 
and the people might be benefit feel that this is incidental to some other and more 
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opportunistic purpose.’148 Part of this approach is due to the fact that Nehru did not 
want development to be seen solely as the answer to Communism but for the 
improvement of living standards in Asia as an end in itself. Focussing on 
Communism, Nehru added, ‘puts the question of economic help to South East Asia 
in the sphere of political controversy and conflict.’149 Development, rather, should be 
seen as a legitimate aim in its own right, argued Nehru.  
As decided at Colombo, the Consultative Committee first met in May 1950 in 
Sydney where the members decided that the best course of action was to draw up 
country-by-country development plans with India as a key participant. The second 
meeting was a meeting of officials rather than foreign ministers, and it is here that 
development as an end in itself, rather than its primary aim being to halt 
Communism, was emphasised.150 With development leading to stable national units 
enshrined as the means to combat Communism and as the purpose of the 
Consultative Committee, there was little discussion of this aspect despite Nehru’s 
fears. Nehru thus sought to keep Colombo joint communiques at the least abstract 
and away from any direct discussion of individual Communist countries. Nehru’s 
reluctance to associate India’s recognition of Communist China with the Colombo 
meeting fits within this aim, and served to separate any positive action at Colombo 
from any discussion of Communism in specific countries in public.  
Moreover, India desired to keep development primarily within the purview of 
the nation-state, and to utilise development as a means for the strengthening of 
nascent national unity through the removal of economic inequalities. At Sydney, the 
Australians attempted to push too quickly by suggesting the establishment of an 
immediate emergency fund, the idea of which was disregarded by both India and 
Britain as both countries wanted to focus on long-term planning.151 The Sydney 
conference decided that in light of the desperate need for technical assistance then a 
Commonwealth Technical Assistance Scheme would be set up immediately, funded 
largely by Britain, but also with a smaller contribution from India.152 The crucial 
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decision made at Sydney, however, was that each participating country prepare its 
proposals for a six year development programme to begin in 1951 based on an 
agreed questionnaire. These plans would then form the basis of a further 
Consultative Committee meeting in London in late 1950. Although the idea behind 
Colombo was some form of regional co-operation, or at least the semblance of co-
operation, the second meeting enshrined the primacy of the nation-state in the 
process: ‘in the preparation of their statements, it would be left to the countries 
themselves.’153 
Nehru was, however, frustrated at the progress in Sydney as is evidenced in 
his communication with his Chief Ministers: ‘Both conferences [Colombo and 
Philippines] dealt, rather vaguely, with these subjects and no immediate picture of 
co-ordinated help has appeared’, Nehru continued, ‘We attended both these 
conferences, but we made it clear that we were not joining any group hostile to 
another group.’154 June 1950 marked the beginning of the Korean War and the threat 
of escalation into global war, and this had two marked effects: one was to strengthen 
the need and desire for some form of psychological assault against the poverty of 
Asia, but it also made it more imperative than ever for Colombo not to be seen as an 
explicitly anti-Communist and anti-China measure. Moreover, it reinforced his belief 
in India’s significant role as a bridge between the West and East.155 
With the principle of designing long-term six year plans agreed upon and 
after the US comprehensively rejected British attempts to link the settlement of the 
balances to development in South and Southeast Asia, Britain decided to follow the 
traditional path of arranging bilateral releases on a six year basis to coincide with the 
length of Colombo.156 However, India and Britain both remained hopeful that the US 
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would become more involved in Colombo.157 India’s Planning Commission had been 
in operation since April 1950 and at the second meeting of the Consultative 
Committee meeting in London in September 1950, the third Colombo meeting in 
total, India presented a scheme for consideration that impressed the other delegates 
and set the tone for the proceedings. India’s plan placed emphasis on agriculture, and 
estimated that a sum of £1381 million would be spent over a six year period, with 
external finance meeting £608 million of the costs.158 Hugh Gaitskell recorded that 
‘As at Sydney, the Indian delegation made a great impression, and their 
developmental programme, which was brilliantly expounded and defended, set the 
tone for much of the report….In almost every question which arose, Mr. Deshmukh 
could be relied upon to take the commonsense line.’159  
During the proceedings, Britain privately indicated to delegates that it would 
be willing contribute approximately £300 million from the accumulated sterling 
balances.160 Deshmukh and Gaitskell met in London at the close of September 1950 
and subsequently Gaistkell reported that informal negotiations had been proceeding 
in parallel with Colombo talks. Agreement was reached that India’s future releases of 
sterling, at £35 million per year, would be in line with India’s expected needs for the 
Colombo Plan.161 £35 million per annum, was broadly in line with what Britain had 
indicated it was capable of contributing to India’s Colombo plan, which was based 
on the six-year timetable and the fact that the remainder of the balances had to be 
kept in currency reserve.162 The agreement, to come into force in July 1951, also 
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transferred to the Reserve Bank of India a sum of £310 million to act as India’s 
currency reserve, but which was not to be drawn upon without prior discussion with 
London. At the end of 1951, the issue of outstanding balances had largely been 
solved, and by the end of the Colombo Plan, Pakistan, Ceylon and India’s holdings 
of sterling would be at a level that could serve as the minimum currency backing and 
reserve.163  
Deshmukh underplayed the potential benefits to India from the Colombo 
Plan to the press in London and noted that ‘People in India are particularly happy to 
be associated in these labours because of India’s centuries-old friendly interest in our 
neighbours of South-east Asia.’164 In doing so he emphasised India’s active role as a 
participant rather than as a recipient. The agreed report of the Consultative 
Committee, containing all of the development plans, was made public and only after 
this could details of the sterling agreement be released so as to keep the two issues 
separate.165 The Indian Finance Minister’s statement on the sterling balances 
agreement, moreover, made no links to the agreed schedule of the Colombo Plan and 
chose to focus rather on the flexibility of the carry over feature of the new 
agreement. This carry over ensured that India’s access to her sterling balances would 
not be lost if, for example, in any given year her balance of payments entered a 
surplus and thus provided crucial support over a six year period.166 There are several 
potential reasons for this approach: first, in light of US reluctance to connect the 
issues of development and balances, it was considered wise to keep the two separate 
in public and secondly the G.O.I. were reluctant that balance releases be seen as a 
British contribution to India’s national development. What Deshmukh failed to 
recall, however, was that he had given his understanding that the agreement would 
have to be abrogated if economic circumstances took a turn for the worse.167 Whilst 
it was by no means the only factor in India’s decision-making process, the 
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availability to utilise her remaining sterling balances must be taken into 
consideration, especially when in the context of the fear of cancellation. The 
Colombo Plan submitted by India later became the First Five-Year Plan, and as such 
had to be emphasised as a national effort, a national plan, and as such the G.O.I. 
insisted that British contributions to the Colombo Plan in the form of sterling 
releases were not classed as contribution from Britain but as a repayment of debt. 
The US sent observers to the London meeting168 and interest in Colombo increased 
throughout 1950, with Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma and Indonesia 
attending the London meeting in various capacities. Indo-China joined the 
Consultative Committee in 1951, Burma and Nepal in 1952, Indonesia in 1953, 
Thailand and the Philippines in 1954 with the Japanese also joining as donors in 
1954. 
The hope that demonstrating a willingness to act would bring US aid on 
board was partly realised after the outbreak of the Korean War, as in November 1950 
the Americans joined the Consultative Committee and ‘began to draw closer to the 
real ideals of the Colombo Plan.’169 At the end of 1950, with the publication of the 
Colombo Plan imminent, the US agreed to association with the Colombo Plan and 
let it be known that it would be desirable if non-Commonwealth countries were also 
invited.170 Moreover, with India’s need clearly set out, the $4.5 million Indo-
American Technical Agreement was signed in December 1950 which was followed 
by the Wheat Loan Act Bill after its tortuous journey through Congress.171 As David 
Lowe argues, by November 1950 the US decided to link some of their own aid with 
the work of the Consultative Committee.172 
The final Consultative Committee Report, as agreed by all members, began 
with the important psychological message for Asia:  
The peoples of Asia have long left the pressure of poverty and hunger. 
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While the realisation of self-government could not of itself relive this 
situation, it has made possible a new approach to the problem of raising 
living standards through the vigorous development of national resources. 
Among the peoples of Asia hopes and aspirations have been raised by the 
plans of their Governments to secure a fuller life for them.173 
The emphasis was on the national, and there was no direct mention of a 
Communist threat. The rhetoric of the plan satisfied both Indian sensibilities and the 
demand for developmental assistance on a national level, provided bilaterally for the 
development of national economies. The closing words of the report are as close to 
an admission of the anti-Communist nature of the plan as can be found:  
In a world racked by schism and confusion it is doubtful whether free men 
can long afford to leave undeveloped and imprisoned in poverty the human 
resources of the countries of South and South-East Asia which could help 
so greatly, not only to restore the world’s prosperity, but also to redress its 
confusion and enrich the lives of all men everywhere.174 
These efforts were not simply about anti-Communism, but about the 
beginnings of some form of regional co-operation in the pursuit of a common goal to 
improve the economic situation of Asia, which in turn was part of the process of 
decolonisation. As part of this, India provided technical assistance and training to 
other members of the Colombo Plan, so was not all about what she could get, but 
also about what she could contribute. The Times of India reported that in 1955 India 
was providing technical training for 190 Nepalese, 46 from Ceylon, 2 from Malaya, 
21 from the Philippines, 12 Burmese, 15 Indonesians, 29 Pakistanis with 8 from 
Thailand and 2 from Vietnam.175 These figures represent an effort by the Indian state 
in its belief in the circulation of ‘government technologies’ which strengthened the 
primacy of the developmental state.176 The list also demonstrates the appeal of 
Colombo as it was extended to non-Commonwealth countries from the end of 1950. 
Conclusions 
The key contribution that this chapter makes to the existing historiography is 
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to provide a study of India’s role in the formation of the Colombo Plan in the context 
of the Cold War and colonialism in Southeast Asia. This chapter emphasises Indian 
agency in the process and demonstrates that there were several parties involved in 
the Colombo Plan and there were several agendas at work. This analysis does not 
argue that Indian influence was decisive in the formulation, but rather that Indian 
views were fundamental in shaping the course of Comonwealth actions in Southeast 
Asia. The eventual structure of the Colombo Plan, with the emphasis on bilateral 
assistance based on well-reasoned individual projects, was at once shaped by India 
and enabled India to participate. Economic co-operation was supported by Nehru as 
a means to forestall the need for military or political pacts and agreements in 
Southeast Asia, and this fact was key in the formulation of British designs for 
regional co-operation.177  
The Colombo Plan, provided an answer to Communism based on Nehru’s 
own reading of the situation and his belief in the power of economic improvement 
translated into support for the initiative. The general purpose of the plans was to 
increase the annual production of food above the annual rate of population increase, 
thereby ensuring food supply was not outstripped by population growth, which 
would lay the foundations for future economic development and growth through 
industrialisation. 
This research also demonstrates that the two issues of Communism in 
Southeast Asia and a resolution for a more fruitful use of the sterling balances 
developed separately, and dovetailed in late 1949-early 1950. The Colombo Plan was 
not exclusively designed as a solution to the sterling balances. Colombo also 
possessed the potential as a conduit for the flow of American aid to the region. India, 
furthermore, managed to receive an assurance on its sterling balances linked to its 
own development plans and to regional efforts at economic improvement and co-
ordination, and likewise saw the provision of Technical Assistance organised and 
provided within the purview of national plans for development. 
Indian involvement, both psychologically as a democratic Asian power and 
as a member of Commonwealth, was crucial and significant, for without Indian 
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involvement Colombo would have had little credibility with other Asian nations. In 
addition, involvement allowed India to present itself as a regional player and as an 
alternative model to Communism. The Commonwealth approach to a certain extent 
meant that others were able to take the lead once India had let its ideas be known, 
and in doing so India received the benefits without the risks and without 
compromising its professed stand of neutrality. Economic co-operation was the only 
form of involvement that India was willing to engage with and this was well-known 
to the British and the Commonwealth.178 Regional economic co-operation, it is 
argued, ensured India’s core national interests and also advanced the cause of anti-
colonialism and development as an integral part of nation-building. For India, 
Colombo served a dual purpose: it assuaged a genuine anxiety at the spread of 
Communism, but it also served India’s purpose for securing development aid and 
generally raising living standards as development was employed to save Asia for 
democracy. The fear of Communism was a convenient means with which to secure 
funding for development. 
Colombo sought to forge some form of regional co-operation, or at least the 
semblance of co-operation, but the second meeting in Sydney enshrined the primacy 
of the nation-state in the process: ‘in the preparation of their statements, it would be 
left to the countries themselves.’179 India not only received vital technical assistance 
as part of the Colombo Plan but also gave assistance to Southeast Asian nations: it 
was an active participant in the Plan.180 India was also able to present itself as a 
compassionate regional power based on its participation. The key to Colombo’s 
success was the very fact that the Colombo Plan was not a plan, but a framework in 
which national development plans could take advantage of bilateral aid and technical 
assistance. Although one of the aims of development was removing the evils that 
Communists thrived on and exploited, Nehru refused to present it in those terms to 
Asians and instead he urged the virtue of development in itself rather than as a 
means to an end. 
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India saw the opportunity of economic development as a means of promoting 
and managing decolonisation, with the economic development of countries in 
Southeast Asia increasing their resistance to Communism at the same time as 
progressing towards self-government, which India argued was the key to fighting 
Communism. Economic progress and political stability was the key mantra behind 
the Colombo Plan and was vitally informed by India’s reading of the situation in 
Southeast Asia. Every move India made in regard to China, from Tibet to Panscheel 
was designed to keep China as ‘friendly’ as possible and to neutralise any threat from 
across the border. The contested nature of the border, inherited from the British, itself 
partly determined this policy. 
The crucial point to emphasise is that Britain had come to terms with the fact 
that any regional efforts in Southeast Asia could not go ahead without Delhi’s 
approval and involvement.181 Remme’s analysis, despite its valuable contribution to 
the historiography of post-war British policy, focuses so tightly on British efforts 
that it neglects to examine any Indian agency. It must be re-emphasised that this is 
not a history of the development of British or Australian regional policy, as much of 
the existing literature attempts to present Colombo in this way, but rather it is an 
effort to examine India’s crucial role. It is an analysis of India’s growing realisation 
of the threats of Communism and how it could be employed to secure and further 
India’s own interests in Southeast Asia.   
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7) ‘Halt this Cannibalism! Severing the Heads of Liberation 
Fighters’1: Colonial Legacy and Colonial War, India, 
Britain and Gurkha Recruitment for Malaya 
As the colony of Malaya experienced a sustained rebellion directed by the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the Gurkhas of the British Army were put into 
action in the jungles of the peninsula. The Gurkhas had constituted an integral part of 
the Indian Army since the beginning of the nineteenth century and were employed in 
theatres world-wide during the following 150 years. In reaction to this practice, the 
Indian National Congress (INC) deplored the use of ‘foreign mercenaries’ in the 
Indian Army, in addition to protesting against the use of the Indian Army abroad. 
Such was the Indian opposition that in 1945 Nehru warned Nepal about permitting 
the Gurkhas to be used for the suppression of Asian freedom movements.2 With the 
transfer of power in 1947, the sobering practicalities of power overcame the ideology 
of Congress opposition and India, the UK and Nepal agreed on a tripartite 
framework for the continued use of troops by both the Indian and British armies.3  
In the face of Nepalese refusal of the British request for recruitment depots 
on its soil in 1947, the G.O.I. allowed the British use of existing depots in India on a 
temporary basis. They also assured crucial transit rights so that Gurkhas could leave 
Nepal’s landlocked borders. The nascent nationalist parties in Nepal followed the 
lead of the INC’s old pronouncements of opposition and criticised the recruitment of 
Nepalese nationals into the British Army. These objections aroused domestic support 
despite the fact that the recruitment of Gurkhas ensured a level of stability through 
its economic benefits that were vital for the largely rural Nepalese economy.4  
With the departure of the British from South Asia, the traditional relationship 
of the Raj to Nepal was little altered, as the inheritor G.O.I. remained the closest 
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partner of Nepal, and for all intents and purposes guaranteed Nepalese security as a 
means to defend India’s north-eastern border region as the British had done. The 
importance of Nepal’s geographical position was reinforced by Communist China’s 
annexation of Tibet, and was demonstrated in the Treaty of Peace of 1950 signed by 
Nepal and India. India’s China policy was not based on a calcuation that the 
Communist giant posed no threat, but that the best way to counter that threat was 
through friendly engagement and inclusion in international and regional affairs, 
India’s policy was in part determined by the need to maintain friendly relations 
across their large shared border and to limit Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.5 
The loss of the tradition outer-buffer of Tibet meant India had to strengthen the 
inner-buffers, including Nepal.6 India saw Nepal as part of its sphere of influence 
and in view of Tibet, Nehru wrote, reform was needed in Nepal and delaying would 
invite trouble.7 The G.O.I. further suggested to the Nepalese Government that it 
needed to strengthen itself from Communist infiltration and warned that unless more 
enlightened reforms were enacted they might fall prey to internal Communist 
inspired uprisings.8 India, in essence, had no desire to have domestic chaos in such a 
strategically vital area as Nepal.9 
Nepal’s fluid political situation with the relative decline of the Rana regime 
and the rise in influence of the Nepali Congress, necessitated that the King step in 
and restore a sense of political stability. Throughout these troubles Nehru and the 
G.O.I. played an influential and co-ordinating role as a tutor to Nepal ensuring a 
level of political and economic stability. With the failure to reach any sustainable 
agreement between the Congress and Ranas, the King ruled in an interim capacity 
with an Advisory Council from late 1952 and so all criticism for decisions rested 
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with him alone.  
As Malaya fell into the chaos of the MCP rebellion, the Gurkhas supported 
existing British troops. These highly trained soldiers not only possessed experience 
in jungle warfare, but were considerably closer to the Malayan theatre than British 
reinforcements if, in fact, British troops could be found at all in the grip of the post-
war manpower shortage. Nehru was willing to tolerate British colonialism’s survival 
in Malaya temporarily, as opposed to an aggressive and militant Communism as 
examined earlier in this thesis. Tacit support of the British in Malaya thus served 
Nehru’s immediate aim of securing stability in Southeast Asia. It also supported the 
longer-term aim of the development of a world of independent, democratic states, as 
the G.O.I. was reluctant to see Communist influence, Chinese Communist influence, 
spread throughout Southeast Asia, which was an area it considered vitally important. 
A stable Malaya also ensured the continued supply of dollars and strength to both the 
Sterling Area and to India.  
The use of Gurkhas in Malaya was not without its problems in India as 
political opponents, the leftist press, members of the Congress Party and the public 
more generally became increasingly opposed to Indian complicity, through the 
Tripartite Agreement of 1947, in the recruitment of Gurkhas for the British fight in 
Malaya. In the eyes of the public and official parliamentary opposition, whatever the 
political hue of the MCP, assisting Britain in their need for Gurkhas was equated 
with facilitating the maintenance of British imperialism in Southeast Asia. This 
sensitivity was evident in the Indian response to British enquiries about an increase 
in Gurkha numbers when the Indian Ambassador in Nepal explained that they had to 
tread carefully before the first post-independence elections in 1952 and avoid 
criticism in relation to the Gurkhas.10 The Gurkha issue, moreover, threatened to 
confirm the condemnation of those who opposed India’s membership of the 
Commonwealth in 1949, and more generally India’s foreign policy. Criticisms from 
political opponents, the press and the public focussed around two newspaper articles 
in Cross Roads, the first of which accused the G.O.I. of complicity by its 
maintenance of the Tripartite Agreement, and the second exposed the fact that the 
depots on Indian soil were still being used for enlistment, a fact that Nehru had flatly 
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denied previously.  Nehru was attacked not only for allowing the British to impinge 
on Indian sovereignty, but also for going against to the anti-imperialist sentiments of 
the nation. 
Nehru was, therefore, placed in a delicate position by these criticisms against 
Gurkha recruitment, and was faced with three competing pressures that had to be 
balanced: sustained opposition on the domestic front, the necessity to maintain a 
level of stability in Nepal and the demands of the British fighting the MCP in 
Malaya, which ultimately helped to secure stability in Southeast Asia. It is these 
three competing pressures that the chapter focuses on as it explores the G.O.I.’s 
attempts to reach a resolution to the problem of Gurkha recruitment. The line of 
action Nehru chose to take was to facilitate the transfer of all Gurkha recruitment 
facilities to Nepal. It is to this aim that the G.O.I. worked from August 1952 - May 
1953 under sustained criticism from domestic political opponents and public opinion 
more widely. The exercise was essentially one of political window-dressing, 
designing a settlement that was acceptable to all parties without fundamentally 
altering the principle of recruitment as established by the Tripartite Agreement. In 
order to achieve this aim the chapter employs newly-released British documents to 
integrate the Gurkhas in to the wider history of both Indian regional and international 
relations.11 The recruitment of Gurkhas was a legacy of imperialism that was thrown 
into stark relief by the rebellion in Malaya and the challenge to Nehru’s claims to an 
anti-colonial, and to a certain extent, a non-aligned foreign policy that the situation 
had produced. There is, moreover, a very limited historiography pertaining to the 
recruitment of Gurkhas. Therefore the focus of the chapter is on placing the issue of 
Gurkha recruitment in something other than the military history tradition.12 Whilst 
Yuri Nasenko narrates that the Lok Sabha called Nehru up on the Gurkhas, he takes 
the story no further and offers no contextualisation.13 The Tripartite Agreement, the 
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relationship between India and Nepal and the state of Nepalese politics in the early 
1950s are examined to provide the essential context for discussing the Gurkhas. The 
investigation will subsequently turn to the criticisms the G.O.I. faced from 
parliamentary opposition, the press and public opinion, which in turn leads us to the 
reactions of the G.O.I..  
The Tripartite Agreement 1947 
The Gurkhas formed some of the most combat-experienced and formidable 
units in the Indian Army, and with the transfer of power both Britain and India 
sought to retain their services and the right to recruit troops in Nepal. This continued 
recruitment was welcomed by the Nepalese Government as a secure revenue stream, 
a mechanism to reduce unemployment and a means to maintain political stability. As 
the transfer of power approached, British use of the Indian Army in foreign wars, 
especially Indonesia, threatened to derail any future agreement between the UK and 
Nehru over the continued use of Gurkhas in the British Army. Discussing the Indian 
population’s adverse stance on Gurkhas, Nehru reasoned with General Montgomery 
that it was the ‘the past that had produced the present psychological approach of our 
people.’14 This meant that ‘anything that we might do and which might lead to the 
continuation of the old tradition of Gurkha troops for imperial purposes would be 
subject to adverse comment in India.’15 Internationally, Nehru asked Montgomery to 
consider, given the psychological background of the issue, not only how Indians 
would see it, but how Southeast Asia in particular would preceive it if India 
facilitated the use of Gurkha troops for the British.16 Nehru was, however, aware of 
British difficulties and verbally agreed to ensure certain facilities and transit rights 
for the continuation of British recruitment. Montgomery finally reasoned with Nehru 
that the Gurkhas were necessary as a reserve for emergencies and British 
commitments in the Far East and that ‘these troops would not be used locally and 
certainly not against peoples’ movements for freedom.’17 With this assurance, the 
interim Indian Cabinet accepted a paper by Nehru on the topic which led to the 
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commencement of negotiations with the Nepalese.18 
After Britain and India had worked negotiated a settlement, a Tripartite 
Agreement was signed between both parties and Nepal in November 1947, assuring 
a division that allowed twelve battalions to remain part of the Indian Army with the 8 
battalions entering British service.19 India provided crucial transit rights for the 
Gurkhas through Indian territory so they could leave landlocked Nepal and serve 
overseas. Certain depot facilities were also granted as the Nepalese had refused to 
grant Britain the right to establish facilities inside Nepal. With the conclusion of the 
agreement, Nehru commented to the Constituent Assembly that the G.O.I. ‘have 
agreed to grant His Majesty’s Government certain necessary facilities, such as, the 
use, as a temporary measure, of the existing depots at Gorakhpur and Ghum.’20 From 
its very inception the operation of the Agreement was contingent upon the goodwill 
of the G.O.I., especially regarding transit rights. The Agreement was, however, not a 
binding treaty but a gentlemen’s agreement, and could be abrogated if the Nepalese 
found themselves at war, or if one of the signing parties denounced the agreement.21  
Both Britain and India, therefore, had a shared interest in the continuance of a stable 
Tripartite Agreement that ensured the flow of recruits to both armies.  
The Gurkhas replaced the Indian Army as the core of British expeditionary 
forces East of Suez and represented an integral part of the forces combating the 
MCP, representing 8 out of a total of 23 total battalions in 1952. Therefore, it was 
critically important that Gurkha services were retained for the British Army.22 With 
the departure of the British from South Asia, India’s influential relationship with its 
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smaller neighbour was instrumental in securing the continued flow of recruits. 
India’s relationship with landlocked Nepal was determined by a combination of 
historical legacy and geography, and as Nepal’s political system developed 
erratically India’s influential position was utilised to ensure Nepal’s political 
stability. For Nehru there were two key strands to this crucial political stabilisation: 
the King and the Nepali Congress.23 As for economic stability, the Gurkha troops 
that served in both the Indian and British armies represented Nepal’s most valuable 
commodity and a key revenue source and provided vital employment for those living 
in the Kathmandu Valley. Before the Second World War some 45-50 lakhs rupees 
went to Nepal for pensions and some 125 lakhs rupees went to the Gurkhas directly, 
much of which found its way back to Nepal.24 As Nehru told Alexander Clutterbuck, 
the British High Commissioner: ‘the economic and social benefits’ would largely 
inform the decision of Nepal.25 These benefits would inform the decision but not 
determine its outcome.   
Nepal was situated in a strategically important position in the Himalayas, 
between the north-eastern border of India and Tibet. India’s interest in the stability of 
Nepal was further reinforced by the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 that brought 
Communism to the frontiers of Nepal and India and posed a threat to the northern 
borders of India and the stability of the Himalayan region and South Asia more 
generally. On reflection, Nehru argued that although the chances of a large-scale 
Chinese invasion of Nepal or India ‘can be ruled out even as a remote contingency’, 
there could be petty troubles in the border regions that could be solved by check 
posts and other measures.26 Nehru emphasised to Bajpai that the crucial point was 
that ‘armies do not stop communist infiltration or communist ideas. They have to be 
dealt with by other methods, namely a strong, stable and progressive civil 
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government undertaking major reforms.’27 Nehru further elucidated his thoughts 
about Nepal’s strategic value in conversation with Clutterbuck, commenting that 
there ‘was always the question of Tibet or China across the border which might take 
advantage of any step which could be utilized for public agitation in Nepal.’28  For 
Nehru, the stability of Nepal was essential for regional security and for protecting 
India’s borders.  
The Treaty of Peace, signed in 1950, formalised the India-Nepal relationship 
in so far as each state pledged to inform the other of any misunderstandings with 
neighbours (namely China). Nepal also agreed to accept Indian aid in the event of 
aggression (again, namely China as no other power could threaten Nepal over land). 
The relationship extended to the economic plane with India supporting Nepalese 
economic development with contributions through the Colombo Plan.29 An Indian 
Military Mission reorganised the Nepalese Army whilst the Indian Air Force 
surveyed the country30 and in April 1952, with the Nepali Congress in an active 
coalition government, the King and Congress leader M.P. Koirala further reinforced 
their dependence upon their neighbour and de facto tutor by asking for a mission of 
civil servants.31 Further to the Treaty of Peace and the Civil Mission it was agreed 
between M.P. Koirala and Nehru during January 1952 that the defence and foreign 
policies of India and Nepal would be closely co-ordinated.32 For his part, Nehru 
wanted to keep foreign powers out of Nepal as far as possible and warned M.P. 
Koirala about approaching the US for assistance.33 Nehru, in fact, wanted to supply 
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Nepal as far as possible from Indian resources partly borne out of a fear of American 
penetration of Nepal and any concomitant Chinese reaction.34 The fear of foreign 
(non-Indian) influence in Nepal is also further reflected in Nehru’s stern warnings 
about the use of foreign (non-Indian) personnel in Nepal which was reiterated to the 
Nepalese several times.35  
Nepal’s political structure was in a state of flux from 1945 with the relative 
decline of the Rana regime and the increasing strength of nationalism. The Nepali 
Congress was the main opposition body to the Rana regime that had held sway over 
Nepal with tacit British support, with the King as figure head.36 The Rana’s power, 
entrenched since 1846, was in swift decline whilst the influence of the Nepali 
Congress was on the increase. Within this fluid system the King of Nepal, a 
figurehead since 1846, took central stage as a stabilising and unifying factor in 
Nepalese politics with the full support of the G.O.I..37 This new union represented 
the largest expression of popular political opposition in Nepal and in terms of policy 
goals, alongside the democratisation of Nepal, the Nepali Congress favoured ‘the 
closest relationship with India and would not tolerate the penetration of Nepal by 
foreign influences, political, economic, or military.’38 Crucially for the recruitment of 
Gurkhas, the Nepal National Congress expressed its abhorrence at the practice of 
recruitment protesting as early as March 1949. They argued ‘against the policy of 
allowing Gurkhas to be recruited in the British Army. It is reactionary and shameful; 
smacks of dependent status. The Nepal Government is advised to give up this 
practice forthwith.’39 Further evidence of the aversion to recruitment was displayed 
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when the Congress was briefly in power. Under pressure from the other Nepalese 
opposition parties, in particular the Communists, M.P. Koirala announced that he 
would recall all Gurkhas serving abroad, but added that the process would be gradual 
due to economic considerations.40 
Within this political flux, the G.O.I. made it known that their favour lay with 
the Nepali Congress and that it was time for the Ranas to relinquish power. In the 
turbulent months after a failed Nepali Congress takeover bid, the leader of the Nepali 
Congress, at this point, U.R. Upadhaya, in November 1950 called for Indian 
intervention in Nepal. In the face of political impasse, Nepalese nationalists invited 
continued and direct Indian input in solving Nepal’s political problems.41 By 
courting direct Indian involvement in Nepalese politics, the relationship between 
India and Nepal was far more involved than that between the Raj and Nepal.  
The Nepalese Defence Minister and Director General for foreign affairs, 
therefore, made their way to Delhi for six weeks of talks, during which the Rana 
regime announced that it was willing to implement the failed Government of Nepal 
Act of 1948. India pushed for more and suggested that a constituent assembly be 
elected and that an interim government representing popular opinion and enjoying 
popular support should be appointed. This was to be composed of both popular 
representatives and members of the Rana, one representative should be Prime 
Minister appointed by the King, and finally Indian suggested that the King should 
remain head of state.42 The Ranas agreed and so an Interim Cabinet of seven Ranas 
and seven popular representatives was formed, the King was to return and the 
Constituent Assembly would be called no later than 1952.  
Power sharing did not run smoothly, however: by April 1951, B.P. Koirala 
openly talked of a crisis in the government and by November the Congress had left 
the government.43 This move was swiftly followed by the resignation of the Rana 
Prime Minister so that the King would be free to form a cabinet of better popular 
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representatives. The King duly asked M.P. Koirala to form an all-commoner cabinet, 
composed of eight members of the Nepali Congress and four independents. The 
Nepali Congress, however, had its share of factionalism, especially between the 
Koirala brothers and by July 1952 a schism emerged between the ministerial (M.P. 
Koirala) and the organisational (B.P. Koirala) wings after the Working Committee 
attempted to force a smaller cabinet chosen by them onto the Prime Minister.44  M.P. 
Koirala resigned as Prime Minister so that he could go before the Nepali Congress 
Committee simply as another member and not as the Prime Minister to contest his 
three year expulsion from the party. The result of this was a vote for B.P. Koirala and 
a deep division within the party. 
In response to the uncertain situation and with the Nepali Congress unable to 
form a cabinet, the King took matters into his own hands and announced the 
appointment of a five-man Advisory Council, containing some Ranas, that would last 
until an effective and representative Council of Ministers could be established.45 
Thus the failure of the Nepali Congress precipitated a situation where power, and 
therefore, criticism for decisions was concentrated in the hands of the King who was 
viewed by Delhi as an interim stabilising influence until such a time that a 
representative government could be formed. In fact, Nehru informed the King that 
with ‘the Nepali Congress having failed for the moment, the only cementing and 
stabilising factor was the King.’46  
The state of Nepalese politics was an issue for recruitment depots on 
Nepalese soil as it directly affected and limited both the King’s and Nehru’s room for 
manoeuvre in the face of popular opposition to the principle of British recruitment. 
The principal role of the King was to provide interim leadership until such a point 
that the plans for the democratisation of Nepal could continue and he was, therefore, 
reluctant to take decisions that would be unpopular with public opinion or the Nepali 
Congress. This increased Indian influence over, and tutelage of, Nepal caused 
consternation in London and further reinforced the existing tendency of seeking to 
gain Indian approval over issues concerning Nepal and the Gurkhas.47 Nye 
commented on the relationship that had developed between India and Nepal since 
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the transfer of power in August 1947, arguing that ‘Whilst [the] Government of India 
outwardly maintain a strictly correct attitude in treating the Government of Nepal as 
entirely independent, in fact we all know quite well that they are exerting improper 
pressure on them and endeavouring to treat them as a satellite country.’48  
As the path that Nepal was taking became clearer, both in terms of the long 
road to a more democratic political apparatus and towards a position of tutelage 
under India, the British became increasingly aware of the tenuous provisions 
provided by the Tripartite Agreement.49 The British oscillated between the positions 
of apprehension about the Indian stance on Gurkhas, to planning to ask India to 
intervene with Nepal on their behalf.50 For example, in their attempts to get the 
Gurkha recruitment ceiling raised throughout 1950-1951, London assumed that 
Nehru would not stand in their way, but also that it was essential to get Indian 
blessing for any alterations.51 British hope for Indian support was an assumption 
based on the realistic and supportive position that Nehru had mostly taken in 
response to the Malayan Emergency. As the Colonial Office opined: ‘we have always 
found that the Indian Government have adopted a reasonably cooperative attitude 
over the Malayan Emergency, and it is perhaps just possible that they might be 
induced to bring their influence to bear on the Nepalese Government.’52 The 
development of the close cooperation between Nepal and India led Britain to 
consider that without the goodwill and the active support of the G.O.I., the practice 
of recruitment could not continue. As Olver of the CRO minuted, ‘with the 
increasing Indian influence in and control over Nepal, any long-term arrangements 
must be based primarily on the goodwill of the Government of India.’53 Gurkha 
recruitment for both India and Britain was contingent upon the willingness of Nepal, 
which had been assured under Rana rule, but as the Nepali Congress and other 
opposition groups in favour of the democratisation of Nepal gained strength and 
entered into the political sphere, recruitment could no longer be assured. 
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India and Britain’s Colonial War in Malaya  
From the outset of the Malayan Emergency, the Gurkhas, like the Indian 
Army before them as the so-called Sword Arm of Empire, formed the backbone of 
British forces in Malaya. Initially, little was said in India about the Tripartite 
Arrangement that tied India to British actions in Nepal. However, in 1952 this 
situation exploded into sustained criticism of the G.O.I.. One early exception was 
Blitz, a leftist weekly that denounced the use of Gurkha troops in Malaya to suppress 
what it termed an Asian freedom movement, and called on the government to put 
pressure on Nepal to cease recruitment and for the government to refuse transit 
rights.54 
After Blitz, left press opposition in reference to the G.O.I.’s consent of 
Gurkha recruitment reappeared in the spring of 1952, when the Communist 
newspaper Cross Roads reported that the practice of beheading was taking place by 
British Army Gurkhas in Malaya. The headline ‘Halt this Cannibalism! Severing the 
Heads of Liberation Fighters’, catalogued the offences of the British regime in 
Malaya based on information obtained from the London-based Communist paper the 
Daily Worker.55 Sections of the leftist press, both in Britain and India, considered the 
situation in Malaya in the same terms as the Viet Minh and their fight against French 
imperialism in Indo-China, stating that: ‘the British imperialists are resorting to 
every atrocity to hold on to Malaya against the wishes of its people.’56 Instead, the 
article suggested that ‘the war in Malaya must cease. The British imperialists must 
quit the country, they have no business to be there. Malaya must be independent to 
shape its own destiny.’57 This opinion was in contrast to the views expounded by the 
G.O.I. in its rare comments on the topic in public debates and in private to the British 
Government. 
In response to the criticism caused by the Daily Worker story in London, the 
British Government promised to stop the practice and the G.O.I. also received a 
censuring in the editorial:   
India’s name is associated with the suppression of the Malayan 
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Liberation struggle. Gurkha troops, recruited with the consent of the Indian 
Government, are helping the imperialists in Malaya. This disgrace must 
end. Gurkha troops must be recalled. India must withdraw from the 
Commonwealth, which is only a combine of colonial looters and 
murderers.58 
The imperial detritus represented by the Tripartite Agreement and the assumed 
tacit consent of the G.O.I. raised the shackles of the leftist press, which had 
consistently opposed association with Britain and especially membership of the 
Commonwealth. The report in Cross Roads also had political repercussions as 
questions were raised in the Lok Sabha. On 12 June 1952, Nehru was 
questioned about the arrangements regarding the Tripartite Agreement.59 Nehru 
was asked if the G.O.I. had given the British special facilities to recruit Gurkhas 
on Indian soil, to which Nehru responded that this information was incorrect 
and, furthermore, that it was not within the purview of the G.O.I. to interfere in 
relations between Britain and Nepal.60 The impact of the story on Gurkha 
recruitment was considered harmful, both in Nepal but more importantly in 
India; however, there was no follow up to this story until the autumn of 1952 
when it was revealed by Cross Roads that recruitment and enlistment for 
Malaya was actually taking place on Indian soil.61  
Cross Roads followed its assaults of the spring and caused a conflagration of 
fierce opposition to the Nehru Government, not only over its complicity in what it 
argued was an anti-colonial struggle, but also for compromising Indian sovereignty 
and compromising independence by allowing Britain to operate on Indian soil.62 As 
the editorial noted ‘it is not merely with the connivance of the Indian government but 
with their active cooperation and help that men are being enlisted.’63The publication 
went on an all-out attack against the Government, in particular Nehru, dedicating 
several double-pages to the story of Gurkha recruitment. The article further 
demanded that British recruiters be expelled from India, and that the recruitment 
depots be disbanded immediately and no other facilities or transit rights should be 
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awarded.64 The fact that Nehru had already provided inaccurate information in the 
Lok Sabha in June only further angered public opinion and newly sworn in 
Opposition following the first elections in post-independence India.65  
The politically neutral The Times of India subsequently reported on the 
parliamentary Opposition’s reaction in the Lok Sabha, noting that the ‘five Leaders 
of the Opposition in the House of the People on Monday demanded the annulment of 
the tripartite agreement…enabling recruitment of Gorkhas by Britain on Indian 
soil.’66 The leaders of the Opposition parties - S.P. Mookerjee (Mukherjee) of the far-
right  Nationalistic Democratic Party (Jan Sangh), Jivatram Bhagwandas (aka 
Acharya) Kripalani of the Socialist Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party67 (the Socialist Party 
had joined Kriplani), A.K. Gopalan of the Communists, Tridid Chaudhiri of the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party and Shankar Shanturam More of the Peasants and 
Workers Party - appropriated the anger already created and stirred up by the Cross 
Roads articles, both in May and August, and pushed Nehru in the Lok Sabha on 8 
August 1952. The Opposition leaders’ statement demanded an explanation for 
Nehru’s earlier misleading statement, a stop to the Tripartite Agreement, including 
transit rights, and recruitment of Gurkhas on Indian soil, which ‘is an action that 
deeply wounds the noblest anti-imperialist sentiments of our freedom loving 
people.’68 
The Opposition was not a homogenous group, but rather a disparate set of 
parties from across the political spectrum of Indian politics. The popular support 
enjoyed by Congress during the struggle against Britain was no less evident in the 
first elections of independent India in 1952. Support for Congress and its leaders 
derived from an unrivalled legacy and reputation amongst the mass of the 
population, and Congress also possessed a national organisational structure inherited 
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from its days as an anti-colonial platform, which no other organisation could equal. 
Emphasising popular support does not mean to argue that Congress made the 
transition from a one-objective organisation to a political party without teething 
problems, and Congress was no exception to the rule that unions designed for a 
single purpose fall apart when the objective is achieved.69 For example, the Congress 
Socialist Party (CSP) left Congress in 1948 after Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel pushed 
Congress too far to the right.70 The subsequent splits in the Socialist Party left the 
Communist Party of India (CPI) as the most consistent politically left force in Indian 
politics.71 The splits in Congress also produced two of the opposition parties in the 
Lok Sabha, the Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, which merged in 
September 1952 to form the Praja Socialist Party. The elections produced a 
parliamentary Opposition facing Congress that posed no tangible threat to its 
majority, but nonetheless represented a broad spectrum of political parties.72 The CPI 
broadly followed the line set by Moscow, which from mid-1950 meant engaging in 
parliamentary methods in their attempt to present a viable alternative to the Congress 
vision.73 Opposition parties, despite their disparate political positions, had few 
qualms about grilling Nehru on the finer points of his foreign policy and they 
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represented a constituency of opinion ranging from the far left with the Communists 
to the Jan Sangh on the right. Foreign affairs was publicly one of the most clearly 
defined areas of Congress policies and an area with which the opposition parties, 
especially the CPI, grew increasingly concerned in the face of the Cold War. 
Congressʼ majority does not negate the fact that Nehru and the G.O.I. expressed 
concern over the negative impact of sustained criticism and questioning of the 
underpinnings of Nehruvian foreign policy.   
In the face of this hostility, Nehru attempted to deflect the criticisms of 
recruitment by emphasising the independent nature of the Government of Nepal and 
that it was not within India’s rights to demand the cessation of recruitment in Nepal. 
Furthermore, he argued, it was agreed that ‘for the present’ the UK might continue to 
use the existing depots at Gorakhpur and Ghum near Darjeeling.74 Nehru further 
emphasised that this was only ever meant to be a convenient and temporary measure 
and claimed that India acquiesced in order to meet the wishes of Nepal not the 
British. The opening of two new depots, Jalapahar (March 1948) and Lehra 
(February 1950), however, was viewed far more as an act of the current government 
and not as imperial baggage. Nehru again used Nepal as a cover to hide behind, 
stating that ‘facilities to use recruiting depots in India were originally asked for and 
granted by us as a purely temporary measure ... and have continued for some years in 
order to meet the wishes of the Nepal Government in this matter.’75 As a means to 
placate hostility, Nehru was at pains to emphasise that the only activities that took 
place on Indian soil were medical examinations and formal enrolment, not training.   
Despite the fact that Nehru had earlier denounced any knowledge of these 
arrangements, he was now hiding behind them and using the wishes of the Nepal as 
a shield. Whether or not Nehru and the MoEA were fully aware of the extent of 
British activities is not ascertainable without reference to G.O.I. records, a distant 
prospect, but it was nonetheless the case that the Tripartite Agreement was signed 
and that the British had recently been allowed to sign ten year leases for properties 
on Indian soil.76 Denying knowledge of certain events was, moreover, a useful 
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mechanism for trying to defuse hostility. Nehru concluded his response to the Lok 
Sabha by promising that the issue would be taken up with the two governments. This 
was a measured response, reflecting Nehru’s reluctance to allow the opposition 
parties to dictate to him, his respect for international agreements as a basis for 
international co-operation, and also his willingness to assist in the continued 
recruitment of the Gurkhas both for the convenience of the British but also to ensure 
the economic and political stability of Nepal. 
With the public reaction to the Cross Roads stories growing and five of the 
Opposition parties and the Congress Party itself voicing not only strong 
condemnation, but demands for immediate British withdrawal, the MoEA’s 
Commonwealth Secretary met Clutterbuck to inform him that there were great 
pressures on the government.77 The Secretary began this task by conveying to his 
British counterpart that Nehru was genuinely surprised to learn that the British were 
still on Indian soil and felt that this was outside the terms of the Tripartite 
Agreement.78 The Secretary continued that there was a great deal of feeling on this 
subject in India, and that ‘Nehru said that it might be Communist-inspired, but 
feeling on the subject was by no means confined to Communists.’79 This admission 
clearly reflected the breadth of opposition that Nehru faced from various domestic 
quarters, but despite this, the British were told that any changes were not likely to 
happen in the immediate future.80 
The admission of the importance of opposition again reveals something of 
the influence of public opinion on the execution of Indian foreign relations that is 
neglected in the current historiographical literature.81 It was not simply the fact the 
recruitment was taking place on Indian territory, but as Nehru reported to B.G. Kher, 
Indian High Commissioner, ‘the difficulty, of course, is that the employment of 
Gurkhas in Malaya is a constant irritant to large sections of Indian opinion.’82 Nehru 
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again wrote to Kher at the end of September, noting that ‘there is no doubt about the 
feeling in India on this subject. It is foolish to think that this feeling is confined to 
the Communists.’83 Nehru communicated the consequences of the pressure that he 
had to operate under in a letter to Kher in reference to Ganapathay and Sambasivam, 
commenting that ‘the subject [of Malaya] having come up before us and received 
wide publicity … is exceedingly difficult to ignore.’84  
The reality of this domestic pressure was repeatedly communicated to 
Clutterbuck, who consequently reported to London on several occasions about 
the Indian public and political pressure that Nehru faced. Following a meeting 
with the Commonwealth Secretary in Delhi, Clutterbuck reported that ‘the 
important point which he had been asked to put to me was that, whatever the 
circumstances of 1947, the position today was that for reasons of policy the 
Government of India felt it impossible to allow continued recruiting on Indian 
soil; it would surely be readily understood that this would not be consistent with 
Indian’s declared policy of independence.’85 Clutterbuck followed with the 
assessment: ‘I fear that this matter is not merely one of keeping record straight 
with Parliamentary Opposition and that there is very strong pressure on the 
Prime Minister. Indians are therefore likely to press vigorously their demand for 
withdrawal of recruitment facilities.’86 Although, as Nehru had pointed out, this 
pressure originated from the Communist press, political parties of both the left 
and right joined in chorus to criticise the Prime Minister, as did members of the 
Congress Party. Therefore, Nehru had to act. 
Gurkha recruitment was not simply a limited episode, but it drew into 
stark relief both India’s sovereignty, and the claims made for an independent 
foreign policy based on the principles of anti-colonialism and neutralism. This is 
why the episode was so swiftly exploited by the press and the Opposition and 
used a stick with which to beat Nehru’s government. Writing to Krishna Menon, 
Nehru elucidated the difficult situation in which Gurkha recruitment placed him, 
noting that ‘I think I realise the various aspects of this question and the reactions 
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in the British mind. But once the subject assumes importance in India it is 
difficult to ignore it.’87 Nehru continued giving the reasons why it would 
assume importance: ‘a subject of this kind excites the public mind and 
practically no Indian is prepared to accept recruitment of soldiers on Indian soil 
for a foreign army, more so for their employment in Malaya at present.’88  
In light of the sustained domestic criticism that he thought damaging, 
Nehru both wanted and needed a fairly swift and acceptable resolution to the 
problem to diffuse domestic political opposition, but also to demonstrate that he 
was in control. Nehru emphasised to Krishna Menon that he did not intend to 
allow the Gurkha question ‘to become a major issue or to demand anything to 
be done suddenly.’89 Despite the pressures on him, Nehru wrote to Kher that ‘I 
have no desire to embarrass the British Government on this or any other issue’, 
he continued that ‘We shall however try to go slowly about this and not create 
too much of a fuss.’90 Nehru’s objective was therefore to produce a formula that 
was acceptable to all three parties, that would last for a number of years so that 
opposition would not again be raised, and that did not disrupt the British 
recruitment of Gurkhas for Malaya. 
After the initial meeting between the MoEA and Clutterbuck, India produced 
an aide-memoire for the British, which stated the Indian problems and maintained 
that they wished ‘to terminate, as early as possible, the facilities given, as a 
temporary measure, to the United Kingdom for the recruitment of Gurkha troops in 
India.’91 Crucially for continued recruitment, the Indian authorities at no point 
questioned transit rights, the Tripartite Agreement, or the use of certain other 
facilities. The aide-memoire only focussed on enlisting on Indian soil. It was these 
depots to which the parliamentary Opposition, the public and press objected for the 
most part and the role they played in furnishing the British with troops. The G.O.I. 
maintained the depots were only ever intended to be temporary measures. However, 
in conversation with Clutterbuck, the Indian Secretary intimated that they would be 
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willing to compensate the British for the two new depots at Lehra and Jolapahar.92 
The G.O.I. had little intention of making recruitment difficult for the British, 
and attempted to make this clear to them. For example, the Indian Ambassador in 
Nepal, in conversation with the British Ambassador in Nepal, stated that he had been 
pressing for ‘Gurkha recruitment and of Indian need to help resist communism in 
Malaya and elsewhere.’93 This sentiment was echoed by Kher, in London, who 
informed London that Delhi did not want to make things difficult, and went so far as 
to admit that if they had not been pushed by the official Opposition then the G.O.I. 
would not have been calling for a termination.94 Kher went even further in 
September, in conversation with the Commonwealth Secretary, when it was reported 
that ‘he assured me that Indian Government was most anxious to help in any way it 
could to help find a solution.’95 Kher further intimated that the G.O.I. may inform 
the Government of Nepal of the utility of the continued flow of recruits to the British 
Army.96  
Nehru assured Clutterbuck by repeating that he had no desire to do anything 
sudden or upsetting to the British, but that ‘now India was independent it was no 
longer politically possible for recruitment for a foreign army to take place on Indian 
soil.’97 Nehru was adamant, however, that this move was not predicated on placating 
the Communists and the Opposition, but came from concern for the Indian 
nationalist sentiments of the population.98 Nehru was at once both setting up defence 
for his actions and demonstrating to the British that the move was not designed to aid 
the Communist cause in any way. 
The broad acceptance of the principle of British recruitment was a point that 
both India and Britain were honest about in their communications, and it encouraged 
the British to be more appreciative of the Indian position and more positive about 
securing Indian assistance with Nepal. Indeed, Percival Liesching (Permanent 
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Secretary Commonwealth Relations Office) advised Churchill ʻthe Indian 
Government are under domestic pressure on this point, and it would be wise for us to 
meet them if we can.’99  In fact, Clutterbuck reported that ‘Nehru himself has always 
had doubts about Gurkha recruitment for the British; he was however prepared to 
face realities and, latterly, has appreciated the value of the contribution of the 
‘British’ Gurkhas in Malaya.’100 The British were broadly appreciative of Nehru’s 
flexible attitude on the wider issue of Malaya, and hoped that despite the public 
outcry, this would continue. As General Harding (Far Eastern Command), Malcolm 
MacDonald and Dening argued: ‘Nehru has on the whole been sympathetic to our 
position in Malaya.’101 The British considered the pressures of Nehru’s position, and 
the constraints acting upon him, as S.J.L Olver of the CRO raised the point that 
Indian objections were based on a reaction to a public outcry.102 This understanding 
led to the impression that they could ‘reasonably count on India not to obstruct a 
settlement with Nepal which would enable them to say no recruitment will in future 
take place on Indian soil.’103 The more swiftly a settlement could be reached with 
Nepal, the sooner the British depots could cease causing irritation for the G.O.I., and 
it was towards this resolution that India and Britain then turned.   
In part due to the legacy of the Tripartite Agreement, and in part due to 
increased Indian influence over Nepalese politics, a solution to the problem of 
British depots was not possible without Indian assistance. The British viewed the 
Nepalese as unwilling to accept any British proposals for fear of angering India, and 
on the other hand the British were reluctant to approach Nepalese without first 
getting Indian approval and pledges of assistance. As Clutterbuck reminded London 
‘we must face the unpleasant fact that the Indians hold the whip hand in this matter, 
and doubly so in view of their influence in Kathmandu.’104 Britain had to secure 
Indian acquiescence for any moves that it wished to make in Nepal, a direct 
reflection of India’s increased influence over Nepal and its King. 
In the same way as they handled the Tripartite Agreement negotiations, 
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Britain and India engaged in a diplomatic to and fro over who would approach 
whom, with what proposals and on what timetable. Time was not on the side of the 
G.O.I., or the British, as the Lok Sabha was due to reconvene on 5 November with 
the assumption that the Opposition would demand to know the outcome of Indian 
representations to the British.105 In fact, on the first day of the new session in the Lok 
Sabha, H.N. Mookerjee, asked Nehru what steps had been taken to terminate the 
facilities used by Britain. In reply Nehru attempted to placate opposition and stated 
that:  
In August 1952, the Governments of the UK and Nepal were 
informed that the Government of India wished to terminate, as early as 
possible, the facilities given as a temporary measure to the Government of 
the UK for the recruitment of Gurkha troops in India. The UK Government 
have informed us of their willingness to meet our wishes on this subject. 
The matter is now under discussion with the Governments concerned.106 
High Commissioner Kher was in the meantime summoned to the CRO to 
discuss with the Commonwealth Secretary ‘some way out of the difficulty which 
would remove the problem of both Governments.’107 It became patently clear at this 
juncture that the two Governments both concurred on the only long term settlement 
possible: to secure depots in Nepal itself. Anxious to secure a settlement, the British 
sought to gain Indian assurances of support before it made its approaches to the 
Government of Nepal, something which the Indians were reluctant to do, but the 
G.O.I. would give its advice to the Nepalese if consulted.108 Kher again reiterated 
that India was anxious to help find a solution to the problem and would pass this on 
to Delhi.109 Concurrently to the discussions in London, and in light of the Indian aide 
memoire, the Indian Cabinet met to discuss the topic of the Gurkhas and reaffirmed 
that there could be no agreement for the use of depots on a permanent basis by 
another sovereign power, and therefore suggested that Lehra and Jalapahar be shut 
down. However, the G.O.I. agreed that the depots could be used until alternative 
arrangements could be made.110  
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With its approaches made and confident of Indian goodwill, the British 
simultaneously forwarded its request to Nepal and informed the G.O.I. of the move. 
In Delhi, Clutterbuck saw Nehru to remind him one last time that ‘we count in 
general upon Indian good offices.’111 In fact, Nehru had already spoken to Nepal’s 
King Tribhuvan in general terms whilst he was in Delhi from 4-7 September,112 who 
at this time was still heading an interim ‘caretaker’ government.113 Nehru duly 
informed the King that India was no longer able to offer recruitment facilities to the 
British, and that there was presumably also opposition to the practice in Nepal.114 
Whilst emphasising his desire not to inconvenience the UK, Nehru informed the 
King that India would be willing to provide vital transit facilities as was custom 
under the Tripartite Agreement.115   
Nehru’s informal approach and advice to the King reflected his wish not to be 
seen to be unduly influencing another nation, but he did nevertheless inform the 
British that King that he hoped he would be as accommodating as possible to their 
needs.116 Nehru, however, noted to the British and to the King that such facilities 
would probably only be on a temporary basis as the nationalist sentiment in Nepal 
further developed. Time was of the essence for Nehru since the more quickly a 
settlement with Nepal could be found, the more quickly British depots in India could 
be closed, or at least the more disagreeable activities transferred to Nepal. Whether 
or not Nehru was ideologically opposed to the principle of recruitment was not the 
determining factor. The key problem was satisfying Nepal, the G.O.I.’s domestic 
opponents, and maintaining relations with Britain and their flow of Gurkhas. 
As Clutterbuck met with Nehru to hear about the King, the Commonwealth 
Relations Secretary saw Kher in London to reiterate the fact that Britain hoped to be 
able to count on India’s support ‘if they were brought into the picture’ by the 
Nepalese approaching them for advice.117 Kher, who did not hide his support for the 
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British, replied by assuring the Secretary that the only real difficulty was that of 
recruiting the Gurkhas on Indian soil. Apart from that there would be no issue at all 
about good will.118 Meanwhile, Summerhayes, the British Ambassador in Nepal, met 
with various members of the Nepalese Advisory Council to formally discuss the 
continuance of British recruitment and the form of the relocation of depots from 
India to Nepal.119 Both Sri Khadgaman Singh (Foreign Affairs) and General Kaiser 
(Defence) saw few potential problems with British proposals as no one wanted an 
early end to recruitment. Meanwhile, at a full Council meeting, the Nepalese 
discussed the initial British approach for depots in Nepal on 3 November 1952, but a 
decision was postponed to enquire whether or not the Indians desired Tripartite talks, 
a prospect that neither the Indians nor the British had previously expressed interest 
in.120 The Nepalese approached the Indians through their Ambassador in Delhi, and 
in reply the G.O.I. orally reported that it had no objections to Nepal granting further 
recruitment aid.121 
With the British approach made, Nehru formally replied to the King in 
writing. He noted that in light of the inability of the G.O.I. to continue providing 
recruitment facilities, and taking into consideration the fact the Nepalese popular 
opinion was against the establishment of British depots in 1947 and remained 
opposed to the principle of foreign armies recruiting on Nepalese soil, Nepal should 
as a short term policy allow the British to establish depots in Nepal.122 Nehru further 
suggested to the King that a time period of four-five years ‘subject to a 
reconsideration at the end of that period or at any time within that period at twelve 
months’ notice at the instance of either Government.’123 This last clause was a sop to 
opposition and an attempt to provide a get-out mechanism for the King that would be 
very unlikely to be used but was essential for political window-dressing. 
At this time, the British High Commissioner, in a confidential conversation 
with the Nepalese Ambassador in Delhi, learned that Nehru had formally replied to 
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the King of Nepal’s letter in the first week of November. The response detailed that 
India did not oppose the establishment of training depots in Nepal and that for their 
part the Indians would continue to offer transit rights.124 The High Commissioner 
learned of the temporary nature of any settlement, a period of four to five years, but 
the Nepalese Ambassador did not see this precluding the possibility of a longer term 
agreement after the end of the five years.125 The spectre of a five year time limit in 
conjunction with the prospect of investing in new facilities in Nepal did not appeal to 
the British authorities, who made the Nepalese Ambassador in Delhi (Bijaya) aware 
of their feelings as he was recalled to Kathmandu to advise the King.126 
A further week passed, and there was still as yet no formal Nepalese 
reply to Britain, partly because the Nepalese were waiting for the President of 
the Nepali Congress to return from India. On 24 November, it was reported to 
Summerhayes by General Bijaya that a decision was that day to be been taken 
by the Advisory Council, and on 25 November Defence Counsellor Kaiser 
confidentially told Summerhayes that Nepal had agreed to depots, but with the 
five year limit terminable at a year’s notice, the wording of which was strikingly 
similar to that suggested by Nehru in his letter to the King.127 This last caveat, 
Kaiser argued, was a concession to local opposition.128 However, it was also 
reported by the Defence Counsellor that the twelve month notice period was 
included at the suggestion of India. In light of the Indian assistance offered to 
the British, the twelve month clause was inserted as a sop to both Indian and 
Nepalese domestic opposition to make it easier to get an agreement past those 
opposed to such actions and at the same time ensure continued recruitment. The 
British knew of these moves by India, but this remained confidential 
information from the Counsellor for Defence. As the Foreign Office argued, 
Gurkha recruitment was ʻso entirely inconsistent with the principles of anti-
colonialism, etc., which theoretically guide Indian foreign policy, that they must 
save their faces in some way.’129  
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Nepal officially informed the British of their decision through the 
Ambassador in Kathmandu, who argued that the government had to take into 
account the increasingly nationalist future generations of Nepal, and as such the 
Government could not ‘in the circumstances, commit themselves to any permanent 
or long term policy, as this might come into conflict with the wishes of the people in 
the future.’130 The case of the twelve month clause was taken up with the King on 29 
November, who argued that there were certain criticisms of continuing recruitment 
which necessitated certain concessions.131 The Defence Counsellor, once again 
confidentially, reiterated his opinion that the clause had been forced upon Nepal, but 
that the aide-memoire should be considered and that the Counsellors would give 
their support for the elimination of the clause.132  
Simultaneously, the Indian Ambassador in Nepal suggested to the British 
Ambassador that the Nepalese had gone a long way for the British and that they 
could hardly wish to invite additional criticism by giving longer terms; the inclusion 
of the twelve month notice period was also a means to placate the opposition and 
would satisfy the pride of subsequent governments so that they would feel less 
inclined to question the agreements in future.133 Once again, it was Indian influence 
on Nepal, or more precisely the King, that was viewed as the answer to the problem. 
The British aimed to demonstrate to Nehru that it was Indian influence that was the 
decisive factor as well as making him see the disastrous consequences that any 
cessation would have on actions in Malaya ‘and therefore on our whole relations 
with India, of any Indian failure to give us the full support over this which we are 
entitled to expect from a fellow-member of the Commonwealth.’134 The British 
Chiefs of Staff pushed for this hardening of attitude and, on the same page as noting 
that India assisted by consenting to changes and encouraging Nepal to agree to 
depots, argued that the G.O.I. ‘are entirely responsible for the present position and it 
is felt we must now be firm. We should now put forward our own terms, which 
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should be acceptable to both India and Nepal.’135  
Clutterbuck thus saw Nehru and impressed upon him the impractical nature 
of the Nepalese proposals.136 First, if Nehru wanted to emphasise the independence 
of Nepal then he should be reminded of the great influence that India has over the 
King; second, any interruption in the flow of recruits would seriously hamper the 
campaign against Malayan insurgents and would thus retard the development of self-
government; thirdly, the cessation of Gurkhas would seriously affect the Nepalese 
economy, and finally the quicker these arrangements could be settled the more 
swiftly the British could relinquish their depots on Indian soil.137 Nehru, in the 
meantime, was again questioned in the Lok Sabha about the progress of the 
negotiations on 12 December 1952 by Mukherjee.138 
On his return from a tour of Southern India Nehru again discussed the matter 
of the Nepalese terms with Clutterbuck.139 Nehru explained his advice given in terms 
of the context of the political situation in Nepal, with the King acting as a ‘caretaker’ 
of sorts, and as such was reluctant to engage in any long term arrangements. 
However, Nehru assured Clutterbuck that the suggestion of the twelve month notice 
period did not originate with him, which was promptly communicated to London.140 
Nehru’s denial over the twelve month clause was not crucially important as he was 
still considered to be the only hope of negotiating a settlement. Instead Nehru argued 
that the fluid situation in Nepalese politics focused criticism for decisions on the 
King to an unusual degree, which meant that any settlement had to be politically 
acceptable to Nepalese opinion.141 
In order to move forward as quickly as possible with the political window 
dressing, Clutterbuck and Nehru decided to convene a further meeting so that 
Clutterbuck and Pillai (Secretary General at Ministry of External Affairs) could work 
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up a plan to take to Nehru, and then to the Nepalese.142 Clutterbuck, therefore, 
approached Pillai on two points: primarily to get the one year’s notice removed and 
if this was successful to extend the five year limit to at least seven.143 With the 
reassurance from Nehru’s denial of inserting the twelve month notice period, it was 
hoped that the Indians could be brought to agree that the practical considerations of 
the case would override the King’s apprehensions. On the second point, Clutterbuck 
was not confident that the Indians would be moved from the five year model and 
instead he proposed that an agreement should last for seven years from the 1 January 
1953 and should be extended each year on 31 March unless notice to the contrary 
was given. 
In Kathmandu Summerhayes suggested that it would be possible to get the 
Indians and the Nepalese to agree to seven years with the two year notice period.144 
The British once again placed their faith in Nehru’s ability to influence the 
Nepalese.145 However, at the same time the suggestion was floated that if no 
satisfactory arrangement could be secured, then Nehru would be left until he visited 
London for the Coronation of Elizabeth II.146 But, as Clutterbuck argued, the longer 
the situation was allowed to drift then the more time this left for opposition to 
develop.With the prospect of elections in Nepal the following year it was imperative 
to push an agreement through. For Nehru, the Gurkha problem had been a running 
issue with the Opposition since June 1952, and the longer it continued the longer the 
attacks against his policies continued.  
Consequently, Pillai and Clutterbuck met on 16 January and Clutterbuck 
illustrated the severe limitations that the initial proposals placed on the British, about 
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which Pillai seemed to be unaware.147 Pillai played a listening role, Clutterbuck held 
back from elucidating his seven year proposals, and the meeting ended with 
agreement to meet again in a week’s time once Pillai had discussed the political 
situation with the Indian Ambassador to Nepal, who was shortly returning to Delhi, 
and with Nehru. Pillai and Clutterbuck met once again, although Pillai had been 
unable to see Nehru, and explained what he felt to be one of the crucial matters: the 
fluid political situation in Nepal. Pillai argued that it was both the Nepalese and 
Indian objective to see a government formed to continue on until elections held in 
the near future, and as such any government would most likely be unwilling to 
engage in any long term agreements that would open them up to criticism and tie in 
future governments.148 Thus Pillai could see only two alternatives: 
i) Fixed term with escape clause to be applied at any time. 
ii) Interim agreement on the understanding that more lasting 
agreement could be signed with a new Nepalese Government. 
Pillai did believe that a seven year term would be possible but only with the 
proviso of a short term notice period. Therefore, he suggested that the British gave 
thought to (ii). In the meantime Pillai promised to make further enquiries and to seek 
discussions with Nehru. These discussions, from the point of view of the Indians and 
the Nepalese, represented not a fundamental attack on the process of recruitment, but 
a way of finding an acceptable formula that satisfied the needs of the three involved 
parties. Clutterbuck reported that ‘Pillai made it clear to me that in his view issue 
was one merely of window-dressing. Everybody…wanted recruitment to continue – 
the Governments of India and Nepal, the Koiralas (he thought) and of course the 
Gurkhas themselves.’149 For both the British and the Indians, the need for a 
settlement continued to press as without agreement no changes would be possible 
before the start of the new recruitment season. 
The G.O.I. continued to assist the British to find a solution to their problem, 
and Pillai again met Clutterbuck on 11 February 1953.150 Contrary to the opinion of 
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Summerhayes, Pillai confirmed that there was little chance of a change in the 
government of Nepal after Nepalese Congress attempts to form a government had 
failed.151 In light of this development, Clutterbuck pushed Pillai on the topic of a 
seven year settlement, to which he was receptive and did not mention the escape 
clause. Pillai thus sought talks with Nehru, who again faced questions in the Lok 
Sabha. During supplementary questions Nehru implied that even transit facilities 
could not be expected to last indefinitely but for the term of the Tripartite 
Agreement.152 This statement, largely for public consumption, was both damaging in 
light of the current discussions and was contrary to the G.O.I.’s professed wish not to 
inconvenience Britain and their attempts to continue recruiting Gurkhas. However, 
the answer was also incorrect as the Tripartite Agreement was of indefinite length. 
Nehru, when questioned how the situation in Malaya affected Gurkha recruitment, 
admitted to the Lok Sabha that what happened in Nepal was not directly the concern 
of the G.O.I. in an attempt to separate India from the decision-making process in 
public, although in private it was through India that an acceptable formula was being 
devised.  
Pillai and Clutterbuck met in the shadow of Nehru’s answers in the Lok 
Sabha, which Pillai argued should not worry the UK as the answers to supplementary 
questions were often forgotten as soon as they were asked, and it must also be 
remembered that Nehru had not been in the loop regarding the development of the 
Pillai-Clutterbuck talks since 9 January 1953.153 The British, alarmed at the length of 
time the Gurkha negotiations were taking, and also shaken by Nehru’s statement in 
the Lok Sabha, informed Clutterbuck that the matter of three frigates due to be 
delivered to India was under question and that the possibility of delaying the delivery 
of these ships until a satisfactory conclusion of the Gurkha episode was being 
examined in London.154 Clutterbuck, seeing the folly of the move, argued against 
this, stating that it could not only risk Gurkha recruitment, but could also wreck 
relations over the entire field; moreover, Nehru was currently considering Pillai’s 
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submissions to him.155 This threat was not a symptom of a lack of trust for Nehru, 
but rather was demonstrative of the extreme importance of the continued recruitment 
of Gurkhas. 
On 18 March, Pillai reported to Clutterbuck that Nehru was in the process of 
considering the question of Gurkha recruitment and was almost in a position to give 
his reactions, but that it would take another week whilst Nehru held further 
discussions with the Nepalese Ambassador.156 Pillai confided in Clutterbuck that the 
political situation in Nepal had made the whole process tiresome and that the 
American coined slogan ‘Asians fighting Asians’ had played right into the hands of 
the Communists. Clutterbuck replied that ‘there were certain difficulties to be 
overcome, (but) I hoped the Prime Minister realised that this was a matter of first 
class importance.’157  
After full discussions with the Indian Ambassador in Nepal and the Nepalese 
Ambassador in Delhi, Nehru devised a compromise formula that sought to meet 
British needs.158 Although the five year limit remained intact, with any extensions to 
be negotiated near the end of the term, the twelve month notice period had been 
dropped to be replaced with a proviso for joint consultation if either party wished to 
change the terms of the agreement.159 The G.O.I., at the behest of Clutterbuck, 
informed Nepal that this provision did not extend to the length of the agreement and 
thus should not be seen in the same context as the twelve month notice clause, which 
had from the beginning been the real bugbear for the British.160 The British, for their 
part, found the proposals agreeable, in light of the difficulties in Nepal and the 
pressure under which Nehru had to operate. Therefore, the High Commissioner was 
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informed that the British Government accepted the terms set out and would use them 
as a basis for approaching the Government of Nepal.161 Thus, after almost a year 
since the first Cross Roads story concerning India’s complicity in recruiting Gurkhas 
for the British Army in Malaya, India designed a compromise formula whereby 
British recruitment would take place on Nepalese soil rather than Indian soil. The 
opposition to recruitment in India potentially threatened to scuttle British recruitment 
of Gurkhas completely.    
Conclusions 
Through examining both the Indian and the British sources, it has been 
possible to investigate the issue of Gurkha recruitment. Until now Gurkha 
recruitment has not been placed in its international context of Cold War and 
decolonisation in South and Southeast Asia. The British sources, whilst appreciating 
Nehru’s importance and the pressures under which he operated, paint him as willing 
to assist. The available Indian sources, predominantly the SWJN, provide an 
appreciation of Nehru’s role as largely one of him insisting that the British leave 
India, but without a focus on the assistance provided to the British. For Nehru, the 
situation was a complex one: he sought stability in Nepal especially in the face of 
Chinese irredentism, he wanted opposition at home to cease, and he wanted the 
continued recruitment of British Gurkhas for Malaya. 
Once again, and similar to the cases of Ganapathy and Sambasivam, the 
Gurkhas were another example of India’s imperial detritus impacting on both 
bilateral and, more widely, on regional and Cold War connections. The Gurkhas, like 
the sterling balances and a large Indian population abroad, were all a direct legacy of 
empire that interacted with, and were sometimes in conflict with, the policies that 
Nehru largely attempted to follow. The British Government was well aware of the 
domestic pressures on Nehru, but as time pressed on they became less inclined to 
consider these pressures and throughout this Nehru was anxious not to upset the 
British or interrupt the flow of recruits. However, the situation was such that Nehru 
was the only hope that the British had of securing any agreement with the Nepalese. 
Nehru was ideologically opposed in principle to the idea of recruitment, but the 
practicalities of the situation overrode but did not entirely extinguish these 
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principles. Moreover, Nehru was under extreme pressure from the parliamentary 
Opposition, the left press and popular opinion. One of the most compelling facets of 
this example is the power of public opinion, opinion informed by the legacy of the 
struggle for freedom that exerted a very compelling influence on Nehru’s room for 
manoeuvre and action with the British. Nehru again faced questions in the Raya 
Sabha for B. Rath (Communist) in the Autumn of 1953, where Nehru followed his 
well-used line that it was not a matter for the G.O.I. to interfere in relations between 
Britain and Nepal.162 
Whilst ideologically opposed to recruitment, this did not drive Nehru’s 
actions. Nehru was largely honest with the British. He did not hide that he thought 
recruitment an anachronism, but that in the circumstances it was a necessity, and he 
also admitted to the pressures that he was under in the form of opposition and 
criticism. Most tellingly, Nehru largely avoided the topic of transit rights, which 
were essential for any recruitment to take place. Had an agreement been reached 
with the Nepalese and the G.O.I. refused transit rights then the entire mechanics 
would have been unworkable. Nehru’s association with India’s foreign policy had its 
negative aspects as evidenced by the fact that attacks against recruitment became 
attacks against Nehru. 
The regional politics of South Asia also had a significant role to play with the 
Gurkhas. Not only were the Indians and British under pressure, but also the King of 
Nepal, and in conversation with Clutterbuck Nehru argued that the King ‘had no 
particular objection to its continuing for some time, (but) he had to do something 
which he could explain and justify to his own people.’163 The art of political 
window-dressing was practised with some confidence during these months of 
negotiations as each of the three parties attempted to arrive at a flexible and lasting 
settlement that met the needs of British recruitment but that could also satisfy the 
voices of opposition in both Nepal and India. The twelve-month notice period was 
inserted, whether by the King or at Nehru’s insistence, to ensure that the future 
Government of Nepal possessed the adequate mechanisms, not necessarily to cancel 
recruitment, but to satisfy their national pride by having the option to do so. The 
twelve month notice clause was in reality neutralised by the economic imperatives of 
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recruitment. As Nehru told the British High Commissioner, ‘the economic and social 
benefits’ would largely inform, but not determine, the decision of Nepal.164 The 
economic gains from recruitment provided stability and a reasonable hope of 
advance and reform. The British, however, could not rely on future governments in 
Nepal seeing the benefits of continued recruitment and so an agreement was a 
necessity.  With the failure of the Nepali Congress to form a stable government, the 
King of Nepal and his council of advisors, containing several Rana veterans, faced 
the focussed criticism of popular opinion in Nepal. The King sought a lasting 
settlement that would mean that he could escape sustained criticism, and would 
reduce the desire of any new government to abrogate any treaty agreements.    
This case study also demonstrates India’s own strategy of buffer states 
and the extension of influence over other sovereign territories to ensure that 
most important of Indian goals: regional stability. India was keen to have a 
stable and prosperous Nepal on its north-eastern border with Tibet, which 
became all the more important with the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950. This 
stability in large part depended upon the income derived from the Gurkhas, at 
the same time as desiring stability for Southeast Asia more generally through 
the continued use of Gurkhas in Malaya. 
Nehru and the G.O.I. were extremely sensitive in the face of the criticism 
from the Opposition and the leftist press, who appropriated the language of liberation 
to defend the actions of the MCP in Malaya and berate the Government for their role 
in subjugation of freedom struggle. When the story of recruitment broke, in the 
autumn, the ambiguity of the situation allowed its appropriation by the left and 
provided them with a stick with which to beat the Government and castigate its 
entire foreign policy stance. Both the cases of Sambasivam and Ganapathy and the 
story of the Gurkhas demonstrate how influential the press was in fomenting 
opposition to aspects of Nehru’s foreign policy that went against the general guiding 
principles, and also how effective the official Opposition could be when it had the 
backing of a section of the press. Moreover, as Nehru admitted many times, feeling 
on the issue of the Gurkhas being used in Malaya was not simply confined to the 
Communists and the left,and as he wrote to Menon: ‘a subject of this kind excites the 
                                               
164
 UKHC to CRO, No. 1336, 28/10/1952, FN 1201/102, FO 371/101159. 
 Gurkha Recruitment 
 
272 
public mind and practically no Indian is prepared to accept recruitment of soldiers on 
Indian soil for a foreign army, more so for their employment in Malaya at present.’165   
In the face of domestic opposition, Nehru was compelled to make some 
balanced concessions and make a point of asking the British to find alternative 
arrangements whilst in fact assisting in helping them do so and intimating that they 
were willing to pay a level of monetary compensation. Crucially the issue of transit 
rights was not questioned, which would have put an end to British recruitment even 
had the Nepalese agreed to depots on their soil. Taken as a whole, Indian actions 
cannot be described as anti-recruitment: they supported continued British 
recruitment through the Tripartite Agreement, guaranteed continued transit rights and 
assisted in negotiations with the Nepalese. As an Indian official argued to the British 
High Commissioner, whatever the settlement reached, the government continued to 
expose itself to sustained criticism because ‘the communist object was to stop transit 
of Gurkhas altogether.’166  
Furthermore, this episode demonstrates India’s stance on Communism in 
Malaya and more widely in Southeast Asia and that Nehru was more willing than 
previously appreciated to give British help to combat militant and expansionary 
Communism, which was closely linked to the progressive nature of British policies 
in Malaya. Stability, as ever, was the key word for Nehru – despite Malaya being the 
site of some of the most exploitative business practices in the empire. Nehru was 
prepared to accept colonialism rather than militant Communism attempting to hijack 
a nascent national liberation struggle.  The case of Malaya more generally is an 
example of the fact that the idea of colonialism and its eradication was not always 
consistent with supporting those physically trying to destroy the colonial system. 
In essence, Nehru had to play a sticky wicket and did so in the only way that 
could satisfy domestic opposition and popular opinion more widely, not 
inconvenience the British and maintain the flow of recruits to Malaya, safeguard the 
economic and political stability of Nepal, and also safeguard the Tripartite 
Agreement, which in turn ensured access to Nepalese recruits for the Indian army. 
Like India’s pragmatic actions over Ganapathy and Sambasivam, the case of the 
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Gurkhas highlights Nehru’s pragmatic and realistic attitude towards the situation in 
Malaya regarding Communist insurrection in a colonial territory and in the wider 
scope of regional stability in both Nepal and Malaya.  Nehru adopted a flexible 
position over Gurkha recruitment and to achieve his aims Nehru needed to balance 
three competing pressures: Nepalese politics, the demands of India’s domestic 
opposition and public opinion and the British requirement for Gurkhas to fight in 
Malaya. 
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8) Concluding Notes 
Conclusions for the specific case studies have already been provided at the 
end of each chapter and so here the emphasis is placed on their collective 
contribution to the wider understanding of India’s foreign policies. The primary 
objective of this thesis was to provide a nuanced analysis of the first years of Indian 
independence that filled the silences in the existing narrative and historiography that 
emphasise an idealistic and morally governed foreign policy. Through the preceeding 
examination, and by employing a wide range of archival materials, it has been 
possible to recast India as a key Cold War player in South and Southeast Asia that 
balanced its national interest with the need to publicly adhere to its espoused foreign 
policy principles.  
The key contributions that this thesis has made can be best explained through 
the interconnected strands the flow throughout the case studies: first, India’s transfer 
of power, its transition to independence, and its imperial legacies. The absence of a 
developed foreign affairs department and the need for economic development in 
India, South and Southeast Asia are two prime examples. The research contributes to 
both an understanding of the process of the external transfer of power and of the 
need to construct the apparatus of state post-independence. By examining specific 
episodes in Indiaʼs foreign policy in the transition period from colony to nation-state, 
Indonesia for example, the thesis has provided a bridge between the two spheres that 
is all too often disregarded by scholars who treat 1947 as a caesura in Indiaʼs history, 
the starting point of the national story.1   
Second, and at the core of this thesis, was an examination of the interaction 
between colonialism and Communism in South and Southeast Asia, and how 
Nehru’s, and others’, reading of this affected Indian foreign policy. The thesis 
explored the closely related nature of colonialism, decolonisation and the threat of 
Communism in Southeast and South Asia, but did not seek to write a regional 
history. Fundamentally, Nehru feared and opposed the violent spread of 
Communism. But he also exploited British, Commonwealth, and later US, fears of 
Communist expansion in an attempt to influence policy in the region in order to 
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further the aim of decolonisation and to secure development aid for India and the 
region by presenting economic development and political freedom as the answer to 
Communism.   
Third, and closely linked to the above point, India’s actions over Malaya, 
Commonwealth membership and the Colombo Plan serve to demonstrate the 
importance of the Sterling Area and Indiaʼs sterling balances in both its own 
development needs and in its approach to Communism and colonialism in Southeast 
Asia. This emphasis is well overdue and serves to contextualise Indiaʼs international 
affairs with its colonial legacy of the sterling balances. In sum, emphasis was placed 
on India’s own national interests in a peaceful transformation of colonial Southeast 
Asia to a collection of democratic nations as opposed to militant Communism. 
Moreover, this research, through its analysis of  the lack of stability in South and 
Southeast Asia, adds a depth of understanding to why Nehru was so eager to avoid 
international instability, and provides further context to India’s peacemaking actions 
regarding the Korean War, the Indo-China war and also later on with the Suez crisis. 
The fourth key strand is the focus on India and Britain and this derived from 
the fact that in the first years of independence Britain was Indiaʼs closest 
international partner. This is further reinforced by the focus on Southeast Asia where 
Britain remained the key regional power. This thesis was not, however, limited to an 
attempt to write a history of the bilateral relationship between India and Britain or to 
chart the decline of that relationship, but rather to examine the complex bonds that 
remained between the two countries in the first years of independence in the context 
of Communism and colonialism in Southeast Asia. In this way this research has also 
contributed to the wider historiography of the decolonisation of the British Empire in 
Asia through its re-examination of this key relationship. Much of the exisiting 
literature, however, seeks to examine the Indo-British relationship in order to chart 
its decline and this retrospective and myopic approach neglects to analyse the 
strengths and complexities of the post-independence relationship.  
Fifth, the focus on Sino-Indian relations in South and Southeast Asia in this 
research contributes to an understanding of India and China outside of the 
teleological narrative of the 1962 war. An integral part of Nehru’s appreciation of 
international Communism came from Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, 
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which positioned China as a rival to Indian influence in Southeast Asia. As with 
Malaya, the Commonwealth and Colombo, the Gurhka case study demonstrated 
Indian anxiety towards an expansionist China. This research focused on Indian 
perceptions of the threat of China not, as much of the existing literature does, with 
the exclusive aim of tracing the roots of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, but rather by 
examining the early years of Sino-Indian interactions in colonial Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, the thesis explored the connection between India’s domestic Communist 
troubles and international Communism in order to demonstrate Nehru’s increasing 
awareness of the destabilising impact of Communism in Southeast Asia. 
Sixth, this research has clearly demonstrated that strict neutralism or non-
alignment, as espoused by Nehru in September 1946, was an aim, an aspiration, a 
goal, but one that was not fully realised in the first years of Indian independence as it 
became more of a rhetorical commitment in the face of prevailing domestic and 
international circumstances. Neutralism, for Nehru, was a fluctuating position based 
on the particular set of circumstances present in each episode on the international 
stage, and was not simply a moral and ideologically driven policy that determined all 
of India’s external relations. A firm rhetorical commitment to neutralism endured and 
it remained a key aspiration as the G.O.I. sought to present its foreign policy as 
unique and ʻIndianʼ in order to satisfy a broad spectrum of public opinion at home. 
Although not the primary aim of the thesis, the research has begun to de-centre the 
teleological narrative that dominates the exisiting historiography that seeks to chart a 
path to Bandung and beyond to the Non-Aligned Movement, and which reinforces 
the notion of a solely morally directed and idealistic foreign policy. Through 
examining previously neglected episodes in India’s external relations, and by shifting 
attention to India’s earliest international forays, this work places the Asian Relations 
Conference and the conference on Indonesian freedom into their respective historical 
contexts rather than simply as part of the path to Bandung. 
 The other key guiding principle of Indian foreign policy, anti-colonialism, 
was far from being universally applied and, like neutralsim, was flexible and 
contingent on the specifics of each situation. For example the differences between 
India’s attitudes towards freedom movements in Indonesia, Indo-China and Malaya. 
More so than India’s unwillingness to formally align itself in the Asian Cold War, 
anti-colonialism was an emotive issue with Indian public and political opinion. 
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Seventh, and stressing the hitherto neglected links between the domestic and 
international, the presentation of Indian foreign policy was politically window-
dressed by the G.O.I. Its private dealings with other nations were, at times, at 
variance with the image that it presented to the Indian public and the political 
establishment, for example Indonesia, Malaya and the Gurkhas. Public opinion, as 
perceived by the G.O.I., was a far more important component in the exercise of 
Indian foreign affairs than is currently accepted in the historiography. Part of the 
importance of public opinion comes from the fact, as demonstrated in the Indonesia 
chapter, that Indiaʼs external identity, its championing of certain causes drew, on the 
Congress platform from before independence, invoking Gandhi in particular, and 
was used as a component in the construction of Indiaʼs national identity as non-
violent and anti-colonial. Furthermore, the case studies examined the relatively 
underdeveloped field of political criticism of the G.O.I.’s external affairs, most 
prominently through the Malaya, Commonwealth membership and Gurkha 
recruitment chapters. 
Overall, with its concentration of primary archival materials from a range of 
countries (the first time that this has been done on such a scale and with India as the 
central focus), it has been possible to construct a more finely grained picture of 
India’s foreign relations than is otherwise possible when depending solely upon 
Indian archives, much of the material in which remains inaccessible. Through this 
method this thesis re-examined India’s role in the Asian Cold War to show it as a 
key, if somewhat reluctant, player in the international relations of the early Cold War 
that pursued its national interests. The conclusions reached here add a depth of 
understanding to those case studies that already featured in the existing narratives of 
Indiaʼs foreign policy: the Commonwealth membership decision and Indonesia’s 
freedom struggle. Both of these examples benefit from being placed in the re-worked 
narrative provided by this thesis that is informed and constructed by the other case 
studies that have until now been neglected by scholars. This selection of studies also 
serves to demonstrate the interconnectedness of the episodes under discussion. It is 
through the combination of these studies that much is revealed about Indiaʼs external 
behaviour, and the extent to which it was influenced by its  domestic situation as the 
need for food, for economic growth and development fundamentally underpinned its 
foreign relations.  
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This research has explored India’s actions in Southeast Asia in order to re-
cast and emphasise its role in the history of the early Cold War in South and 
Southeast Asia, and has demonstrated its active and key regional actions in the 
period before Bandung in 1955 through its exisiting connections with the British 
Empire and Commonwealth. This thesis explored India’s earliest forays in 
international affairs in the context of its own transfer of power, its domestic 
economic and political needs, and the Cold War and decolonisation in South and 
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, this work offers future research opportunities by 
demonstrating that there are many silences in both the G.O.I.’s presentation of its 
external policies and in the exisiting historiography, which can be read by employing 
the range of sources employed in this research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusions 
 
280 
 
 
 
 
 Bibliography 
 
281 
9) Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources: Unpublished 
 
National Archives of India, Janpath, New Delhi 
 
Files of the Ministry of External Affairs 
File No. 41-2/48-OSII 
File No. MIC-1949-F.56-1/49-OSII - Malaya 1949 
File No. 12(3)-R&I/49 – Malaya Telegrams 
File No. 56-1/49-OSII – Malaya Telegrams 
File No. 39-R&I/52 – Reports from Malaya 
File No. 12-R&I/1949 – Reports from Malaya 
File No. 1950 – 20-38/50-M(M) – Ministry of External Affairs Notes 
File No. 21-9/51-UK – Ministry of External Affairs, Monthly Meetings 
File No. 55-R&I/50 – Monthly Reports from Malaya 
File No. 39-R&I/53 – Monthly Situation Reports from Malaya Including Newspaper 
clippings 
File No. 39-R&I/55 – Monthly Reports 
File No. 3(42)-R&I/52 – Annual Report from Malaya 1953 
File No. 3(44)- R&I/53, R&I Branch, Annual Reports 1952 
File No. 3(44)- R&I/55 – Annual Report from Malaya 1954 
File No. 1121-IANZ/49 
File No. 103-C.J.K/49 – Review of the Situation in Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Sarawak, Brunei, North Borneo and Philippines by J.A. Thivy  
File No. 9-R&I/49 – Press Cuttings concerning Southeast Asian Countries 
File No.  22-5/51-UK – Annual Reports from the High Commission of India in London, 
1951 
File No. 17/29/xp(P)/53 – Monthly Political Reports from London 
File No. K/54/1321/41 – Monthly Political Reports from High Commission of India in 
London, 1954 
File No. 14-14/56-UK Annual Political Report from High Commission of India in 
London, 1955 
File No. 58-R&I/55 – Monthly Report from London 
File No. 58-R&I/56 – Monthly Reports from London  
File No. 1(32)-AAC/55 – Foreign Press Reaction to Bandung 
File No. 12(155)-Pt/49 – Monthly Summaries produced by the Ministry of External 
Affairs 
 
Private Papers 
Private Papers of Chakravarti Rajagopalachari   
Private Papers of Rajendra Prasad 
 
 
 
 Bibliography 
 
282 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Teen Murti, New Delhi 
 
Papers of V.K. Krishna Menon – only accessible until 1946 
 
India Office Library, British Library (IOR) 
 
L/E India Office: Economic Department Records c.1876-1950 
L/E/5/76 
L/E/8/2527 
L/E/9/303 
L/E/9/304 
L/E/9/306 
L/E/9/307 
L/E/9/309 
L/E/9/316 
L/E/9/325 
L/E/9/332 
L/E/9/335 
L/E/9/336 
L/E/9/337 
L/E/9/338 
L/E/9/339 
L/E/9/341 
L/E/9/345 
L/E/9/346 
L/E/9/349 
L/F: India Office: Financial Department Records c.1800-1948 
L/F/7/403 
L/F/7/457 
L/F/7/2623 
L/F/7/2861 
L/F/7/2868 
L/F/7/2869 
L/F/7/2870   
L/F/7/2875 
L/P&J: India Office: Public and Judicial Department Records 1795-1950 
L/P&J/10/81 
L/PO: Secretary of State for India: Private Office Papers 1858-1948 
L/PO/6/123 
L/PO/10/22 
L/PO/10/24 
L/PO/325 
L/P&S: India Office: Political and Secret Department Records 1756-c.1950 
L/P&S/12/726 
L/P&S/12/1159  
L/P&S/12/1174 
 Bibliography 
 
283 
L/P&S/12/1124 
L/P&S/12/726 
L/P&S/12/1373 
L/P&S/12/1389 
L/S&G: India Office: Services and General Department Records c1920-c1970 
L/S&G/7/1253 
R/3: India: Viceroy's Private Office Papers and other Government Records 1899-
1948 
R/3/1/153 
R/3/1/154 
R/3/1/4 
MSS EUR.C. 273/1-5: ‘Five Autobiographical Narratives of Sir Olaf Caroe’ 
 
The National Archives, Kew 
 
CAB – Cabinet: Consulted for the years 1940-1955 
 
CAB 21: Cabinet Office and predecessors: Registered Files (1916-1965) 
CAB 65: War Cabinet and Cabinet Minutes and Papers: Conclusions 
CAB 66: War Cabinet and Cabinet Minutes and Papers 
CAB 91: War Cabinet and Cabinet: Committees on India: Minutes and Papers 
CAB 124: Offices of the Minister of Reconstruction, Lord President of the Council and 
Minister for Science: Records 
CAB 127: Private and Official Papers 
CAB 128: Cabinet Minutes and Papers: Conclusions 
CAB 129: Cabinet Minutes and Papers 
CAB 130: Records of Cabinet Committees 
CAB 133: Commonwealth and International Conferences and Ministerial Visits to and 
from the UK: Minutes and Papers 
CAB 134: Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers 
CAB 195: Cabinet Secretary's Notebooks 
 
CO – Colonial Office 
 
CO 537: Colonial Office and predecessors: Confidential General and Confidential 
Original Correspondence 
CO 537/ 2092 - Indian Council for World Affairs: Inter-Asian Relations Conference 
CO 537/2953 - India: Commonwealth Relations Office telegrams  
CO 537/3502 - Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Discussion with Pandit 
Nehru on Colonial Policy, 1948 
CO 537/3766 - Conference of UK Diplomatic Representatives in Southeast Asia, 1948 
CO 537/4573 - India’s Future Relations with the Commonwealth, 1949 
CO 537/5657 - South East Asian Affairs: Political Summaries and Correspondence 
Relating Thereto, 1950 
CO 537/5669 - India Foreign Policy, 1950 
CO 537/5670 - India Foreign Policy, 1950 
 Bibliography 
 
284 
CO 866/59/4 - Proposed visits by Lord Listowel to Indian subcontinent: visits to Nehru, 
Jinnah and Mountbatten; correspondence 
CO 967 - Private Office Papers 
 
DEFE – Ministry of Defence 
 
DEFE 7: Records of the Defence Chiefs of Staff 
 
DEFE 7/1922 - Agreement with Government of Nepal regarding employment of 
Gurkhas 
 
DO - Dominions Office/Commonwealth Relations Office 
 
DO 35: Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Original 
Correspondence 
DO 35/2246 - Indian external relations: Inter Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, 
1947 
DO 35/2247 - Indian external relations: representation of the Government of India in 
Colonial territories 
DO 35/2684 - Sterling and Sterling Balances 
DO 35/2685 - Sterling and Sterling Balances 
DO 35/2860 - Circular messages from the Prime Minister to Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, on Indonesia 
DO 35/2921 - Economic aid to India as part of a counter attack against communism 
DO 35/2923 - Australia plan for economic development 
DO 35/3090 - Indians residing and employed overseas: appointment of Gopala Menon 
as Representative of the Government of India in Malaya, and in Singapore 
 
DO 121: Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Private Office Papers 
DO 121/19 - Minutes to the Prime Minister by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations on Commonwealth affairs 
DO 121/23 - Minutes to the Prime Minister by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations on Commonwealth affairs 
DO 121/25 - Minutes to the Prime Minister from the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations on Commonwealth affairs 
DO 121/30 - Records of meetings on foreign affairs between the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations and Dominions High Commissioners 
 
DO 133: Commonwealth Relations Office and successors: High Commission and 
Consular Archives, India: Registered Files 
DO 133/70 - India's foreign policy 
DO 133/89 - Relations between the British Commonwealth and the governments India 
and Pakistan, 1948 
DO 133/91 - Relations between the British Commonwealth and the governments of 
India and Pakistan, 1948-1950 
DO 133/92 - Relations between the British Commonwealth and the governments of 
 Bibliography 
 
285 
India and Pakistan, 1950-1952 
 
DO 142: Commonwealth Relations Office: India: Registered Files 
DO 142/137 - Political and economic repercussions of India and Pakistan remaining in 
Commonwealth 
DO 142/177 - Proposals by Sir Archibald Nye on provision of UK economic aid to India 
DO 142/222 - Sterling balance negotiations, May 1948: proceedings of plenary meetings 
and main file 
DO 142/227 - UK-India Joint Consultative Committee on the Working of the Indo-UK 
Financial Agreement 
DO 142/228 - Future of sterling balances 
DO 142/229 - Future of sterling balances 
DO 142/341 - Advantages to India and Pakistan of Commonwealth membership, 1948 
DO 142/343 - Advantages to India and Pakistan of Commonwealth membership, 1948 
DO 142/344 - Advantages to India and Pakistan of Commonwealth membership, 1948 
DO 142/356 - Attitude of India towards the Commonwealth, 1948 
DO 142/404 - Effects on nationals of India in Malaya of measures to deal with 
Communist disturbances 
DO 142/405 - Death sentences in Malaya on Mr S A Ganapathy and Mr Sambasivam 
DO 142/479 - India’s Foreign Policy 
 
FO – Foreign Office 
 
FO 371: General Correspondence from Political and Other Departments, 
FO 371/69795 - Recognition of the Indonesia Republic and Indonesian representation 
abroad 
FO 371/69796 - Raising of ban on provision of arms to Dutch forces in Indonesia 
FO 371/69797 - Raising of ban on provision of arms to Dutch forces in Indonesia 
FO 371/75609 - UK-American-Canadian Tripartite discussions on sterling balances 
FO 371/75693 - Financial aid to Burma 
FO 371/75704 - Financial aid to Burma 
FO 371/76017 - Minutes of interdepartmental liaison meeting 18 May 1949. Situation in 
South East Asia and Far East 
FO 371/76023 - Discussions on South East Asia and the Far East between Mr Bevan and 
Mr Acheson during visit of Secretary of State to Washington, Apr 1949 
FO 371/76024 - British, French and American views on the problems of South East 
Asia. Meeting at State Department 17 Sept 1949 
FO 371/76026 - Indian attitude towards South East Asian affairs 
FO 371/76030 - United Kingdom policy in South East Asia and the Far East 
FO 371/76031 - Combating communism in South East Asia. Proposed South East Asia 
regional                         cooperation 
FO 371/76032 - Combating communism in South East Asia. Proposed South East Asia 
regional cooperation 
FO 371/76033 - Measures to be taken to achieve a non-communist solution of the 
problems of South East Asia 
FO 371/76034 - Mr MacDonald's visit to London. Discussions on problems connected 
 Bibliography 
 
286 
with              South East Asia and the Far East 
FO 371/76046 - Reconstitution of the Far East (Official) Committee. Consideration of 
economic development in South East Asia. Economic surveys on various countries in 
South East Asia 
FO 371/76049 - Contribution of Malaya towards United Kingdom dollar-earning 
capacity 
FO 371/76050 - Proposed Economic Conference to be held in South East Asia 
FO 371/76090 - India: foreign policy 
FO 371/ 76098 - India and Pakistan 
FO 371/76100 - Record of a meeting to discuss provision of economic aid to India 
FO 371/76147 - Conference on Indonesia, called by Pandit Nehru, New Delhi, Jan 1949 
FO 371/76271 - Employment of Gurkhas in Malaya 
FO 371/82963 - Indian sterling balances 
FO 371/92916 - Recruitment of Gurkhas for the British Army and the Malay Police 
Forces; negotiations on numbers and ceiling for Britain and India 
FO 371/92917 - Recruitment of Gurkhas for the British Army and the Malay Police 
Forces; negotiations on numbers and ceiling for Britain and India 
FO 371/92918 - Recruitment of Gurkhas for the British Army and the Malay Police 
Forces; negotiations on numbers and ceiling for Britain and India 
FO 371/92919 - Recruitment of Gurkhas for the British Army and the Malay Police 
Forces; negotiations on numbers and ceiling for Britain and India 
FO 371/101156 - Recruitment in Nepal of Gurkhas for the British Army; negotiations 
with India for extension of Gurkha recruiting facilities on Indian territory; negotiations 
with Nepal for erection of recruitment depots with at least seven years' life 
FO 371/101157 - Recruitment in Nepal of Gurkhas for the British Army; negotiations 
with India for extension of Gurkha recruiting facilities on Indian territory; negotiations 
with Nepal for erection of recruitment depots with at least seven years' life 
FO 371/101158 - Recruitment in Nepal of Gurkhas for the British Army; negotiations 
with India for extension of Gurkha recruiting facilities on Indian territory; negotiations 
with Nepal for erection of recruitment depots with at least seven years' life 
FO 371/101159 - Recruitment in Nepal of Gurkhas for the British Army; negotiations 
with India for extension of Gurkha recruiting facilities on Indian territory; negotiations 
with Nepal for erection of recruitment depots with at least seven years' life 
FO 371/106872 - Negotiations with India and Nepal on arrangements for continued 
recruitment of Gurkhas for British Army: including establishment of temporary 
recruitment camps in Nepal, air transport and status of Gurkhas contracting tuberculosis 
FO 371/106873 - Negotiations with India and Nepal on arrangements for continued 
recruitment of Gurkhas for British Army: including establishment of temporary 
recruitment camps in Nepal, air transport and status of Gurkhas contracting tuberculosis 
FO 371/106874 - Negotiations with India and Nepal on arrangements for continued 
recruitment of Gurkhas for British Army: including establishment of temporary 
recruitment camps in Nepal, air transport and status of Gurkhas contracting tuberculosis 
FO 371/83003 - United States tin stockpiling; tin negotiations in Washington 
 
PREM – Prime Minister’s Office 
 
 Bibliography 
 
287 
PREM 8: Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951 
PREM 8/537 - Future of the Gurkhas. Employment of up to 25,000 in the regular British 
Army 
PREM 8/820 - The Prime Minister wrote to Pandit Nehru about the future relationship 
between India and the Commonwealth, 1948 
PREM 8/967 - High Commissioner for India sought reprieves for Ganapathy and Samba 
Sivam who were found to be carrying arms and ammunition in Malaya 
PREM 8/1008 - India's future relations with the British Commonwealth. (Including 
Report on Congress Working Committee's meetings), 1949 
PREM 8/1149 - Proposal for meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Ministers: Colombo Conference 
 
T – Treasury 
 
T 236: Treasury: Overseas Finance Division: Registered Files 
T 236/1142 - Sterling balances negotiations with India and Pakistan 
T 236/1143 - Sterling balances negotiations with India and Pakistan 
T 236/2684 - Sterling balances 
T 236/2685 - Sterling balances 
T 236/2686 - Sterling balances 
T 236/2687 - Sterling balances 
T 236/2691 - Sterling balances 
T 236/2753 - Southeast Asia Development, Colombo Plan: Release of Sterling Balances 
 
WO – War Office 
 
WO 203: War Office: South East Asia Command: Military Headquarters Papers, Second 
World War 
 
WO 203/6259 - Visit of Pandit Nehru to Singapore and Malaya: report by Director of 
Intelligence 
Bodleian Library, University of Oxford 
 
Special Collections, Private Papers 
Private papers of Sir Stafford Cripps:  
MSS Stafford Cripps 11, 17, 20, 22, 24, 32, 34, 42   
Private Papers of Clement Attlee:  
MSS Attlee dep. 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 94, 143, 144 
 
Rhodes House, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford 
 
Private Papers of Arthur Creech Jones 
MSS Brit. Emp. S 332 
Transcripts of Interviews with Sir Malcolm MacDonald 
MSS Brit. Emp. S 533 
 
 Bibliography 
 
288 
Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge 
 
The Statesman (Calcutta) 
Private Papers of Rajendra Prasad 
Private Papers of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel 
 
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, 
Maryland 
 
RG 59 – Files of the Department of State – Consulted for the years 1945-1955 
 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
 
Library of Congress: Manuscript Division 
 
Papers of Loy Henderson, United States Ambassador to India 1948-1951 
 
Primary Sources: Published 
 
Edited Collections 
 
The Transfer of Power, 1942-47 (London) 
 
Mansergh, N. (ed.) with E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power, Volume II: “Quit 
India”, 10 April – 21 September 1942 (London, 1971) 
 
———, The Transfer of Power, Volume IV: The Bengal Famine and the New 
Viceroyalty, 15 June 1943-31 August 1944 (London, 1973) 
 
Mansergh, N. (ed.) with P. Moon, The Transfer of Power, Volume V: The Simla 
Conference, Background and Proceedings, 1 September 1944-28 July 1945 (London, 
1974) 
 
———, The Transfer of Power, Volume VI: The Post-War Phase: New Moves by the 
Labour Government, 1 August 1945-22 March 1946 (London, 1976) 
 
———, The Transfer of Power, Volume IX: The Fixing of a Time Limit, 4 November 
1946-22 March 1947 (London, 1980) 
 
———, The Transfer of Power, Volume X: The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Formulation 
of a Plan, 22 March-30 May 1947 (London, 1981) 
 
———, The Transfer of Power, Volume XI, The Mountbatten Viceroyalty Announcement 
and Reception of the 3 June plan, 31 May-7 July 1947 (London, 1982) 
 
 Bibliography 
 
289 
———, The Transfer of Power, Volume XII The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Princes, 
Partition and Independence, 8 July-15 August, 1947 (London, 1983) 
 
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series (New Delhi)  
 
Gopal, S. (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 1 (New 
Delhi, 1984) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 3 (New Delhi, 
1985) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 4 (New Delhi, 
1986) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 7 (New Delhi, 
1988) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 8 (New Delhi, 
1989) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 9 (New Delhi, 
1990) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 10 (New Delhi, 
1990) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 11 (New Delhi, 
1991) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 12 (New Delhi, 
1991) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 13 (New Delhi, 
1992) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 14, Part I (New 
Delhi, 1992) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 14, Part II (New 
Delhi, 1993) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 15, Part I (New 
Delhi, 1993) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 16, Part II (New 
Delhi, 1995) 
 Bibliography 
 
290 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 18 (New Delhi 
1996) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 19 (New Delhi, 
1996) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 20 (New Delhi, 
1997) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 21 (New Delhi, 
1997) 
 
———, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 22 (New Delhi, 
1998)  
 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964 (New Delhi) 
 
Parthasarathi, G. (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, 
Volume 1, 1947-1949 (New Delhi, 1985) 
 
———, Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, Volume 2, 1950-1952 
(New Delhi, 1985) 
 
Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (New Delhi)  
 
Chopra, P. (ed.), Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Volume 12, 1st January 
1947-31 December 1947 (New Delhi, 1998) 
 
———, Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Volume 13, 1st January 1948-31st 
December 1949 (New Delhi, 1998) 
 
———, Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Volume 14, 1st January 1949-31 
December 1949 (New Delhi, 1999) 
 
Das, D. (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945-50, Volume VIII, Foreign Policy in 
Evolution-Constitution Making-Political and Administrative Problems (Ahmedabad, 
1973) 
 
British Documents on the End of Empire Series (London)  
 
Hyam, R. (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire: Series A Volume 2, The 
Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945-51, Part I, High Policy and 
Administration (London, 1992) 
 
———, British Documents on the End of Empire: Series A Volume 2, The Labour 
 Bibliography 
 
291 
Government and the End of Empire, 1945-51, Part II, Economics and International 
Relations (London, 1992) 
 
———, British Documents on the End of Empire: Series A Volume 2, The Labour 
Government and the End of Empire, 1945-51, Part IV, Race Relations and the 
Commonwealth (London, 1992) 
 
Stockwell, A.J. (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire: Series B, Volume 3, 
Malaya, Part I, The Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948 (London, 1995) 
 
———, British Documents on the End of Empire: Series B, Volume 3, Malaya, Part II, 
The Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953 (London, 1995) 
 
Government Publications 
 
Nehru, J., Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, Volume One, September 1946- May 1949 (New 
Delhi, 1949) Published by the Publications Division of the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, Government of India 
 
———, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New 
Delhi, 1961) Published by the Publications Division of the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, Government of India 
 
Government of India Press, Sterling Balances: A Record of Discussions held with the 
Representatives of the United Kingdom Government and Connected Discussions, 
Presented to the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) by Finance Minister, 9 August 1948 
(New Delhi, 1948) 
 
Central Office of Information, Reference Division, The Colombo Plan: A Short 
Introduction (London, 1959) 
 
Primary Sources: Online 
 
Constituent Assembly of India Debates 
 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/debates.htm, last accessed 20/4/2012 
 
Chetty’s Budget Speech, 26/11/1947 
 
http://indiabudget.nic.in/bspeech/bs194748.pdf, last accessed 14/7/2010  
 
Electoral Commission of India 
 
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp, last accessed 
12/1/2011 
 
 Bibliography 
 
292 
United Nations, Security Council Resolutions 
 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html, last accessed 15/8/2011  
 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (Hansard) 
 
http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk/home.do, last accessed 12/12/2011 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Multiple Volumes Consulted 
 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/, last accessed 14/8/2011 
 
Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room   
 
www.foia.cia.gov, last accessed 17/5/2011  
 
Online Newspapers and Websites 
 
Manchester Guardian accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers:  
http://proquest.umi.com, last accessed 4/7/2011  
 
Times of India accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers:  
 
http://search.proquest.com/news?accountid=13828, last accessed 8/12/2011 
 
Daily Telegraph (London) 
 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jeremywarner/100015182/bretton-woods-
uncovered-a-scoop-of-sorts/, accessed 24/2/2012 
 
New York Times (New York) 
 
India Ink blog: Notes on the World’s Largest Democracy, last accessed 22/3/2012 
 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/repairing-the-damage-at-indias-national-
archives/#more-27531 
 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/in-india-history-literally-rots-away/ 
 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/indias-archives-how-did-things-get-this-bad/ 
 
Arpi, C. and S. Roy, ‘Transparency & History: India’s Archives must be Opened to 
World Standards’ at http://independentindian.com/2009/01/01/indias-archives-must-be-
opened-to-world-standards/, accessed 12/01/2010 
 
 Bibliography 
 
293 
 
Secondary Sources 
Books 
Acheson, D., Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York and 
London, 1969) 
Aldrich, R., The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence 
(London, 2001) 
Amery, L.S., J. Barnes and D. Nicholson, The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 
1929-1945 (London, 1988) 
Ampiah, K., The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: 
The Reactions of the US, UK and Japan (Folkestone, 2007) 
Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (Revised edn, London, 1991) 
Antlov, H. and S. Tønnesson (eds), Imperial Policy and South East Asian Nationalism, 
1930-1957 (Richmond, 1995)  
Appadorai, A., Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1971) 
———, The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy (New York, 1981) 
———, National Interest and India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1992) 
Appadorai, A. and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations (New Delhi, 1985) 
Vithal Babu, V., Colombo Plan and India (New Delhi, 1951) 
Balachandran, G., John Bullion's Empire: Britain's Gold Problem and India between the 
Wars (Richmond, 1996) 
——— (ed.), Indian and the World Economy, 1850-1950 (Oxford, 2003) 
Bandyopadhyaya, J., The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, 
Processes and Personalities (Revised edn, New Delhi, 1980) 
Banerji, A.K., India and Britain, 1947-68: The Evolution of Post-Colonial Relations 
(Calcutta, 1977) 
Banerjee, P., When Ambitions Clash: Indo-US Relations, 1947-1974 (New Delhi, 2003) 
Barnds, W.J., India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent 
(London, 1972) 
Barooah, D.P., Indo-British Relations, 1950-1960 (New Delhi, 1977) 
 Bibliography 
 
294 
Barratt Brown, M., After Imperialism (Revised edn, London, 1970) 
Baxter, C., The Great Power Struggle in East Asia, 1944-50: Britain, America and Post-
War Rivalry (Basingstoke, 2009) 
Bayly, C. and T. Harper, Forgotten Armies: Britain's Asian Empire and the War with 
Japan (London, 2005) 
———, Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire (London, 2007) 
Bell, P.W., The Sterling Area in the Postwar World: Internal Mechanism and Cohesion, 
1946-52 (Oxford, 1956) 
Berger, M.T., The Battle for Asia: From Decolonisation to Globalisation (London, 
2004) 
Berkes, R. and M. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United 
Nations (Stanford, 1958) 
Best, A., Hanhimaki, J.M., Maiolo, J.A. and Schulze, K.E., International History of the 
Twentieth Century (London, 2004) 
Bhushan, S. (ed.), Twenty Years of Bandung and Problems of Peace and Security in 
Asia: A Collection of Articles (New Delhi, 1975) 
Bose, S. and A. Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (London, 
1999) 
Boquerat, G., No Strings Attached? India’s Policies and Foreign Aid, 1947-1966 (New 
Delhi, 2003) 
Brass, P., The Politics of India Since Independence (Second edn, Cambridge, 1990) 
——— (ed.), Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal (London, 2010) 
Brecher, M., Indian Foreign Policy: An Interpretation (New York, 1957) 
———, Nehru: A Political Biography (London, 1959) 
———, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (Oxford, 1968) 
Bridge, C., Holding India to the Empire: the British Conservative Party and the 1935 
Constitution (New Delhi, 1986) 
Brimmell, J.H., Malayan Communist Party: A Short History (Singapore, 1956) 
Brobst, P.J., The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s Independence, and 
the Defense of Asia (Ohio, 2005) 
Brown, J.M. and Wm. R. Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume 
IV, The Twentieth Century, (Oxford, 1999) 
 Bibliography 
 
295 
Brown, J.M., Nehru: A Political Life (Yale, 2003) 
Bullock, A., Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-51(Oxford, 1983) 
Burton, A., Dwelling in the Archive: Women, Writing House, Home, and History in Late 
Colonial India (Oxford, 2003)  
Burton, J.W. (ed.), Nonalignment (London, 1966) 
Cain, P.J. and Hopkins, A.G., British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (Second edn, London, 
2002) 
Cairncross, A., Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy, 1945-51 (London, 1985) 
Campbell-Johnson, A., Mission with Mountbatten (Reprint edn, London, 1985, first 
published 1951) 
Chapman, G.P., The Geopolitics of South Asia (Second edn, Aldershot, 2003) 
Chatterji, B., Trade, Tariffs and Empire: Lancashire and British Policy in India 1919-
1939 (Oxford, 1992) 
Chibber, V., Locked in Place: State-building and Late Industrialization in India 
(Princeton, 2003) 
Chopra, S., Studies in India's Foreign Policy (Amritsar, 1980) 
Clarke, P., The Cripps Version: The Life of Sir Stafford Cripps (London, 2002) 
Clutterbuck, R., The Long, Long War: Counter-Insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New 
York, 1966) 
Coen, T.C., The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule (London, 1971) 
Cohen, S.P., The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation 
(Berkeley, 1971) 
Conan, A.R., The Sterling Area (London, 1952) 
Connell-Smith, G., Pattern of the Post-War World: A Penguin Special (London, 1957) 
Copland, I., The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947 (Cambridge, 
1997)  
Corbridge, S. and J. Harriss, Reinventing India: Liberalisation, Hindu Nationalism and 
Popular Democracy (Cambridge, 2000) 
Crocker, W., Nehru: A Contemporary’s Estimate (London, 1966) 
Darby, P., Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American Approaches to Asia and 
Africa, 1870-1970 (New Haven and London, 1987) 
 Bibliography 
 
296 
Darwin, J., The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate (Oxford, 1991) 
———, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 
(Cambridge, 2009) 
Dasgupta, A.K., A History of Indian Economic Thought (London, 1993)   
Day, A.C.L., The Future of the Sterling Area (Oxford, 1954) 
Dewey, C. and A.G. Hopkins (eds), The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic 
History of Africa and India (London, 1978) 
Dewey, C., Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service (London, 1993) 
Dhar, B., The Sterling Balances of India (Calcutta, 1956) 
Dockrill, M.S. and J.W. Young (eds), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56 Volume One 
(Basingstoke, 1989) 
Donaghy, G. (ed.), Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943-1957 (Ottawa, 1998) 
Donaldson, R.H., Soviet Policy Toward India: Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1974) 
Dumett, R.E. (ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate 
on Empire (Harlow, 1999) 
Dutt, R.C., The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age (London, 1906) 
Dutt, V.P., India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1984) 
Edgerton, D., Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second 
World War (London, 2011) 
Edwardes, M., Nehru: A Political Biography (London, 1971) 
Federowich, K. and M. Thomas (eds), International Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat 
(London, 2001) 
Fforde, J., The Bank of England and Public Policy, 1941-58 (Cambridge, 1992) 
Frankel, F.R., India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution (Second 
edn, New Delhi, 2005) 
Frey, M., R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: 
International Perspectives on Decolonisation (New York, 2003) 
Ganguli, B.N., India’s Economic Relations with the Far Eastern and Pacific Countries 
in the Present Century (Bombay, 1956) 
Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American collaboration in the 
Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (Oxford, 1956) 
 Bibliography 
 
297 
Gardner, R.N., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective (Third  edn, New 
York, 1980) 
Gaur, A. (ed.), British Library Occasional Papers 7: South Asian Studies (London, 
1986) 
George, T.J.S., Krishna Menon: A Biography (London, 1964) 
Gilpin, A.C. with Foreword by G.D.H. Cole, India’s Sterling Balances: A Report 
Prepared for the Indian Affairs Group of the Fabian Society (London, 1946) 
Goldrick, J., No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, 1945-1996 (New Delhi, 1997) 
Gopal, S., Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, 1889-1947, Volume One (London, 1975) 
———, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, 1947-1956, Volume Two (London, 1979) 
Gordon-Walker, P., The Commonwealth (London, 1962) 
Goscha, C.E. and C.F. Ostermann (eds), Connecting Histories: Decolonisation and the 
Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 (Stanford, 2010) 
Gould, J.W., The United States and Malaysia (Cambridge, Mass., 1969) 
Greenough, P.R., Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943–44 
(New York, 1982) 
Gregorian, R., The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War Strategy in the Far East, 
1947-1954 (London, 2002) 
Grierson, E., The Imperial Dream: British Commonwealth and Empire, 1775-1969 
(Newton Abbey, 1972) 
Grover, V. (ed.), International Relations and Foreign Policy of India, Volume 5, Great 
Britain, Commonwealth and India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1992) 
Guha, R., The Last Liberal and Other Essays (New Delhi, 2004)  
Gupta, A.K. (ed.), Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, 1945-47 (New 
Delhi, 1987) 
Gupta, K., Indian Foreign Policy: In Defence of National Interests (1969) 
Gupta, P.S., Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964 (New Delhi, 
1975) 
———, Power, Politics and the People: Studies in British Imperialism and Indian 
Nationalism (London, 2002) 
Hack, K., Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia, 1941-1968: Britain, Malaya 
and Singapore, 1941-1968 (Richmond, 2001) 
 Bibliography 
 
298 
Hall, D.G.E., A Short History of early Indian Influence in South-East Asia (Fourth edn, 
Basingstoke, 1981), pp. 12-24 
Hancock, W.K. and M. Gowing, British War Economy: History of the Second World War 
(London, 1975) 
Hanrahan, G.Z., The Communist Struggle in Malaya (London, 1954) 
Harper, T., The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge, 1999) 
Harrison, S.S., P.H. Kreisberg and D. Kux (eds), India and Pakistan: The First Fifty 
Years (Cambridge, 1999) 
Hathaway, R.M., Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations Since World 
War II (Boston, 1990) 
Heimsath, C. and S. Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay, 1971) 
Heinlein, F., British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising 
the Official Mind (London, 2002) 
Hess, G.R., The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950 (New 
York, 1987) 
Hinds, A., Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonisation, 1939-1958 (Westport, 
2001) 
Hobsbawm, E., The Age of Extremes, 1914-1991 (London, 1995) 
Holland, R. (ed.), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945 
(London, 1994) 
Howard, M. and Wm. R. Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford, 1998)  
Hua, Wu Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaysia: Politics in a Dependent Capitalist 
State (London, 1983) 
Husain, A., British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal, 1857-1947: A 
Diplomatic History of Nepal (London, 1970) 
Hutchins, F.G., The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India (Princeton, 
1967) 
Hyam, R., Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 
(Cambridge, 2006) 
Inder Singh, A., The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American 
Relationship, 1947-56 (London, 1993) 
Iriye, A., Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, 
 Bibliography 
 
299 
Massachusetts, 1981) 
Jackson, A., The British Empire and the Second World War (London, 2006) 
Jackson, R., The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth’s War 1948-1966 (London, 
1991) 
Jain, B.M., Global Power: India's Foreign Policy 1947-2006 (Plymouth, 2009) 
Jalal, A., Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge, 1995) 
Kalecki, M., Essays on Developing Economies (Sussex, 1976) 
Jansen, G.H., Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London, 1966) 
Kapur, H., India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-92, Shadows and Substance (New Delhi, 1994) 
Kent, J., British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49 (London, 
1993) 
Kesavan, K.V. (ed.), Building a Global Partnership: Fifty Years of Indo-Japanese 
Relations (New Delhi, 2002) 
Khan, Y., The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (Yale, 2008) 
Khan, Z.K., International Politics and India's Foreign Policy Under Nehru (2000) 
Kimiche, D., The Afro-Asia Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World 
(Tel Aviv, 1973)  
Knight, H., Food Administration in India, 1939-1947 (Stanford, 1954) 
Krishna, B., India’s Bismarck: Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (Second edn, Mumbai, 2010)  
Krozewski, G., Money and the End of Empire: British International Economic Policy 
and the Colonies, 1947-58 (London) 
Kulke, H. and D. Rothermund (eds), A History of India (Third edn, London 2002) 
Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-1954: A Study of Relations with the Western 
Bloc (Groningen, 1955) 
Lee, C.J. (ed.), Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political 
Afterlives (Athens, Ohio, 2010)  
Lee, S.H., Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 
1949-1954 (Liverpool, 1995) 
Leffler, M.P. and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: 
Origins (Cambridge, 2010) 
 Bibliography 
 
300 
Lewin, R., The Chief: Field Marshall Lord Wavell, Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy, 
1939-1947 (London, 1980) 
Leys, C., The Rise and Fall of Development Theory (Oxford, 1996)  
Lipton, M. and J. Firn, The Erosion of a Relationship: India and Britain since 1960 
(London, 1975) 
Lockard, C.A., Southeast Asia in World History (Oxford, 2009) 
Leifer, M., International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia 
(Alphen aan den Rijn, 1978)  
——— (ed.), Asian Nationalism (London, 2000) 
Livingstone, J.M., Britain in the World Economy (London, 1966) 
Louis, Wm. R., Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonisation of the 
British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978) 
——— and H. Bull (eds), The 'Special' Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 
1945 (Oxford, 1986) 
———, In the Name of God Go!: Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of 
Churchill (New York, 1992) 
Low, D.A., Eclipse of Empire (Cambridge, 1993) 
Lowe, P., Contending with Nationalism: British Policy towards Southeast Asia, 1945-
65: Global Conflict and Security since 1945 (London, 2009) 
Lynn, M. (ed.), The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival? (London, 2006) 
MacMillan, M., Dangerous Games: The Uses and Abuses of History (New York, 2009) 
Masaldan, P.N., Jawaharlal Nehru's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Principles and 
Conduct (Nagpur, 1977) 
Masani, M., The Communist Party of India: A Short History (New York, 1954) 
———, Against the Tide (New Delhi, 1981) 
Mason, P., The Men Who Ruled India (London, 1985) 
Masselos, J., Indian Nationalism: An History (Revised edn, New Delhi, 1991) 
Maxwell, N., India's China War (London, 1970) 
Mazower, M., No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of 
the United Nations (Princeton and Oxford, 2009) 
McIntyre, W.D., Colonies into Commonwealth (London, 1966) 
 Bibliography 
 
301 
McMahon, R.J., Colonialism and the Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for 
Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949 (Ithaca, 1981) 
———, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New 
York, 1994) 
McVey, R.T., The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings (Ithaca, 1958) 
Mehrotra, S.R., India and the Commonwealth, 1885-1929 (London, 1965) 
Menon, K.P.S., India and the Cold War (Bombay, 1966) 
———, Many Worlds: An Autobiography (London, 1965) 
Menon, V.P., The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Bombay, 1961) 
Merrill, D., Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic 
Development, 1947-1963 (Chapel Hill and London, 1990) 
Miller, H., The Communist Menace in Malaya (New York, 1955) 
Milward, A.S., War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1979)  
———, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London, 2003) 
Misra, K.P., Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1969) 
——— (ed.), Non-Alignment and Neutrality: Proceedings of the Indo-Austrian Seminar 
(New Delhi, 1982) 
Misra, M., Business, Race and Politics in British India c.1850-1960 (Oxford, 1999) 
Misra, S.N., India: The Cold War Years (New Delhi, 1994) 
Mohan, J. (ed.), Twenty-Five Years of Indian Independence (New Delhi, 1973) 
Moon, P., Strangers in India (New York, 1945) 
——— (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (Oxford, 1997) 
Moore, R.J., Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem 
(Oxford, 1983) 
———, Making the New Commonwealth (Oxford, 1987) 
———, Endgames of Empire (London, 1988) 
Morgan, D.J., The Official History of Colonial Development, Volume II: Developing 
British Colonial Resources (London, 1980) 
Morris-Jones, W.H. and G. Fischer (eds), Decolonisation and After: The British and 
French Experience (London, 1980) 
 Bibliography 
 
302 
Mukerjee, H., The Gentle Colossus: A Study of Jawaharlal Nehru (Calcutta, 1964) 
Mukherjee, A., Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class, 
1920-1947 (New Delhi, 2002) 
Mullik, B.N., My Years with Nehru, 1948-1964 (Bombay, 1972) 
Nagai, Y. and A. Iriye (eds), The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo, 1977) 
Nanda, B.R., Indian Foreign Policy (1976) 
——— (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years (New Delhi and London, 1990) 
———, Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman (Oxford, 1995) 
———, Three Statesmen: Gokhale, Gandhi and Nehru (Oxford, 2004) 
Naoroji, D., Poverty and Un-British Rule (London, 1901) 
Nasenko, Y., Jawaharlal Nehru and India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1977) 
Nehru, J., The Discovery of India (Oxford, 1985, first published 1945) 
———, Glimpses of World History: Being Further Letters to his Daughter, Written in 
Prison, and Containing a Rambling Account of History for Young People (Second edn, 
Bombay, 1962)  
Nizami, T.A., The Communist Party and India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1971) 
Norman Brown, W., The United States and India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Third edn, 
Cambridge, 1974) 
Nye, M.J., Blackett: Physics, War and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge and 
London, 2004) 
Oakman, D., Facing Asia A History of the Colombo Plan (Canberra, 2010) 
O'Ballance, E., Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60 (London, 1966) 
O’Malley, L.S.S., The Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930 (London, 1965, first published 
1931) 
Ovendale, R., The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions 
and the Cold War, 1945-1951 (Winchester, 1985) 
Palmer, N.D., South Asia and the United States Policy (Boston, 1966) 
Pandey, B.N., Nehru (London, 1976) 
———, South and South-east Asia, 1945-1979: Problems and Policies (London, 1980) 
Panikkar, K.M., In Two Chinas: Memoirs of the Diplomat (London, 1955) 
 Bibliography 
 
303 
———, Asia and Western Dominance; A Survey of the Vasco Da Gama Epoch of Asian 
History, 1498-1945 (Eighth edn, London, 1970) 
Pavier, B., The Telengana Movement, 1944-1951(New Delhi, 1981) 
Phillips, C.H. and M.D. Wainwright (eds), The Partition of India: Policies and 
Perspectives, 1935-1947 (London, 1970)  
Prasad, B., The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy (Calcutta, 1962) 
Prashad, V., The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World A New Press 
People's History (New York and London, 2007) 
Pressnell, L.S., External Economic Policy Since the War, Volume 1, The Post-War 
Financial Settlement (London, 1987) 
Purcell, V., Malaya: Communist or Free (Stanford, 1954) 
Raghavan, N., India and Malaya: A Study (Bombay, 1954) 
Rahman, M.M., The Politics of Non-Alignment (New Delhi, 1969) 
Rajan, M.S., Studies on India's Foreign Policy (1993) 
———, India and International Affairs: A Collection of Essays (1999) 
Raman Pillai, K., India's foreign Policy (1969) 
Remme, T., Britain and Regional Co-operation in South-East Asia, 1945-49 (London, 
1995) 
Rhodes, R.I. (ed.), Imperialism and Underdevelopment (London, 1970)  
Robb, P., A History of India (London, 2002) 
Robb, P.G., The Government of India and Reform: Policies Towards Politics and 
Constitution, 1916-1927 (London, 1976) 
Roskill, S., The Navy at War, 1939-1945 (London, 1960) 
Rothermund, D., An Economic History of India: From Pre-Colonial times to 1997 
(Second edn, London, 1993) 
———, The Role of the State in South Asia and Other Essays (New Delhi, 2000) 
——— (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Decolonisation (Oxford, 2006) 
Rotter, A.J., The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast 
Asia (Ithaca and London, 1989) 
Ryan, D. and V. Pungong (eds), The United States and Decolonisation: Power and 
Freedom (London, 2000) 
 Bibliography 
 
304 
Potter, D.C., India's Political Administrators From ICS to IAS (New Delhi, 1996) 
Sanders, D., Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 
(Basingstoke, 1990) 
Sanger, C., Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing an End to Empire (Liverpool, 1995) 
SarDesai, D.R., Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 1947-1964 
(Berkley, 1968) 
Sarila, N.S., The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition 
(London, 2006) 
Sarkar, S., Modern India, 1885-1947 (New Delhi, 1983) 
Sayers, R.S., Financial Policy, 1939-45: History of the Second World War (London, 
1956) 
Schenk, C., Britain and the Sterling Area: From Devaluation to Convertibility in the 
1950s (London, 1994) 
Schofield, V., Wavell: Soldier and Statesman (London, 2006) 
Sen, A.K., Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford, 
1981) 
Sharma, S.R., India's Foreign Policy: The British Interpretations, 1947-57 (Gwalior, 
1961) 
Shenoy, B.R., The Sterling Assets of the Reserve Bank of India (New Delhi, 1996) 
Shipway, M., Decolonisation and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the 
Colonial Empires (Oxford, 2008) 
Shonfield, A., British Economic Policy Since the War (London, 1958) 
Short, A., The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960 (London, 1975) 
Simha, S.L.N., History of the Reserve Bank of India, Volume 1, 1935-51 (Bombay, 1970, 
Reprint 2005)   
Singh, I., Between Two Fires: Towards an Understanding of Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign 
policy, Volume 1 (New Delhi, 1992) 
Singh, L.P., The Politics of Economic Co-operation in Asia: A Study of Asian 
International Organisations (Missouri, 1966) 
Smith, S.C., British Relations with the Malay Rulers from Decentralisation to Malayan 
Independence, 1930-1957 (Oxford, 1995) 
Spear, P., A History of India, Volume Two (Middlesex, 1965) 
 Bibliography 
 
305 
Spector, R.H., In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for 
Postwar Asia (New York, 2008) 
Spender, P., Exercises in Diplomacy:  The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan 
(Sydney, 1969) 
Srinivasan, K., The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth (London, 
2005) 
Strang, L.W., Home and Abroad (London, 1956) 
Strange, S., Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency 
in Decline (Oxford, 1971) 
Stubbs, R., Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-
1960 (Singapore, 1989) 
Tarling, N., The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia (Oxford, 1993) 
———, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War (Cambridge, 1997) 
——— (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume Four: From World War 
II to the Present (Cambridge, 1999) 
———, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Impact of the Korean War (Singapore, 2005) 
Thakur, R., The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy (1994) 
Thakurdas, P., J.R.D. Tata, G.D. Birla, A. Dalal, S. Ram, K. Lalbhai, A.D. Shroff and J. 
Matthai, Memorandum Outlining A Plan of Economic Development for India: Parts One 
and Two (Part One first published 1944, both parts published in London, 1945)  
Thien, T.T., India and South East Asia, 1947-1960: A Study of India’s Foreign Policy 
towards the South East Asian Countries in the Period 1947-1960 (Geneva, 1963) 
Thomas, M., B. Moore and L.J. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonisation and Europe’s 
Imperial States, 1918-1975 (London, 2008)  
Thompson, V. and R. Aldoff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia (New York, 1950) 
Thorne, C., Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 
1941-1945 (New York, 1978) 
Tickner, J.A., Self-Reliance versus Power Politics: The American and Indian 
Experiences in Building Nation States (New York, 1987) 
Tinker, H., Separate and Unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 
1920-1950 (London, 1976) 
Tomlinson, B.R., The Indian National Congress and the Raj (London, 1976) 
———, The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947: The Economics of 
 Bibliography 
 
306 
Decolonisation in India (London, 1979) 
———, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970, Volume 3 The New Cambridge 
History of India (Cambridge, 1996) 
Trager, F., Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries (Stanford, 1965) 
Trevelyan, H., The India We Left (London, 1972) 
Van Der Vat, D., The Pacific Campaign: The Second World War and he US-Japanese 
Naval war (1941-1945) (Edinburgh, 2001, first published 1992)  
Wainwright, A.M., The Inheritance of Empire: Britain, India and the balance of power 
in Asia, 1938-55 (Westport and London, 1994) 
Watt, D.C., Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975 (Cambridge, 
1984) 
Westad, O.A., The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times (Cambridge, 2005) 
——— (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London, 
2006) 
White, N.J., Business, Government and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942-57 (Oxford, 
1996) 
Williams, L.J., Britain and the World Economy (London, 1971) 
Winks, R.W. (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume V, Historiography 
(Oxford, 1999) 
Wolpert, S., Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny (Oxford, 1996) 
———, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (Oxford, 2006) 
Woodruff, P., The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders (London, 1953) 
———, The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians (London, 1954) 
Zachariah, B., Nehru (London, 2004) 
———, Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, c.1930-50 (New Delhi, 
2005) 
———, Playing the Nation Game: The Ambiguities of Nationalism in India 
(forthcoming, 2012) 
Ziegler, P., Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London, 1985) 
Zinkin, M., Asia and the West (London, 1951) 
 Bibliography 
 
307 
Zinkin, T., Reporting India (London, 1962) 
Zinkin, M. and T. Zinkin, Britain and India: Requiem for Empire (London, 1964) 
Zins, M.J. and G. Boquerat (eds), India in the Mirror of Foreign Archives (New Delhi, 
2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bibliography 
 
308 
Articles and Chapters in Edited Books 
Adams, J., ‘The Impact of the Suez Canal on India’s Trade’, Indian Economic and 
Social History Review 8 (1971), pp. 229-240 
———, ‘India: Much Achieved, Much to Achieve’, in S.S. Harrison, P.H. Kreisberg and 
D. Kux (eds), India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 65-88 
Adamthwaite, A., ‘Britain and the World, 1945-49: The View from the Foreign Office’, 
in J. Becker and F. Knipping (eds), Power in Europe: Great Britain, France, Italy and 
Germany in a Post-War World, 1945-60 (London, 1986), pp. 9-26 
———, ‘Overstretched and Overstrung: Eden, The Foreign Office and the Making of 
Foreign Policy, 1951-55’, International Affairs 64 (1988), pp. 241-59 
Adeleke, A., ‘The Strings of Neutralism: Burma and the Colombo Plan’, Pacific Affairs 
76 (2003-2004), pp. 593-610 
———, ‘Playing Fairy Godmother to the Commonwealth: The United States and the 
Colombo Plan’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 42 (2004), pp. 
393-411 
Adeney, K. and A. Wyatt, ‘Democracy in South Asia: Getting Beyond the Structure-
Agency Dichotomy’, Political Studies 52 (2004), pp. 1-18 
Aldrich, R.J., ‘British Strategy and the End of the Empire: South Asia, 1945-51’, in R.J. 
Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 (London, 1992), 
pp. 273-304 
Alford, B., ‘1945-51: Years of Recovery or a Stage in Economic Decline’, in P. Clarke 
and C. Trebilock (eds), Understanding Decline: Perceptions and Realities of British 
Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 186-211 
Amrith, S.S., ‘Asian Internationalism: Bandung’s Echo in a Colonial Metropolis’, Inter-
Asia Cultural Studies 6 (2005), pp. 557- 569 
Anderson, P., ‘Internationalism: A Breviary’, New Left Review 14 (2002), pp. 5-25 
Anderson, R.S., ‘Blackett in India: Military Consultant and Scientific Intervenor, 1947-
72. Part One’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 53 (1999), pp. 253-273 
———, ‘Blackett in India: Military Consultant and Scientific Intervenor, 1947-72. Part 
Two’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 53 (1999), pp. 345-359 
———, ‘Empire’s Setting Sun? Patrick Blackett and Military and Scientific 
Development of India’, Economic and Political Weekly 36 (29 September – 5 October 
2001), pp. 3703-3720 
Appadorai, A., ‘India’s Foreign Policy’, International Affairs 25 (1949), pp. 37-46 
Ashton, S.R., ‘Mountbatten, the Royal Family and British Influence in Post-
 Bibliography 
 
309 
Independence India and Burma’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 33 
(2005), pp. 73-92 
———, ‘Burma, Britain and the Commonwealth, 1946-56’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 29 (2001), pp. 65-91 
Baber, Z., ‘Modernization Theory and the Cold War’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 31 
(2001), pp. 71-85 
Bailer, U., ‘Sterling Balances and Claims Negotiations: Britain and Israel, 1947-52’, 
Middle Eastern Studies 28 (1992), pp. 157-177 
Bajpai, G.S., ‘India and the Balance of Power’, The Indian Year Book of International 
Affairs (1952), pp. 1-8 
Balachandran, G., ‘The Sterling Crisis and the Managed Float Regime in India, 1921-
1924’, Indian Economic and Social History Review 27 (1990), pp. 1-31 
———, ‘Reappraisal: Finance and Politics in Late Colonial India, 1917-1947’, South 
Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 19 (1996), pp. 77-101 
———, ‘Developing the State of a Nation in the Post-Colonial World: A Review Essay’, 
Indian Economic and Social History Review 44 (2007), pp. 67-83 
Banerji, A.K., ‘The Nehru-Menon Legacy that Still Survives’, Round Table 284 (1981), 
pp. 346-352  
Bangsberg, H.F., ‘The United States and the Colombo Plan’, India Quarterly 15 (1959), 
pp. 130-141 
Barkawi, T., ‘Peoples, Homelands, and Wars? Ethnicity, the Military and Battle among 
British Imperial Forces in the War against Japan’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 46 (2004), pp. 134-163 
———, ‘Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World 
War’, Journal of Contemporary History 41 (2006), pp. 325-355 
Basch, A., ‘The Colombo Plan: A Case of Regional Economic Cooperation’, 
International Organisation 9 (1955), pp. 1-18 
Beaglehole, T.H., ‘From Rulers to Servants: The ICS and the British Demission of 
Power in India’, Modern Asian Studies 11 (1997), pp. 237-255 
Berger, M.T., ‘Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political 
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945-1975’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34 (2003), pp. 421-48 
———, ‘The Real Cold War Was Hot: The Global Struggle for the Third World’, 
Intelligence and National Security 23 (2008), pp. 112-126 
Bhambri, C.P., ‘India's Foreign Policy’, Social Scientist 10 (1982), pp. 51-55 
 Bibliography 
 
310 
Bhagavan, M., ‘Princely States and the Making of Modern India: Internationalism, 
Constitutionalism and the Postcolonial Moment’, Indian Economic and Social History 
Review 46 (2009), pp. 427-456 
———, ‘A New Hope: India, the United Nations and the Making of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’, Modern Asian Studies 44 (2010), pp. 311-347  
Bhatia, L.M., ‘Indo-British Relations: From Non-cooperation to Cooperation’, Indo-
British Review 11 (1984), pp. 101-105  
Bhattacharya, S. and B. Zachariah, ‘“A Great Destiny”: the British Colonial State and 
the Advertisement of Post-War Reconstruction in India, 1942-45’, South Asia Research 
19 (1999), pp. 71-100 
Bjorkman, J.W., ‘Public Law 480 and the Politics of Self-Help and Short-Tether: Indo-
American Relations, 1965-1968’, in L.L. Rudolph and S.H. Rudolph (eds), The 
Regional Imperative: The Administration of US Foreign Policy towards South Asia 
under President Johnson and Nixon (New Delhi, 1980), pp. 201-247 
Blackton, C.S., ‘The Colombo Plan’, Far Eastern Survey 20 (1951), pp. 27-31 
Blyth, R.J., ‘Britain versus India in the Persian Gulf: The struggle for political control, 
c.1928-48’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28 (2000), pp. 90-111 
Bose, S., ‘Starvation Amidst Plenty: The Making of Famine in Bengal, Honan and 
Tonkin, 1942-1945’, Modern Asian Studies 24 (1990), pp. 699-727 
Boquerat, G., ‘France’s Political Interaction with India through the Quai d’Orsay 
Archives (1947-1972)’, in M.J. Zins and G. Boquerat (eds), India in the Mirror of 
Foreign Diplomatic Archives (New Delhi, 2004), pp. 11-32 
Bowles, C., ‘America and Russia in India’, Foreign Affairs 49 (1971), pp. 636-651 
Brands, H.W., ‘India and Pakistan in American Strategic Planning, 1947-54: 
Commonwealth as Collaborator’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 15 
(1986), pp. 41-54 
Brasted, H.V. and C. Bridge, ʻThe Transfer of Power in South Asia: An 
Historiographical   Reviewʼ, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 17 (1994), pp. 
93-114 
Brecher, M., ‘International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System 
of Southern Asia’, World Politics 15 (1963), pp. 213-35 
———, ‘Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon's View of the 
World’, Pacific Affairs 40 (1967), pp. 60-92 
———, ‘India's Decision to Remain in the Commonwealth’, Journal of Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics 12 (1974), pp. 62-91 
Bridge, C., ‘Conservatism and Indian Reform (1929-39): Towards a Prerequisites Model 
 Bibliography 
 
311 
in Imperial Constitution-Making?’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 4 
(1976), pp. 176-193 
———, ‘The Malayan Campaign, 1941-2, In International Perspective’, South Asia: 
Journal of South Asian Studies 19 (1996), pp. 169-182 
Brobst, P.J., ‘“By the Finger and Thumb”: India's Partition and the Great Game in 
Postwar Asia’, Orbis 52 (2008), pp. 509-22 
Brown, J.M., ‘Nehru – the Dilemmas of a Colonial Inheritance’, in J. Dülffer and M. 
Frey (eds), Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 
177-194 
Burra, A., ‘The Indian Civil Service and the Nationalist Movement: Neutrality, Politics 
and Continuity’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 48 (2010), pp. 404-32 
Cain, P.J. and A.G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas 
I: The Old Colonial System, 1688-1850’, Economic History Review, XXXIX (1986), pp. 
501-525 
———, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 
1850-1945’, Economic History Review, XL (1987), pp. 1-26 
Caire, G., ‘Dependence, Independence and Interdependence in Economic Relations’, in 
W.H. Morris-Jones and G. Fischer (eds), Decolonisation and After: The British and 
French Experience (London, 1980), pp. 136-157 
Caldwell, M., ‘From “Emergency” to “Independence”, 1948-1957’, in M. Amin and M. 
Caldwell (eds), Malaya: The Making of a Neo-Colony (Nottingham, 1977), pp. 216-65 
Carter, G.M., ‘The Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth’, Pacific Affairs 22 (1949), 
pp. 367-75 
Chakrabarty, D., ‘“In the Name of Politics” Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Multitude 
in India’, Economic and Political Weekly 40 (2005), pp. 3293-3301 
Chakravarty, S., ‘V.K. Krishna Menon’, Indian Horizons 45 (1998), pp. 45-51 
Chandavarkar, A., ‘Sir (Abraham) Jeremy Raisman, Finance Member, Government of 
India (1939-1945): Portrait of an Unsung Statesman Extraordinaire’, Economic and 
Political Weekly 36 (2001), pp. 2641-2655 
Chandra, B., ‘P.C. Joshi and the National Politics’, Studies in History 24 (2008), pp. 
245-264 
Charrier, P.J., ‘ASEAN’s Inheritance: The Regionalisation of Southeast Asia, 1941-61’, 
Pacific Review 14 (2001), pp. 313-338 
Chary, S., ‘Democracy, Security, and Development in India’, Journal of Asian Studies 
57 (1998), pp. 573-75 
 Bibliography 
 
312 
Chatterjee, P., ‘Empire and Nation Revisited: 50 Years After Bandung’, Inter-Asia 
Cultural Studies 6 (2005), pp. 487-496  
Chatterji, B., ‘Business and Politics in the 1930s: Lancashire and the Making of the 
Indo-British Trade Agreement, 1939’, Modern Asian Studies 15, Power, Profit and 
Politics: Essays on Imperialism, Nationalism and Change in Twentieth-Century India 
(1981), pp. 527-73 
Clarkson, S.H.E., ‘Yankee Imperialism and Indian Independence: Two Soviet 
Publications on India’, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 33 
(1967), pp. 298-303 
Clymer, K.J., ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis Johnson, India, and Anti-Colonialism: 
Another Look’, Pacific Historical Review 57 (1988), pp. 261-84 
———, ‘The United States and Development in the Third World: The Case of India’, 
Diplomatic History 16 (1992), pp. 643-47 
Cohen, J.B., ‘Problems of Economic Development in India’, Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 1 (1952), pp. 196-208  
———, ‘Economic Development in India’, Political Science Quarterly 3 (1953), pp. 
376-395  
Cohen, S.P., ‘Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army’, Pacific Affairs 36 
(1963-1964), pp. 411-29 
———, ‘The United States, India, and Pakistan: Retrospect and Prospect’, in S.S. 
Harrison, P.H. Kreisberg and D. Kux (eds), India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years 
(Cambridge, 1999), pp. 189-205 
Copland, I., ‘Lord Mountbatten and the Integration of the Indian States: A Reappraisal’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21 (1993), pp. 385-408 
Corfield, C., ‘Some Thoughts on British Policy and the Indian States, 1935-47’, in C.H. 
Philips and M.D. Wainwright (eds), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 
1935-1947 (London, 1970), pp. 527-534 
Crowl, S.E., ‘Indonesia’s Diplomatic Revolution Lining Up for Non-Alignment, 1945-
1955’, in C.E. Goscha and C.F. Ostermann (eds), Connecting Histories: Decolonisation 
and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 (Stanford, 2010), pp. 238-257 
Crozier, B., ‘The Struggle for the Third World’, International Affairs 40 (1964), pp. 440-
5 
Darwin, J., ‘Imperalism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy Between the 
Wars’, The Historical Journal 23 (1980), pp. 657-79 
———, ‘Diplomacy and Decolonisation’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 28 (1984), pp. 5-54 
 Bibliography 
 
313 
———, ‘Diplomacy and Decolonisation’, in K. Fedorowich and M. Thomas (eds), 
International Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat (London, 2001), pp. 5-24 
Das Gupta, A.K., ‘India’s Foreign Economic Policy’, India Quarterly 10 (1954), pp. 
215-225 
Dasgupta, J., ‘Community, Authenticity, and Autonomy: Insurgence and Institutional 
Development in India’s Northeast’, The Journal of Asian Studies 56 (1997), pp. 345-370 
Das, P.K., ‘The Reaction of the Commonwealth Nations’, International Studies 5 
(1963), pp. 64-69 
Dash, K.C., ‘The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Pacific 
Affairs 69 (1996), pp. 185-209 
Das Gupta, A., ‘South Asia and Superpower Competition 1954 to 1972’, Asian Affairs 
26 (2004), pp. 5-43 
Dasgupta, B., ‘World Oil, Development, and India’, Social Scientist 5 (1977), pp. 49-72  
Dasgupta, S. and S.P. Cohen, ‘Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?’ The 
Washington Quarterly 34 (2011), pp. 163-177 
Dastur, A.J., ‘India and Foreign Possessions in India’, in M.S. Rajan (ed.), India’s 
Foreign Relations During the Nehru Era: Some Studies (Bombay and New York, 1976), 
pp. 166-198 
Deery, P., ‘The Terminology of Terrorism: Malaya, 1948-52’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 34 (2003), pp. 213-47 
———, ‘Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War?’, Journal of Cold War Studies 9 
(2007), pp. 29-54 
Des Chene, M., ‘Soldiers, Sovereignty and Silences: Gorkhas as Diplomatic Currency’, 
South Asian Survey XIII (1993), pp. 67-80 
Dewey, C., ‘The Education of a Ruling Caste: The Indian Civil Service in the Era of 
Competitive Examination’, English Historical Review 88 (1973), pp. 262-285 
———, ‘The End of the Imperialism of Free Trade: The Eclipse of the Lancashire 
Lobby and the Concession of Fiscal Autonomy to India’, in C. Dewey and A.G. Hopkins 
(eds), The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India 
(London, 1978), pp. 35-67 
Dreisbach, K., ‘Between SEATO and ASEAN: The United States and the Regional 
Organisation of Southeast Asia’, in M. Frey, R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds), The 
Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives of Decolonisation (New 
York, 2003), pp. 240-256 
Dülffer, J., ‘The Impact of World War II on Decolonisation’, in M. Frey, R.W. Pruessen 
and T.T. Yong (eds), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives 
 Bibliography 
 
314 
of Decolonisation (New York, 2003), pp. 23-34 
Duncan, I., ‘The Politics of Liberalisation in Early Post-Independence India: Food 
Deregulation in 1947’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 33 (1995), 
pp. 25-45 
Edwardes, M., ‘Illusion and Reality in India’s Foreign Policy’, International Affairs 41 
(1965), pp. 48-58 
Efimova, L., ‘Did the Soviet Union Instruct Southeast Asian Communists to Revolt? 
New Russian Evidence on the Calcutta Youth Conference of February 1948’, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 40 (2009), pp. 449-69 
Elkins, C., ‘The Re-Assertion of the British Empire in Southeast Asia’, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History XXXIX (2009), pp. 361-85 
Feer, M.C., ‘India’s Himalayan Frontier’, Far Eastern Survey 22 (1953), pp. 137-141 
Fickett, L.P. Jr., ‘The Praja Socialist Party of India – 1952-1972: A Final Assessment’, 
Asian Survey 13 (1973), pp. 826-832 
Fieldhouse, D.K., ‘The Metropolitan Economics of Empire’, in J.M. Brown and Wm. R. 
Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, The Twentieth 
Century (Oxford, 1999), pp. 88-113 
Fifield, R.H., ‘Philippine Foreign Policy’, Far Eastern Survey 20 (1951), pp. 33-38 
Finkelstein, L.S., ‘US at Impasse in Southeast Asia’, Far Eastern Survey 19 (1950), pp. 
165-72 
Fitzsimons, M.A., ‘British Foreign Policy in Southern and Far Eastern Asia’, The 
Review of Politics 24 (1962), pp. 109-40 
Fontera, R.M., ‘Anti-Colonialism as a Basic Indian Foreign Policy’, Western Political 
Quarterly 13 (1960), pp. 421-32 
Frey, M., ‘Control, Legitimacy, and the Securing of Interests: European Development 
Policy in South-East Asia from the Late Colonial Period to the Early 1960s’, 
Contemporary European History 12 (2003), pp. 395-412 
———, ‘The Indonesian Revolution and the Fall of the Dutch Empire: Actors, Factors 
and Strategies’, in M. Frey, R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds), The Transformation of 
Southeast Asia: International Perspectives of Decolonisation (New York, 2003), pp. 83-
104  
Furedi, F., ‘Creating a Breathing Space: The Political Management of Colonial 
Emergencies’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21 (1993), pp. 89-106 
Gadgil, D.R., ‘The Economic Prospect for India’, Pacific Affairs 22 (1949), pp. 115-129 
Gaitskell, H., ‘The Sterling Area’, International Affairs 28 (1952), pp. 170-176 
 Bibliography 
 
315 
Gangal, S.C., ‘India and the Commonwealth’, International Studies 17 (1978), pp. 709-
717 
Ganguli, B.N., ‘India and the Commonwealth: Economic Relations’, in V. Grover (ed.), 
International Relations and Foreign Policy in India, Volume 5, Great Britain, 
Commonwealth and India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1992), pp. 378-398 
Ganguly, S., ‘From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil: The Army in 
Contemporary India’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 26 (1991), pp. 11-26 
———, ‘India: Policies, Past and Future’, in S.S. Harrison, P.H. Kreisberg and D. Kux 
(eds), India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 155-169 
Ganguly, S. and M.S. Pardesi, ‘Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign Policy’, India 
Review 8 (2009), pp. 4-19 
Gardner, R., ‘Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective’, in Wm. R. Louis and 
H. Bull (eds), The ‘Special Relationship’ Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford, 
1986), pp. 185-200 
Ginat, R., ‘India and the Palestine Question: The Emergence of the Asio-Arab Bloc and 
India’s Quest for Hegemony in the Post-Colonial World’, Middle Eastern Studies 40 
(2004), pp. 189-218 
Glynn, R., ‘“An Untouchable in the presence of Brahmins” Lord Wavell’s Disastrous 
Relationship with Whitehall During His Time as Viceroy to India, 1943-7’, Modern 
Asian Studies 41 (2007), pp. 639-663 
Goldsworthy, D., ‘Britain and the International Critics of British Colonialism, 1951-56’, 
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 29 (1991), pp. 1-24 
Gopal, S., ‘The Commonwealth: An Indian View: Bonds Which Must Not be 
Slackened’, Round Table 60 (1970), pp. 613-617 
Gopalachari, K., ‘The India-China Boundary Question’, International Studies 5 (1963), 
pp. 33-42 
Goscha, C.E and C.F. Ostermann, ‘Introduction: Connecting Decolonisation and the 
Cold War in Southeast Asia’, in idem. and C.F. Ostermann (eds), Connecting Histories: 
Decolonisation and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 (Stanford, 2010), pp. 1-
12   
Goswami, O., ‘The Bengal Famine of 1943: Re-Examining the Data’, Indian Economic 
and Social History Review 27 (1990), pp. 445-63 
Grajdanzev, A.J., ‘India’s Wartime Economic Difficulties’, Pacific Affairs 16 (1943), pp. 
189-205 
Gupta, A., ‘Almost a Jubilee? India, Britain and Empire’, Round Table 93 (2004), pp. 
609-612  
 Bibliography 
 
316 
Gupta, P.S., ‘British Strategic and Economic Priorities during the Negotiations for the 
Transfer of Power in South Asia, 1945-47’, Bangladesh Historical Studies 7 (1983), pp. 
39-51 
Gupta, S.K., ‘Stalin and India, 1947-47: From Cooperation to Hostility’, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 33 (1987), pp. 78-92 
Gurry, M., ‘Neither Threat Nor Promise: An Australian View of Australian-Indian 
Relations since 1947’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 13 (1990), pp. 85-101  
Hack, K., ‘Screwing Down the People: The Malayan Emergency, Decolonisation and 
Ethnicity’, in H. Antlov and S. Tønnesson (eds), Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian 
Nationalism, 1930-1957 (Surrey, 1995), pp. 83-109  
———, ‘“Iron Claws on Malaya”: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30 (1999), pp. 99-125 
———, ‘Theories and Approaches to British Decolonization in Southeast Asia’, in M. 
Frey, R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: 
International Perspectives of Decolonisation (New York, 2003), pp. 105-126 
———, ‘The Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948’, Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 40 (2009), pp. 471-96 
———, ‘Negotiating with the Malayan Communist Party, 1948-89’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 39 (2011), pp. 607-632 
——— and G. Wade, ‘The Origins of the Southeast Asian Cold War’, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 40 (2009), pp. 441-48 
Harris, J., ‘A Review of South Asian Studies’, Modern Asian Studies 22 (1988), pp. 43-
56 
Henderson, W., ‘The Development of Regionalism in Southeast Asia’, International 
Organisation 9 (1955), pp. 463-476 
Hess, G.R., ‘Global Expansion and Regional Balances: The Emerging Scholarship on 
United States Relations with India and Pakistan’, Pacific Historical Review 56 (1987), 
pp. 259-95 
Heston, A., ‘National Income’, in D. Kumar and M. Desai (eds), Cambridge Economic 
History of India: Volume II, c.1757-c.1970 (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 376-462  
Hewitt, V., ‘International Politics of South Asia’, in P. Brass (ed.), Routledge Handbook 
of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal (London, 
2010), pp. 399-418 
Hinds, A., ‘Sterling and Imperial Policy, 1945-1951’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History XV (1987), pp. 148-69   
———, ‘Imperial Policy and Colonial Sterling Balances, 1943-56’, Journal of Imperial 
 Bibliography 
 
317 
and Commonwealth History XIX (1991), pp. 24-44 
Hodson, H.V., ‘The Role of Lord Mountbatten’, in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright 
(eds), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947 (London, 1970), pp. 
117-126 
Hopkins, M.F., ‘Teaching and Research on the Cold War in the United Kingdom’, Cold 
War History 8 (2008), pp. 241-58 
Hopkins, A.G., ‘Imperial Connections’, in C. Dewey and idem. (eds), The Imperial 
Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India (London, 1978), pp. 1-20 
———, ‘Rethinking Decolonisation’, Past and Present 200 (2008), pp. 211-47 
Huei, P.Y., ‘The Four Faces of Bandung: Detainees, Soldiers, Revolutionaries and 
Statesmen’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 39 (2009), pp. 63-86 
Ilchman, W.F., ‘Political Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of India’, Journal 
of Commonwealth Political Studies 4 (1966), pp. 216-230 
———, ‘A Political Economy of Foreign Aid: The Case of India’, Asian Survey 7 
(1967), pp. 667-88 
Inder Singh, A., ‘Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India, 1946-1947’, 
International History Review 4 (1982), pp. 571-83 
———, ‘Decolonisation in India: The Statement of 20 February 1947’, International 
History Review 6 (1984), pp. 191-99 
———, ‘Economic Consequences of India's Position in the Commonwealth: The 
Official British Thinking 1949’, Indo-British Review 11 (1984), pp. 106-11 
———, ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 
1947-49’, Journal of Contemporary History 20 (1985), pp. 469-81 
———, ‘Post-Imperial Attitudes to India: The Military Aspect, 1947-51’, Round Table 
296 (1985), pp. 360-75 
———, ‘Britain, India and the Asian Cold War, 1949-1954’, in A. Deighton (ed.), 
Britain and the First Cold War (London, 1990), pp. 220-36 
———, ‘The Limits of ‘Super Power’: The United States and South Asia’, International 
History Review 14 (1992), pp. 98-108 
———, ‘India's Relations with Russia and Central Asia’, International Affairs 71 
(1995), pp. 69-81 
Islam, M.M., ‘The Great Bengal Famine and the Question of FAD Yet Again’, Modern 
Asian Studies 41 (2007), pp. 421–40 
Itty, A., ‘From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65’, 
 Bibliography 
 
318 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 46 (2008), pp. 195-219 
Jacobini, H.B., ‘Main Patterns of Philippine Foreign Policy’, The Review of Politics 23 
(1961), pp. 507-530 
Jalal, A., ‘Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue’, Modern Asian 
Studies 19 (1985), pp. 29-53 
———, ‘India’s Partition and the Defence of Pakistan: An Historical Perspective’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 15 (1987), pp. 289-310 
———, ‘Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold 
War, 1947-1955’, International History Review 11 (1989), pp. 409-33 
Jeffery, K., ‘The Second World War’, in J.M. Brown and Wm. R. Louis (eds), The 
Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), 
pp. 306-28 
Jennings, I., ‘Crown and Commonwealth in Asia’, International Affairs 32 (1956), pp. 
137-147 
Kahin, G.M., ‘The United States and the Anti-colonial revolutions in Southeast Asia, 
1945-50’, in Y. Nagai and A. Iriye (eds), The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo, 
1977), pp. 338-61 
Kalecki, M., ʻObservations on Social and Economic aspects of “Intermediate 
Regimes”ʼ, in J. Osiatynski (ed.), Collected Works of Michal Kalecki: Volume V: 
Developing Economies (Oxford, 1993), pp. 6-12 
Kauffman, K.M., ‘The Indian Economy: Some Recent History and Near Term 
Prospects’, Asian Survey 7 (1967), pp. 405-22 
Kaur, A., ‘Tappers and Weeders: South Indian Plantation Workers in Peninsular 
Malaysia, 1880-1970’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 21 (1998), pp. 73-102 
Kaushik, S.K., ‘India’s Evolving Economic Model: A Perspective on Economic and 
Financial Reforms’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 56 (1997), pp. 69-
84 
Keenleyside, T.A., ‘Prelude to Power: The Meaning of Non-Alignment before Indian 
Independence’, Pacific Affairs 53 (1980), pp. 461-83 
———, ‘The Inception of Indian Foreign Policy: The Non-Nehru Contribution’, South 
Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 4 (1981), pp. 63-78 
———, ‘Indian Attitudes Towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence 
Indian Foreign Policy’, Pacific Affairs 55 (1982), pp. 210-30 
———, ‘Nationalist India and the Issue of Commonwealth Membership’, Journal of 
Indian History 60 (1982), pp. 227-250 
 Bibliography 
 
319 
———, ‘The Indian Nationalist Movement and the League of Nations: Prologue to the 
United Nations’, India Quarterly 39 (1983), pp. 281-98 
Kent, J. and J.W. Young, ‘British Policy Overseas: The “Third Force” and the Origins of 
NATO- In Search of a new Perspective’, in B. Heuser and R. O'Neill (eds), Securing 
Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era (London, 1992), pp. 41-
61 
Khan, Y., ‘Performing Peace: Gandhi’s Assassination as a Critical Moment in the 
Consolidation of the Nehruvian State’, Modern Asian Studies 45 (2011), pp. 57-80 
Kirk-Greene, A., ‘Decolonization: The Ultimate diaspora’, Journal of Contemporary 
History 36 (2001), pp. 133-51 
Koebner, R., ‘The Concept of Economic Imperialism’, Economic History Review 2 
(1949), pp. 1-29 
Kolyhalova, C., ‘The Indian Road to Bandung’, in S. Bhushan (ed.), Twenty Years of 
Bandung and Problems of Peace and Security in Asia: A Collection of Articles (New 
Delhi, 1975), pp. 95-109 
Kondapi, C., ‘Indian Opinion of the United Nations’, International Organisation 5 
(1951), pp. 709-721 
Kreling, B., ‘India and the Commonwealth: A Symbiotic Relationship?’, Round Table 98 
(2009), pp. 49-66 
Krozewski, G., ‘Sterling, the “Minor” Territories, and the End of Formal Empire, 1939-
1958’, Economic History Review 46 (1993), pp. 239-265 
———, ‘Finance and Empire: The Dilemma Facing Great Britain in the 1950s’, The 
International History Review 18 (1996), pp. 48-69 
———, ‘Finance and Empire: A Note in Reply to Catherine R. Schenk’, International 
History Review 19 (1997), pp. 848-851 
Kudaisya, M., ‘“A Mighty Adventure” Institutionalising the Idea of Planning in Post-
Colonial India, 1947-60’, Modern Asian Studies 43 (2009), pp. 939-78 
Kumar, M., ‘Sino-Indian Relations 1950-59’, International Studies 5 (1963), pp. 21-32 
Kumarasingham, H., ‘The Indian Version of First Among Equals – Executive Power 
during the first Decade of Independence’, Modern Asian Studies 44 (2010), pp. 709-751 
Kuracina, W.F., ‘Sentiments and Patriotism: The Indian National Army, General 
Elections and the Congress’s Appropriation of the INA Legacy’, Modern Asian Studies 
44 (2010), pp. 817-856  
Kux, D., ‘America Meets India: Jawaharlal though the Eyes of US Officials’, in M.J. 
Zins and G. Boquerat (eds), India in the Mirror of Foreign Diplomatic Archives (New 
Delhi, 2004), pp. 33-54 
 Bibliography 
 
320 
Lal, D., ‘Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-64’, Economic and Political Weekly 2 (1967), pp. 
879-86 
Lal, H., ‘Foreign Economic Policy’, in J. Mohan (ed.), Twenty-Five Years of Indian 
Independence (New Delhi, 1973), pp. 87-94 
Lehmkuhl, U., ‘From Conflict to Cooperation: Anglo-American Diplomacy in Search of 
a Postwar Design for Asia and the Pacific, 1945-1953’, American Studies 38 (1993), pp. 
83-97 
Leng, S.C., ‘India and China’, Far Eastern Survey 21 (1952), pp. 73-78 
Levi, W., ‘Union in Asia’, Far Eastern Survey 20 (1950), pp. 144-149 
———, ‘India Debates Foreign Policy’, Far Eastern Survey 20 (1951), pp. 49-52 
———, ‘India's Political Parties’, Far Eastern Survey 20 (1951), pp. 169-72 
———, ‘Government and Politics in Nepal: I’, Far Eastern Survey 21 (1952), pp. 185-
91 
———, ‘Government and Politics in Nepal: II’, Far Eastern Survey 22 (1953), pp. 5-10 
———, ‘Nepal in World Politics’, Pacific Affairs 30 (1957), pp. 236-48 
———, ‘Indian Neutralism Reconsidered’, Pacific Affairs 37 (1964), pp. 137-47 
———, ‘Ideology, Interests and Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly 14 
(1970), pp. 1-31 
Lin, H-T., ‘Boundary, Sovereignty, and Imagination: Reconsidering the Frontier 
Disputes between British India and Republican China, 1914-47’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 32 (2004), pp. 25-47 
Lipton, M., ‘Neither Partnership nor Dependence: Pre-Decolonisation, Inertia, 
Diversification and Para-Protectionism in Indo-British Relations since 1947’, in W.H. 
Morris-Jones and G. Fischer (eds), Decolonisation and After: The British and French 
Experience (London, 1980), pp. 158-192 
———, ‘Growing Mountain, Shrinking Mouse? Indian Poverty and British Bilateral 
Aid’, Modern Asian Studies 30 (1996), pp. 481-522 
Lloyd, D.O., ‘Succession, Secession, and State Membership in the United Nations’, 
Journal of International Law and Politics 26 (1993-1994), pp. 761-796  
Louis, Wm. R., ‘American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire’, 
in idem. and H. Bull (eds), The ‘Special Relationship’ Anglo-American Relations Since 
1945 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 261-283 
——— and R. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonisation’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 22 (1994), pp. 462-511 
 Bibliography 
 
321 
———, ‘Hong Kong: The Critical Phase, 1945-1949’, The American Historical Review 
102 (1997), pp. 1052-1084 
———, ‘The Dissolution of the British Empire’, in J.M. Brown and idem. (eds), The 
Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), 
pp.  329-56 
Lowe, D., ‘Percy Spender and the Colombo Plan’, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History 40 (1994), pp. 162-76 
———, ‘Canberra’s Colombo Plan: Public Images of Australia’s Relations with Post-
Colonial South and Southeast Asia in the 1950s’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian 
Studies 25 (2002), pp. 183-204 
Lowe, P., ‘Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism, Communism, and British 
Policy, 1948-1955’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 15 (2004), pp. 137-147  
Lumby, E.W.R., ‘British Policy Towards the Indian States, 1940-7’, in C.H. Philips and 
M.D. Wainwright (eds), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947 
(London, 1970), pp. 95-103 
Mabon, D.W., ‘Elusive Agreements: The Pacific Pact Proposals of 1949-1951’, Pacific 
Historical Review 57 (1988), pp. 147-177 
Mackenzie, H., ‘An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth: Canadian Policy on 
the Question of India’s Membership, 1947-49’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 27 (1999), pp. 82-112 
Maitra, S.N., ‘A New Look at Foreign Policy’, Economic and Political Weekly 2 (1967), 
pp. 793-96 
Majumdar, A.K., ‘Writings on the Transfer of Power, 1945-1947’, in B.R. Nanda (ed.), 
Essays in Modern Indian History (New Delhi, 1980), pp. 182-222 
Malcolm Hause, E., ‘India: Noncommitted and Nonaligned’, Western Political 
Quarterly 13 (1960), pp. 70-82 
Mallavarapu, S., ‘Development of International Relations Theory in India: Traditions, 
Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories’, International Studies 46 (2009), pp. 165-
83 
Mansergh, N., ‘The Asian Conference’, International Affairs 23 (1947), pp. 295-306 
———, ‘The Commonwealth in Asia’, Pacific Affairs 23 (1950), pp. 3-20 
Mansingh, S., ‘Nehru and Non-Alignment’, in B.R. Nanda (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy: 
The Nehru Years (New Delhi, 1990), pp. 170-84 
Marshall, P.J., ‘The Transfer of Power in India: Lord Wavell and his Political Masters’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 5 (1977), pp. 331-334 
 Bibliography 
 
322 
Marshall, P., ‘Shaping the “New Commonwealth”, 1949’, Round Table 88 (1999), pp. 
185-197 
Mason, R., ‘Containment and Challenge of Non-Alignment: The Cold War and U.S. 
Policy toward Indonesia, 1950-1952’, in C.E. Goscha and C.F. Ostermann (eds), 
Connecting Histories: Decolonisation and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 
(Stanford, 2010), pp. 39-67 
Mathur, R., ‘The Delay in the Formation of the Reserve Bank of India: The India Office 
Perspective’, Indian Economic and Social History Review 25 (1988), pp. 133-169  
Maxwell, N., ‘China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute’, The China Quarterly 43 
(1970), pp. 47-80 
———, ‘Jawaharlal Nehru: Of Pride and Principle’, Foreign Affairs 52 (1974), pp. 633-
643 
McGarr, P.M., ‘“A Serious Menance to Security”: British Intelligence, V.K. Krishna 
Menon and the Indian High Commission in London, 1947-1952’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 38 (2010), pp. 441-69 
———, ‘After Nehru, What? Britain, the United States, and the Other Transfer of 
Power in India, 1960–64’, International History Review 33 (2011), pp. 115-142 
———, ‘“India’s Rasputin”?: V.K. Krishna Menon and Anglo-American 
Misperceptions of Indian Foreign Policymaking, 1947-1964’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 
22 (2011), pp. 239-260 
McIntyre, W.D., ‘The Strange Death of Dominion Status’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 27 (1999), pp. 193-212  
———, ‘“A Formula May have to be Found” Ireland, India and the Headship of the 
Commonwealth’, Round Table 365 (2002), pp. 391-413 
———, ‘The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933-59: Precursors of 
the Tri-Sector Commonwealth’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36 
(2008), pp. 591-614 
McKenzie, F., ‘Renegotiating a Special Relationship: The Commonwealth and Anglo-
American Economic Discussions, September-December 1945’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 26 (1998), pp. 71-93 
———, ‘In the National Interest: Dominions’ Support for Britain and the 
Commonwealth after the Second World War’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 34 (2006), pp. 553-576 
McMahon, R.J., ‘Food as a Diplomatic Weapon: The India Wheat Loan of 1951’, 
Pacific Historical Review 56 (1987), pp. 349-77 
———, ‘The Cold War in Asia: Toward a New Synthesis?’, Diplomatic History 12 
 Bibliography 
 
323 
(1988), pp. 307-27 
———, ‘The United States and Southeast Asia in an Era of Decolonisation, 1945-1965’, 
in M. Frey, R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: 
International Perspectives of Decolonisation (New York, 2003), pp. 213-225 
Mehra, P., ‘India, China and Tibet, 1950-54’, India Quarterly 12 (1956), pp. 3-22 
———, ‘India’s Border Dispute with China: Revisiting Nehru’s Approach’, 
International Studies 42 (2005), pp. 357-365 
Mehta, P.B., ‘Still Under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks 
in India’, India Review 8 (2009), pp. 209-233 
Mehrotra, S.R., ‘India and the Commonwealth’, in B.R. Nanda (ed.), Indian Foreign 
Policy: The Nehru Years (New Delhi and London, 1990), pp. 24-41 
Merrill, D., ‘Indo-American Relations, 1947–50: A Missed Opportunity in Asia’, 
Diplomatic History 11 (1987), pp. 203-26 
Metcalfe, A., ‘India's Foreign Relations Now and in the Future’, International Affairs 21 
(1945), pp. 485-96 
Millar, T.B., ‘The Commonwealth and the United Nations’, International Organization 
16 (1962), pp. 736-757 
Misra, K.P., ‘Succession of States: Pakistan’s Membership in the United Nations’, 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 3 (1965), pp. 281-289  
———, ‘International Relations Research in India’, Orbis 26 (1982), pp. 245-50 
Misra, M., ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and the Raj: British Policy in India between the 
World Wars’, in R.E. Dumett (ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: 
The New Debate on Empire (London, 1999), pp. 157-174  
Moore, R.J., ‘The Transfer of Power: An Historiographical Survey’, South Asia: Journal 
of South Asian Studies 9 (1986), pp. 83-95 
———, ‘India in the 1940s’, in R.W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British 
Empire: Volume V, Historiography (Oxford, 1999), pp. 231-242 
Morris-Jones, W.H., ‘India Under New Management, Business as Usual’, Asian Survey 
5 (1965), pp. 63-73 
———, ‘Shaping the Post-Imperial State: Nehru’s Letters to Chief Ministers’, in M. 
Twaddle (ed.), Imperialism, the State and the Third World (London, 1992), pp. 220-241 
Morrison, I., ‘The Communist Uprising in Malaya’, Far Eastern Survey 17 (1948), pp. 
281-286 
Mukherjee, A., ‘Indo-British Finance: The Controversy over India’s Sterling Balances, 
 Bibliography 
 
324 
1939-1947’, Studies in History 6 (1990), pp. 229-51 
Mukherjee, M., ‘“A World of Illusion”: The Legacy of Empire in India’s Foreign 
Relations, 1947-62’, International History Review 32 (2010), pp. 253-271 
Murray Hogben, W., ‘An Imperial Dilemma: The Reluctant Indianisation of the Indian 
Political Service’, Modern Asian Studies 15 (1981), pp. 751-769 
Nanda, B.R., ‘Nehru and the British’, Modern Asian Studies 30 (1996), pp. 469-79 
Narayanan, K.R., ‘Foreign Policy’, in J. Mohan (ed.), Twenty-Five Years of Indian 
Independence (New Delhi, 1973), pp. 74-86 
Newton, C.C.S., ‘The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall 
Plan’, Economic History Review 37 (1984), pp. 391-408 
———, ‘Britain, the Sterling Area and European Integration, 1945-50’, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 13 (1985), pp. 163-182 
Nichols, J.P., ‘United States Aid to South and Southeast Asia, 1950-1960’, Pacific 
Historical Review 32 (1963), pp. 171-84 
Norbu, D., ‘Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality’, Asian Survey 
37 (1997), pp. 1078-1095 
North, R.C., ‘The NEP and the New Democracy’, Pacific Affairs 24 (1951), pp. 52-60 
Oakman, D., ‘The Seed of Freedom: Regional Security and the Colombo Plan’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 46 (2000), pp. 67-85 
Olver, A.S.B., ‘The Special Commission in South-East Asia’, Pacific Affairs 21 (1948), 
pp. 285-91 
Onley, J., ‘The Raj Reconsidered: British India's Informal Empire and Spheres of 
Influence in Asia and Africa’, Asian Affairs 40 (2009), pp. 44-62 
Ovendale, R., ‘Britain, the United States, and the Cold War in South-East Asia, 1949-
1950’, International Affairs 58 (1982), pp. 447-64 
———, ‘Britain, the United States and the Recognition of Communist China’, The 
Historical Journal 26 (1983), pp. 139-158 
Palmer, N.D., ‘India's Foreign Policy’, Political Quarterly 33 (1962), pp. 391-403 
Pandit, V.L., ‘India's Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs 34 (1955/56), pp. 432-40 
Panikkar, K.M., ‘The Defence of India and Indo-British Obligations’, International 
Affairs 22 (1946), pp. 85-90 
Pardesi, G., ‘Foreign Policy of Developing Countries’, Social Scientist 4 (1976), pp. 17-
37 
 Bibliography 
 
325 
Park, R.L., ‘India’s General Elections’, Far Eastern Survey 21 (1952), pp. 1-8 
Patil, S.S., ‘India's China Policy in the 1950s: Threat perceptions and Balances’, South 
Asian Survey 14 (2007), pp. 283-301 
Pavadya, B.S., ‘Notes and Memoranda: Mr. Nehru, the Indian National Congress and 
India's Membership in the Commonwealth’, International Studies 4 (1962), pp. 298-311 
———, ‘Nehru, The Indian National Congress and India’s Membership in the 
Commonwealth’, in V.T. Patil (ed.), Studies on Nehru (London, 1987), pp. 367-386 
Peden, G.C., ‘The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment 
Reconsidered’, The Historical Journal 27 (1984), pp. 405-23 
———, ‘Economic Aspects of British Perceptions of Power on the Eve of the Cold 
War’, in J. Becker and F. Knipping (eds), Power in Europe: Great Britain, France, Italy 
and Germany in a Post War World, 1945-60 (Berlin, 1986), pp. 237-62 
Poeze, H.A., ‘The Cold War in Indonesia, 1948’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40 
(2009), pp. 497-517 
Potter, D.C., ‘Manpower Shortage and the End of Colonialism: The Case of the Indian 
Civil Service’, Modern Asian Studies 7 (1973), pp. 47-73 
Poulose, .T.T., ‘India as an Anomalous International Person (1919-1947)’, British 
Yearbook of International Law 44 (1970), pp. 201-212 
Prasad, B., ‘Nehru and the New Commonwealth’, India Quarterly 34 (1983), pp. 432-
446  
——— , ‘Nehru and the Commonwealth’, in V. Grover (ed.), International Relations 
and Foreign Policy in India, Volume 5, Great Britain, Commonwealth and India’s 
Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1992), pp. 242-259 
Rajan, M.S., ‘India and the Commonwealth’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 
12 (1966), pp. 229-240 
Rana, A.P., ‘The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Non-Alignment’, Journal of Asian 
Studies 28 (1969), pp. 299-312 
Rao, V.D., ‘The Background of India's Foreign Policy’, Quarterly Review of Historical 
Studies (1964), pp. 207-19 
Rao, V.K.R.V., ‘India’s First Five-Year Plan – A Descriptive Analysis’, Pacific Affairs 
25 (1952), pp. 3-23 
Remme, T., ‘Britain, the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, and Regional Co-operation 
in South-East Asia’, in A. Gorst, L. Johnman and W. Scott Lucas (eds), Post-War 
Britain, 1945-64: Themes and Perspectives (London, 1989), pp. 109-134 
Reynolds, D., ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order 
 Bibliography 
 
326 
since the Second World War’, International Affairs 62 (1985-86), pp. 1-20 
———, ‘Rethinking Anglo-American Relations’, International Affairs 65 (1988-89), 
pp. 89-111 
Riggs, F.W., ‘Tibet in Extremis’, Far Eastern Survey 19 (1950), pp. 224-230 
Rivers, W.F., ‘The Position of Foreign Business in India Today’, Pacific Affairs 28 
(1955), pp. 26-40 
Rizvi, G., ‘Transfer of Power in India: A ‘re-statement’ of an Alternative Approach’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 12 (1984), pp. 127-144 
Robinson, R., ‘Imperial Theory and the Question of Imperialism after Empire’, Journal 
of Imperial Commonwealth History 12 (1984), pp. 42-54 
Rooth, T., ‘Economic Tensions and Conflict in the Commonwealth, 1945-c.1951’, 
Twentieth Century British History 13 (2002), pp. 121-143 
Rosinger, L.K., ‘India in World Politics’, Far Eastern Survey 18 (1949), pp. 229-33 
Rotter, A.J., ‘The Triangular Route to Vietnam: The United States, Great Britain and 
South East Asia 1945-50’, International History Review 6 (1984), pp. 404-26 
———, ‘Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947-
1964’, Journal of American History 81 (1994), pp. 518-542 
Roy, T., ‘Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Links’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16 (2002), pp. 109-30 
Roy, W.T., ‘India and the Commonwealth: A Study in Parliamentary Opinion’, in V. 
Grover (ed.), International Relations and Foreign Policy in India, Volume 5, Great 
Britain, Commonwealth and India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1992), pp. 260-272 
Rubin, E.S., ‘America, Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian 
Independence, 1939-1945’, India Review 10 (2011), pp. 40-80 
Sacks, M., ‘The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia’, Pacific Affairs 23 (1950), 
pp. 227-247 
Saint Brides, L., ‘Britain, the United States and South Asia’, in Wm. R. Louis and H. 
Bull (eds), The ʻSpecialʼ Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford, 
1986), pp. 295-309 
SarDesai, D.R., ‘India and South-East Asia’, in B.R. Nanda (ed.), Indian Foreign 
Policy: The Nehru Years (New Delhi and London, 1990), pp. 78-101 
Sathe, R.D., ‘Non-Alignment: Response to Historical System’, in K.P. Misra (ed.), Non-
Alignment and Neutrality: Proceedings of the Indo-Austrian Seminar (New Delhi, 
1982), pp. 1-8 
 Bibliography 
 
327 
Satyanarayana, A., ‘“Birds of Passage” Migration of South Indian Labourers to 
Southeast Asia’, Critical Asian Studies 34 (2002), pp. 89-115 
Schenk, C., ‘Finance and Empire: Confusions and Complexities’, International History 
Review 28 (1996), pp. 869-872 
Shannon, H.A., ‘The Sterling Balances of the Sterling Area, 1939-49’, The Economic 
Journal 60 (1950), pp. 531-551 
Shaw, T., ‘The Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office and the 
Korean War, 1950-53’, Journal of Contemporary History 34 (1999), pp. 263-81 
Sherman, T.C., ‘The Integration of the Princely State of Hyderabad and the Making of 
the Postcolonial State in India, 1948-56’, Indian Economic and Social History Review 
44 (2007), pp. 489-515 
Sherman, T.C., W. Gould and S. Ansari, ‘From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the 
Everyday State in India and Pakistan’, Modern Asian Studies 45 (2011), pp. 1-6 
Shlomowitz, R. and L. Brennan, ‘Mortality and Indian Labour in Malaya, 1877-1933’, 
Indian Economic and Social History Review 29 (1992), pp. 57-75 
Singer, H.W., ‘India’s Five-Year Plan: A Modest Proposal’, Far Eastern Survey 21 
(1952), pp. 97-101 
Singh, S., ‘From Delhi to Bandung: Nehru “Indian-ness” and “Pan-Asian-ness”’, South 
Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 34 (2011), pp. 51-64 
Singh, S.C., ‘America, India and the Commonwealth’, in V. Grover (ed.), International 
Relations and Foreign Policy in India, Volume 5, Great Britain, Commonwealth and 
India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1992), pp. 285-308 
Singh, V., ‘India, Pakistan, and South-East Asia’, International Studies 8 (1966), pp. 
167-176 
Smith, S.C., ‘Conflicting Commitments: Britain and the Portuguese Possessions in 
India, 1847-1961’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 20 (1997), pp. 17-34 
Solidum, E.D., ‘Regional Co-operation and ASEAN: The Philippine Experience’, Asian 
Journal of Political Science 5 (1997), pp. 52-67 
Soward, F.H., ‘The Korean Crisis and the Commonwealth’, Pacific Affairs 24 (1951), 
pp. 115-130 
Spear, P., ‘From Colonial to Sovereign Status: Some Problems of Transition with 
Special Reference to India’, Journal of Asian Studies 17 (1958), pp. 567-577 
Spender, P., ‘Partnership with Asia’, Foreign Affairs 29 (1950/51), pp. 205-218 
Srikanth, H. and C.J. Thomas, ‘Naga Resistance Movement and the Peace Process in 
Northeast India’, Peace and Democracy in South Asia 1 (2005), pp. 57-87 
 Bibliography 
 
328 
Springhall, J., ‘“Kicking out the Vietminh”: How Britain Allowed France to Reoccupy 
South Indo-China, 1945-46’, Journal of Contemporary History 40 (2005), pp. 115-130 
Srinivasan, K., ‘The Commonwealth, India and Lost Opportunities in South Asia’, Asian 
Affairs 32 (2001), pp. 131-41 
———, ‘Nobody's Commonwealth? The Commonwealth in Britain's Post-Imperial 
Adjustment’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 44 (2006), pp. 257-69 
Stockwell, A.J., ‘Colonial Planning During World War II: The Case of Malaya’, Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 2 (1974), pp. 333-351 
———, ‘The Historiography of Malaysia: Recent Writings in English on the History of 
the Area Since 1874’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 5 (1976), pp. 82-
110  
———, ‘British Imperial Policy and Decolonisation in Malaya, 1942-52’, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 13 (1984), pp. 68-87 
———, ‘Insurgency and Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 25 (1987), pp. 71-81 
———, ‘“A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya”? 
The Origins of the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 21 (1993), pp. 66-88 
———, ‘Malaysia: The Making of a Neo-Colony?’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 26 (1998), pp. 138-56 
———, ‘Imperialism and Nationalism in South-East Asia’, in J.M. Brown and Wm. R. 
Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, The Twentieth 
Century (Oxford, 1999), pp. 465-79 
———, ‘Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of European Colonial Empires’, in 
N. Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume Four: From World 
War II to the Present (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 1-57 
———, ‘The United States and Britain's Decolonisation of Malaya, 1942-57’, in D. 
Ryan and V. Pungong (eds), The United States and Decolonisation: Power and Freedom 
(London, 2000), pp. 188-206 
———, ‘British Decolonisation: The Record and the Records’, Contemporary 
European History 15 (2006), pp. 573-83 
Strange, S., ‘A New Look at Trade and Aid’, International Affairs 42 (1966), pp. 61-73 
Subritzky, J., ‘Britain, Konfrontasi, and the End of Empire in Southeast Asia, 1961-65’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28 (2000), pp. 209-227 
Talbot, I., ‘Planning for Pakistan: The Planning Committee of the All-India Muslim 
League, 1943-46’, Modern Asian Studies 28 (1994), pp. 875-889 
 Bibliography 
 
329 
Tang, J.T.H., ‘From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat: Britain’s Postwar China Policy 
and the Decolonisation of Hong Kong’, Modern Asian Studies 28 (1994), pp. 317-337 
Tarling, N., ‘The United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo Plan’, The Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 24 (1986), pp. 3-34 
———, ‘“Some Rather Nebulous Capacity”: Lord Killearn's Appointment in Southeast 
Asia’, Modern Asian Studies 20 (1986), pp. 559-600 
———, ‘The British Empire in South-East Asia’, in R.W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford 
History of the British Empire: Volume V, Historiography (Oxford, 1999), pp. 403-15 
———, ‘British Attitudes and Policies on Nationalism and Regionalism’, in M. Frey, 
R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International 
Perspectives of Decolonisation (New York, 2003), pp. 127-141 
Thakur, R., ‘India’s Vietnam Policy, 1946-1979’, Asian Survey 19 (1979), pp. 957-976 
———, ‘India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Fiji’, Asian Survey 25 (1985), pp. 
356-370 
Thomas, M., ‘Processing Decolonisation: British Strategic Analysis of Conflict in 
Vietnam and Indonesia, 1945-1950’, in C.E. Goscha and C.F. Ostermann (eds), 
Connecting Histories: Decolonisation and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 
(Stanford, 2010), pp. 84-120 
Thompson, V. and R. Adloff, ‘Asian Unity: Force of Façade’, Far Eastern Survey 16 
(1947), pp. 97-99 
Thorne, C., ‘Chatham House, Whitehall, and Far Eastern Issues: 1941-45’ International 
Affairs 54 (1978), pp. 1-29 
Tinker, H., ‘The Contraction of Empire in Asia, 1945-48: The Military Dimension’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 16 (1988), pp. 218-233 
Tomlinson, B.R., ‘Foreign Private Investment in India 1920-1950’, Modern Asian 
Studies 12 (1978), pp. 655-677 
———, ‘Colonial Firms and the Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 1914-47’, 
Modern Asian Studies 15 Power, Profits and Politics: Essays on Imperialism, 
Nationalism and Change in Twentieth-Century India, (1981), pp. 455-486 
———, ‘The Political Economy of the Raj: The Decline of Colonialism’, The Journal 
of Economic History 42 (1982), pp. 133-37 
———, ‘Indo-British Relations in the Post-Colonial Era: The Sterling Balances 
Negotiations, 1947-49’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 12 (1985), pp. 
142-62 
———, ‘The Historical Roots of Indian Poverty: Issues in the Economic and Social 
History of Modern South Asia: 1880-1960’, Modern Asian Studies 22 (1988), pp. 123-
 Bibliography 
 
330 
40 
———, ‘Imperial Power and Foreign Trade: Britain and India, 1900-1970’, in P. 
Mathias and J. Davis (eds), The Nature of Industrialisation, Volume V, International 
Trade and British Economic Growth from the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day 
(Oxford, 1996), pp. 146-62 
 ———, ‘Imperialism and After: The Economy of The Empire on the Periphery’, in 
J.M. Brown and Wm. R. Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume 
IV, The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), pp. 357-378 
Tomlinson, J., ‘The Attlee Government and the Balance of Payments, 1945-51’, 
Twentieth Century British History 2 (1991), pp. 47-66 
Toye, J., ‘Political Economy and the Analysis of Indian Development’, Modern Asian 
Studies 22 (1988), pp. 97-122 
Toye, R., ‘The Labour Party’s External Economic Policy in the 1940s’, The Historical 
Journal 43 (2000), pp. 189-215 
Trager, F.N., ‘Burma’s Foreign Policy, 1948-56: Neutralism, Third Force, and Rice’, 
Journal of Asian Studies 16 (1956), pp. 89-102 
Turnbull, C.M., ‘British Planning for Post-War Malaya’, Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 5 (1974), pp. 239-254 
Twitchett, K.J., ‘Colonialism: An attempt at understanding Imperial, Colonial, and Neo-
Colonial Relationships’, Political Studies 13 (1965), pp. 300-23 
Tyson, G., ‘Foreign Investment in India’, International Affairs 31 (1955), pp. 174-181 
Tze Ken, D.W., ‘Malaysia during the early Cold War Era: The War in Indochina and 
Malaya, 1946-1963’, in C.E. Goscha and C.F. Ostermann (eds), Connecting Histories: 
Decolonisation and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 (Stanford, 2010), pp. 
258-274  
Venkatarangaiya, M., ‘Some Recent Developments in Asia, 1946-1952 - Political’, India 
Quarterly (April-June, 1952), pp. 109-135 
Vorys, K. von., ‘Some Political Incentives for Economic Development in India, 
Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon’, The Western Political Quarterly 12 (1959), pp. 1057-
1074 
Wade, G., ‘The Beginnings of a “Cold War” in Southeast Asia: British and Australian 
Perspectives’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40 (2009), pp. 543-65 
Watnick, M., ‘The Appeal of Communism to the Peoples of Underdeveloped Areas’, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 1 (1952), pp. 22-36 
Watt, D.C., ‘Britain and the Cold War in the Far East, 1945-58’, in Y. Nagai and A. Iriye 
(eds), The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo, 1977), pp. 89-122 
 Bibliography 
 
331 
Weiler, P., ‘British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labour 
Governments, 1945-51’, Journal of British Studies 26 (1987), pp. 54-82 
Ward, B., ‘India and the West’, International Affairs 37 (1961), pp. 440-51 
White, N.J., ‘Government and Business Divided: Malaya, 1945-57’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 22 (1994), pp. 251-274 
———, ‘Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan 
Emergency, 1948-57’, Modern Asian Studies 32 (1998), pp. 149-77 
———, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and Empire in the Twentieth Century: The Forgotten 
Case of Malaya, 1914-1965’, in R.E. Dumett (ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism and British 
Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire (Harlow, 1999), pp. 175-95 
———, ‘The Business and the Politics of Decolonization: The British Experience in the 
Twentieth Century’, Economic History Review 53 (2000), pp. 544-64 
Williams, J.E., ‘The Colombo Conference and Communist Insurgency in South and 
South-East Asia’, International Relations 94 (1972), pp. 94-107 
Wint, G., ‘The Aftermath of Imperialism’, Pacific Affairs 22 (1949), pp. 63-70 
Wolf, W.C., ‘“To Secure a Convenience”: Britain Recognizes China – 1950’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 18 (1983), pp. 299-326 
Wright, K.M., ‘Dollar Pool in the Sterling Area, 1939-1952’, The American Economic 
Review 44 (1954), pp. 559-76 
Xiang, L., ‘The Recognition Controversy: Anglo-American Relations in China, 1949’, 
Journal of Contemporary History 27 (1992), pp. 319-343 
Xu, G., ‘The United States and the Tibet Issue’, Asian Survey 37 (1997), pp. 1062-1077 
Yoshihiko, T., ‘The Cominform and Southeast Asia’, in Y. Nagai and A. Iriye (eds), The 
Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo, 1977), pp. 362-78 
Zachariah, B., ‘Imperial Economic Policy for India, 1942-44: Confusion and 
Readjustment’, in B. Pati (ed.), Turbulent Times, India, 1940-4 (Mumbai, 1998), pp. 
185-213 
———, ‘Rewriting Imperial Mythologies: The Strange Case of Penderel Moon’, South 
Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 24 (2001), pp. 53-72 
———, ‘The Creativity of Destruction: Wartime Imaginings of Development and Social 
Policy, c.1942-1946’, in H. Liebau, K. Bromber, K. Lange, D. Hamzah and R. 
Ahuja (eds.), The World in the World Wars (Leiden, 2010), pp. 547-578 
Zinkin, M., ‘The Commonwealth and Britain East of Suez’, International Affairs 42 
(1966), pp. 207-18 
 Bibliography 
 
332 
Zinkin, T., ‘Indian Foreign Policy: An Interpretation of Attitudes’, World Politics 7 
(1955), pp. 179-208 
Zins, M.J., ‘British Perceptions of India's External Policy, 1947-1953’, International 
Studies Bombay 24 (1987), pp. 25-44 
———, ‘Introduction’, in M.J. Zins and G. Boquerat (eds), India in the Mirror of 
Foreign Diplomatic Archives (New Delhi 2004), pp. 7-10 
Ziring, L., ‘Pakistan and India - Politics, Personalities, and Foreign-Policy’, Asian 
Survey 18 (1978), pp. 706-30 
Unpublished Theses 
Adams, E.J., ‘Commonwealth Collaboration in Foreign Affairs, 1939-1947: The British 
Perspective’, PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 1981 
Aikman, C.C., ‘The British Commonwealth and the United Nations’, PhD thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1948 
Anstey, C., ‘Foreign Office Efforts to Influence American Opinion 1945-49, PhD thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1984 
Charrier, P.J., ‘Britain, India and the Genesis of the Colombo Plan, 1945-51’, PhD 
thesis, University of Cambridge, 1995 
Dali, A.M., ‘The Fifth Column in British India: Japan and the INA’s Secret Weapon, 
1941-1945’, PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, 2007 
Fernando, J.M., ‘The Emergence of the Alliance and the Making of Malaya’s 
Independence Constitution, 1948-1957’, PhD thesis, Royal Holloway, University of 
London, 1995 
Foley, M., ‘Post-Colonial Transition, Aid and the Cold War in South-East Asia: Britain, 
the United States and Burma, 1948-62’, PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2007 
Kember, J.L., ‘India in the British Commonwealth: The Problem of Diplomatic 
Representation, 1917-1947’, PhD thesis, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1976 
Keenleyside, T.A., ‘Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: A Study of Indian Nationalist 
Attitudes to Foreign Affairs, 1927-1939’, PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, 1966 
Lall, M.-C., ‘India's Relationship with Non-Resident Indians, 1947-1996: A Missed 
Opportunity?’, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1999 
McGarr, P.M., ‘Anglo-American Relations with South Asia under the Kennedy and 
Macmillan Governments, 1961-63’ PhD thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 
2008 
Newton, C.C.S., ‘Britain, the Dollar Shortage, and European Integration, 1945-1950’, 
 Bibliography 
 
333 
PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 1981 
Norman, N., ‘Swinging the Club: Relations Between the United States and the British 
Commonwealth in the Economic Transition from War to Peace, 1943-48’, PhD thesis, 
University of London, 1994 
Pullin, E.D., ‘“Noise and Flutter”: India, Propaganda, and Global Conflict 1942-63’, 
PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2009 
Roadnight, A., ‘The Greatest Prize in Southeast Asia: United States’ Policy Towards 
Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years’, PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 
1998  
Shiwcharan, C.T., ‘Indians in British Guiana, 1919-1929: A Study in Effort and 
Achievement’, PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 1990 
Sharma, V.B.L., ‘Strategic Aspects of India’s Foreign Policy’, PhD thesis, University of 
London, 1958 
Wainwright, A.M, ‘The Role of South Asia in British Strategic Policy, 1939-50’, PhD 
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1989 
Working Papers, Conference Papers and Online Reviews 
Samarani, G., ‘Shaping the Future of Asia: Chiang Kai-Shek, Nehru and China India 
Relations During the Second World War Period’, Working Paper, No 11 (2005), Centre 
for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden accessed on 12/1/2012 
at 
http://www.lu.se/images/Syd_och_sydostasienstudier/working_papers/Samarani.pdf 
‘Karl Hack on Philip Deery’ in  
http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/Hack-Deery.pdf  accessed on 21/2/2011 
Tomlinson, B.R., ‘“The Weapons of the Weakened”: British Power, Sterling Balances 
and the Origins of the Colombo Plan’, in The Formation of the New International Order 
in Asia and the International Aid Plan Conference, Tokyo, 2009 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
Bond, B., ‘Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre (1884–1981)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30774, accessed 2 Aug 2011] 
Brass, P.R., ‘Patel, Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai (1875/6–1950)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35403, accessed 2 March 2010] 
Caroe, O., ‘Bajpai, Sir Girja Shankar (1891–1954)’, rev. B.R. Nanda, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
 Bibliography 
 
334 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30544, accessed 3 Jan 2010] 
Deighton, A., ‘Strang, William, first Baron Strang (1893–1978)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31729, accessed 16 Feb 2010] 
Fergusson, B. and J.M. Brown, ‘Wavell, Archibald Percival, first Earl Wavell (1883–
1950)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36790, accessed 4 Aug 2011] 
Gordon, L.A., ‘Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/47756, accessed 10 March 2010] 
Harrison, B., ‘Lawrence, Frederick William Pethick-, Baron Pethick-Lawrence (1871–
1961)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35491, accessed 2 Aug 2011] 
Ireland, G., ‘Hare, William Francis, fifth earl of Listowel (1906–1997)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/65196, accessed 2 Aug 2011] 
Lavin, D., ‘Amery, Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett (1873–1955)’, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30401, accessed 4 Aug 2011] 
Prior, K., ‘Menon, (Vengalil Krishnan) Krishna (1896–1974)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31437, accessed 27 Feb 2010] 
———, ‘Caroe, Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick Kruuse (1892–1981)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30901, accessed 5 Sept 2011] 
Taylor, D., ‘Pandit, Vijayalakshmi (1900–1990)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/47741, accessed 4 June 2012] 
Theakston, K., ‘Brook, Norman Craven, Baron Normanbrook (1902–1967)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32089, accessed 12 Jan 2012] 
Ziegler, P., ‘Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas, first Earl Mountbatten 
of Burma (1900–1979)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31480, accessed 4 Aug 2011] 
